Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sat Aug 17, 2024 11:26 am

Faith in the story
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/17/2024

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The revelations published this week by several Western media outlets in both Germany and the United States about what happened on September 26, 2022, on the gas pipeline linking Russia to its main European client should have put some pressure on the governments whose actions have been called into question. This week, both Berlin and kyiv have had to read publications in which their position is seriously undermined. In the case of Germany, supposedly warned about the existing risks of an attack on Nord Stream, its silence over the past two years continues in the face of the German government's inability to defend its critical infrastructure and respond to the virtual certainty that an ally has attacked its interests. The weakness of someone who has not even been able to respond to the revelations and continues to supply weapons to the country where the plot was hatched has been exposed, and is doing so by acquiring material where it knew about it and did not do enough to prevent it from being carried out. Yesterday, the United States authorized the sale of Patriot systems to Germany, which is seeking to replenish its stocks after having donated part of its possession to Ukraine.

Although slightly nuanced in the body, an article published by Frankfurter Allgemeine , one of the country’s main media outlets, opens by stating that “if true, it can be considered a permissible defensive action. Ukraine must effectively defend itself against Russia.” In fact, the reaction of the liberal establishment can be summed up in that idea. A tweet by the former liberal Spanish MEP Luis Garicano, a professor at the prestigious London School of Economics, sums it up perfectly: “Ukraine’s destruction of Nord-Stream 2 is totally justified. The country is fighting for its existence! Europe should have more guts and understand what is at stake. And Germany has to drop this ridiculous criminal procedure. It is outrageous,” he wrote, later adding that Nord Stream should never have existed. That is also the position of Ukraine and possibly of the rest of the countries of the European Union, which en masse have remained silent in the face of the reality that an ally has attacked and destroyed vital infrastructure of one of the member countries.

Scholz's weakness in being unable to react to the events has gone completely unnoticed by the press, which has also refused to focus on the position in which the revelations of The Wall Street Journal leave Volodymyr Zelensky and Valery Zaluzhny, now Ukraine's ambassador to the United Kingdom, a diplomatic post of the highest level. Sometimes, the reactions of the affected countries are as important as the information revealed by the media. This week, it has been seen that, despite being singled out even by friendly press, Volodymyr Zelensky has not felt the need to give any explanation or to qualify the information published. According to the American media, the Ukrainian president would have quickly approved a plot to destroy the gas pipeline and would have only withdrawn his support for the operation after receiving a reprimand from American intelligence. Regardless of whether the Ukrainian president followed Washington's orders and gave the order to cancel the operation or whether, on the contrary, he decided to bite the hand that feeds him - Germany, Ukraine's second largest supplier - against the wishes of his main sponsor, the reality is that Zelensky has been singled out. However, the widespread Western willingness to justify any Ukrainian occurrence and to cheer any action as heroic and justified has prevented the debate from focusing on the fact that the attack was not only on an enemy, Russia, but also on an ally, Germany.

This position, unanimous in the European media, which these days focus on reproaching Berlin for the slow abandonment of Russian energy or prefer to refer to Ukrainian self-defence, forgetting that the attack was also against Germany, contrasts with that of the first days after the attacks. The speed with which Ukraine's alleged action has been justified is proportional to that produced in September 2022 when an enormous number of arguments pointed to Moscow's hand. Only a few hours had passed since the explosions were confirmed when Bloomberg published an article condemning the acts and explaining them by looking at Russia's attempt to involve NATO in the war. Russia had not only attacked itself, but it did so to achieve something that it has made clear it wants to avoid: confronting the Alliance on the battlefield.

“We, the Allies, have committed to prepare, deter and defend against coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors,” read the statement by Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, in those early moments, suggesting that there could be a collective response to an enemy attack. That rhetoric has completely disappeared now that the prime suspect has turned out to be not only an ally, but a proxy that needs to continue to be supplied with weapons. “Any deliberate attack against the Alliance’s critical infrastructure will be met with a united and determined response,” the allied countries added, evoking the language used by the European Union in response to the gas leaks in the Baltic Sea but giving it a new dimension as it is a military organisation,” wrote the Brussels correspondent of La Vanguardia on 29 September , a newspaper whose deputy director stated three days later that “No one has, at the moment, irrefutable data to point to Russia as the author of the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines. However, the action fits with its current tactical interests.”

On May 6, 2023, when time was enough to understand that no evidence of the long-awaited Russian plot was going to be found , Enric Juliana, a convinced believer in the cause that Russia is always guilty, stated that “Scandinavian televisions point to the presence of Russian ships in the sabotage area before it occurred.” Now, from that same medium, those who believed in the conspiracy theory that Russia had attacked itself hide their credulity without the need for any evidence pointing to Moscow by accusing those who wanted to believe another theory, that of Hersh, which also lacked them. “But then the thing about the Madelman divers brought from Panama by the CIA was an INVENTION by the liar Seymour Hersh? They prick me and I don’t bleed,” wrote Pedro Vallín, who before the publication of the veteran journalist wrote that “the information, if it were well done, would cause an international scandal. But since it is a botch, it is podcast fodder.” Hersh, whose contacts on the Russia-Ukraine issue are notoriously weak, had only one source, hence the insults and jeers from journalists who did not need any. The Wall Street Journal article , which compiled the data that had already been leaked and which had numerous sources, did not cause any scandal. The need to continue supporting an ally makes any real political reaction to the sabotage impossible.

“The Nord-Stream 1 gas leak is nothing more than a terrorist attack planned by Russia in its aggression against the European Union,” wrote Mikhail Podolyak on September 27, 2022, when the trend of accusing Moscow made the explosions a terrorist attack. Russia wanted to “destabilize the economic situation in Europe,” for which “the only answer: tanks for Ukraine.” Kiev was asking for armored vehicles from the country that had been attacked by a plot supposedly approved by its president. “Moscow officially offered Europe to supply gas through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline , Putin’s personal project,” he added on October 5 of that year. “‘They didn’t want to agree on good terms, so there they are,’ the Russians say, de facto . Is there any doubt about who sabotaged the Baltic Sea?” he argued using a reasoning that he himself had invented. However, at that time, the Russian track was still the official version that was not questioned by either political authorities or Western media. The conspiracy theory was then that Russia had not attacked itself. But even when the Russian hand became the Ukrainian hand , the media-savvy adviser to the Office of the President stood his ground. “Although I enjoy compiling entertaining conspiracy theories about the Ukrainian government, I have to say: Ukraine has nothing to do with the disaster in the Baltic Sea and has no information about pro -Ukrainian groups . What happened to the Nord Stream pipelines? They sank , as they say in the Russian Federation itself,” he said, again inventing an argument that Russia had not made. His statements have been cited in the media as official communications from the Office of the President without questioning their credibility.

The moral of the story of the attacks on Nord Stream is the will to believe what is most convenient at any given moment, even if it comes from voices that have stood out in the past for using lies for their own benefit. Those who responded quickly by pointing the finger at their enemy and accusing them of committing an act of terrorism, an unjustified attack, ecocide or irresponsibility are now silent or are defending the act as a lesser evil, a necessary evil or even a wake-up call to an ally whom they reproach for opening up to countries beyond their inner circle. To believe, you don't need proof, journalistic sources or a minimally credible story, but faith. And when the facts turn against you, the conspiracy theory is exposed and the culprit turns out to be a friend and not an enemy; all you need to do is join the official story of downplaying the attack, insulting those who held a contrary position, ignoring reality or simply denying it.

It should come as no surprise that the Ukrainian government has opted for the latter option. “Such an act could only have been committed with vast technical and financial resources… and who had all that at the time of the explosion? Only Russia,” said Podolyak after the publication of the Wall Street Journal article , which is based on the fact that vast resources were not needed to destroy the pipeline. Without any arguments to support it, Ukraine seems to have chosen to stick to a conspiracy theory that no one believes in anymore, but which has always been, and seems to continue to be, the Ukrainian narrative. For the moment, the narrative has been enough for Ukraine to maintain Western support for a vision of the war that presents the conflict as a struggle between absolute good and evil.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/17/30389/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad

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Rybar : Massive combined raid of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Crimea

A week after the last massive raid on the border and rear regions, Crimea was again subjected to a combined attack. The raid also used ATACMS OTRK .

According to available information, the missiles were launched from the area of ​​the temporarily occupied Mirnograd (Dimitrov), just 10 km from the advanced Russian positions in the Pokrovsky direction.

On the approach to the Crimean Bridge , 12 targets were shot down, fragments of ammunition and cluster parts slightly damaged the road surface of the bridge, without causing damage to the supporting structures. At approximately 5 am, the bridge was closed to eliminate the consequences. Fragments of the downed drones were also found in Kerch .

At the same time, the enemy carried out a combined raid on Sevastopol . Naval aviation helicopters sank five unmanned boats in Yarylchag Bay , and one drone was shot down by a Tor air defense missile system. Another four UAVs were shot down on approach to Sevastopol and three BeKs were sunk, but significant damage on the ground was avoided. Another three naval drones retreated to their base area, and a search is underway for their possible holding area.

For the first time in a long period of time, the main target of the Ukrainian forces' raid was the Crimean Bridge.

It is worth noting that there are statements circulating on the Internet about the imminent transfer of JASSM long-range missiles (air-to-surface missiles) to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which can be launched from F-16s already delivered to the enemy.

Given this, as well as the fact that for the first time in a very long period of time, target designation was carried out by an American MQ-9 Reaper drone from the Black Sea, further attempts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to damage the bridge should be expected

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Colonelcassad

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Kursk direction: fighting along the entire length of the front
what is known as of 12:00 on August 17, 2024

The situation in the Kursk direction remains difficult, and the enemy is still trying to break through the defensive lines of the Russian Armed Forces in different parts of the direction.

In the Glushkovsky district, the situation has not changed significantly over the past day - yesterday's information about the Ukrainian Armed Forces entering Vishnevka has not been confirmed. Also, not far from the bridge in Glushkovo destroyed by a missile strike , Russian troops have built a pontoon crossing.

In the Korenevsky district, evidence of the enemy's presence in Russkoye Porechny , for which there was fighting yesterday, has appeared. Footage published online shows strikes on armored vehicles of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the center of the village.

In the Sudzhansky district, Ukrainian formations continue to film videos in the same western part of the city, including near one of the Magnit stores on Pervogo Maya Street. At the same time, there is still no objective evidence of the presence of either side on the eastern side of the settlement.

In the Belovsky district, the situation has not changed significantly, and in the area of ​​the settlements of Kamyshnoye and Giri, no clashes have been noted over the past 24 hours. After the statements of the Russian Ministry of Defense about the clearing of the settlement of Ozerki several days ago, no data on battles have been received, so the village is currently under the control of the Russian Armed Forces.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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August 15, 2024 by M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
US has Ukraine’s back in Kursk incursion

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War-displaced people receive humanitarian aid at a Russian Red Cross distribution point in Kursk, August 15, 2024
As the Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk Region rolls on, war conditions have appeared in Russia for the first time since the Second World War. It is a stunning experience that an estimated 180,000 people have become internally displaced.

Ukrainian military was apparently gasping for breath, per Russian narrative. But Ukrainian mastery of combined arms warfare is on display and it is impressive — deploying everything from air defence to electronic warfare and armour and infantry. Ukraine made its point that it is capable of mounting a combined arms assault and bring some pain to Russians.

The best spin that pro-Russian analysts could think of is that the Kremlin had set a trap actually so that Ukraine’s soldiers could once again be put into the meat grinder. It Is hogwash. It’s impossible to cover up the naked truth that Russian military has been caught with its pants down.

Of course, Russians will eventually bring in enough forces to overwhelm the invading Ukrainians but it may take time as there’s no front-line. Kiev, which claims to be in control 1000 sq. km of Russian territory, says it is not interested in “taking territory” but will continue its offensive until Moscow agrees to “a just peace.” But Ukraine has set up a command centre inside Russia, hinting at prolonged occupation.

Without doubt, this is a huge political and diplomatic setback for Russia and highlights that a Russian victory in Ukraine’s battlefields is not yet a foregone conclusion. That is not surprising, since this Clausewitzean war is absoluter Krieg (‘pure war’) — “the collision of two living forces” — and, therefore, a complex of interactions, multi-layered and often unpredictable exists where goals of the warring states will be invariably influenced by the course of the war.

Clausewitz wrote in his classic work On War that the complexity of actual war is evident in what he called a “remarkable trinity” of passion, reason and chance that underlie wars.

The passion of war, he analysed, is the “primordial violence, hatred and enmity” that motivate people to fight; the reason of war is the calculation of means to achieve ends and the reckoning of costs and benefits; and, chance besets the whole enterprise.

President Vladimir Putin’s demands for ending the war, as outlined in his hard-hitting speech at the Foreign Ministry in Moscow on June 14, possibly triggered this new phase of war starting on August 6. There is a lot of speculation regarding President Zelensky’s intentions. Pentagon Spokesman Patrick Ryder insists that Ukraine had not warned Washington in advance about its plans, but a Ukrainian official told Independent newspaper that “there were discussions between partner forces, just not on the public level.”

Putin himself estimated that “the enemy, with the support from their Western backers, is executing their directives, and the West is using Ukrainians as proxies in this conflict. It seems the opponent is aiming to strengthen their negotiating position for the future.”

Putin added that “these actions clearly aim to achieve a primary military objective: to halt the advance of our forces in their effort to fully liberate the territories of the Lugansk and Donetsk people’s republics, the Novorossiya region (read the former imperial Russian territory conquered from the Cossacks and the Ottomans comprising present-day eight oblasts of southeast Ukraine: Odessa, Mykolayiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhya, Kharkov, Donetsk, Luhansk.)

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Map of Novorossiya region

Overall, Zelensky has challenged Putin’s concept of a ‘security zone’ beyond the frontline. Putin first spoke of it in March in a speech after winning re-election. The Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov explained, “Against the backdrop of (Ukrainian) drone attacks and the shelling of our territory: public facilities, residential buildings, measures must be taken to secure these territories. They can only be secured by creating some kind of buffer zone so that any means that the enemy uses to strike us are out of range.”

Putin himself justified later — interestingly, during a visit to China — the launch of the Russian offensive on May 10 in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkov Region insofar as Moscow aimed “to create a security zone, a sanitary zone. That’s what we are doing.”

But Ukraine has since hijacked the Russian concept. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, Iryna Vereshchuk announced yesterday that the Ukrainian forces are creating a “security zone” inside Russia near the border with Ukraine so as to conduct humanitarian operations, open evacuation corridors (both in the direction of Russia and Ukraine) and allow international organisations to enter the conflict zone.

Vereshchuk disclosed that relevant preparations and consultations are currently underway. Indeed, Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesman for the UN Secretary-General told the media on Friday, “Well, certainly it’s a question of real concern that these developments are happening. We don’t have a presence on the ground in that region… we call for all concerned to act responsibly and ensure the protection of civilians. We would need more information about what is happening to understand exactly what the nature of the conflict in the Kursk region is.”

Meanwhile, Zelensky also wrote on the social media yesterday, “Meeting on the situation in the Kursk region. We discussed key issues. Security, humanitarian aid, establishment of military commandant’s offices if necessary.” While Ukraine is internationalising its operations in the Kursk Region, on a parallel track, it is also expanding the operations to include the oblasts adjacent to Kursk.

The big question is whether Moscow took its eyes off the ball and began daydreaming in recent months with seductive thoughts — Zelensky’s ‘readiness’ for talks; prospect of a Donald Trump presidency in the US; tensions (real or imaginary) between Washington and Kiev; expectations of Ukraine’s imminent collapse and so on. Whereas, the hard reality is that Crimea’s annexation and the Battle of Donbass remain unfinished business.

Ukraine’s long-range drones reportedly hit four Russian airbases overnight on Aug. 14 in the largest attack on airfields in the war. As the summer months give way to autumn by October, the much vaunted Russian offensive to wrap up the war is nowhere in sight.

Now that the Kremlin’s ‘red line’ on episodic Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian territory has been massively breached in Kursk with ‘boots on the ground’, what next? Indeed, Ukraine could be underestimating Russia’s numerical advantage in manpower and superior weaponry and the challenge of having to to redeploy units to mount and sustain the cross-border incursion as well as overstretched logistics is indeed daunting.

On the other hand, the lame duck US president Joe Biden is an ‘X’ factor — an embittered man consumed by his own visceral hatred of Putin. He still has 5 months of absolute power, more than the time President Barack Obama needed to create a fait accompli in US-Russia relations for years to come.

Ukraine is using weapons provided by Western governments, including the UK, US, and Germany, as part of its ongoing incursion into Russia. German and US armoured fighting vehicles, as well as UK tanks have been involved in Ukraine’s ground operation. This signals that the Kremlin’s verbal threats carry less and less weight in Western capitals.

Ukraine may be punching above its weight to defend itself from Russia’s devastating glide bombs. But the fact remains that every time Putin mentions tactical nukes, it is still a message of deterrence. Ukraine’s audacious move to carry the war into Russian territory may well precipitate that nuclear moment.

If crunch time comes, Biden may meet Russia’s use of tactical nukes with a conventional response (i.e. non-nuclear), which Russia risks losing. That may well be Biden’s game plan.

https://www.indianpunchline.com/us-has- ... incursion/

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Mark Chapman...

... did a wonderful write up on the issue I am going to discuss tomorrow, as written by NYT .


Zelensky’s madcap Kursk adventure marks Ukraine’s last ‘something ere the end’ – its last frantic hand-waving for attention before its head slips under the waves. And in that effort, it is wildly successful: the western media is giddy, euphoric, it cannot stop talking about Zelensky’s bold stroke, Putin’s abject embarrassment and humiliation. But these are just words; words from past masters of ‘framing the narrative’ so the story you get out of happenings is the one they want to tell. The west is the self-declared sworn enemy of Russia: of course anything which discomfits its leader and its government is an occasion for celebration and high-fiving. It hand-picked Ukraine to throw it against Russia, so it is unsurprising that any exhibition of aggression on its part is received with cheers and approval.

Excellent piece. Moreover, Larry doesn't mince words and goes for jugular:

The United States is Preparing to Jettison Volodomyr Zelensky

The tawdry show around the terrorist act against NS-2 pipeline is designed for a kindergarten for retarded children. That is the requirement for believing this utter BS of 404 executing this "operation". What can I say, or, rather what Marx said: History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce (c). Something tells me we are in the third, if not the fourth iteration of a farce stage...

P.S. I am "stealing" Mark's superb definition of NYT piece: a casserole of mendacity! (c)

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2024/08 ... apman.html

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So what really happened in Kursk?

Pepe Escobar

August 16, 2024

An extremely serious debate is already raging among selected circles of power/intelligence in Moscow.

An extremely serious debate is already raging among selected circles of power/intelligence in Moscow – and the heart of the matter could not be more incandescent.

To cut to the chase: what really happened in Kursk? Was the Russian Ministry of Defense caught napping? Or did they see it coming and profited to set up a deadly trap for Kiev?

Well-informed players willing to share a few nuggets on condition of anonymity all stress the extreme sensitivity of it all. An intel pro though has offered what may be interpreted as a precious clue: “It is rather surprising to see such a concentration of force was unnoticed by satellite and drone surveillance at Kursk, but I would not exaggerate its importance.”

Another intel pro prefers to stress that “the foreign intel section is weak as it was very badly run.” This is a direct reference to the state of affairs after former security overseer Nikolai “Yoda” Patrushev, during Putin’s post-inauguration reshuffle, was transferred from his post as secretary of the Security Council to serve as a special presidential aide.

The sources, cautiously, seem to converge on a very serious possibility: “There seems to have been a breakdown in intel; they do not seem to have noticed the accumulation of troops at the Kursk border”.

Another analyst though has offered a way more specific scenario, according to which a hawkish military faction, spread across the Ministry of Defense and the intel apparatus – and antagonistic to the new Minister of Defense Belousov, an economist – let the Ukrainian invasion proceed with two objectives in mind: set a trap for Kiev’s top enemy commanders and troops, who were diverted from the – collapsing – Donbass front; and put extra pressure on Putin to finally go for the head of the snake and finish off the war.

This hawkish faction, incidentally, regards Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov as “totally incompetent”, in the words of one intel pro. There’s no smoking gun, but Gerasimov allegedly ignored several warnings about a Ukrainian buildup near the Kursk border.

A retired intel pro is even more controversial. He complains that “traitors of Russia” actually “stripped three regions from troops to surrender them to the Ukrainians.” Now, these “traitors of Russia” will be able “to ‘exchange’ the city of Suzha for leaving the fake country of Ukraine and promote it as an inevitable solution.”

Incidentally, only this Thursday Belousov started chairing a series of meetings to improve security in the “three regions” – Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk.

Hawks in the siloviki apparatus don’t make it a secret that Gerasimov should be fired – and replaced by fabled General Sergey “Armageddon” Surovikin. They also enthusiastically support the FSB’s Alexander Bortnikov – who de facto solved the extremely murky Prigozhin affair – as the man now really supervising The Big Picture in Kursk.

And the next one is Belgorod

Well, it’s complicated.

President Putin’s reaction to the Kursk invasion was visible in his body language. He was furious: for the flagrant military/intel failure; for the obvious loss of face; and for the fact that this buries any possibility of rational dialogue about ending the war.

Yet he managed to turn the upset around in no time, by designating Kursk as a counter-terrorist operation (CTO); supervised by the FSB’s Bortnikov; and with an inbuilt “take no prisoners” rationale. Every Ukrainian in Kursk not willing to surrender is a potential target – set for elimination. Now or later, no matter how long it takes.

Bortnikov is the hands-on specialist. Then there’s the Overseer of the whole military/civilian response: Alexey Dyumin, the new secretary of the State Council, who among other previous posts was the deputy head of the special operations division of GRU (military intel). Dyumin does not respond directly to the Ministry of Defense nor the FSB: he is reporting directly to the President.

Translation: Gerasimov now seems to be at best a figurehead in the whole Kursk drama. The men in charge are Bortnikov and Dyumin.

The Kursk P.R. gambit is set to massively fail. Essentially, the Ukrainian forces are moving away from their lines of communication and supplies into Russian territory. A parallel can be made with what happened to Field Marshall von Paulus at Stalingrad when the German Army became overextended.

The Russians are already in the process of cutting off the Ukrainians in Kursk – breaking off their lines of supply. What’s left of the crack soldiers launched into Kursk would have to turn back, facing Russians both at their front and back. Disaster looms.

Irrepressible commander of the Akhmat special forces, Major General Apti Alaudinov, confirmed on Rossiya-1 TV that at least 12,000 Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) entered Kursk, including a lot of foreigners (Brits, French, Poles). That will turn out to be a “take no prisoners” on a massive scale.

Anyone with an IQ above room temperature knows Kursk is a NATO operation – conceived with a high degree of probability by an Anglo-American combo supervising the Ukronazi cannon fodder.

Anything Kiev does depends on American ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and NATO weapons systems of course operated by NATO personnel.

Mikhail Podolyak, adviser to the sweaty green T-shirt actor in Kiev, admitted that Kiev “discussed” the attack “with Western partners”. The “Western partners” – Washington, London, Berlin – in full cowardly regalia, deny it.

Bortnikov won’t be fooled. He succinctly stated, on the record, that this was a Kiev terrorist attack supported by the West.

We are now entering the stage of hardcore positioning combat bound to destroy villages and towns. It will be ugly. Russian military analysts remark that if a buffer zone had been preserved way back in March 2022, mid-range artillery activity would have been restricted to Ukrainian territory. Yet another controversial decision by the Russian General Staff.

Russia will eventually solve the Kursk drama – mopping up small Ukrainian groups in a methodically lethal way. Yet very sensitive questions about how it happened – and who let it happen – simply won’t vanish. Heads will have to – figuratively – roll. Because this is just the beginning. The next incursion will be in Belgorod. Get ready for more blood on the tracks.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/ ... -in-kursk/

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Resistance to Military Conscription Deepens in Ukraine
Posted by Internationalist 360° on August 14, 2024
Dmitri Kovalevich

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The beginning of August in Ukraine was marked by increased confrontations over the government’s ever-tightening, military conscription policies.

Every day, across the country, police are reporting arson attacks against Ukrainian military vehicles. Military personnel in the rear are increasingly wary of leaving their vehicles on the streets overnight, instead parking them near police stations. But even this does not always help.

Those detained by police for these attacks have mostly been teenagers between 12 and 18 years of age, according to governor Oleh Sinegubov of Kharkiv Oblast (province), writing in early August.

Shoot the youth who are attacking military vehicles?

As a result of such attacks increasing in number, Oleh Romanov, commander of an anti-tank unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), has declared he has given permission to shoot on sight those who set fire to military vehicles in the rear. “In coordination with higher command, using military immunity, I give verbal permission to my fighters to shoot those things on the spot. Such traitors must be eliminated on the spot, considering wartime conditions.” His unit is the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, formerly a unit of the neo-Nazi ‘Azov Battalion’ now fully integrated as an autonomous unit of the regular army.

So the commander of what is today a regular Ukraine military unit is openly claiming that he has issued orders to shoot without trial civilian youths should they be caught in the act of damaging military equipment… or be only accused of doing so.

Ukrainian authorities are not denying that many of the attacks against military equipment are carried out by teenagers, nor do they deny that orders to shoot perpetrators are being issued and are bypassing the formal, decision-making of the country’s government and armed forces general staff. Such orders are also bypassing the Ukraine constitution, which since the year 2000 (at the insistence of the European Union at the time) has prohibited the death penalty.

All this highlights once again that the ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi formations embedded within the AFU are accustomed to acting without regard for the law and at their own discretion, arguing that without their actions, the military front and the entire Ukrainian state machine could well crumble.

At the same time, the Ukrainian telegram channel Rubicon believes that the order issued by the commander of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade to “shoot on the spot” arsonists or others engaged in damaging military equipment could only be authorized from above (for example, from the presidential office), aiming to intimidate not only potential arsonists but anyone contemplating civil disobedience against the Ukraine government’s war policies.

Fear of military conscription only deepening

Ukrainian authorities traditionally blame Russia for any antiwar protests that may take place in Ukraine, but the fact that the vehicles of military enlistment officers were the first to be burned many months ago suggests more of a spontaneous protest against conscription than anything being covertly organized.

The Ukrainian Telegram channel Kartel comments on the recent trends, writing, “Arson attacks against the vehicles of employees of [military enlistment officers in Ukraine], that is, the vehicles of those who are hunting down men of the age of military service, are now being recorded all over the country. And the public does not consider the people behind these incidents as playing along with Moscow; the arsons have actually become a symbol of protest against forced conscription, corruption, and all the other injustices committed by authorities.”

Protests against conscription have manifested themselves in the form of arson attacks on military vehicles, physical assaults on individual Ukrainian soldiers in the rear, and spontaneous rallies against conscription officers at work. In early August, the town of Kovel near the Polish border in western Ukraine exploded. Crowds turned out for a rally demanding the release of three forcibly conscripted locals. The crowd stormed the military enlistment office and the protest continued through the night until residents secured the release of the three detainees.

The next day, authorities accused the protesters of “working for Russia” and launched criminal prosecutions. Ukrainian MP Yevhen Shevchenko wrote in Telegram on August 3 that the events in Kovel showed that “the party of peace is growing in the form of people voting against the war with their feet”. He continued, “How are the blind philosophers in Ukraine coping with this? Will they continue to brag about the fact there is no such thing in Ukraine as a formal party of peace?”

The Telegram channel Rubicon notes that riots against military enlistment officers are not a rare or unique phenomenon in Ukraine. There have been mass rallies protesting the continued war against Russia in Zaporozhye city and region; in Carpathia region (western Ukraine), where road blockades of burning tires have been erected by Roma people; and in Odessa city several months ago, where a mass brawl took place between ambulance crews and military enlistment officers when one of the crew was seized and threatened with forced conscription. But what happened in Kovel differs significantly from everything that has happened before. There, it was a mass confrontation and brawl against military and government authorities that unfolded in which men who would ‘normally’ be quietly hiding at home to avoid being forcibly conscripted took part.

The conscription crisis is a sign of a failing war

According to the writers at ‘Rubicon’, the government in Kiev cannot change its current conscription regime. Volunteering for the army has run out, all-but ending as early as 2022. Meanwhile, financial motivations to gain recruits, as are widely available in Russia, are very expensive and unrealistic for a depopulated Ukraine with a moribund economy, notwithstanding the funds that the U.S. government has allocated to boost recruitment.

Nevertheless, the large Western governments continue to demand intensified conscription by the Ukraine government, which means more capture and kidnapping by military conscription officers without the slightest heed or attention to human rights. Ukrainian MP Fyodor Venislavskyy wrote on Telegram on August 6 that Ukraine’s Western ‘partners’ are also raising periodically the proposal that Ukraine lower its official age of military service (conscription). He writes, “They believe that the age range of 18-25 is the most optimal and effective age of military service for citizens when physical and psychological qualities needed to be able to fight are at their prime.”

Currently, the age of military registration in Ukraine is 18, while the youngest age for military service is 26.

Ukrainian politicians and analysts typically offer ‘regrets’ to the Ukrainian population for the demands by Western governments for more military recruitment, at the same time saying that Ukraine’s Western allies have the right to pronounce on such a domestic matter because they are the ones providing the funds and equipment to wage war against Russia.

More war dead in order to improve negotiating position

Western analysts and politicians are unrelentingly pushing Ukraine further into battle, using the argument that Kiev needs more combat in order to improve its future negotiating position. This argument was used in 2022 and again in 2023. Today, it is the equivalent of flogging an exhausted and worn-out horse. It also shows a complete misunderstanding of the aims of the political and military leadership in Russia.

Western capitalists measure everything against themselves. They imagine future negotiations between Russia and Ukraine as resembling one company up against its business competitor, each side seeking to strengthen its respective position. But for the Russian leadership, nothing changes should the AFU occupy a Russian town or two or should it withdraw from there to the relative safety of the border of Poland.

The list of demands and conditions by Russia for an end to the war (including an end to the dream by NATO and Kiev for a rump, NATO-member Ukraine) will remain unchanged no matter what happens. This rigidity and unchanging of military goals is the key to Russian stability and to the slow and steady military advances it is making.

This is being continually reinforced by the deep wellspring of historic memory of the Russian people. They recall only too well the harsh, social and economic disaster of the post-Soviet years of the 1990s, when promises by the West to Russia of eventual integration into the Western world’s economy had the ear of the Russian governments of the day while many Russian people themselves held such hopes. The 25 years since then, and in particular the past ten years, have shown to the Russian people that their country does not need economic ties to the Western economy to survive and even prosper. Indeed, Russia is doing quite well today having lost much of its trade and investment ties to the West.

Flight of youth from Ukraine, and mass desertions from the armed forces

Expecting a lowering of the conscription age, young people in Ukraine are fleeing the country daily by the dozens and hundreds. Some are dying while making perilous crossings across the rough river border in western Ukraine. Oleksiy Arestovich, a former adviser to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, wrote in early August in the online Eurasia Daily that ‘official’ estimates of the flow of men of conscription age trying to escape from Ukraine are being underestimated by 30 times.

“If I tell you how many people are trying to escape from Ukraine every day, you would gasp. The State Border Service admits 100 or so people trying to leave each day, while a Rada deputy has recently admitted 200. But the real figure is approximately 30 times higher… Imagine, each day, the equivalent numbers of five military brigades are seeking to escape from Ukraine. Many try to cross the Tisa (Tisza) River [which borders Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia in places] each day by whatever means possible.”

According to recent estimates by the National Bank of Ukraine, a further 700,000 people will leave Ukraine in 2024-2025. The Bank expects a gradual return of Ukrainians to their homeland only from 2026 and only if, by then, the security situation improves, new housing is built, and the overall economic situation improves.

Mass desertion is no less of a problem than is conscription for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Germany’s Deutsche Welle state broadcaster reported on August 2 that desertion from the Ukrainian army in 2024 has reached an alarming scale. Every 14th serviceman has quit his unit arbitrarily, the publication reports. Overall, since the beginning of 2022, the prosecutor’s office has counted 63,200 criminal proceedings for desertion.

Poliltnavigator news website reports on August 5 that according to retired SBU (secret police) colonel Oleg Starikov, more and more soldiers are deserting. “I have a comrade who is now deputy commander of a battalion of paratroopers. He is not a professional soldier; he was conscripted and rose to the rank of lieutenant. I asked him about the personnel situation he faces, and he replied that the soldiers serving under him, quite simply, ‘do not want to serve, they do not wish to fight’.”

” ‘So what are they doing out there?’, I asked. ‘They dig trenches and build fortifications’, he replied. ‘But that is logistical support,’ I replied, ‘who is doing the actual fighting?’, I asked again. ‘They do not want to fight’, came the reply.”

A mercenary role for the future Ukraine?

Although the Armed Forces of Ukraine are constantly short of men and Ukrainian troops have been slowly retreating along the front lines all year, Ukrainian authorities and security services are finding in countries other than Ukraine new recruits, weapons, and other means to fight for the interests of the West. Ukraine has no special interests in these other countries, but the U.S., UK, Germany, and France do.

In August, two African countries, Mali and Niger, severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine. Both accuse Kiev of supporting radical terrorist groups [linked to Al Qaeda] that have been fighting the governments of these two countries since they began to distance themselves economically and militarily from the West last year.

The Mali government reacted to statements by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency (GUR) which praised an alleged involvement by Kiev in an attack against Mali government forces last month near the border with Algeria. “The actions taken by the Ukrainian authorities violate the sovereignty of Mali, go beyond the scope of foreign interference, which is already condemnable in itself. They constitute clear aggression against Mali and clear support for international terrorism,” the Malian government charged.

In Senegal, Ukraine’s interference in Mali’s affairs also caused outrage. The Ukrainian ambassador was summoned to that country’s foreign ministry to hear its condemnation.

On July 31, the Kyiv Post reported that Ukrainian forces made a strike on Russian and Syrian forces at the Kuweires Air Force base in Syria. As well, in the spring of 2024, there were published reports of Ukraine’s involvement in the fighting in Sudan. As reported by the Wall St. Journal in March, Ukraine has participated in combat in Sudan because “the West has been reluctant to get directly involved”.

Thus does the Kiev regime try to sell itself to the West as resembling an effective, private military company that will fight against anti-imperialist movements around the world whenever and wherever the Western governments do not dare to introduce their own troops. Rubicon Telegram channel reports on August 6, “We can only state this curious precedent in international relations when an entire state begins to position itself as a large, highly specialized, private military company (PMC).

In the early days of August, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry announced its support for a draft law ‘On International Defense Companies’ which, in essence, would legalize the operations of PMCs (mercenary companies) on the territory of Ukraine. One author of the bill, MP Serhiy Grivko, proposes to send Ukrainian soldiers to serve in other global hot spots, saying that many will not wish to surrender their weapons and return to peaceful life.

“Following the demobilization of a large number of personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, there is a risk of a wide range of negative consequences,” the bill says. The ‘negative consequences’ for Ukraine in this case is the presence of a large number of foreigners with weapons in hand on Ukrainian soil, the reactions should payments to PMCs (which the Ukrainian budget cannot afford) ever be reduced, and the beginning of anticipated “destructive political processes in the country”.

Simply put, Ukrainians are to become expendable human material spending their entire lives fighting wars and working to pay off international loans, all for the sake of preserving the hegemony of Western imperialism.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2024/08/ ... n-ukraine/
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sat Aug 17, 2024 6:05 pm

Ukraine SitRep: Kursk Attack Derailed Partial Ceasefire Deal

The Ukrainian incursion into Russia's Kursk oblast has even worse consequences for Ukraine than had been known so far.

Over the last six months, in revenge for Ukrainian attacks on Russian infrastructure, especially oil refineries, the Russian forces created serious damage on Ukraine's electricity network. Nearly every conventional power generation facility in Ukraine has been damaged. Half of Ukraine's 18 Gigawatts of electricity generation capacity has been taken offline. The damaged power stations were often also used to provide heating to large blocks of Soviet type apartments. Without power and heating it will be a very difficult winter for many people in Ukraine.

There was interest on both sides to stop the campaigns against the other sides infrastructure. An agreement about it was in the making and was possible. But, as Washington Post reports, the Ukrainian attack on Kursk blew it apart:

Ukraine and Russia were set to send delegations to Doha this month to negotiate a landmark agreement halting strikes on energy and power infrastructure on both sides, diplomats and officials familiar with the discussions said, in what would have amounted to a partial cease-fire and offered a reprieve for both countries.
But the indirect talks, with the Qataris serving as mediators and meeting separately with the Ukrainian and Russian delegations, were derailed by Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Russia’s western Kursk region last week, according to the officials.
...
The diplomat familiar with the talks said that Qatar has been discussing the arrangement for an energy strike moratorium with Kyiv and Moscow for the past two months. The official said the two sides agreed to a summit in Doha with just minor details left to be worked out.

“After Kursk, the Russians balked,” another person familiar with the talks said.


Instead of its senseless attack on Kursk Ukraine could have had an agreement that would make it possible to get through the winter without many blackouts and other interruptions. It blew that chance.

The moral uplift for Ukrainian forces created by the attack on Kursk is already waning. Russia has not pulled any of its troops involved in the attacks in the east to defend Kursk. It has instead pulled reserves from elsewhere. One of the hoped for effects of the Kursk incursion is thereby not happening.

Ukraine's attack was only made possible by pulling troops for the eastern frontline. Moreover artillery supplies, which were already problematic, have become even scarcer:

Soldiers fighting in the Donetsk region said they had been buoyed by the incursion into Russia. But they also said it would use up weapons and ammunition that they crucially need. One commander stationed at a hot spot on the eastern front said his brigade had fewer than four mortar guns to defend its position, and could fire only 10 shells a day per mortar.

Each day the Ukraine is losing more ground in the east. Meanwhile its Kursk incursion has already culminated and it will be a deadly struggle to hold onto the captured ground.

Ukraine has brought in high value assets to hinder Russian reserves from reaching the area. However, near to the frontline these assets have difficulties to survive.

Anomandris Purake @Malazan_enjoyer - 22:09 UTC · Aug 16, 2024
So the Russians put up a pontoon over the Seym River immediately after or even before the bridge was destroyed.

Ukraine meanwhile lost 3 HIMARS, 3 patriots and 1 IRIS-T making potholes on the bridge. I would say that's a very good exchange. I hope they try more of this.


Additionally reported were the destruction of a Polish made S-125 air defense system and a fourth HIMARS platform.

A New York Times analysis suggests, just as I did previously, that the main aim of the Kursk campaign was to convince the Ukraine's western supporters that it can still win the war and therefore deserves further support:

The real goals of the operation may not be on the Russia battlefield.
After the failure of Ukraine’s much-advertised counteroffensive last year and the ongoing losses in the east, it appears to be trying to change the war’s narrative.

The Ukrainians may be trying to convince the West that they will not give up, and that the United States in particular should allow them to use American long-range cruise missiles inside Russia.


The U.S. will hopefully not allow the Ukraine to extend its attacks deep into Russia. If it does allow these there will be a point where Russia will have to strike back, hard, against U.S. assets.

Ukraine is not the only country that has destructible power plants.

Posted by b on August 17, 2024 at 8:49 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/08/u ... .html#more

*******

Russian Forces Take Serguiivka and Advance Towards Kramatorsk

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Russian troops in Zheleznoye, Aug. 14. 2024. Photo: X/ @Zlatti_71

August 16, 2024 Hour: 8:28 am

On Thursday, Russian authorities established a coordination council on military security issues in border areas.
On Friday, the Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that its troops controlled the town of Sergievka and continued to advance toward Kramatorsk, one of the main Ukrainian strongholds in the eastern Donetsk region.

“As a result of the actions of units of the Tsentr (Center) military group, the towns of Lishichne, Ivanivka, and Sergievka have been liberated,” the Russian military authorities said.

Previously, the Russian military command had reported the liberation of Lishichne and Ivanvika but not the seizure of control of Sergievka, a town from which Russian troops have Kramatorsk within gunshot range.

Meanwhile, Russian soldiers from the Sever (North) group are repelling invasion attempts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region, where the Ukrainians have managed to control some 80 towns since they began an offensive on August 6.


On Thursday, the Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov established a coordination council on military security issues in border areas and held the first meeting of the council.

The council is responsible for handling the military security issues covering Belgorod, Bryansk and Kursk regions, he said adding that it aims to improve the efficiency of comprehensive support for battlegroups protecting the state border, the territory and population of the regions.

The newly-established council will also focus on engineering work on the territory of regions and military-medical provision, namely, coordinating forces and capabilities for evacuating affected people.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/russian- ... ramatorsk/

*******

The last post looked at how old nationalist luminaries successfully evade mobilization.

The new nobility

But Poroshenko and Orest Lyuty are old news.

There’s a new generation of sprightly young neo-liberal neo-nazis in town. And they aren’t content with secretly evading mobilization - they prefer to legalize their privileges.

Image

But as one Ukrainian parliamentarian (Maksym Buzhansky of Zelensky’s party) remarked, if the feudal nobility was guaranteed material privileges because it was obliged to fight wars for the king, the new Ukrainian nobility has been guaranteed the right not to fight.

Buzhansky was responding to the following: On July 10, it emerged that 133 mainly western-funded NGOs had received legal exemption from mobilization.

A remarkable situation, given that, as I’ve written, Ukraine’s paramedics and even legally exempted employees at real critical infrastructure facilities are still snatched up by mobilizers.

According to cabinet decree No. 650, registered on June 5 and signed into action on June 21, employees of the following NGOs were granted 100% exemption from mobilization. First of all, the list in all its glory. Skip it to go straight to my investigation of the more obviously shady setups.

1.AHT Group AG, Federal Republic of Germany

ADT Project Consulting GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany

Alinea International Limited, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Alinea International Ltd., Canada

American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI), USA

The American Center for International Labor Solidarity (Solidarity Center), USA

Association of Users of the Ukrainian Academic and Research Network "Uran"

Association of Public Health Laboratories, USA

Business and Strategies in Europe S.A., Kingdom of Belgium

Charity organization "Right to Protection" Charitable Fund

Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., USA

Westminster Foundation for Democracy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), USA

All-Ukrainian Civic Organization "OPORA Civic Network"

Global Communities, USA

Civic Organization "Association of Energy Auditors of Ukraine"

Civic Organization "DIXI GROUP"

Civic Organization "Initiative Center to Support Social Action 'Ednannia'"

Civic Organization "Kyiv School of Economics Institute"

Civic Organization "Internews-Ukraine"

Civic Organization "Development of Civic Competencies in Ukraine"

Civic Organization "Transparency International Ukraine"

Civic Organization "Ukrainian Leadership Academy"

Civic Organization "Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research"

Civic Organization "Center for Democracy and Rule of Law" (NGO "CDR")

Civic Organization "Center for Economic Strategy"

Civic Organization "Center for Political and Legal Reforms"

Civic Organization "Center for Political Studies and Analytics 'Eidos'"

Civic Union "All-Ukrainian Agrarian Council"

Civic Union "Support for the Activities of the Business Ombudsman Council"

Civic Union "Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union"

Civic Union "Foundation for the Architecture of Reforms in Ukraine (ARU Fund)"

GFA Consulting Group GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany

WGI Global Inc., USA

DAI Global LLC, USA

Deloitte & Touche LLC, USA

Deloitte Consulting Overseas Projects LLC, USA

Deloitte Consulting LLP, USA

State Specialized Financial Institution "State Fund for Youth Housing"

Detecon International GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany

Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL), Swiss Confederation

Abt Associates Inc., USA

Ecorys Europe EEIG-GEIE, Kingdom of Belgium

Ecorys Netherlands B.V., Netherlands

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany

Consulting Company "SIVITTA Ukraine" (company code according to EDRPOU 38510763)

Expert France S.A.S., French Republic

Encompass LLC, USA

FHI 360, USA

Egis International, French Republic

Enconet Consulting Ges.m.b.H, Republic of Austria

JSI Research & Training Institute, Inc., USA

The Institute of International Education, USA

Internews Network, USA

Canadian Non-Governmental Organization "Societe de Cooperation Pour le Developpement International (SOCODEVI)," Canada

Chemonics International Inc., USA

Cowater International, Kingdom of Belgium

Holtec International, USA

Municipal Enterprise "Dnipro Municipal Energy Service Company" of the Dnipro City Council

Municipal Enterprise "Kryvbasstelenergoprom" of the Kryvyi Rih City Council

Consulting Company Kokusai Kogyo Co, LTD, Japan

Consortium consisting of GFA Consulting Group / Tractebel GKW Consult GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany

Consortium consisting of Egis International, French Republic, Egis Eau, French Republic, and Tetra Tech International Development B.V., Kingdom of the Netherlands, led by Egis International (Belgium) on behalf of the company Egis International

Consortium consisting of IMC Worldwide Ltd, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Kocks Consult GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany, and a company representing IMC Worldwide Ltd (IMC Worldwide Ltd)

The Consortium of Corporate & Public Management Consulting International OU (CPM)

Estonian Republic, Particip GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany, and Business and Strategies in Europe S.A., Kingdom of Belgium

Corporation "Ukrainian Atomic Priborod and Systems" ("Ukratompribor Corporation")

Lloyd's Register RiskSpectrum AB, Kingdom of Sweden

International Development Law Organization (IDLO), Italian Republic

International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), USA

International Charitable Fund "Alliance for Public Health"

International Charitable Fund "Ukrainian Women's Fund"

International Charitable Organization "Charitable Organization 'Ukraine'"

International Republican Institute (IRI), USA

International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policy (Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas, F.S.P.), Kingdom of Spain

International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Republic of Austria

National Democratic Institute for International Relations, USA

National Opinion Research Center (NORC), USA

National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Netherlands Business Academy BV, Kingdom of the Netherlands

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany

Niras Sweden AB, Kingdom of Sweden

Nordisk Sikkerhet AS, Kingdom of Norway

Overseas Strategic Consulting, LTD, USA

OCA Global Consulting and Technical Advisory Services S.L.U., Kingdom of Spain

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Ukraine, Japan

Pact, Inc., USA

Palladium International, LLC, USA

Open Contracting Partnership, USA

Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO), Republic of Finland

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Federal Republic of Germany

Abt Associates Inc. in Ukraine, USA

Representative of Children's Fund in Ukraine, USA

Representative of German International Cooperation (GIZ) GmbH, Federal Republic of Germany

Central Agency for Project Management, Republic of Lithuania

"Kyiv School of Economics" University, Private Establishment

Private Company "GARDE"

Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH), USA

Project HOPE - The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc., USA

IREX (International Research & Exchanges Board), USA

Ramboll Denmark A/S, Kingdom of Denmark

Raytheon Company, USA

RTE International, Federal Republic of Germany

CH2M Hill, Inc., USA

Tetra Tech ES, Inc., USA

Tetra Tech, Inc., USA

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), USA

IC Consulenten LLC

"Akvamarin Engineering" LLC

"VIC Technology" LLC

"Deloitte & Touche" LLC

"Deloitte Technology Services" LLC

"Egis Ukraine" LLC

"CSM-Group" LLC

"Sam Systems Development" LLC

"Sojitz Auto Ukraine" LLC

"AVEGA" LLC

Limited Liability Company "Deloitte & Touche USC" (Deloitte & Touche USC LLC)

Limited Liability Company "Deloitte Technology Services" (Deloitte Technology Services LLC)

Limited Liability Company "COMENERGOSERVICE" LLC

Limited Liability Company "Miyamoto International Ukraine" LLC

Limited Liability Company "Rems-Stroy" LLC

Limited Liability Company "SDM Engineering Ukraine" LLC

Ukrainian Social Investment Fund

Management Sciences for Health, Inc., USA

Fichtner GmbH & Co. KG, Federal Republic of Germany

Eurasia Foundation, USA

U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation, USA

The HALO Trust, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Zurich University of Teacher Education, Swiss Confederation

Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute, Swiss Confederation

Ukraine-Moldova American Enterprise Fund (UMAEF), USA

133.Jacobs Clean Energy International Limited, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

What an interesting list! A little bit of investigation of just some of the more suspicious-sounding names reveals a great deal.

Business and biolabs
First of all, Business and Strategies in Europe S.A. It’s ‘a private Belgian consulting firm providing multi-sectorial expertise and services in developing, transition and partner countries all over the world’.

These business experts know which markets are most promising, so to speak:

Our current permanent offices are based in Belgium, Romania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Lebanon and Libya, gathering up to 76 staff members in total.

Next, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity. It’s aligned with the AFL-CIO, or, as it’s often more accurately named, the AFL-CIA. That’s because the AFL-CIO is famed for its role in assisting US covert operations against leftwing governments and forces across the world.

Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., USA. Sounds worryingly like Blackrock or Blackwater, right? The truth is even better. Here’s what its website advertises:

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) competitively awarded Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. (Black & Veatch) one of its Biological Threat Reduction Integrating Contracts (BTRIC) in 2008. The 5-year IDIQ contract (with a 5-year option) has a collective ceiling of $4B among the five selected contractors. DTRA also competitively awarded Black & Veatch (Integrating Contractor) the first task order under BTRIC, BTRIC TO1 in Ukraine in 2008. BTRIC TO1 is a vital part of the Cooperative and Biological Threat Reduction (CTR and BTR) program of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) / DTRA and Implementing (Executive) Agents of the Ukraine - Ministry of Health (MoH), Academy of Agrarian Sciences (AAS) and State Committee for Veterinary Medicine (SCVM).

But hey - at least these Biological Threat Reduction Integrating programs are ‘100% employee-owned’! Maybe their colleagues over at the American Center for International Labor Solidarity have been radicalizing them.

Image

As far as their bio-threat programs go, Black and Veatch clearly have plenty of help from other organizations on the list like the US Association of Public Health Laboratories.

The US embassy website describes ‘four mobile laboratories from DTRA with the goal of reinforcing the system of epidemiological surveillance in the Armed Forces of Ukraine’. One of them is in the city of ‘Pokrovskoe’ (the US website uses the Russian name for whatever reason), which is currently under imminent threat from the Russian army.

The US embassy site boasts that Zelensky visited this site in 2020. It was supposedly meant to help with Covid, but given that Ukraine had one of the highest mortality rates in Europe - partly because of its politicized decision to refuse Russian vaccines, and partly because of the destructive neoliberalism of US-born post-maidan ‘doctor death’ minister of health, Ulyana Suprun. I wrote about her and her swastika-loving friends here.

Westminster’s freedom fighters
Other members of the new nobility are more mundane, so to speak, neo-colonial instruments following the immortal teachings of Gene Sharp Thought on Neoliberalism with Atlanticist Characteristics for a New Cold War Era.

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (UK), Transparency International Ukraine, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Group, Foundation for the Architecture of Reforms in Ukraine (EU and USA), the International Republican Institute (USA), the National Democratic Institute for International Relations (USA).

The names say it all. Need I say any more? Clearly critically important infrastructure, without which the frontline would instantly collapse.

Another telling inclusion on the list is the US-based Open Contracting Partnership. ‘We connect governments, civil society and business to open up and monitor public procurement. Open contracting results in fairer deals and less corruption.’

On the topic of public procurements, one of my favorite older articles is this one. It looked into how Transparency International and other western-funded NGOs in Ukraine sabotaged a feeble attempt by the Zelensky government in 2020 to introduce minimal industrial protectionism. According to them - along with western governments - Ukraine’s proposition to reserve a portion of state procurements for local producers was outrageously corrupt. We can, you can’t.

The Overseas Strategic Pact
And plenty of organizations to make sure that the Ukrainian people make the right decisions in any elections - that is, if they ever take place. If they do, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (USA) and the National Opinion Research Centre (USA) will be able to help out.

Back when elections were a thing, western-funded NGOs played an important role in declaring elections that elected the wrong people ‘fraudulent’, while Ukraine’s newly-reformed (on western money) supreme court unconstitutionally declared a voting rerun. See this post of mine on the topic of the 2004 ‘orange revolution’.

The US-based Overseas Strategic Consulting can also help out:

OSC designs and implements communications campaigns that increase the transparency of development and reform initiatives, resulting in greater host government accountability and public support of reform agendas

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Indeed, Ukrainians are often all too ungrateful for the neoliberal ‘reform agendas’ that unelected NGOs so graciously force through. Luckily, they will be in experienced hands:

OSC drives strategic communications for measurable results, worldwide, in some of the most challenging environments – often in conflict and post-conflict countries.

Relatedly - Aidan Jonah over at the Canada Files has also done some great investigative journalism looking at how western NGOs and governments have sunk serious money into transforming the mindsets of young Ukrainian judges to embrace the neoliberal reform agenda of land privatization.

Another group on the list similar to OSC is the ominously named 'Pact’. Its website - pactworld.org - describes itself as a group which ‘fosters secure democratic societies’ that ‘builds peace with conflict-affected communities’. Among its success stories is the Democratic Republic of Congo.

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Grifters and libertarian militarists
Then there’s the more straightforward grifters - like the DIXI group, whose website publishes its signature, for instance, on ‘the statement about a new Green Marshall Plan for Ukraine’. Or the Lithuanian Central Agency for Project Management. Fear not, devastated Ukrainian infrastructure.

The Kyiv School of Economics also has exemption from mobilization for its libertarian ideologues, such as former economics minister Mylovanov. This also includes Mykhailo Zhernakov, an anti-corruption activist, a euromaidan luminary, friend of sorosite icon (and fellow draft-dodger) Vitaly Shabunin, and a grizzled veteran of the NGO circuit.

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In December 2023, Law and Business found out that this brave activist and vicious critic of (proletarian) draft-dodgers is himself avoiding conscription. His grave medical excuse, as evidenced by his military medical certificate:

‘Flat feet and other deformities of the foot and toes (with moderate functional impairment).’

Soon after, he was apprehended by a mobilization office in the capital, where he was fined 5300 hryvnia (less than $150 USD) for draft-dodging. Naturally, he continued to defend himself from the accusations in public, though the military medical commission officially declared him medically fit to serve.

Luckily, poor Zhernakov soon got a reprieve. Despite having no military experience in any field other than draft-dodging, he became employed as an ‘expert for the Change Office’ at the ministry of defence in January 2024.

Freedom of speech is for leftists
Given that this whole ecosystem is funded by networks controlled by the Democratic Party and George Soros (not doing an anti-semitism, just pointing out a fact - I can do that since my parents worked for him), does that mean that those patronized extoll the values of the ‘open society’ - tolerance, pluralism, and freedom of speech?

Not really. Yaroslav Yurchishin, a parliamentarian from the ‘Holos’ party (the Atlantic Council/Fukuyama-approved party), and former leader of Soros’s Transparency International Ukraine (also on the list of the 133), put forward a bill to regulate or ban telegram. Because it spreads ‘russian narratives’. He didn’t explain what he meant by that, but images of men being violently forced into mobilization minibuses come to mind…

The essence of the NGO nobility is perhaps best illustrated by the head of Internews-Ukraine (sponsored by USAID and Soros’ Renaissance Foundation), Konstantyn Kvurt. He was among the initiators of the anti-telegram bill. Here’s how he justified it:

To avoid being accused later of, so to speak, "obstructing freedom of speech"—you know, all that stuff the "leftists" love to talk about—we need to refer to European practices, where they know how to "encourage" technological platforms to cooperate.

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Kvurt

Funnily enough, the list of telegram channels that must be banned (itself impossible - it’s only possible to ban telegram as a whole, but the government enjoys communicating through it too much to do so) because they are ‘kremlin channels’ includes a variety of Ukrainian channels. Plenty of them aren’t anonymous and clearly aren’t sponsored by Russia, nor do the anti-telegram group even try to claim that. Their crime? They criticize the wrong people:

This network of nearly 30 Telegram channels is discrediting the judicial reform, virtuous judges, and leaders of public organizations who are monitoring the reform of the judicial branch.

This network discredits honorable judges, members of the High Council of Justice, and leaders of prominent public organizations, particularly Vitaliy Shabunin, head of the Anti-Corruption Action Center, and Mykhailo Zhernakov, chairman of the DEJURE Foundation.

The wrong people: professional grant-feeders and draft-dodgers like Shabunin and Zhernakov. Don’t forget, freedom of speech is for leftists!

The nobles petition for more

But that’s not all. On August 5, another piece of legislation entered parliament. Bill №11460 has a somewhat misleading name:

‘On additional measures to enhance motivation and protect the rights of military personnel under martial law.’

In fact, the bill proposes that several groups of people be given the right to freely leave the country in wartime, namely ‘recipients of foreign grants, members of parliament, officials, judges, and prosecutors, as well as all other individuals exempt from mobilization or citizens entitled to deferment’, as strana.ua sums it up.

Can you guess who was among the initiators of the bill? No one other than the Cossack Hetman (Leader) himself, as his devoted fans call him…

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https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/the-new-nobility
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sun Aug 18, 2024 11:59 am

Kursk and diplomacy
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/18/2024

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On August 13, just a few days after the start of Ukrainian military operations in the Russian region of Kursk, and about to be replaced by someone even more belligerent, the still head of European Union diplomacy, Josep Borrell, announced that he had “discussed with Dmitro Kuleba the latest developments on the front and the Kursk counteroffensive.” In that message, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union expressed his approval of the Ukrainian operation on Russian territory and, above all, made clear the nature of the most recent offensive. Almost two weeks after Ukrainian troops surprised Russia by crossing yet another red line of the many that have already been crossed, the situation is stabilizing. This is not the stabilization that some Russian sources claim, which for several days have been talking about their successes, Ukrainian casualties and destruction of equipment, but rather the chronicization of a situation that, barring any surprises, will continue for some time.

On Friday, an article in The Washington Post gave voice to Ukrainian soldiers who had participated in the incursion and confirmed the Ukrainian attempt to extend its offensive to the Belgorod region as well, where they encountered resistance that prevented any progress. Previous experiences with groups such as the RDK and other formations affiliated with Kirilo Budanov's GUR had already made it clear that Belgorod was an area that Russia had to protect. Indeed, that was the Russian logic for initiating the now almost forgotten adventure north of Kharkiv, where troops remain mired in a fight for Volchansk, just eight kilometers from the border, that was never meant to last for months. The buffer zone that Vladimir Putin claimed was sought with the incursion has become another stalemate that has been unable to prevent the continuation of the bombing of towns such as Shebekino, which instead of decreasing, have actually increased. However, the number of troops on the ground and previous experience have meant that, at least for now, there has not been a Ukrainian breakthrough in this sector, as has happened, and with astonishing ease, in the Kursk region.

The relatively deep advance on Kursk in an area still enclosed and abandoned by Russian troops undoubtedly stretches the Ukrainian army a little further, even though it still has enough troops and equipment to open a new front and cause great difficulties for Russia. Ukrainian troops now talk about achieving a buffer zone in Russia, refer to the towns they capture as “liberated”, allow themselves to apply their anti-communist law by destroying statues of Lenin and graves of Soviet soldiers or removing the flags of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and, what is more worrying for Moscow, blow up bridges to undermine Russian logistics.

Several days ago, Ukraine captured the town of Suya, with a population of around 5,000 and close to the border. Its size would make the capture a minor success if it were not the site of the only gas pipeline that still supplies Russian gas to several countries in the European Union, especially Hungary and Slovakia, with which Kiev has a tense relationship due to its position in favour of moving the conflict to diplomatic channels. This is one of the keys to the current phase of the war, precisely because the suggestion of the possibility of negotiations has not come in recent months only from those countries that had proposed it as an alternative to a military solution, but also from those who until now had defended a resolution on the battlefield as the only possible negotiation . The need for negotiations has even been commented on by the Ukrainian government, until now the party most reluctant to initiate diplomatic contacts.

Against the backdrop of speculation about Ukraine’s strategic goals in Kursk – the tactical ones are clear: to undermine Russian logistics and force Moscow to divert resources to fight for an area it did not expect to have to defend – Presidential Office adviser Mikhail Podolyak has made clear what any analyst should have understood from the beginning: Kiev seeks to achieve a position of strength to force Russia into “a just peace”. Podolyak’s statement and Borrell’s mention of a “counteroffensive” are enough to understand that the Kursk operation seeks exactly the same objectives as the major ground attack in the summer of 2023. If we add to this what NBC reveals , which claims that the current offensive was being planned for a year, that is, since it became clear that the tanks heading towards Crimea were not going to achieve the objectives, the situation becomes even clearer.

Since the beginning of the current conflict in 2014, Ukraine's negotiating strategy has always used the front and the intensity of the bombing as an element of pressure. Therefore, the current offensive should not be understood as a contradiction to the words of Zelensky and Kuleba about diplomatic contacts. It is necessary to remember the idea of ​​a "just peace", something that throughout Ukraine's diplomatic career also has a clear meaning: kyiv has always refused to make political concessions, that is the meaning of the word. During the course of the war in Donbass, the peace that Ukraine demanded was one in which Russia would make the concessions so that kyiv could recover, without having to fulfill its commitments, the lost territory. In the current context, when Ukraine continues to publish surveys on what to do with the territories of Donbass and Crimea “after their liberation” and boasts that the population refuses to make territorial compromises, any mention of a “just peace” carries with it the usual demand of kyiv: the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity according to its 1991 borders, i.e. Russia’s unilateral surrender.

In this sense, the current attack on Kursk, which aims to spread to other Russian regions, endanger control of a nuclear power plant on Russian territory and which has made it clear that it intends to destabilize the situation in the Russian Federation internally, has the same goal as the counteroffensive of 2023. Neither then nor now was it about advancing people by people to the 1991 borders, but about placing Russia between a rock and a hard place, forced to submit to Ukrainian and Western dictates. The mission failed a year ago when the tank columns collided with the Russian defense, much more solvent than NATO desired in the face of a conventional ground attack. Ukraine was unable to endanger control of Crimea, the main card to force Russia to negotiate in a position of weakness, so it has been forced to innovate. The demand from its partners to receive weapons to attack military targets throughout Russian territory and the emphasis on striking Crimea to make Russian control unsustainable (a strategy that is also applied to the Energodar plant, in this case playing with nuclear security) is now joined by the offensive in Kursk, which openly seeks to bring war to the Russian population in the hope that chaos will undermine state control.

Despite the propaganda victory that each image of Ukrainian soldiers in the Russian Federation represents - although perhaps not the presence of SS symbols, which has already been confirmed - the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently strategic successes in Kursk to force Moscow to withdraw troops from Donbass, where Russia continues to advance, makes the Ukrainian calculation a risk that has already had consequences. As The Washington Post revealed yesterday , Russia has cancelled indirect contacts in Qatar with which the mediating countries were seeking negotiations in search of a reduction in the intensity of the battle and a truce in critical installations such as the power plants. "Either all the coordinated ceasefire talks coming from Ukraine this past month (plus this ceasefire meeting) have been psychological diversions for Ukraine's surprise incursion in Kursk or a pro-war faction inside Ukraine launched the incursion in Kursk to end the ceasefire talks," commented journalist Mark Ames yesterday. In fact, tightening the noose to force the other side to accept unacceptable terms has always been Ukraine's modus operandi . If its goal was to force Russia to give up attacks on power plants, what better pressure than threatening not one but two nuclear power plants? Obviously, the situation in Kursk makes any compromise impossible for Russia, so the imminent cancellation of indirect talks with Ukraine is not surprising.

The optimism of the past few months, in which analysts and experts have wanted to take Zelensky's statements at face value without remembering that, over the past decade, Ukraine has used negotiations to buy time or achieve its goals, not necessarily peace, was just an optical illusion. The parties' demands for a compromise remain contradictory, both retain the ability to continue fighting and neither is at immediate risk of collapse, so the conditions for a negotiation with aspirations to reach a political resolution simply do not exist. Much may change in the event of a much broader Ukrainian operation in Russia (something unlikely) or a Ukrainian collapse in Krasnoarmeysk that causes a domino effect on the eastern and southern fronts, but, for the moment, the war seems more destined to continue indefinitely in the current state of constant escalation - already with the West's permission to attack more and more targets in the Russian Federation - than towards any kind of ceasefire, even partial. The war is too important to think about peace.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/18/30396/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Summary of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of August 18, 2024) Main points:

— The losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the zone of the West group of forces in one day amounted to 440 soldiers, two ammunition depots - the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation;

— Units of the East grouping improved the position along the forward edge, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 100 soldiers and a tank;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost 420 soldiers in the zone of the South grouping;

— Russian air defense systems shot down seven HIMARS MLRS shells, a Hammer aerial bomb and 27 Ukrainian drones, 11 of which were outside the special operation zone;

— The Dnepr grouping hit two Ukrainian brigades, the enemy lost up to 80 soldiers;

— The North grouping defeated three enemy brigades, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 90 soldiers.

Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated formations of the 65th Mechanized and 128th Mountain Assault Brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Malaya Tokmachka and Pyatikhatki in the Zaporizhia region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 80 servicemen, six vehicles, two 155-mm howitzers M777 made in the USA, a 152-mm gun D-20 , a 122-mm howitzer D-30 and two electronic warfare stations "Anklav-N" . Two ammunition depots were destroyed.

▫️ Operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile troops and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces destroyed: a workshop for the production of tank guns, a US-made M270 MLRS multiple launch rocket system and a US-made HIMARS multiple launch rocket system.
In addition, concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment were hit in 163 areas.

▫️ Air defense systems shot down a French-made Hammer guided bomb , seven US-made HIMARS rockets , and 27 unmanned aerial vehicles, 11 of which were outside the area where the special military operation was being conducted.

📊 In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 639 aircraft, 282 helicopters, 30,112 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,320 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,411 multiple launch rocket systems, 13,392 field artillery pieces and mortars, 24,894 units of special military vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

SITREP 8/16/24: Zelensky's Nuclear Gambit Rears Its Head Again

Simplicius
Aug 17, 2024
More and more “rumors” insist that Zelensky is planning a devious escalation to his Kursk game in the form of a ‘nuclear event’ of some kind. The threat seems serious enough that major outlets like RIA and RT are covering it:

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(Video at link.)

Russian Foreign Ministry Ambassador Miroshnik, speaking about the Ukrainian Armed Forces preparing to attack Russian nuclear facilities, urged the U.S. to obtain information from Kiev on this matter. "It would be wise for the White House to inquire with their Nazi protégés about what they are planning and preparing for this time, so there will be no reason later to claim they knew nothing about the upcoming stunt!"

Per RIA Novosti the planned strike against both nuclear power plants is being supervised by the Intelligence Services of the United Kingdom. Large numbers of Western journalists are in Zaporozhye and Sumy to report on the strikes and ensure early spin.


Another report:

‼️🇺🇦 🏴‍☠️ Ukraine intends to strike Zaporizhzhya and Kursk NPPs - sources

▪️The strikes are planned to be carried out on spent nuclear fuel storage sites in the Kursk and Zaporizhia regions, federal media reported, citing security forces.

▪️The Kiev regime plans to attach a warhead with radioactive material - the so-called "dirty bomb".

▪️According to sources, the warheads were delivered to the Eastern Mining and Processing Plant in the village of Zhovti Vody in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

▪️The purpose of this action is to accuse Russia of committing a nuclear provocation.

❗️A large number of Western reporters have arrived in Sumy and Zaporizhia amid Kiev’s preparations for an attack on the Kursk and Zaporizhia NPPs

❗️Local residents should not panic, our forces are monitoring the situation and keeping an eye on the enemy, including strengthening air defense.

Rvvoenkor


Truthfully, though, I really don’t understand this plan, as it is explained. According to the reports based on some Russian defense insiders, Ukrainians have smuggled nuclear material in the form of a ‘dirty bomb’ somewhere into Dnipro region, and are planning to use it inside of a missile attack onto either the Russian ZNPP or Kursk nuclear power plants. In particular, they plan to hit the depleted nuclear fuel storage casks.

But logically speaking, why would you need nuclear material of your own, if you already plan to hit the storage casks which contain spent fuel rods, if you want to create a nuclear contamination incident? That’s the part I don’t quite understand. I suppose it would create a ‘larger’ incident, plus the dirty bomb would have more “live” material that would create greater contamination, but it’s still strange enough that I would have dismissed it offhand if it weren’t for the fact authentic sources are reporting it, which include Russian Chief of the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense Forces Igor Kirillov.

This is about the third or fourth time we’ve been down this road; this has been a long-lasting plan of Ukraine’s from as far back as 2022. But things are culminating now in a way where Zelensky may finally be ready to unload all trump cards, since things are melting down for the AFU on the front.

A reminder:

This same week 2 years ago Ukrainian Nazi Korchinsky proposed to strike at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant:

- "They can be stopped only with a nuclear attack"...“Yes, it is a risk. Many people will suffer ... You have to strike, there is no other way."


(Video at link.)

Right now, the information campaign being coordinated in parallel with the Kursk offensive is reaching a deafening fever pitch. NATO and its vast intel machinery are working overtime to push the narrative that the Kursk campaign is ‘overwhelming’ Putin and Russia, that internal fissures are threatening to swallow Putin’s ‘regime’ whole, and that things are generally collapsing for Russia. Even the latest Western articles are switching to this last blind shot in the dark to give Ukraine a chance:

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The latest push includes all kinds of provocations, such as foreign journalists—from UK and Italy—embedded with the AFU, illegally entering sovereign Russian territory to report from it.

Here’s British CNN correspondent illegally entering Russian territory:(Video at link.)

This includes infamous American mercenary outfit ‘Forward Observation Group’ flaunting the fact they too are allegedly in Kursk:

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This is a timed and calculated provocation, meant to push Russia to the brink, hitting every conceivable pressure point of outrage, stoking ancestral Russian pride and patriotism. And it’s true, the invasion is a black eye on Russia, to an extent—but it must be considered within the grander overall scope of the situation: things feel terminal for Ukraine; Zelensky is accelerating as if propelled by some unprecedentedly urgent impetus. By his own actions, he’s demonstrating that Ukraine appears to be on the brink, and the West is giving its all in what may amount to be one final heroic propaganda provocation to try to stir Russia out of its comfort zone.

(Video at link.)

We can see the two-pronged urgency emerge from the dire situation on Ukraine’s eastern flank in Donbass, as the collapse continues to accelerate there.

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Today was a record day for enterprise level destruction of Ukraine’s biggest prestige systems.

A Mig-29 destroyed in its airfield berth in Dnepropetrovsk airbase, at geolocation: 48.3588265, 35.0817737 (Video at link.)

This was followed by half a dozen Patriot launchers in two separate locations being hit by Iskander cluster attacks:(Video at link.)

And a highly valuable German Iris-T air defense system:(Video at link.)

As well as Sa-125:(Video at link.)

And the crowning achievement, a HIMARS destroyed in the Sumy region, which was likely being used to hit Russian bridges in Kursk:(Video at link.)

Aftermath:(Video at link.)

And much more.

Meanwhile, the squeeze is on for Ukraine’s troops in the Donetsk direction:

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https://www.wsj.com/world/as-ukraine-in ... t-8a7b1686

"'We don’t have enough people to do our job properly,' said the commander of the 21st Battalion of the Separate Presidential Brigade... Russia has a 10-to-1 advantage in artillery fire in some areas.

In addition, the Russians are neutralizing Ukrainian drones with electronic jammers. But the biggest factor, officers say, is the lack of manpower...

'If we’re supposed to have five or six people in a position, we’ll have two or three,'...He said they were so short-handed that cooks, mechanics and other rear personnel were being deployed to trenches.

Now, he said, the Russians have a manpower advantage of around five to one. Only about 20% of the casualties his battalion takes are replaced by new recruits, and the mobilized men who arrive tend to be older than those who volunteered at the start of the war.


Do yourself a favor and re-read this very carefully:

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For the folks who still believe the casualties are even, or in Ukraine’s favor, could you kindly explain how—as the commander above admits—the two sides had “roughly the same number of men” in the spring, and now Russians have a 5:1 manpower advantage? You would think that sort of implies that one side is losing massively more men than the other.

A senior US official and a senior European intelligence official both said a major goal of the operation appears to be to create “strategic dilemmas” for Putin, particularly when it comes to where Russia should allocate manpower.

As stated above, it becomes increasingly clear Ukraine has various asymmetric goals with its Kursk operation, rather than defined physical objectives. Mikhail Podolyak just outright admitted on his official account that Ukraine is “not interested occupying Russian territories:

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Ukraine is not interested in occupying Russian territories. This is obvious. Because #Ukraine is waging an exclusively defensive war strictly within the framework of international law... But if we are talking about potential negotiations – I emphasize potential – we will have to put #Rf at the table opposite. On our own terms. We have absolutely no plans to beg: "Please, sit down to negotiate". Instead, we have proven, effective means of coercion.

The Ukrainian presidential advisor openly admits the Kursk ploy revolves around “coercing” Russia to the negotiating table on Ukraine’s terms. In fact, the whole point, which was recently spelled out, was to hijack the Kursk nuclear power plant then hold it for “ransom” in blackmailing Russia to pause the war and enter negotiations at an unfavorable position.

He goes on:

In addition to economic and diplomatic ones, this is also a military tool. We need to inflict significant tactical defeats on #Russia. In the Kursk region, we can clearly see how the military tool is being used objectively to persuade Rf to enter a fair negotiation process. Once again, to enter into a negotiation process, not the traditional Russian propaganda and capitulation blackmail...

But now that the plan was thwarted and Ukraine stands no chance of capturing the plant, it appears they may be proceeding to Plan B, which is to use nuclear blackmail of a far more sinister variety via the dirty bomb method.

However, there continue to be strong indications that the Kursk operation is still potentially just the opening salvo of a larger overture. Reports of troop concentrations and equipment, such as supply trucks, being moved around the Zaporozhye region abound.

From Condotierros channel:

"The Ukrainian Armed Forces headquarters are preparing for another phase of the counteroffensive. This time in the south, in the Zaporozhye region.

They are planning to target the nuclear power plant [in Energodar]

For more than a week, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been increasing the number of armored vehicles in the direction of Orekhovo. The enemy is conducting reconnaissance and is especially trying to uncover the movement of our military units. An important element is also the "march of fuel trucks" through the city of Zaporozhye from west to south. A significant number of vehicles carry the "blood of war" for armored vehicles. At the same time, they were moving with their beacons extinguished, which may indicate real movement, and not a demonstrative movement of columns for false purposes.

It is quite possible that the enemy will undertake similar attempts as in the Kursk region. Kiev's terrorist forms of work are clear: an attempt to seize Russian land/an important negotiating facility. Such goals are confirmed by officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and mercenaries captured in the Kursk region."

They have done this several times before - so this is definitely in keeping with them. If it happens expect things to get bumpy but Russia has fended off several assaults before.


Rezident UA’s rumor mill notes:

#Inside
Our source in the General Staff said that the issue of the second stage of the counteroffensive will be resolved next week at the rate, no more than twenty days remain to start the operation to capture the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. The Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have enough reserves to conduct an operation in the Kursk region and an attack on the Zaporizhzhya NPP, which was originally the main goal, but after going deep into the territories of Russia, it faded into the background.


Igor Strelkov allegedly wrote a letter from prison, wherein he reveals he’s been watching the situation and likewise believes Ukraine is gearing up for the main attack, after launching the Kursk diversionary raid:

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Recall that thus far, the Kursk direction appears to mostly employ the Ukrainian 22nd, 80th, and 82nd brigades, with some reinforced elements and separate special forces detachments, like the ‘Bravo Team’ from the 130th Reconnaissance Battalion. But Zelensky allegedly had as many as 8-14 total brigades, which means it is conceivable that a main thrust will be launched at Zaporozhye nuclear plant in Energodar to basically achieve the same objective that Kursk could have achieved if they had broken through to Kurchatov. Of course, it’s also very possible that all the Zaporozhye movements are just maskirovka meant to keep Russia on its toes while Ukraine goes all-in on Kursk.

But Kursk itself isn’t out of danger yet. Top Russian analyst channel Two Majors claims that the AFU has begun introducing “main reserves” into the Kursk “break through”, in the form of the elite 95th Brigade:

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Now Ukrainian forces have used HIMARS to take out 3 key bridges along the Seym River, isolating the Glushkovo district, south of Rylsk and west of Sudzha:(Video at link.)

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But the Russians immediately established pontoons:

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Translated:

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To get back to Pokrovsk, the city administration is already panicking and has called for a mass evacuation, which was echoed by Rada deputy Bezuglaya:

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Russian forces have already taken two new areas since last time, and are getting close to both Mirnograd and Pokrovsk:

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In fact, Ukrainian troops screech that Russian forces are approaching Selydove, just south of there as well:

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He states that if the Russians get to it, Selydove will fall very quickly, and it will threaten the whole Kurakhove region south of it, which will then eventually lead to the downfall of Ugledar itself, as Ugledar’s supply lines are already cut from nearly every direction but the north one.

Another Ukrainian officer:

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Besides the collapsing frontline, the most important aspect driving Zelensky’s last desperate Kursk bid is that Ukraine has entered its economic doom spiral. Fitch has just cut Ukraine down to ‘restricted default’ from CCC- rating, after Ukraine effectively defaulted on its eurobond debt:

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https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ ... 024-08-13/

Default on Eurobond: The downgrade of Ukraine's LTFC IDR to 'RD' follows the expiration of the 10-day grace period for the 2026 USD750 million Eurobond coupon payment due on 1 August. This marks an event of default under Fitch's criteria with respect to the sovereign's IDR as well as the individual issue rating of the affected security.

Now couple the growing economic disaster with what is soon to take place for Ukrainian civil society, and by extension its economy, after Russia finishes off the electric grid for this coming winter.

There are now rumors Russia plans a historic, record-breaking series of strikes on Ukraine for the Kursk affront, while others believe the grid-crippling strikes will come later in the fall. Whichever it is, Ukraine will be in dire shape come this winter, and afterwards in the spring. By then the collapse will have accelerated on every front of Ukraine’s existence, including the political—after the U.S. elections.

Zelensky knew his window was closing and he had to go all out in a final bid despite not having any reserves left to bother with the main strategic frontline. It feels more and more likely that these next few months will truly be decisive.

That all being said, the opening of the Kursk operation was certainly still a fairly competent showing by the AFU, and a pretty poor one for Russia. Ukraine released this footage of the very first attack on the Kursk border checkpoint, where AFU tanks were able to drive up and fire on the checkpoint unopposed: (Video at link.)

Someone recently wrote, “a dinosaur turns slowly”, and it is a kind of apt description of the Russian general staff’s quite ponderously stiff control of this sector. However, Russia cinched things up fairly fast after that, as reinforcements were able to be quickly redeployed, and begin setting up regional-operational command and control oversight in short order which, it must be said, was impressive in its adaptiveness and agility.



A few last videos:

German generals provocatively discussing battle plans for invasion into Russia, a quite jarring modern sight: (Video at link.)

Zelensky formally requests Syrsky to find more meat for the Kursk grinder: (Video at link.)

Zelensky asks Syrsky to find more people for the offensive on Kursk region "I understand that it is not easy, but maybe we can somehow strengthen our troops in these areas," he said.

Many Ukrainian prisoners continue to be captured in Kursk, including women:

(Video at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sit ... ear-gambit

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Jeff Childers Analyzes WSJ’s Incredible Report on the Nordstream Pipeline Attack
August 16, 2024 natyliesb
By Jeff Childers, Substack, 8/15/24

Yesterday the Wall Street Journal dished up a steaming pile of deep-state horse hockey, an ‘exclusive’ with the wild and (literally) unbelievable headline, “A Drunken Evening, a Rented Yacht: The Real Story of the Nord Stream Pipeline Sabotage. But wait, it immediately got even better. The sub-headline claimed, “Private businessmen funded the shoestring operation, which was overseen by a top general; President Zelensky approved the plan, then tried unsuccessfully to call it off.”

Let’s check and see how well you guys have been following along. Take a quick test to predict where this article is going. Choose one of the following forecasts:

A. [_] The article was sourced from credible, verifiable individuals known to exist who were in positions to have personal knowledge about what happened; OR…

B. [_] The article was sourced only from loosely-identified, anonymous informants.

If you didn’t pick ‘B’, stay after class for a remedial reading assignment.

Now let’s use this piece of high fantasy as a guide for how to spot articles pre-written for media by the Operation Mockingbird department of some squiddly organization bearing an obscure three-letter acronym. This story might be the most obvious example to date; it’s like they aren’t even really trying anymore.

Ready? Let’s crack some cephalopods.

The Journal’s tall tale began with a tell: it described the story to follow as an “outlandish” —unbelievable— scheme, concocted in a bar using alcohol-muddied thinking. How relatable! Who among us hasn’t concocted wildly dangerous sabotage schemes after throwing back a few? In other words, it knew the story was a whopper and would be hard to swallow.

Prepare to throw the old canard, “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence,” right out the window. Who needs evidence?

Here’s the Journal’s generic description of the highly-technical operation, with one key sentence highlighted. Think about that sentence while you’re reading the rest:

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Haha, they couldn’t resist smuggling a little diversity into their fabulous fiction (“one was a woman”). Women can blow up pipelines too. And they even added a laugh track! But let’s focus back on that leading sentence: “Now, for the first time, the outlines of the real story can be told.”

Can be told. That sentence was a mistake made in haste. It wasn’t written by any independent WSJ journalist. The line implied some outside force or authority always stopped the story from being told before. But now, it has granted permission. The article never explained who or what that authority was. It raises murky questions that linger like octopus ink:

Who stopped the story from being told?

Why did they stop the story about ‘private businessmen’ being told?

Why did this invisible authority decide now the story could be told?

I’ll suggest we weren’t meant to know about the outside authority. It slipped into the article by accident, as the writer struggled to explain the story’s timing. That was an unintended gift, but it wasn’t necessary to understand the game.

The article continued by claiming that President Zelensky initially approved Operation Vodka, but the CIA “found out about it,” asked the former comedian to stand down, and Zelensky complied, ordering the saboteurs to stop. But former commander-in-chief Zaluzhniy —since fired and given a sweet, immunity-laden ambassadorship— went ahead anyway.

How exactly did CIC Zaluzhniy get involved with these ‘private businessmen?’ How did the CIA find out about the plot (the article says Dutch intelligence told them, but how did the Dutch know)? Why was Zelensky involved in the first place? Was it an official military op or not?

Both Zelensky and Zaluzhniy denied the story. So our belief must rest only on the Journal’s anonymous sources, composed of “four senior Ukrainian defense and security officials who either participated in or had direct knowledge of the plot.” The WSJ never sourced any of the alleged “private businessmen” (and woman!). It sounds like Operation Vodka included a lot more than “private businessmen,” but the article never stretched to connect that dot.

Think critically. How did these ‘senior officials’ learn of the supposedly private operation? Even more importantly, why would they would disclose it? Why would they disclose it to a newspaper? Why now? The Journal never said.

In whom do we readers place our trust? The named sources who denied the story? Or the Journal’s inky anonymous informants, who don’t even match the profile of the inebriated private businesspeople it claims planned the attack? Is this story just a massive appeal to the Journal’s credibility? You can trust us, because.

Enter the German connection. Based on “no evidence” (see for yourself) they issued a warrant for a Ukrainian dive instructor in June:

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No admissible evidence? Is this the same Journal that for years stubbornly insisted there was “no evidence” Ivermectin successfully treated covid infections? Now, apparently, “no evidence” is just fine when assigning blame for one of the most geopolitically significant stories in our lifetimes.

Arrest warrants are usually public information. Knowing who is supposed to be arrested is generally helpful for catching them. Pose for the mugshot! But the story never disclosed the alleged “Ukrainian dive instructor’s” identity. He could be any old octopus, for all we know.

Not only were the Journal’s claims completely unverifiable by actual humans, but the Journal even insisted verification would be impossible:

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Uh-huh. So … how does the WSJ know there is no paper trail? Is it plausible every junior bureaucrat would meekly accept a verbal approval for a massive war crime, without even wanting an email for the file? Did the conspirators never ever discuss the plan and its complicated logistics in any text messages, emails, DMs, Word documents, or even a spreadsheet?

The remainder of Journal’s article was packed with convoluted, mind-numbing details and speculations that would be inadmissible in county court. But there was an even bigger hole in the story. Again, think critically.

If the Journal just broke an explosive exclusive resulting from terrific, Pulitzer-level investigative reporting, where are those details? Where is the Journal’s triumphant narrative about how it broke the story of a lifetime and solved a war crime that the World’s governments have been unable to crack?

As to how the Journal pulled off this exclusive, there was nothing but radio silence. No paper trail. Just the inky water left behind.

Here’s what the Journal’s “Exclusive Investigation” amounted to: Anonymous informants, implausibly precise and highly technical operations (by civilians!), unnamed perps, critical internal contradictions, vague and convenient claims that evidence does not exist, denials by named sources, lack of source transparency, unexplained timing, and an invisible investigation.

Great work, Wall Street Journal. By “great “work,” I mean deplorable hackery. So this article could only have been yet another spectral fairy tale planted by the subterranean security state. But why? And why now? What we’ve learned in the past about these kinds of fantastic one-off stories, which quickly sink into the Baltic without a geopolitical ripple, is that they were intended to discipline Ukraine, by showing the deep state’s whip hand.

What are they trying to force a recalcitrant Zelensky to do now?

Oh well. A least now the story “can be told.” Thanks for letting us know, I guess. We live in a time of media malfeasance and control beyond any nightmarish, tentacular villain Orwell could possibly have dreamed up following a drunken oyster-eating contest. Stay frosty.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2024/08/jef ... ne-attack/

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Here’s Why The US Is Playing Dumb About Ukraine’s Plans To Invade Kursk

Andrew Korybko
Aug 17, 2024

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This dishonesty advances the US’ escalation control and soft power interests.

White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre claimed that the US didn’t know about Ukraine’s plans to invade Russia’s Kursk Region, but that’s unbelievable since there’s no way that its intelligence services didn’t even catch a hint of it, not to mention likely participate in the preparations. Putin even reaffirmed during a meeting on Monday with high-ranking government officials about this crisis that Ukraine is the West’s proxy for waging war on Russia. Here are the five reasons why the US is still playing dumb:

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1. Maintain Plausible Deniability For Escalation Control

Admitting complicity in Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s universally recognized territory would make the US a direct participant in these unprecedented hostilities and thus place enormous pressure upon Moscow to respond against it and/or other NATO countries like Poland. The US doesn’t want that to happen, ergo why it also forced Ukraine to call off its reportedly planned assassination of Putin last month as explained here, so dishonestly denying knowledge of its proxy’s plans is par for the course and not unexpected.

2. Avoid Embarrassment & Responsibility Once Ukraine Fails

It’s unlikely that Ukraine will be able to indefinitely hold the territory that it captured inside of Russia so it’s a question of when and not if it fails. Accordingly, the US wants to avoid the embarrassment associated with that once it happens and also reduce the chances that Russia feels pressured to respond against it and/or other NATO countries as written above. The US is basically letting Ukraine hold the bag after everything inevitably fails apart so that Russia’s full fury is directly solely against its proxy.

3. Propagate David-vs.-Goliath Optics For Boosting Morale

By pretending to be caught off guard by what just happened, the US is lending false credence to the optics that the latest phase of the already decade-long Ukrainian Conflict that began almost two and a half years ago is a modern-day David vs. Goliath story. This is meant to boost morale inside of Ukraine amidst its drastic slump caused by the ramping up of forcible conscription there and increase support among the Western public for continuing to fund this proxy war in the face of growing fatigue.

4. Keep Up The Charade Of A “Gentlemen’s Agreement” Gone Bad

RT’s Sergey Poletaev introduced an intriguing theory into the global information ecosystem earlier this week when he wrote that “The relative calm along the 1,000-kilometer border for two and a half years likely wasn’t coincidental. We can suggest there were agreements between Moscow and Washington, specifically with the administration of US President Joe Biden.” If there’s any truth to that, then lying about not being aware of Kiev’s plans could be an attempt by the US to try to hoodwink Putin yet again.

5. Troll Russia After It Previously Denied Supporting Donbass

Russia always denied militarily supporting Donbass throughout the eight years between “EuroMaidan” and the special operation, but the US insisted that this was a lie and that Russia had “invaded” Ukraine, albeit at a limited scale. Whatever the truth may be, playing dumb about its support for Ukraine’s indisputable invasion of Russia is also an attempt to troll Russia for denying the dubious claim that it “invaded” Donbass before 2022.

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There’s no truth to the US’ denial that it knew nothing about Ukraine’s plans to invade Russia, but claiming otherwise advances its escalation control and soft power interests. Those who play along with this are insulting the intelligence of their targeted audience, some of whom might feel pressured not to call them out though due to fear of being aggressively harassed online and “canceled”. All objective observers know the truth, especially those in the Global South, which is all that matters for Russia.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/heres-wh ... aying-dumb

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Volga was called in Kursk region
August 17, 6:51 p.m

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Twenty-four servicemen from the 22nd separate mechanized brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces surrendered in an organized manner to the Russian army near the village of Komarovka in the Kursk region.

(Video at link.)

Those wishing to surrender contacted the Russian Armed Forces through a specially created channel FREE_SOLDIER2022 in Telegram. So to speak, "On the benefits of TG in conducting military operations."

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9328312.html

Google Translator

******

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🇷🇺🇺🇦 On the attack of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on an oil depot in the Rostov region

At night, Ukrainian drones attacked an oil depot near Proletarsk , southeast of Rostov-on-Don . The target was the Kavkaz Combine , a major storage facility for fuel and lubricants in the region and under the jurisdiction of Rosrezerv.

At around five in the morning, a Ukrainian UAV hit one of the fuel tanks, causing a fire. While the fire was being extinguished, another enemy drone attacked the oil depot. Later, a fire train arrived in the incident area to extinguish the two fires. According to preliminary information, there are no casualties or injuries.

If in the last two weeks the main target of Ukrainian UAV attacks was military airfields in Lipetsk , Voronezh and Nizhny Novgorod regions , then during the new raid the enemy again returned to hitting fuel and energy complex facilities.

Given the high volume of production of such devices, it is very naive to hope that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will soon run out of their stocks. Therefore, the only sure way to combat raids is to destroy UAV groups in advance while they are approaching the target, which is ensured by a set of measures - from the creation of an appropriate control system to the use of light aircraft and FPV drones as interceptors.

https://rybar.ru/29779-2/

Kursk direction: Ukrainian Armed Forces strikes on bridges and local battles
August 18, 2024
Rybar

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The situation in Kursk Oblast remains stably tense. The enemy is consolidating its positions in the occupied territory and amassing forces.

In the Glushkovsky district, no attempts to advance by the enemy are observed, but they are striking populated areas. In addition, the condition of the bridge in Zvannoye after the recent landing has become clearer: judging by the footage, the object has received serious damage, but has not collapsed and may be suitable for use by pedestrians and, in some cases, light vehicles.

There is no information about advances from either side from the Korenevsky and Sudzhansky districts . Fighting continues, and footage of the aftermath of strikes on Ukrainian equipment and captured members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is multiplying on the Internet. On the enemy side, in turn, videos are appearing that indicate control over settlements taken last week.

In the Belovsky district, after an unsuccessful dash to Girya, the enemy is not taking active action - evidence of this, at least, does not appear in open sources.

At the same time, Ukrainian formations are taking steps to consolidate their positions in the occupied territory of the Kursk region , bringing in both engineering equipment and air defense systems.

https://rybar.ru/kurskoe-napravlenie-ud ... alnye-boi/

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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blindpig
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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Mon Aug 19, 2024 12:07 pm

Tendencies
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/19/2024

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Lindsey Graham's stance and his enthusiasm for the continuation of the war or for a move to an even harsher phase should not be seen as a trend indicator or a harbinger of things to come. A veteran of the media war against Russia in Ukraine since the years when the battle was limited to Donbass, the US senator has always wanted more, more attacks on Russia and Russian forces. With the Russian invasion, he has been joined in the will to fight to the last Ukrainian by many journalists, think-tankers and new experts who, when Graham visited Ukrainian troops in Shirokino at Christmas 2018, would probably not have been able to place the tiny town on the map.

On his last visit, the Republican politician wanted to take a further step towards bringing together the positions of Volodymyr Zelensky and Republican candidate Donald Trump, whom he supports. On that occasion, Graham managed to get the reluctant Ukrainian president to accept, albeit with difficulty, the proposal from the entourage of the candidate for return to the White House according to which Ukraine would obtain American weapons and ammunition on credit. Until then, Ukraine had flatly refused to consider the possibility. The argument was that its troops were fighting in a war with Russia that is common and in which only the Armed Forces of Ukraine make it possible for Western countries not to have to fight against the second largest army in the world. From this Manichean position, the delivery of weapons and ammunition would function as payment for services rendered . However, the fear of Donald Trump's return to the White House at a time when the former president does not hesitate to insist on his desire to quickly achieve an end to the war - which Ukraine fears will be based on territorial concessions - has made it impossible to maintain this intransigence. After Graham's visit, which convinced Zelensky and his entourage of the benefits of receiving aid on credit, the formula was finally included in the package of more than 61 billion dollars linked to the war in Ukraine that the US Congress approved in April. In fact, Lindsey Graham's work in this case favored Joe Biden more, who managed after months of delay to approve the resumption of the shipment of weapons that Trumpism had been blocking for some time. Moreover, the measure is nothing more than a fiscal trick with which the United States guarantees arms orders for its military-industrial complex, and it does so from the income column and not from the expenditure column, a short-term trap that does not even try to hide the fact that the logic - and the initial approach - of these credits is that they should be forgiven.

Graham's visit last week came at a much more pleasant time for the belligerent senator, who was elated to see the Ukrainian operation in the Russian territory of Kursk, which he did not hesitate to praise, calling it "beautiful" and "bold." Perhaps the most relevant thing about Graham's trip to Europe was not his statements, but the fact that the man who until recently was an unimportant senator, a figure to be mocked for his mistakes and who stood out for his extreme and seemingly limitless belligerence, has been received in several European countries and his profile has risen considerably. Lindsey Graham's desire to escalate the war eternally until achieving the destruction of Russia, similar to that which his faithful squire John McCain would most likely maintain, is not new, but it is increasingly striking that his radical stance is becoming a reflection of the thinking of the establishment , not only in the United States, but above all in Europe. It is significant in this regard that the American representative who openly uttered the words “fight to the last Ukrainian” in an attempt to militarily defeat the common enemy Russia has met this past week with the future Secretary General of NATO or with the authorities of Norway and Finland in order to achieve the objectives of the United States in Europe through the Alliance. Scandinavia, once an example of the friendly-faced social democracy that was to achieve world peace, is now receiving the most pro-war American envoys, not out of sheer courtesy, but because their points of view are perfectly aligned.

“As one of NATO’s newest members, Finland brings a lot to the table. Finland is one of the most advanced countries in AI and quantum computing research and development, and has some of the largest shipyards in the world. The future of our economy and war itself will be determined by the development of AI, and Finland is well ahead of the curve. There is no doubt that joining NATO further strengthens the alliance. The United States and our NATO allies need to build larger naval forces to provide the deterrence that has been lost around the world, and in collaboration with Finland, we will greatly accelerate that effort,” Graham wrote about his productive meeting with the president and prime minister of Finland, which took advantage of the war situation to join NATO without having to give voice to the public and at a time when it was aware that it would not encounter opposition. Since then, the country has stood out as one of the most radical in justifying every Ukrainian action and in praising the most radical sectors of Ukrainian nationalism. This was demonstrated by the mournful face of the social democrat and then Prime Minister Sanna Marin at the funeral of DaVinci , a prominent member of the Ukrainian far right and from the Praviy Sektor.

After visiting Norway to discuss issues related to strengthening NATO and collective action to maintain the Ukrainian war effort, Graham arrived in the Netherlands, where he met with the future NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte. The journey, the destinations, the people he visited and the content of Lindsey Graham's trip, accompanied for part of the visit by Democratic Senator Sidney Blumenthal, do not seem to be the private initiative of an individual senator but rather a mission of his country in the context of preparations to guarantee the status quo of the Alliance in the event of Donald Trump's arrival at the White House.

Ensuring that the military solution remains the only possible one and that diplomacy is relegated to minor issues is the main task. “It is important for us to maintain bipartisan support for the United States. I told them about our needs in strengthening the air defense system and priorities in implementing reforms. We also discussed frozen Russian assets. I thanked them for the Senate’s vote on important initiatives for Ukraine and for the United States’ support for restoring the Ukrainian energy sector,” Prime Minister Shmyhal wrote about their meeting. The priorities are clear: insisting that support for Ukraine must be unanimous and independent of partisan divisions, increasing the flow of arms and financing, sanctions against Russia and solutions to the issue of energy infrastructure. As it became known this past weekend, resolving this issue through diplomatic means was the goal of the mediating countries, who are about to begin indirect contacts to reach an agreement to leave the electricity production infrastructure out of military objectives. In a negotiating style typical of those like Graham who want war to be the only way forward, Ukraine has, however, opted to resume its attacks on the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant and begin an adventure in Kursk that could threaten another nuclear power plant, in this case on Russian territory.

Everything is justified when the goal is to achieve a fair peace, i.e. the imposition of Ukrainian terms on the entire population, especially those who a decade ago responded to Ukrainian aggression and looked to Moscow for help. “It is important that Ukrainians and Americans truly emerge victorious in our defense of normal life and people’s freedom. Today I met with the US Senate delegation. We discussed exactly what is needed to end this war in a fair way, including the need to use long-range weapons,” Zelensky wrote, mentioning his bargaining tools: weapons, funding, and the green light to strike at ever-widening distances in Russia.

To do this, Ukraine needs weapons. Its air force was destroyed in the initial stages of the Russian invasion and has been repeatedly supported by donations and spare parts from the former Warsaw Pact countries that still had Soviet or Russian aircraft. However, the ambition of Ukraine and its staunch supporters is to have large numbers of Western aircraft, starting with the F-16s, which have already begun to arrive, although in tiny numbers that will not be able to change the balance of power. The problem is not a shortage of equipment, but of Ukrainian pilots trained to fly them. Always capable of finding solutions to ensure that the war escalates a little further, Senator Graham has proposed that Ukraine should have retired American pilots to fly the F-16s that have been or will be donated by various Western countries. Without any fear that the use of Western equipment flown by American personnel will be interpreted as direct US participation in the war, the American senator simply wants more war. The fact that he has shifted from a fringe senator speaking only for himself to representing the establishment indicates the trend in which the war is taking place: always closer to escalation than diplomacy.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/19/tendencias/

Google Translator

(Graham's serial belligerence might be attributed to his need to be perceived as uber-macho by the Republican primary voters here in SC where persistent rumors of his queerness nearly sank him in an earlier primary. Shouldn't matter a whit but those people...Regardless, he is a sorry asshole, as we say in these parts.)

*******

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Pokrovskoe direction: advance of the Russian Armed Forces in several areas
situation as of 17:00, August 18, 2024

While Ukrainian formations continue to attack in the Kursk region, the operational crisis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Pokrovskoe direction has been steadily worsening over the past weeks. In just a few days, units of the Russian Armed Forces were able to expand the zone of control towards both Novogrodovka and the Karlovskoye Reservoir .

To the northwest of Zhelannoye, Russian troops occupied Zhuravka and began fighting in Kruty Yar . Apparently, the main target of the Russian Armed Forces in this area is the mine No. 3 "Novogrodovskaya" located to the west , which is on a hill.

To the south, assault groups of the Russian Armed Forces also expanded the zone of control, but due to the lack of objective control footage on the Internet, it is difficult to establish the front line. At the same time, Russian servicemen are trying to break through to the Kotlyarevskaya mine (formerly Rossiya), which was previously used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a storage facility for equipment and communications systems. There are also reports of Russian Armed Forces attack aircraft reaching the outskirts of Selidovo , but it is not yet possible to confirm this information. The city itself was hit several times by artillery, and FPV drones are already flying in to targets within the city limits. Russian troops have achieved significant success on the southern flank, where at least five settlements have come under the control of the Russian Armed Forces. Among them is Zavetnoye , from the center of which videos of the raising of a flag have appeared . From the Novoselovka Pervaya - Yasnobrodovka line , units of the Russian Armed Forces have leveled the control zone along the shore of the Karlovskoye Reservoir . On the opposite side, Ukrainian formations still retain control over Ptichye .

▪️The Russian Defense Ministry also reported the liberation of the village of Sviridonovka , located on the northern flank. However, according to our data, the village itself was occupied by units several days earlier.

Over the past weeks, the situation has significantly worsened for Ukrainian formations in the Pokrovsk direction , and the general description of the situation for the enemy is often reduced to interjections. The scale of the advance of Russian troops also demonstrates the cost of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' offensive in the Kursk region .

At the same time, the Ukrainian command is already actively preparing Selidovo and Mirnohrad for defense in case of further advancement of the Russian Armed Forces - since August 19, a virtually round-the-clock curfew has been imposed in the cities, while reserves are being transferred there. High-resolution map @rybar

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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Ukraine Weekly Update
16th August 2024

Dr. Rob Campbell
Aug 16, 2024

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Prokhorovka - part of the Kursk battle 1943

<snip>

‘Negotiations Impossible’ - Putin

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Russian President Vladimir Putin - Sputnik International, 1920, 12.08.2024

Vladimir Putin, in a press interview on the 12th August, said that negotiations with Ukraine are now impossible:

It is now clear why the Kiev regime refused to return to our proposals for a peaceful settlement. The enemy is seeking to improve its negotiating positions in the future, but what kind of negotiations can we talk about with people who attack peaceful people and create a danger to nuclear power facilities.

I agree of course but Ukraine has been attacking civilians for more than a decade so am not sure why he said this. I have heard that the Russian public has been in favour of negotiations prior to the Kursk attacks so maybe Putin’s response reflects a hardening of the population who are losing patience with their Ukrainian ‘brothers’.

Russian Introduces Counter Terrorist Operation (CTO)
Kursk, Belgorod and Bryansk are now subject to a CTO regime due to the increased threat of sabotage in the border regions. According to Tass:

As part of counterterrorism operations, the government can relocate people to safe areas, control communication by phone, restrict communications, requisition vehicles, and suspend manufacturing activity involving hazardous materials.

US To Replace the Once Great Z?

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Watch this face.

The Russian intelligence service has claimed that the US is attempting to find a ‘less corrupt’ and ‘more manageable’ figure than the once great Z, according to Sputnik. Former Ukraine Interior Minister, Arsen Avakov (pictured), who appears on Russia’s list of terrorists and extremists, is wanted for crimes against civilians in the Donbass and elsewhere. You can read more here. The US must surely realise that Russia will not negotiate with this man. The Intelligence Service claimed that the legacy media will embark on a campaign to discredit Zelensky in preparation for the change.

Power Outages Increase

Ukraine is experiencing the worse power outages since the SMO began, according to Time (reported by Slavyangrad).

Ukrainian Accused of Nord Stream Attack

German prosecutors now consider Vladimir Zhuravlev, a native of Kiev, to be the main suspect in the investigation of the Nord Stream attacks - according to Sputnik. Zhuravlev, who is thought to have had at least three accomplices in the attack, was last seen in Warsaw. Sorry, I am a little sceptical about this claim. According to RT, the Wall Street Journal - said by some to be the mouthpiece of US intelligence services - is claiming that Zelensky approved of the Nord Stream attacks but bowed out after US pressure. However, Zaluzhny went ahead without his permission. This is such a convenient story. A German ex-spy master has said that Poland was also involved, according to RT.

The People Fight Back

Odessa
According to this report an elderly woman with a handbag chased TCC employees attempting to recruit young men. It appears that this is a daily occurrence in Odessa and elsewhere.

TCC Vehicles Torched
Overnight on the 11th/12th August, according to Intel Republic:

Cars belonging to Kiev goons melt and go up in smoke after Ukrainians commit arson attacks in Odessa, South Ukraine and Dnepropetrovsk, East Ukraine under cover of night.

Disabled Soldiers Deserted by State

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Ron Kovic - abandoned by the state

Since the beginning of the SMO, Zelensky has promised that badly injured and disabled soldiers would receive ‘first class treatment’ from the state. But the once great Z hasn’t kept many of his promises, has he. According to this Ukrainian source disabled soldiers receive zero support from the state. There are now 4 million disabled people in Ukraine. TCC thugs are disabling more as part of their ‘recruitment drive’ while the state turns a blind eye - according to another Ukrainian source.

Ukraine is not alone in this. Anyone who has seen Oliver Stone’s film ‘Born on the Fourth of July’ will be aware of how the US state mistreated wheelchair bound Ron Kovic and his ilk.

West Approves Kursk Terrorist Attacks

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Civilians attacked in Kursk

Politicians from the US and Germany have spoken approvingly about the Kursk incursion which appears to break with a previously held view that Ukraine should not attack Russian territory with Western weapons. They must know that civilians are being targeted but still they offer encouragement. Anyway, I suppose this was to be expected. Predictably, Poland, Estonia and Finland have joined the chorus - according to RT. The US has claimed that it did not know about the Kursk ‘invasion’ beforehand - which is utter nonsense of course. Indeed, Z’s advisor Podolyak has admitted as much.

Ukrainian Drones Enter Belarus

Lukashenko has complained that Ukrainian drones have been entering their air space criticising the Ukrainians for escalating the conflict. It is not clear whether Belarus will retaliate.

Ukraine Terrorist Attacks
Since the beginning of this year, Ukrainian drone attacks have killed 114 civilians and injured another 656.

Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant

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On August 11th, the Zaporozhye NPP was hit by two drones causing damage to one of the cooling towers. Maria Zakharova condemned the attack thus:

Kiev, under the leadership of the West, has undermined world energy security and has now embarked on a nuclear terror of the continent.

The fire at the cooling tower was extinguished just before midnight and it is reported that nuclear safety has not been jeopardised . You can read more at Sputnik.

Once again, as with previous attacks on the plant, the IAEA has failed to admit that these attacks came from Ukraine - unbelievable!

Zakharova urged the international community to get Ukraine to stop the attacks but Zelensky is admitting nothing.

According to Ukrainian Telegram Channel legitimniy, the once great Z has posted footage of the fire on social media and is claiming that the Russians are responsible by burning tyres at the base of the cooling tower: hence the smoke. But Ukrainians are not buying it.

You can see footage on X.

The Western media mostly reported on Z’s claim that the Russians had set its own NPP alight. But Zero Hedge provided more balanced coverage.

Kursk

This person’s profession is ‘protecting the motherland’.
For those who don’t know, a great tank battle was fought in Kursk during the summer of 1943. This will still reside in the collective memory of the people in the area. The Germans attacked towards Kursk from the north and south in an attempted ‘pincer’ movement - but they failed. The Germans will also ‘remember’ the failure of the Kursk Offensive (Operation Citadel). For both Russians and Germans there will be a sense of deja vu regarding the movement of German tanks towards Kursk. The once great Z, wishing to be great again, has said that ‘the Kursk catastrophe will mark the end of Putin’s rule'. Abraham Lincoln once said, in response to the boast of General Joe Hooker about reaching Richmond, ‘the hen is the wisest of all of the animal creation because she never cackles until egg has been laid’.

There has been much concern about this latest Kursk operation, its terroristic nature and the fact that it was allowed to happen. There is much evidence that civilians have been targeted and that chemical weapons have been used, including hexachloroethane delivered through 155mm cluster MLRS munitions. Kursk, along with Belgorod and Bryansk, are under CTO which means that Russia is treating Ukraine’s incursion as a terrorist act delivered by a terrorist state. Those Ukrainians and foreign mercenaries participating will be treated as terrorists along with those who organised it, including the Kiev regime and Western intelligence services such as the CIA or MI6. Western leaders are supporting this action thereby demonstrating their qualified opposition to terrorism. When acts of terrorism are perceived to benefit them they approve and they disapprove of terrorism only when it does not benefit them. There is no consistency or principle involved in this pragmatism.

Many have been worried that the incursion could succeed in its alleged objective of capturing the Kursk NPP but it doesn’t look as if this will now happen. Writing on Andrei Martyanov’s blog, Larch reminded us of the standard tactic employed by the SMO during the past two years:

Allow the attack to form, allow the attack to proceed.
Catch the front spear and stop it. Missile and air strike the rear and shred the attacking columns.

The Russians allowed the attack so it could attenuate, they stopped it and hit the rear, cutting off the first echelon from any second or third. Destroyed the command Hq with Iskanders, killing 15 commanding officers, and set their elite killer special forces, Akhmat, ex-Wagner and the Donetsk group on the attackers now cut off and diced into small DRG-marauder groups hiding in houses and tree-lines and narrow forest bands.

They have killed most all the first echelon and destroyed most all the whole damn grouping's vehicles and armor. In some places, it is a turkey shoot for drones and bombers and helos.


Whether things will turn out this way remains to be seen. Last week I quoted the Russian MoD’s claim that Ukraine had suffered 945 casualties out of only 1,000 troops deployed - which I found hard to believe but Larch makes a similar claim here. I am still sceptical, however. Other commentators, such as Larry Johnson, believe as many as 4,000 could have been involved - which is more credible maybe.

Thus far, Putin has not declared Ukraine to be a terrorist state as far as I am aware.

On August 11th, according to Ukrainian sources, the advance into Russia was stopped due to fierce Russian resistance and the Ukrainian troops have been ordered to dig in. If the Ukrainians believed that the incursion would sow discontent among the Russian population they were mistaken as the people rally around the victims of Kursk - as this footage shows.

Major General Apti Alaudinov of the Chechen fighter group Akhmat has said that this is the battle they have been waiting for that will bring down NATO as well as Ukraine:

For those who are sitting in their comfortable seats, be it a couch or a warm place, as well as for those who took part in the special military operation and are now resting at their homes, I want to say: guys, this is exactly the battle I have always talked about.

Although the enemy has advanced considerably into our territory we have the situation under control, he said, according to Pravda. He also said that the Kursk operation was planned by the US involving many of its Generals - according to Pravda. 76,000 people have been evacuated from the border region of Kursk - though many more will leave shortly.

Some Ukrainian bloggers take the view that Zelensky forced this offensive onto Syrsky and even blackmailed him with bad publicity until he succumbed. I have seen a number of reports including this one from FT where captured soldiers have been told to shoot civilians on the spot with complete immunity from prosecution (but the Russians will punish them). Those who have killed unarmed Russian soldiers - as reported by the Business Insider - will also be punished (see b MoA 15th August). Even though the killing of unarmed combatants is a war crime, the Insider simply didn’t notice! Both the Insider and The FT reported on their stories without any hint of criticism of these crimes.

By the 12th August, the offensive had ground to a halt as the remaining Ukrainians in the ‘bulge’ dug in to await the Russian onslaught. b from the MoA provides a good summary dated 12th August.

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This map provides some more detail on the 15th August:

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By the end of the week, the Ukrainians were still conducting raids into Kursk and some villages, such as Glushkovo, have been evacuated as a precaution. The Ukrainians have evacuated civilians from part of Sumy region so that they can accommodate their troops in civilian dwellings which will make it more difficult for the Russians to target them - according to the Two Majors. The fog of war is particularly dense in this Direction. Russian General Apti Alaudinov has stated that 12,000 Ukrainian troops have now entered the Kursk Oblast. According to Yury Podolyaka, a reliable source, the battle for Glushkovo will be Ukraine’s final push before the Russians have concentrated sufficient forces to counter-attack. Dr. Gilbert Doctorow, speaking on Dialogue Works, believes that when they are ready the Russians will pulverise the Ukrainians who have ventured into Kursk. Time will tell.

Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, has chaired a ‘coordination council’ meeting to discuss the situation in the border regions and how to improve security. Perhaps this is the equivalent of an ‘inquiry’ which will attempt to learn from past mistakes - though I don’t think many countries on earth could protect their borders completely. I would not be too critical therefore - but Russia has to adapt to the new situation.

Another Ukrainian source has information claiming that Western Intelligence, when it became clear that Russia was not going to move troops out of the Donbass, told Z to withdraw. Expanding the front, they advised, would stretch the Ukrainians even further than they already are. But the once great Z, wanting to be great again, refused.

It should be noted that the fighting in Kursk is characterised by maneuver as the Two Majors explain in their summary for the 16th August:

The fighting in the region is characterised as manoeuvre warfare: the enemy is trying to occupy territory and settlements by raids, while the RFAF are knocking out the enemy by counteraction: yesterday there was fighting near Olgino, Spalnoye, Korenevo, and, of course, Martynovka. In Sudzha there is a focal presence of both sides, there are clashes.

<snip>

Kharkiv

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By the end of the week, according to Rybar:

On the Kharkov front, Ukrainian formations carried out an attack on the RFAF positions in the area of ​​the Kolotilovka International Checkpoint and for some time occupied its territory. Later, Russian troops knocked the enemy out of its positions and regained control of the crossing.

Pokrovsk

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Marat Khairullin’s Map

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Yuriy Lutsenko, former head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, has said that the capture of Pokrovsk will cause the Ukrainians enormous logistical problems. A highway runs from here to Konstantinovka, Chasov Yar, and then up to Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. The Russians were just 5 km from this highway on the 10th August and moving slowly towards it. Once this road is cut, Ukrainian men and supplies will need to travel twice the distance.

On August 14th, according to Yury Podolyaka:

While the Ukrainian offense in the Kursk region is visibly losing steam and failing, the Russian offensive towards Pokrovsk is beginning to look very threatening indeed. In just one day yesterday [i.e. 14th August], the last Ukrainian line of defense in front of the large settlement of Novogorodovka, erected along the Zhuravka River, completely collapsed. The Russian breakthrough was up to 5 kilometers wide and up to 3 kilometers deep. Without bringing fresh reserves into the battle, Ukraine may see further collapse of the front here.

By the end of the week Nikolaevka was captured along with Novotoretskoye which has also been cleared. By the 16th August, the situation was so serious that the Ukrainian administration advised civilians to leave Pokrovsk.

Toretsk-New York

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According to Yury Podolyaka:

Toretsk, Zheleznoye - "New York": Ukraine is short of reserves (Map 4). Yesterday [i.e. 14th August], Russians largely finished liberating "New York" (aka Novgorodskoe). They also made a significant advance to the west of this settlement, moving along the road to Sukhaya Balka. Thus, Ukrainian strongholds northeast of Novgorodskoe have been enveloped, and Ukrainians will likely have to withdraw from them very soon. The Russians have also finished liberating the settlement of Zheleznoye (Artemovo) and started serious fighting in the first high-rise buildings area of Toretsk itself. The Russian offensive thus continues apace, the pressure is not easing, as Ukraine may have hoped after its Kursk incursion. The all-in strategy is now playing against Ukraine.

By the end of the week Kirovo was almost completely liberated.

Krasnogorovka

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According to Yury Podolyaka:

Having crossed the Lozovaya River, the Russians have reached the rear of the most important enemy fortification in this area.

Konstantinovka
By the end of the week, the Russians had advanced to the centre of Konstantinovka where the town is separated by a motorway.


Avdeyevka
By the end of the week, the Russians had liberated Orlovka and had advanced to the south east of Zhuravka.

(Much more at link.)

https://robcampbell.substack.com/p/ukra ... update-e15

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Interpreting Donald Tusk’s Scandalous Tweet About The Nord Stream Pipelines

Andrew Korybko
Aug 18, 2024

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He inadvertently circumstantiated Putin’s accusation that US intelligence was behind this attack.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk tweeted the following on Saturday: “To all the initiators and patrons of Nord Stream 1 and 2. The only thing you should do today about it is apologise and keep quiet.” This followed the Wall Street Journal’s latest report about how Germany suspects that Ukraine and Poland were to blame for September 2022’s bombing. Former German spymaster August Henning also shared his opinion that Zelensky and his Polish counterpart Andrzej Duda reached an “arrangement” on this.

It was explained in spring 2023 when this narrative first emerged that “The US’ Latest Disinfo Campaign About The Nord Stream Terrorist Attacks Was Preplanned” as a red herring to deflect from credible accusations of American complicity in case they ever arose. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh had just cited unnamed administration sources back then to put forward his case that the US was responsible so the timing suggests an attempt to completely reshape the narrative about this attack.

To explain, it’s possible that some of this story is true such as the details about former Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny overseeing a Zelensky-approved plot to bomb these pipelines with Poland’s tacit approval, but that doesn’t mean that they were successful. The US might have let some of this intrigue play out in order for there to be a trail that could later be expediently exposed for the abovementioned reason. Putin accused US intelligence of being behind this attack and hasn’t changed his view on this.

It's within this context that Tusk’s scandalous tweet should be interpreted. Coming right after the Wall Street Journal’s latest report and Henning’s allegation, it seemed to many that he was being overly defensive, thus inadvertently hinting that there might be some truth to their claims. At the same time, Poland has always opposed the Nord Stream pipelines since it considered them part of a modern-day Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, so it’s not surprising that Tusk wants their initiators and patrons to apologize.

His demand that they keep quiet is obviously suspicious since it lends credence to speculation that Poland played a role in their destruction, but it could also be that Tusk doesn’t want his country’s name being dragged in the mud either. He’s been accused by opposition leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski of literally being a “German agent”, the perception of which was reinforced by his hardcore pro-Germany policy that was elaborated on here, so sticking up for Poland could be an attempt to push back against that.

The unprecedented post-election partisanship that’s plagued Poland since last fall predisposes Tusk to lay the blame for the Nord Stream attacks on his conservative-nationalist predecessors’ lap, yet he eschewed that politically convenient tactic despite it being in his interests to do so. This observation coupled with his open Germanophilia suggests that no evidence veritably exists tying them to what happened otherwise he wouldn’t have missed the opportunity to discredit them and please his masters.

Some might speculate that he’s being pressured by members of his country’s permanent military, intelligence, and/or diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) to cover everything up for the “greater good” of Poland’s national interests, yet that doesn’t make sense if one actually thinks about it. Whatever they could possibly do to him afterwards as punishment for “spilling the beans” would only further prove his predecessors’ guilt from the perspective of the Western liberal-globalist elite.

They despise those who came before him and passionately supported his return to the premiership on the false pretext that he was a “democrat opposing dictatorship” so they’d love nothing more than if their “golden child” shared proof of his political opponents’ involvement in this attack. Their reputation would be ruined if it was proven that they helped attack a fellow NATO member, thus reducing the chances that they’d ever come back to power and reverse everything that German-backed Tusk is doing.

His liberal-globalist coalition could theoretically rule indefinitely if they waged lawfare against their opponents on this basis, which is why it’s difficult to believe that he wouldn’t share such evidence or at least obliquely hint at its existence after the latest developments if there was any truth to this. Accordingly, Tusk inadvertently circumstantiated Putin’s accusation that US intelligence was behind this attack, thus discrediting the Western media’s narrative that it was a joint Polish-Ukrainian operation.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/interpre ... scandalous

Was Qatar Secretly Mediating A Partial Russian-Ukrainian Ceasefire Before Kursk?

Andrew Korybko
Aug 18, 2024

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Russia could have advanced its long-term diplomatic interests without curtailing its campaign in Donbass if they succeeded, while Ukraine could have kept Russia’s guard down during this process for facilitating its unprecedentedly risky gamble in Kursk aimed at staving off seemingly inevitable defeat.

The Washington Post (WaPo) reported on Saturday that Qatar was secretly mediating a partial Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire before Kiev’s sneak attack against Kursk, which would have seen both sides agree not to target each other’s energy infrastructure. The Kremlin hadn’t commented by the time of that article’s publication nor this present one so it’s unclear how truthful it is. In any case, it’s worthwhile taking a look at what WaPo’s sources said, which might help discern whether or not this is believable.

The first tidbit is that “Some involved in the negotiations hoped they could lead to a more comprehensive agreement to end the war, according to the officials”. This was followed by the claim that “Russia ‘didn’t call off the talks (after Kursk), they said give us time,’ the diplomat said.” The Ukrainian “presidential office” then alleged that talks in Doha were indeed scheduled but were postponed until 22 August “due to the situation in the Middle East” and will now “take place in a video conference format”.

WaPo went on to cite “senior officials in Kyiv” who “had mixed expectations about whether the negotiations could succeed, with some putting the odds at 20 percent and others anticipating even worse prospects” even before Kursk. They still explored the reportedly Qatari-mediated partial ceasefire with Russia though because “’We have one chance to get through this winter, and that’s if the Russians won’t launch any new attacks on the grid,’ a Ukrainian official who was briefed on the talks said.”

“’Everything has to be weighed — our potential and the possible damage to our economy versus how much more damage could we cause them and their economy,’ the Ukrainian official briefed on the planned Qatar summit said. ‘But energy is definitely critical for us. We sometimes forget about the economy here, but we’re facing free fall if there’s no light and heat in the winter.’” According to them, the partial ceasefire would be modeled off of the now-defunct grain deal, but Kursk changed all of that.

It’s at this point that two interconnected questions come to mind: 1) why would Russia consider agreeing not to target the energy infrastructure upon which Ukraine’s entire war effort depends, thus preventing its foes’ complete collapse and possibly perpetuating the conflict into another year?; and 2) why would Ukraine launch its sneak attack knowing that it ended any chance, at least for the time being, that Russia might give them such a reprieve that could then allow them to keep fighting into next year?

As regards the first question, if there’s any truth to WaPo’s report (the veracity of which will be assessed later), then Russia might have thought that this could soften its image ahead of the possible resumption of peace talks and create the conditions for Ukraine to comply with more of its terms. Trump’s potential return to power and his promise to swiftly end the conflict could have hung heavy over policymakers’ heads and influenced them to consider abiding by this moratorium until after the elections at least.

If such negotiations were indeed being mediated by Qatar, then that could also explain why Russia left its border with Ukraine largely undefended and might have even shrugged off reports of a buildup there since policymakers could have considered it “irrational” for Kiev to carry out any such sneak attack. RT’s Sergey Poletaev also speculated that a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ was in place between Russia and the US over the defense of the former’s border from the latter’s Ukrainian proxy this entire time.

Taken together and assuming for the sake of this thought exercise that WaPo’s report is accurate, then it might have been that Russia was lured by the aforesaid speculative ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with the US and the then-ongoing Qatari-mediated partial ceasefire talks with Ukraine into keeping its guard down. The purpose all along could have been for them to get Russia to leave large swathes of its border undefended in order to facilitate a Ukrainian sneak attack as part of an unprecedentedly risky gamble.

This hypothesis segues into answering the second question about why Ukraine would throw away any chance, at least for now, of Russia giving them a reprieve from attacks against their energy infrastructure that could then allow them to keep fighting into next year if they make it through the upcoming winter. Kiev and its US patron might have concluded that the pace of Russia’s on-the-ground gains in Donbass will inevitably lead to their defeat unless something drastic is done to change the conflict’s dynamics.

Freezing attacks on one another’s energy infrastructure wouldn’t halt Russia’s advance, not to mention if Moscow pulls out of the deal after the elections. Despite the odds of success being low, one possible way to prevent Russia’s seemingly inevitable victory would be to seize, hold, and then swap some of its pre-2014 land in exchange for Russia withdrawing from some Ukrainian-claimed land. This plan’s obvious flaw is that Russia might achieve a breakthrough in Donbass that leads to Ukraine’s collapse before then.

It can’t be ruled out though that NATO might conventionally intervene in Ukraine if that happens in order to force a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis aimed at saving its proxy from full-blown defeat. This could take the form of creating a NATO-Russian DMZ inside the disputed territories, but it’s unclear whether members have the political will to risk World War III over this. Ukraine knows that its sneak attack against Kursk leaves Donbass vulnerable so it might be hoping that this will happen if need be.

If that’s their leadership’s thought process, then the endgame might be to seize and hold some of Russia’s pre-2014 land through the winter, possibly aided by a conventional NATO intervention in its defensive support if Russia breaks through in Donbass, in order to swap it back next year. This plan assumes that Ukraine could survive until then even if its electricity sector is destroyed, which is dubious but could still happen if the abovementioned sequence of events leads to a NATO-Russian DMZ.

It also takes for granted that World War III wouldn’t break out if NATO conventionally intervenes in Ukraine to force the creation of that DMZ and then the threat thereof would remain manageable even if Russian-Ukrainian hostilities continue raging in Kursk. Another related assumption is that Russia would either allow NATO to also set up a DMZ on its pre-2014 border with Ukraine or NATO would willingly leave that frontier open and thus risk Russia launching offensives against those Ukrainian border regions.

The preceding calculations are “irrational”, but they might have still influenced the Ukrainian leadership’s thought process when deciding to launch their sneak attack against Kursk in spite of knowing that it would end any chance of a Qatari-mediated partial ceasefire with Russia, at least for now. From Russia’s perspective, such a deal wouldn’t have adversely affected the pace of its on-the-ground gains in Donbass, might have given it diplomatic leverage in new peace talks, and could always be abandoned.

It therefore appears that there might be some truth to WaPo’s report about Qatar secretly mediating a partial Russian-Ukrainian ceasefire before Kursk since both sides would have gained from those talks. Russia could have advanced its long-term diplomatic interests without curtailing its campaign in Donbass if they succeeded, while Ukraine could have kept Russia’s guard down during this process for facilitating its unprecedentedly risky gamble in Kursk aimed at staving off seemingly inevitable defeat.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/was-qata ... -a-partial

*****

War correspondent Simonov on the situation in the Kursk region. 08/18/2024
August 18, 3:51 p.m

(Image of dead Ukrainian soldier at link.)

War correspondent Simonov on the situation in the Kursk region. 08/18/2024

Kursk Region

I spent the last two days at several command posts of one special forces unit.

The situation on their section of the front has relatively stabilized. The global advance of the enemy has been stopped.

But.

This does not mean that everything has suddenly become good. The situation remains very tense. The enemy is constantly counterattacking, literally 24/7. Ours are fighting back.

The line of combat contact is now very fluid, jagged in places. Enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups are active.

At the same time, some attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces border on recklessness. As we found out from prisoners, they have problems with communication, interaction and the classic "go there, there is no one there."

The situation with drones is the same as everywhere else - they fly like mosquitoes. Both "disposable" and hexacopters. It is very dangerous to travel on roads without electronic warfare. Moreover, from my feeling in terms of birds, it is more dangerous to drive here at night than during the day.

In general, everything is fine with artillery. There are nuances, but they have already been reported above. The shell consumption reaches up to a hundred per day. The enemy equipment burns well, brightly and in large quantities.

I don't know about the enemy's artillery, I haven't heard of its high activity. Of the large calibers, they mainly use tanks plus khimari.

I won't speculate on how long it will take to push out the enemy. Very intensive combat work is underway. People don't sleep for several days.

Keep your fingers crossed for them, believe in our army. We will win.

(c) war correspondent Simonov

@brussinf - zinc

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9329209.html

New York is disappearing
August 19, 14:49

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Oy vey. Seems like yesterday...

P.S. By midday on August 19, the Russian Armed Forces controlled almost all of New York. The cleanup of the northern outskirts and the phenol plant continues. After the cleanup is completed and the official announcement of the liberation of New York is made, the city will be renamed Novgorodskoye.

The Russian Armed Forces also liberated Artemovo, are storming Nelepovka and are successfully advancing in Dzerzhinsk.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9330389.html

There is nothing to talk about with people who do such things.
August 19, 7:42

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"After August 6, the whole world saw the response of the Ukrobanderites to this gesture of goodwill (we are talking about the peace initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin) - a bandit raid in the Kursk region, their atrocities against the civilian population, targeted murders of doctors, rescuers and volunteers, attacks on civilian vehicles, rocket attacks on residential buildings, widespread looting and even the creation of threats to nuclear safety. Of course, as the president said, there is nothing to talk about with people who do such things" (c) Russian Foreign Ministry

"Strengthened Ukraine's position for negotiations."
The next conditions will be seriously worse for Ukraine.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9329957.html

Information for Metallica fans
August 19, 6:14

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Information for Metallica fans

https://ic.pics.livejournal.com/colonel ... 03_900.jpg

(Unsurprising, they've always sucked.)

Google Translator

*****

Aleksandro-Kalinovskoye direction: advance of the Russian Armed Forces in the Novgorodskoye area and to the southwest of Artemovo
August 18, 2024
Rybar

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At the same time as the problems in the Pokrovsk direction, a difficult situation for Ukrainian formations is also developing in the Aleksandro-Kalinovsk direction , where assault groups of the Russian Armed Forces have also managed to significantly expand the zone of control.

Information about the successes of Russian troops in the Novgorodskoye (New York) area has appeared on the Internet . In particular, the territory of the Phenol Plant was taken , as well as the private sector to the east of the industrial zone. Thus, almost the entire settlement is under the confident control of the Russian Armed Forces, with the exception of the northern outskirts.

To the northeast, near the city of Artemovo (Zheleznoye), Russian armored groups with landing troops attacked from the side of the Central-330 electrical substation in the direction of Nelepovka . According to unconfirmed information, fighting is already underway on the eastern outskirts of the settlement.

In addition, to the southeast of Nelepovka , the "pocket" where the positions of the 53rd separate motorized rifle brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were located was partially cleared. Ukrainian formations brought reinforcements there to the south of the Zheleznaya River until the very end, but were later forced to retreat. Nevertheless, there may still be a focal presence of Ukrainian formations in this area.

The current target of Russian troops in this area is Nelepovka , which is being attacked from both Artemovo and Novgorodskoye . After its liberation, the Russian Armed Forces will be able to concentrate their efforts on storming the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defenses in Leonidovka , Shcherbinovka and Petrovka. Establishing control over them will allow them to encircle Dzerzhinsk (Toretsk) from the west in the future .

https://rybar.ru/aleksandro-kalinovskoe ... -artemovo/

Google Translator

*****

Ukraine Reportedly Has A Whopping 120,000 Troops Deployed Along Its Border With Belarus

Andrew Korybko
Aug 19, 2024

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It would be a mistake for Russia to ignore this large agglomeration of forces since some of them might soon be redeployed to the Donbass and/or Kursk fronts.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko told leading Russian media in a recent interview that Ukraine has deployed a whopping 120,000 troops along the border, which adds context to Belarus’ earlier reported buildup there that was analyzed here last week. This number is surprising since it suggests that Ukraine isn’t anywhere near running out of troops like some in the Alt-Media Community have speculated over the past two years might soon happen.

While it’s true that resistance to Ukraine’s forcible conscription policy has increased since the age of conscription was dropped to 25 from 28 this spring, and some forces were diverted from Donbass to Kursk, this large number shows that there are still plenty of troops available that haven’t yet begun to fight. It’s also worth noting that this is twelve times the number that participated in Ukraine’s sneak attack against Russia’s Kursk Region according to the Wall Street Journal.

Battles of been raging inside of Russia’s borders for two weeks already as part of Zelensky’s newly declared goal of carving out Ukraine’s own “buffer zone” along the lines of what Russia has sought to do in Ukraine’s Kharkov Region since early May. It’s therefore frightening to imagine what the Ukrainian force on Belarus’ southern border could hypothetically achieve if they crossed the frontier. Lukashenko reassured his interlocutor that it’s heavily mined though so perhaps a repeat of Kursk isn’t possible.

Nevertheless, it’s extremely unlikely that Ukraine will keep that many troops in reserve indefinitely, especially as Russia continues gaining ground in Donbass. They could also be redeployed to Kursk to fortify Ukraine’s gains there or even as part of another sneak attack against a different Russian region like Bryansk or Belgorod. The reason why they’ve yet to be sent to any of those fronts is due to Ukraine’s fear of a joint Russian-Belarusian invasion from the latter’s Gomel Region.

Lukashenko said that this was the reason that Ukraine shared for its military buildup along their frontier, which he blamed on the US maliciously feeding them false intelligence about his side’s intentions. If Ukraine has no secret plans to invade Belarus and is confident in what Italy’s La Repubblica newspaper reported earlier this year about how NATO would conventionally intervene in Ukraine’s support if Belarus invades, then it might soon begin redeploying some of these troops to those other fronts.

That can’t be taken for granted though, but in any case, the point is that Ukraine still has a whopping 120,000 troops that haven’t yet begun to fight. This means that Russia mustn’t let its guard down in Bryansk or Belgorod Regions, nor must it assume that a breakthrough in Donbass and Kursk is inevitable due to Ukraine’s supposedly imminent military collapse there. It should also remain prepared for the possibility of a Ukrainian sneak attack against Belarus.

To be clear, no such sneak attacks or reinforcements might materialize, or they might also not make a difference if they do. That said, it would be a mistake for Russia to ignore this large agglomeration of forces since that could greatly raise the chances that they’d indeed be effective if deployed to battle. It remains to be seen what their future role will be, but observers should closely monitor all movements along that front for signs that some of them might finally be about to enter the fight.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/ukraine- ... a-whopping
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Tue Aug 20, 2024 11:43 am

Towards Krasnoarmeysk
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/20/2024

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Since Ukrainian troops crossed the Russian border, surprising the Russian General Staff, media and experts have tried to decipher what the real objectives of the operation are. In tactical terms, several Western sources insist that Zelensky is demanding a deep breakthrough from Syrsky, which would imply control of a significant amount of the Kursk region. The second objective is aimed at destroying bridges, with which Ukraine wants to make it impossible to supply supplies south of the Seim River northwest of the city of Suya, the most important of the towns that Ukraine has captured and where its soldiers now enjoy removing Soviet symbols or looting supermarkets. A front is beginning to take shape and Russia is deciding how to respond to the incursion. Describing the maneuvering war that Kiev troops used in their incursion, The Economist , citing soldiers on the ground, states that “for the first five days, it was tremendously effective,” although it regrets that “with the loss of the element of surprise, Ukrainian successes have slowed down.” Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the Kursk region say they are already beginning to see a different level of resistance. The Russians have saturated the front with more trained units, including marines and special forces.

“Out in the open and on the move in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, Ukrainian forces are vulnerable and are losing a lot of armored vehicles,” Forbes adds , noting that, unlike in other theaters of war, it is Ukraine that suffers the most material losses, something that could only be justified if strategic results were achieved. Judging by Mikhail Podolyak’s words, one of them seems to be getting Russia to cause destruction in Kursk. “Now Putin’s army is fighting on the territory of the Russian Federation, bombing and storming Russian cities and towns. Russian pilots are destroying civilian infrastructure in the Kursk region with multi-kilogram bombs, forcing tens of thousands of local residents to flee their homes. Russian soldiers are looting shops and civilian homes of their neighbors,” he wrote yesterday on social media in a perfect exercise in projection, since it is Ukraine that carries out these acts. The tactic is similar to that used by Syrsky in Donbass, where Ukraine tends to fight for long periods of time for towns it knows it cannot defend, thereby ensuring the almost complete destruction of any town Russia gains in Donetsk or Lugansk, a front that is only a priority for Moscow. Ukraine's action contrasts with Russia's decision to withdraw, without a fight, from the town of Kherson, thus preventing the battle from entailing an irreversible cost for infrastructure and the civilian population.

For the moment, as in Donbass, Russia has also opted for withdrawals in Kursk to avoid heavy casualties and allow the evacuation of civilians, although the consolidation of the front will involve hand-to-hand combat, casualties and material losses. According to The Economist , the Ukrainian grouping in this sector would be between 10,000 and 20,000 soldiers, a serious operation planned for some time that has tactical and strategic objectives - primarily to cause Russian casualties and put Ukraine in a better negotiating position with respect to Russia when demanding concessions, but also with its allies to be able to demand more weapons and financing - but it also entails costs. The negative consequences are not measured only in material losses, wounded, dead or captured soldiers or attrition, but in what this operation implies for other sections of the front. A few weeks ago, Ukraine withdrew from Krinky, a bridgehead on the southern bank of the Dnieper that was achieved by means of suicidal operations and without any possibility of achieving objectives. However, unlike that time, when kyiv did not need large numbers of troops, the attempt to control a portion of a Russian region requires a large number of troops and the ability to replenish those ranks.

In the early hours of the Ukrainian offensive, the press was keen to speculate about the effect that the need to defend Kursk would have on Russian troops, and the withdrawal of some units from the Donbass front confirmed the obvious: resources are finite and Moscow had been forced to divert troops to prevent a rapid Ukrainian advance approaching the regional capital or the nuclear power plant. However, for now at least, the trend on the Donbass front has not only not changed, but the Russian advance has even slightly accelerated. “Ukrainian soldiers I interviewed yesterday near the Sumy-Kursk border who have been redeployed there from the Donetsk front to take part in the Ukrainian incursion into Russia said they expected New York to be captured. ‘It could happen as early as tomorrow,’ said one,” wrote Christopher Miller, a correspondent for the Financial Times, last week . On Sunday, Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops had already abandoned the trenches of 2014 in the face of the irreversible Russian advance in the town that Poroshenko pompously and with great show decommunized so that it would bear the name of the American city. The capture of Novgorodske - and the recovery of its name prior to the intervention of the Ukrainian government - is taken for granted and is added to the announcement of the capture of Artyomovo, a town of similar size to Suya, which was confirmed yesterday, although without the headlines that each Ukrainian capture in Kursk gives these days. All this further complicates the situation of the Ukrainian troops on the front west of Gorlovka, in the direction of Dzerzhinsk, Toretsk, a much more populated town (30,000 inhabitants before the war) and which Ukraine is expected to try to defend. The importance of this sector of the front lies in the change of trend: despite numerous attempts, neither the Republican nor the Russian troops had managed to advance in that direction since the front dangerously approached the city of Gorlovka, which in July 2014 was practically besieged and isolated from Donetsk.

However, the most worrying situation for Ukraine is in Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk), a communications hub essential for the continuation of the fight on the Donetsk front. The tendency to exaggerate one's own successes means that too many towns are labelled as strategic, which can devalue the term. Because of its position on the front and as a central base for Ukrainian logistics on the eastern front and, to some extent, also on the southern front, and because of its value as a communications hub, Krasnoarmeysk is, right now, the most important point on the front. For weeks, Ukrainian media such as DeepState have been reporting on the slow but sure Russian advance in that direction, a path that began with the capture of Avdeevka, continued with the rapid capture of Ocheretino and has accelerated in recent days. Russia began this process 30 kilometres from the town and is now about ten kilometres away, a distance that is still sufficient for defence, but which is already dangerous for Ukraine. Local authorities have therefore ordered the evacuation of the civilian population, which is mandatory for families with children (4,000 children are still in the city according to Ukrainian sources) and recommended for the rest of the population of the city of more than 60,000 inhabitants.

The capture of Krasnoarmeysk would seriously complicate Ukraine's ability to maintain effectiveness in the fight for the westernmost part of the Donetsk region and would seriously undermine the entire war effort on a large section of the most important part of the front. However, the development of events and the way Russia is advancing from Ocheretino, in a semicircular fashion, not in a straight line towards the final objective, indicate that it is not seeking a direct assault on Krasnoarmeysk, a city too large to be attacked from a single direction. It does not seem to be seeking a bridgehead, but rather the movement of the entire front to the west. It is therefore to be expected that the Russian command will try to advance from the Ocheretino area to the south, specifically towards Krasnogorovka, where fighting continues, and the western outskirts of Marinka. Progress in these three directions would mean moving the front definitively away from the city of Donetsk, the main urban agglomeration in Donbass, and would provoke a sustained advance by Russia towards the most important objective, Krasnoarmeysk, where a battle comparable to those experienced in Artyomovsk or Chasov Yar could take place, so a quick resolution is not expected.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/20/en-di ... noarmeisk/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's telegram account:

Forwarded from Readovka
6:21
Evacuation continues from Glushkovsky District even though the crossings have been completely destroyed — volunteers from Kursk are pulling out of the danger zone those who did not have time to get out on their own.

By organizing a brutal invasion of Kursk Oblast, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were clearly counting on the panic and disunity of the local population, which would have made them even easier prey and a “still life” for a spectacular picture of total victory. It didn’t work out — the Kursk residents showed an example of rare courage and mutual assistance, which, it seemed, you would never see these days. During the disaster, several dozen stories have already been collected about the exploits of both military and civilians who voluntarily put their lives on the line to save people. Readovka correspondents met a grandmother and grandfather in Rylsk, which became a transit base for those who left the danger zone and were waiting for buses. The military patiently persuaded them to leave for several days, although the old people were determined to stay and, if necessary, die in their home. The bridges had already collapsed, so the elderly had to be ferried by boat along the Seim River. Fortunately, everything ended well.

They also met local young people who became a voluntary evacuation group. Having lived here all their lives, they know the river and all the places, and did not doubt for a minute that they should help their homeland and fellow countrymen as much as they can as civilians. They are not going to leave until everyone is evacuated. Separately, it is worth telling about Irina, the wife of a serviceman, working as a taxi driver. Since the beginning of the invasion, she began accepting applications for free and evacuating to a safe place all those who wrote to her in the chat. Several times they had to escape shelling and drone pursuit, once Irina herself took off with documents and a dog as far away as possible and stood on the highway until her husband called and said that the danger had passed. Their children are with their grandmother in another region, the brave woman, confident that everyone here needs her, does not want and will not leave without her husband.

***

Colonelcassad
On the situation in Kursk Oblast from the Ministry of Defense:

Units of the North group of forces, with the support of army aviation and artillery fire, are conducting reconnaissance and search operations to identify and destroy enemy sabotage groups in forested areas that were attempting to penetrate deep into Russian territory, south of the settlements of Skrylevka and Sheptukhovka. Attacks by enemy assault groups in the direction of the settlements of Olgovka, Russkoye and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye

have been repelled . As a result, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost a tank , an infantry fighting vehicle , two armored combat vehicles and more than 25 people, four Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen were taken prisoner . The air strikes, artillery fire and actions of the defending troops inflicted damage on concentrations of manpower and equipment of the 22nd, 61st, 115th mechanized and 80th airborne assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Borki, Bogdanovka, Vishnevka, Viktorovka, Kositsa, Lyubimovka, Melovy, Snagost, west of Martynovka and southeast of Korenevo. Operational-tactical aviation struck areas of concentrations of personnel and military equipment of the reserves of the 82nd airborne assault brigade, the 103rd and 129th territorial defense brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Basovka, Vorozhba, Kruzhok, Miropolye, Novaya Sich and Sadki in Sumy Oblast. Over the past 24 hours, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have lost more than 330 servicemen and 27 armored vehicles, including four tanks, an infantry fighting vehicle , three armored personnel carriers, 19 armored combat vehicles, as well as eight cars, two artillery pieces and three mortars. In total, during the fighting in the Kursk direction, the enemy has lost up to 3,800 servicemen, 54 tanks, 26 infantry fighting vehicles, 48 ​​armored personnel carriers, 281 armored combat vehicles, 123 cars, 27 artillery pieces, five anti-aircraft missile systems, seven multiple launch rocket system launchers, including three HIMARS and one MLRS , five electronic warfare stations, as well as four units of engineering equipment, including two engineering mine clearance vehicles and one UR-77 mine clearing unit .

***

Colonelcassad
Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 19 August 2024) Main points:

The losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the zone of the North group of forces in the Kharkiv region in one day amounted to 170 soldiers, a tank and two infantry fighting vehicles;

- The East group of forces destroyed 3 field warehouses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in one day, the enemy lost up to 90 soldiers;

- The West group of forces took more advantageous positions in one day and repelled two counterattacks, the enemy's losses amounted to 535 soldiers;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 570 soldiers in one day as a result of the actions of the South group;

- The Russian air defence system shot down 49 drones, 26 HIMARS shells and a Hammer aerial bomb in one day;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost more than 495 soldiers and two tanks in one day as a result of the actions of the Center group;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 75 servicemen in the area of ​​responsibility of the Dnepr group in one day.

▫️ Units of the "East" group of forces inflicted losses on the manpower and equipment of the 72nd mechanized, 58th motorized infantry brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the 106th and 125th territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Ugledar, Prechistovka, Velyka Novosyolka of the Donetsk People's Republic and Dolinka of the Zaporizhia region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 90 servicemen, three vehicles, a 155-mm self-propelled artillery unit "Bogdana" , a 152-mm howitzer D-30 , three electronic warfare stations "Bukovel-AD" . Three field ammunition depots were destroyed .

▫️ Units of the Dnepr group of forces inflicted losses on formations of the 65th mechanized, 128th mountain assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the 39th coastal defense brigade in the areas of the populated areas of Novodanilovka, Kamenskoye in the Zaporizhia region, and Tyaginka in the Kherson region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 75 servicemen, five vehicles, a 155-mm howitzer M777 made in the USA, and a 122-mm howitzer D-30 . An ammunition depot was destroyed .

▫️Tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups have destroyed concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 147 areas . Air defense systems have shot down a French-made Hammer guided bomb , 26 US-made HIMARS rockets and 49 unmanned aerial vehicles.

▫️ In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed : 639 aircraft, 282 helicopters, 30,161 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,340 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,412 multiple launch rocket systems, 13,415 field artillery pieces and mortars, 24,919 units of special military vehicles.

Google Translator

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

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Russian Troops Continue to Advance Towards the City of Toretsk

Image
Russian troops on the battlefield, Aug. 2024. Photo: X/ @EHDonbass

August 19, 2024 Hour: 8:48 am

Russia has not stopped its advance in eastern and southern Ukraine despite the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk.
On Monday, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that the Russian military captured the town of Artemovo in its advance towards the city of Toretsk in the Donetsk region.

“Units of the Tsentr military group liberated Artemovo, one of the largest towns in the urban agglomeration of the Dzerzhinsk district of the Donetsk People’s Republic,” the military department said.

Known to Ukrainians as Zalizne, Artemovo is a town with about 5,000 people and is located less than four kilometers from Toretsk, whose capture would allow the Russian advance towards Konstantinivka, an important crossroads used by Ukraine to supply its forces.

This advance is another step towards the Ukrainian stronghold of Kramatorsk and also cuts off the military supply route to Chasiv Yar, which has been besieged by the Russians for months.


Russia has not stopped its gradual advance in eastern and southern Ukraine despite the Ukrainian incursion in the border region of Kursk, where Ukrainian forces managed to capture some 1,200 square kilometers.

On Monday, Russian authorities also reported that their forces captured 19 Ukrainian soldiers who were taking part in the offensive against the Russian Kursk region.

They were captured by marines from one of the Black Sea Fleet groups who were transferred to the Kursk front after the start of the Ukrainian offensive two weeks ago today. The soldiers were part of the 22nd motorized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Two days ago, another 24 Ukrainian soldiers surrendered in Kursk.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/russian- ... f-toretsk/

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Washington Post Report on Russia-Ukraine Negotiation to End Energy System Attacks: An Admission of Russian Long-Term Weakness or More Complex Calcuation?
Posted on August 19, 2024 by Yves Smith

The Washington Post ran a simply stunning story two days ago: Ukraine’s offensive derails secret efforts for partial cease-fire with Russia, officials say. As we will explain, if this account is accurate, it would mean Russia was willing to trade away its best weapon in the war against Ukraine, its campaign against Ukraine’s energy supply, for effectively nothing. This bad exchange would be made worse by the fact that it is very clear that Russia has conducted its campaign so far to minimize the deaths of Russian soldiers. The war on the grid is the cheapest, easiest, and lowest risk way for Russia to drop the hammer on Ukraine. Why give that up for very little in return?

Any agreement along these lines would indicate Russia is over-eager for a way to end the conflict, that it sees the war moving in the direction of requiring Russia to subdue nearly all of Ukraine, say save Galacia, which would also be severely damaged by Russian operations. That would mean an open-ended process of occupation and then installation of puppet governments in the areas that did not have ethnic Russians as a large proportion of the population. A less costly but not-very-nice-looking-to-the-international-community alternative we have repeatedly discussed, building on John Helmer’s discussion of creating a very large DMZ, the width of the longest-range mobile-launched weapons NATO possesses, now the 500 km Taurus missile. Our variant of this idea would be to add that areas that look impossible to control politically and could thus be staging grounds for terrorist acts would be kept de-electrified, reducing them to the condition of the Unorganized Territory of Maine.

We’ll look at the Washington Post report and point to an obvious way to make sense of it, that it greatly exaggerated how far along these talks actually were. It is not hard to see that given Russia’s repeated statements about Western duplicity, lack of legitimacy of Ukraine leadership, and the fact that Ukraine is merely a US/NATO pawn, that Russia would set reasonable conditions that Ukraine would be unable to meet. In this scenario, there was no reason not to indulge the feelers, midwifed by Qatar, because they would inevitably founder. But Russia would benefit they ever came to light by demonstrating that it was willing to negotiate but that neither Ukraine nor its NATO masters could consummate the deal.

But if these talks were actually serious and advanced, as the Post indicates, the picture is far darker for Russia unless Russia wanted to use the question of “And who can sign this deal?” to undermine the status of the Zelensky government.

In light of that, another thesis is more probable: that this story is part of a deception operation, to cover for the fact that Ukraine entertained or perhaps even whispered to Qatar about this scheme in order to provide yet more cover for its Kursk invasion.2 How could Ukraine possibly want to scupper what looked like a one-sided deal, even if the odds of it happening were not all that high?

But before we turn to the article, some brief context. Ukraine invaded Russia on August 6. This is a low population area with little strategic importance. Nevertheless, any successful Ukraine entry into Russia, save a short-lived raid, is a very very bad look for the Russian government.

Commentators posited that Ukraine had one or two objectives: to seize the Kursk nuclear power plant, about 60 kilometers from the border, and to force Russia to divert soldiers from the line of contact, giving over-stretched Ukraine forces some relief. Even with Russia being a bit leisurely in opposing the Ukraine advance, it seems to have been blocked about 10 km into Russia, which both sides arguing as to who controls the hamlet of Sudzha. And contrary to Ukraine hopes, Russia has not redeployed troops from the Donbass battlefront but instead has sent in men from reserves inside Russia.

Some have added a third rationale: to shore up flagging support from the US and NATO states and morale at home by showing that Ukraine could still land a punch. The wee problem with that line of thinking (even if some in Ukraine and NATO were of this view) is that a short-lived success accomplishes little, even before getting to the fact that it increases the Ukraine burn rate. For instance, Germany has confirmed it is sending no more weapons to Ukraine out of budget constraints. No amount of flash-in-the-pan wins will change that.

Many commentators have stressed that this attack was a big strategic own goal, a Battle of the Bulge in miniature. Ukraine has had to pull troops from the front lines elsewhere to shore up its Kursk operation. Russia has been systematically destroying scare Ukraine equipment, particularly armored vehicles, missile platforms, and the components of a full Patriot air defense battery.

However, Russia experts, such as Mark Sleboda, point out that this incursion was a huge embarrassment to the Russian government, so the Anglosphere media is correct on this point. The West is hyping reports of Russians in the Kursk area being angry at the Kremlin, but it appears the far more preponderant reaction is fury with the Ukraine government and NATO, and an even harder resolve to keep prosecuting the war.

And this was a NATO drill. The Russians destroyed three HIMARS launchers and the afore-mentioned Patriot system. Those cannot be operated without considerable NATO assistance. Anecdata also supports the Russian view:

📌 Kursk Region.
#Ukraine’s adventure has been prepared by American and British generals and NATO military staff and intelligence.

#Russian soldiers from the field write that they actively hear English speeches and French and Polish on the radios.


Keep in mind that Putin has also taken the position that the use of Collective-West supplied targeting and surveillance data is tantamount to foreign actor involvement.

An addition bit of context is, as we stated above, that Russia’s General Staff intended to use attacks on the electric grid to finish off Ukraine. From John Helmer’s Buzzer Beater – Russian General Staff Aims at Ending the Ukraine by Electric War in June. As Helmer explained, a big objective was to drive the civilian population westward so that when Russia attacked, it would be less constrained by the need to avoid targeting civilians:

As the Ukraine’s peak summer electricity season approaches, the list of the Russian General Staff’s Electric War targets is shrinking. This is because almost all the Ukrainian electricity generating plants have been stopped. What remains for destruction are the connecting lines and distribution grids for the Ukraine’s imported electricity from Poland and other European Union neighbours. The microwave and cell telephone towers, and the diesel fuel stocks which are powering the back-up generating sets are next.

“There’s no keeping the Ukrainian cell network up any more than there is keeping up the electrical grid,” comments a close military observer. “The General Staff have set the flow of Ukrainian refugees west as inversely proportional to the flow of data and electrons over Ukrainian airwaves and transmission lines. We can expect that relationship to be set to highly inverse before the summer is out. What calculations have been made regarding things further west are just beginning to become evident.”….

In the very long history of siege warfare, there has never been a case of letting the enemy’s civilian population run safely away from his castles and cities until the fortifications and army which remain must choose between surrender and destruction….

The NATO military engineer has compiled his forecast list of Russian targets in the coming days. “We should expect the commercial fuel storage and distribution network to be hit. These are legitimate military targets as the Ukrainian military relies on them to support its war effort. The railways should be hit as well. There’s no good military reason to allow them to keep functioning. Given the NATO country endorsements for striking Russian territory targets, I don’t see the rationale on the Moscow side for leaving unscathed the rail network connecting Lvov and Kiev to Rzeszów [Poland].”

“The target list should include the border switchyards and substations connecting the Ukraine to the European transmission lines. Destroying those and targeting the stations transmitting power from nuclear sources will finish the job. There will be no more load balancing after that. The collapse of Ukrainian logistics, not to mention the society, will follow soon after. If the switchyards connecting the nuclear power plants to the grid are smashed, it’s the end for the Ukrainians.”

As for the Ukraine side of the energy war, despite the Anglosphere media cheerleading occasional Ukraine strikes on Russian oil refineries, which have sometimes set off impressive explosions, there’s no evidence of lasting material damage to any of the facilities, let alone Russian output.2

Now to the Washington Post piece. With this background, it’s hard to see why Russia would have any interest in pursuing this ceasefire scheme, beyond indulging Qatar, with whom Russia would like to maintain good relations. The most logical interpretation is that these talks were actually more on the order of feelers, being brokered by intermediaries who did not have the authority to make commitments. I have no idea about the diplomacy world, but this happens in the very big ticket deal world all the time.

The subhead to the story supports a reading that the exchanges were actually not that far along: “The warring countries were set to hold indirect talks in Qatar on an agreement to halt strikes on energy and power infrastructure, according to officials.” In other words, they’d agreed to discuss a proposal, and not the proposal per se.

Now the text does contain much stronger claims, but the story hinges on the account of a single diplomat “briefed on the talks” who among other things asserted “The official said the two sides agreed to a summit in Doha with just minor details left to be worked out.” That seems wildly implausible given Putin’s personal bitterness over the Western duplicity in the Minsk Accords, with him played for a fool to buy time for Ukraine to build up its forces. The article mentions (and misleads readers) about the last time Russia decided to play nice with Ukraine, the so-called grain deal. The story inaccurately says Russia withdrew from the pact. It in fact was subject to periodic renewal (IIRC every 90 days). Russia did not renew based on non-performance. The agreement was not just about grain. The second set of provisions, integral to the scheme, was for the West to end sanctions on the Russian agricultural bank so that Global South countries, particularly ones in Africa, could buy Russian fertilizer. Russia also complained that the Ukraine grain was going largely to Europe and not poor nations as promised (confirmed by EU countries getting agitated about the deliveries undercutting their farmers), but the big beef was the failure to honor the second big leg of the deal.

The normal journalistic standard is that when relying on anonymous sources, a publication should have three of them to regard a claim as verified. This is not only an anonymous source, but one getting a second-hand account.

Now the fact that some sort of exchange was happening is verified by Ukraine sources (only!). They say a meeting in Doha was on and that Ukraine still wanted to participate (now virtually). But Qatar nixed the idea, not wanting to indulge the sort of one-sided show that has become a Zelensky speciality (recall his peace plan conferences where pretty much everyone but Russia was invited). But given that Russia’s official posture is that it is open to negotiation, it’s can’t refuse to entertain proposals.

Of course, the other obvious problem with the thesis of this story is that Russia knows full well it needs to negotiate with the US, not with its proxy Ukraine. Yet we have the article confirming that the US will have no part of any such talks: “The Biden administration has long said the timing and terms of a potential cease-fire agreement with Russia are for Ukraine alone to decide.”

So the next most likely possibility is that this article is intended to take the teeth out of a successful Ukraine deception operation by depicting the energy war initiative as sincere on the Ukraine side. This idea is not entirely nuts; look how long it took for the repeated Minsk duplicity to become public. And those who outed it were at the very top: first Porshenko, then Hollande, then Merkel. In other words, the considerable number of staffers, including in the US, who were on to this ruse kept quiet about it for years.

Some sources have said this invasion had been in the works for a very long time but had been put off because reasons. Alexander Mercouris has repeatedly said a contact knowledgeable about Russian government operations told him that the Russians knew of Ukraine plans to attack into Kursk two months ago. The timetable lines up with that of the feelers:

The diplomat familiar with the talks said that Qatar has been discussing the arrangement for an energy strike moratorium with Kyiv and Moscow for the past two months.

Mind you, I am not saying this ruse, if indeed that was the card that Ukraine was playing, in any way justifies Russia’s flatfootedness in anticipating the Kursk invasion. Russia should know bloody well by now what it is dealing with in the form of Ukraine’s leadership. Its fondness for terrorism as a substitute for military prowess and its obsession with PR management has only become more extreme as it is becoming obvious, even to occasional readers of the Western press, that the war situation has developed not necessarily to Ukraine’s advantage.

Russia apparently didn’t want to see the forces massing in Ukraine in the Sumy region as preparation for an attack for a host of reasons: it would be strategically stoopid (what Ukraine was marshaling would be insufficient for Ukraine to get far into Russia or hold terrain), it would be therefore be more likely to be Ukraine bolstering defensed before an expected Russian invasion of Sumy. But a just as likely reason, and one I suspect has some currency in Russia, is that the MoD was predisposed to ignore this risk because it would be a nuisance to bolster defenses there.

Now let’s turn to other possible interpretations of this Washington Post piece, accepting its claim that the talks were far along and close to being inked. This is its logic as to why Russia would go along:

The academic added that Russia might be more willing to consider an energy infrastructure deal as a way to lure Kyiv to broader cease-fire talks. Otherwise, he said, Moscow could be less motivated since it believed it could inflict more damage on Ukrainian energy infrastructure than Kyiv was able to on Russian oil refineries.

In other words, the logic is Russia wants out of the war so badly it would trade away its best weapon. This is completely inconsistent with the ever-increasing resolve among the Russian public and Putin signaling over time that more parts of Ukraine are on the menu, such as Odessa and more recently, Kiev.

The only reason I could fathom for a retreat of this magnitude when Russia is winning the war and still increasing the size of its military and its weapons production, it that it has finally started taking a hard look at the end-game problem. As we’ve been pointing out, it is becoming more and more evident that the least bad resolution for Russia is to subdue nearly all of Ukraine, including the potentially very troublesome Western Ukraine (ex nasty Galacia). Russia has seen how determined the US and NATO are to have Russia not win this war. That includes trying to make it into a Pyrrhic victory by trying to bleed Russia with continued terrorism by Ukrainians. That would strongly argue for Russia reducing that exposure by controlling territorial Ukraine and forcing the West into the riskier posture of trying to wage that sort of guerrilla campaign from NATO states.

But one reason that Russia might feel the need to accept even lousy-seeming peace overtures is dependence on its de facto coalition partners. Here I do not mean in the military sense; Russia is more self-sufficient here than the West gives it credit. I mean in the economic sense. Russia succeeded in redirecting its economy to China, India, Turkiye, and Africa with impressive speed. The nations have all stood up to considerable US pressure to respect illegal US and EU sanctions.3

A big reason that Russia has won and gotten even more support from them is that Russia has succeeded in persuading them that it is the wronged party despite being an invader: Russia did everything it could to try to avoid this war (witness the Minsk Accords con and then the West breaking up peace talks in 2022), Russia is working to minimize civilian casualties, Russia is open to talks.

Russia may have felt it had to pursue these talks despite them being at odds with Russia’s interest to keep the support of its de facto coalition partners, particularly China and Middle East states. Recall that China did not participate in Ukraine’s latest one-sided peace conference, regarding them as unproductive with Russia absent. However, China invited Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba for a visit on July 23 to 25 to discuss how to end the war in Ukraine and a potential Chinese part in a settlement. China has taken to playing a soft power card outside the region as a peace-maker, witness its success in end-running the US in brokering a pact between Iran and the Saudis.

However, another scenario (which does not exclude the above scenario, that Russia felt pressured to appease its economic partners) is that Russia saw the talks, if they advanced, as a vehicle for destabilizing the Zelensky government. Putin and other top officials have pointed out that Ukraine has made it impossible to negotiate any deal with Russia via a Constitutional amendment forbidding that as long as Putin is in charge. On top of that, Russia has taken to depicting that Zelensky is illegitimate, that the Ukraine Constitution does not allow for a President to continue in power even under martial law. Putin has opined that his reading of the Ukraine Constitution is that authority is now in the hands of the Speaker of the Rada, but Ukraine legal experts need to settle that question.

Regardless, at some point (and it really should occur early rather than late in a deal process), Russia cqn quite legitimately question the authority of its counterparts to enter into binding commitments. It would look particularly bad for Russia to be theoretically willing to enter into an extremely Ukraine-favorable deal but be unable to deliver because the present government could not make a binding deal.

Needless to say, even though the intent of this planted-looking story may have been to get in front of yet another instance of Ukraine duplicity, the Russians and Qataris and Chinese already have a better grasp of facts. And if they surmise Ukraine used the pretext of peace talks to play yet another dirty, no wonder the Russian are incandescent.

_____
1 The Post depicts Qatar as proposing this pact. However, given that that the Post also depicts it as arising after the second, peculiar one-sided Zelensky peace conference, that there was not at least some Ukraine input and quite possibly instigation given the impact of the grid attacks.

2 The Post claims otherwise. I do not have time to prove a negative, but as Lambert is wont to say, I do try to pay attention. I have yet to see anything from an independent source confirming that the Russian energy system has suffered meaningful damage from the Ukraine attacks.

3 Economic sanctions are illegal when not approved by the UN, not that the US cares about such niceties.

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2024/08 ... ation.html

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Britain Claims To Have Helped With The Ukrainian Invasion Of Russia

Yves Smith is discussing the Washington Post report on Russia-Ukraine negotiation to end the infrastructure attacks:

An Admission of Russian Long-Term Weakness or More Complex Calculation?

I had previously discussed the WaPo piece here.

Yves suggests that the negotiations, if they really have happened as described, were an Ukrainian ruse to distract Russia from the Ukrainian preparation of the Kursk oblast incursion. The talks were useless for Russia, she says. She doubts that Russia would favor to stop the attacks on the Ukrainian electricity generating and network capabilities. She suggests that the Ukrainian attacks on Russia create little damage. It disagree with that view.

The winter will already become very difficult for Ukrainian civilians. There is no need to increase the damage on Ukrainian infrastructure beyond the already achieved level.

The Ukrainian attacks have so far created repairable damage in Russia. But that may not be the case forever. One day one of such attacks could in fact create some real catastrophe. The attacks are also binding lots of Russian resources. One needs a huge number of soldiers and equipment to give at least some protection to the most exposed sites. The Russian economy is currently short on men. Not diverting some 100,000 men for local air defense purposes can make a difference.

I believe that Russia was genuinely interested in making such deal. But the Ukrainian attack on Kursk oblast blew it apart.

There are new suggestion on how the Ukrainian incursion into Russia was prepared for.

The Times in London claims that it largely followed a British plan (archived):

When footage of British Challenger 2 battle tanks being used by the Ukrainian army for its counterinvasion of Russia emerged on Tuesday, Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence were ready.
For the previous 48 hours, officials and political aides working for Sir Keir Starmer and John Healey, the defence secretary, had been in talks about how far to go to confirm growing British involvement in the incursion towards Kursk.

The stakes were high. Unseen by the world, British equipment, including drones, have played a central role in Ukraine’s new offensive and British personnel have been closely advising the Ukrainian military for two years, on a scale matched by no other country.


The U.S., in contrast, has claimed not to have known about the Ukrainian plans and there purpose. This leads Kit Klarenberg to develop a theory:

Kit Klarenberg @KitKlarenberg - 15:02 UTC · Aug 18, 2024
"🧵: I speculated earlier was probably Britain behind Kursk suicide op. Lo and behold, a Times article confirms this. More broadly, contents amply underline Kursk latest effort by London to keep the US in the proxy war - and it appears Washington has finally had enough of this.

Times reveals up top heavily promoted footage of British Challenger 2 tanks in Kursk was a conscious, deliberate decision made by new PM Keir Starmer and his defence secretary John Healey. British equipment is said to have "played a central role" in the "counterinvasion".
...
Starmer and Healey reportedly made the decision to advertise London's involvement "to be more open about Britain’s role in a bid to persuade key allies to do more to help." In other words, to encourage/pressure the US et al to double down on this unwinnable, nightmare quagmire.
...
However, US reportedly unhappy with Kursk incursion, because it scuppered peace talks. Kiev's purported culpability for Nord Stream bombing is, it seems, being used to justify ending German aid to Ukraine. And the US is blocking Kiev from firing British-made missiles at Russia.


Kit's theory is that the Washington Post story about the blown negotiations as well as the latest "Nord Stream done by Ukraine" rumor reporting by the WSJ are expressions of U.S. anger over the Ukrainian government and its Kursk invasion.

The Times also reports that Britain is pushing its allies to provide more weapons and to allow their use against targets deep inside of Russia:

In the coming weeks Healey will attend a new meeting of the Ukraine Defence Co-ordination Group, where Britain will press European allies to send more equipment and give Kyiv more leeway to use them in Russia. Healey spoke last week to Lloyd Austin, the US defence secretary, and has been wooing Boris Pistorius, his German opposite number.
Germany, whose Taurus missiles have a similar 155-mile range to Storm Shadow but a more powerful warhead, has been the country under the most pressure to move. However, it was revealed yesterday that Germany has actually frozen military aid to Ukraine because of a domestic budgetary crisis. Pistorius had asked for £3.4 billion of additional supplies but that was rejected by the finance ministry.


A previous leak provided that the long range Taurus missiles are complicate and have to be programmed just-in-time by German officers. There is no support in Germany for allowing such a deep involvement in attacks on Russia.

To me it seems that Britain has promised to Ukraine that it would get its allies to agree to the usage of longer range weapons against Russia in exchange for Ukraine to launch the attack on Russia.

Only that can explain this Zelenski complain about Starmer:

The Ukrainian president complained that British aid to Kyiv had begun to wane as his forces continued their unprecedented incursion into Russian territory in the Kursk region.
“Unfortunately, the situation has slowed down recently,” Mr Zelensky said, referring to UK military assistance.

Sir Keir has upheld a Conservative ban on using UK-made Storm Shadows to strike targets deep inside Russia, amid concerns it could lead to escalation with nuclear-armed Moscow.

“We will discuss how to fix this because long-range capabilities are vital for us. The whole world sees how effective Ukrainians are – how our entire nation defends its independence,” said Mr Zelensky.

It came as four former Conservative defence secretaries called on No 10 to do more to support Ukraine, with some demanding Kyiv be allowed to use Storm Shadows in the Russian offensive.


But it is not Starmer who is blocking the missiles, it is the U.S. of A. (archived):

Washington is in effect blocking Britain from allowing Kyiv to fire Storm Shadow missiles inside Russia, amid fears in the Biden administration of an escalation in the Ukraine war.
...
It is understood that although the UK wants to give Ukraine the freedom to do what they want with the long-range weapon, it requires consensus from allies, including the US, France and a third undisclosed Nato country. A government source stressed that the UK was not blaming the US for any delay, adding that such policy changes took time.


Combining all the above one can (re-)construct this story.

Britain, in a bipartisan move, wants to prolong the war in Ukraine. It suggested to and helped Ukraine to invade Russia even as it knew that this would interrupt peace talks in Qatar. It also promised to press its allies for long range attack permission against Russia. But the U.S. and Germany are still blocking such attacks. Zelensky now complains that Britain failed to deliver on its promise.

The U.S., miffed about the British involvement in a likely useless Ukrainian attack on Russia, is leaking about the Ukrainian/Russian negotiations in Qatar.

The above is largely based on the U.S. claims that it was not really involved in the planing of the Kursk incursion.

There are of course good reason to doubt those claims:

As the Ukraine war enters its most perilous phase, with Kiev’s forces fighting inside Russia, the United States is operating a formal “sensitive activities” detachment that is active in providing direct military support to the beleaguered country. The detachment, never before disclosed, is run by U.S. special operations forces, and with its Ukrainian counterparts, provides on-the-battlefield support, including near-real time targeting intelligence, operators say.
...
An operator formerly deployed to the Army’s 10th Special Forces Group assigned to a sensitive activities detachment told me their work included the creation of clandestine human networks for intelligence gathering, as well as identifying Russian military weaknesses for targeting.
...
A second operator also described having been tasked with providing near up-to-the-minute intelligence support to Ukrainian forces.


Those U.S. operators in Ukraine certainly did not miss the preparations the Ukrainians were making for their attack.

P.S. Bonus from The Times piece:

“It’s not just about the military support, but it’s about the industrial, economic, and diplomatic support,” the defence source said. “If Putin succeeds in Ukraine he’s not going to stop there. But also the economic implications of that are massive, because we all saw how heavily Britain got hit when he first invaded.”

Yes, the sanctions, intended to hurt Russia, were quite damaging to those who issued them. Nice to see that finally acknowledged.

Posted by b on August 19, 2024 at 15:58 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/08/b ... .html#more

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The wars inside the war

Putting together the puzzle: the popular yet dismissed brigade commander, Bezuhla, the Kursk operation, Syrsky's cunning 'Operation Rehabilitation'. Commanders vs generals, generals vs Zelensky.

Events in Ukraine
Aug 19, 2024
∙ Paid
I won’t bore you with speculations about which parts of the Kursk region are under control of the AFU. There are plenty of places you can find that.

There are much more interesting political processes taking place ‘beneath’, so to speak’, the Kursk operation. Besides the obvious PR advantages, the Kursk offensive is profoundly linked to two ongoing conflicts - that between Zelensky’s ruling clique and the top army generals, and that between lower-level officers and the generals. They are at once parallel and intersecting. Today I’ll try untangle them.

The Ishkulov mystery
To begin with, the conflict between the lower level officers and the generals. The former are often known as ‘combrigs’ - brigade commanders. This conflict was most spectacularly - and successfully for the combrigs - manifested by the Azov vs Sodol drama, which I wrote about here. I wrote about other recent manifestations of the conflict here.

But as I predicted then, not all combrigs have the political clout Azov does to defy impossible, suicidal commands.

And this was illustrated by the saga of the 80th battalion, which until recently was fighting on the hottest parts of the Donbass front. It is often described by Ukrainian commentators as being among the most militarily capable units at the frontline. And its troops ascribe this to good leadership - a common refrain of the ‘young nationalist officers’ against the ‘old soviet generals’ is that ‘all (or almost all) we need to win the war is better commanders on the ground’.

But this was not to be. On July 29, the fighters of the 80th released a video statement calling on President Zelensky not to fire their beloved commander, Emil’ Ishkulov:

Why are commanders who hold unquestionable authority not favored by the higher leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine? Because they are not afraid to raise problematic issues and report on the actual state of affairs. They don't recklessly sacrifice people in pursuit of medals.

(Video at link.)

This cry for help was supported by a range of people associated with the ‘anti-general’ movement. This included top Azov political and military figure, Rodion Kudriashov. The Poroshenko-affiliaited military journalist Yuriy Butusov, who has 1 million youtube subscribers and also extensively covered the Sodol saga, also supported Ishkulov.

The nationalist telegram sensations Lachen and Sternenko, with over 1.5 million subscribers, also supported Ishkulov . Note that Lachen and Sternenko are generally considered to be fairly close with the president’s office (as well as western structures) - more later on the complicated relationship between the office and the generals.

But regardless of all this, commander’ Ishkulov was removed from his post by August 1, as confirmed by an official post by the army on the topic. The post claimed that he was in fact being promoted, though he would soon after deny that.

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According to Ukraine’s most influential military telegram, ‘Deep State’ on August 1, there were serious reasons why Ishkulov was removed:

🦅 Former commander of the 80th Brigade, Emil Ishkulov, gave a comment to the publication "Glavkom," where he explained the reason for his removal.

💬 Specifically, he confirmed the unofficial version of his dismissal, which involved his removal due to his refusal to carry out a task that was obviously impossible. The situation was brought to light by the brigade's battalion commanders, who called for their commander not to be removed from his position.

“The unit commanders of the brigade are dissatisfied with the higher leadership's decision to remove me. They are partly aware of the situation and the unrealistic nature of the task assigned to them. Consequently, I was told by the Air Assault Forces leadership: "You probably need to take a break."“

💬 According to him, the unrealistic tasks were given to him by "higher authorities," and the task remains before the brigade to this day.

🚫 The Air Assault Forces Command also essentially lied because, in their response to the situation, they stated that the brigade commander was being promoted. However, Emil Ishkulov noted the complete opposite:

“Well, what kind of promotion?.. Now, my deputy has taken the position of brigade commander, while I am moving to his position — deputy chief of intelligence.”


But what were these ‘unrealistic tasks’ assigned to Ishkulov, and which ‘higher authorities’?

Syrsky’s cunning plan?

I’ve written about Maryana Bezuhla here several times. Suffice to say, she is a parliamentarian with a medical background (in particular, a medical internship at the US state department) who positions herself as a vicious critique of military corruption and strategic failures among the top military brass. She is considered by all liberal-nationalist opposition forces to be a tool of Zelensky (though she tries hard to act otherwise) to offset popular discontent onto the military, and make it seem as if he is working hard to fix the situation at the frontline.

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Before Zaluzhny was sacked at head of the army at the start of 2024, Bezuhla was working at full steam to discredit him daily. And only recently, she was doing the same to the current head of the military, Oleksandr Syrsky. On July 14, she even accused Syrsky and his entourage of secretly preparing for peace. Her current facebook cover is even an edit of Syrsky triumphantly holding a shovel, a reference to the shocking incapacity of the Ukrainian army to build defensive lines:

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But then, she mysteriously stopped with a final anti-Syrsky post on August 3…

And a day after the Kursk operation began, she started praising Syrsky for his role in it - quite an unexpected turn!

She posted another half-hearted anti-Syrsky meme on the 9th, but the real meat came soon after. On August 14, she took a break from the social media restraint she had been demonstrating since early August to post a huge text about Kursk, Syrsky - and Ishkulov.

It was titled ‘Operation "Rehabilitation" or the Cunning Plan of the Ukrainian Zhukov’ - because Bezuhla, like her colleagues, is biologically incapable of making any criticism without implying that it is the fault of the ephemeral ‘Soviet Mentality’. I’d recall that Zhukov was quite militarily successful, but who am I to doubt Dr Bezuhla’s military prowess…

Anyway, according to Bezuhla, Zaluzhny was always against operations to enter Russia, because:

he favored linear operations and, lacking combat experience, preferred traditional frontal assaults, which were implemented with mixed success in 2022 in the Kherson region and completely failed in 2023 in the Zaporizhzhia region

She even praises Syrsky:

Syrskyi, on the other hand, insisted on finding unprotected areas and rapid attacks, which he proposed for the liberation of the Kharkiv region in 2022. There was even talk of going further to secure the border. However, at that time, the focus was on advancing in Kherson, and Zaluzhnyi was against diverting resources elsewhere. Nevertheless, at the Stavka, Syrskyi managed to secure the President's intervention, and the Kharkiv counteroffensive took place. They did not advance further.

According to Bezuhla, Syrsky ‘with political support, began planning something more serious’ as soon as he was appointed to replace Zaluzhny in June 2024.

She doesn’t forget to chastise Syrsky as well, of course:

the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine became obsessed with the idea of showing himself again in active operations. In the process of preparation and due to this autocratic management style, other matters were somewhat "forgotten." Avdiivka, after which the Russians advanced 30 km through unprepared positions, Kharkiv region, Toretsk rotation, and scandals with Sodol, the unprepared Pokrovsko-Myronivka agglomeration, and much more were not addressed in the midst of our, I admit, only commander-in-chief's active plans.

Naturally, she follows up by clarifying that this is all caused by Syrsky’s influence by the ‘Soviet classical school’, with its ‘attitude towards human life’.

Nevertheless, she praises Syrsky’s appropriate choice for attack, use of elite instead of mobilized units, and the informational silence around the operation, which she contrasts favorably to Zaluzhny’s failed 2023 counter-offensive.

But after a complicated theory of how Syrsky is trying to steal responsibility for the Kursk ‘success’ from airborne units, Bezuhla gets to the most interesting part:

But that's not all. The idea looked like a "task 200" one-way mission [EIU: ‘200’ means military fatality in Russia and Ukraine]. Unable to withstand such treatment, one of the most authoritative paratrooper commanders, the commander of the 80th brigade, Emil Ishkulov, openly told the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine about the unrealistic nature of the task. This was non-public. But Syrskyi's reaction — to dismiss the brigade commander without any explanations, appoint a more obedient one, and not consider the risks — outraged the entire brigade and gained public resonance. Moreover, Ishkulov did not give in and in a comment spoke the truth about the situation, mentioning both the political pressure regarding the operation and the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Without details about the plan, of course. The brigade commander was not reinstated, but something else happened: the plan was improved, and this can be considered a positive outcome that saved more than one life.

So, as it turns out, Ishkulov was removed by Syrsky, and because of his doubts regarding Kursk. This itself was also confirmed yesterday by the Guardian

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Back to Bezuhla’s megapost about Kursk. In it, she is also quite blunt about the risks of the operation:

(Paywall will free trial)

https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/ ... de-the-war
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Wed Aug 21, 2024 11:40 am

Peace plans, or the opposite
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/21/2024

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“The Russian Armed Forces are creating three new military groups: Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk. After filling them with troops, they should not only reinforce the southern areas of the mentioned regions, but also be used in the medium term for operations in the north of Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv,” wrote Colonel Cassad Boris Rozhin yesterday , wanting to give a purely defensive action an offensive potential in the future. Several Russian sources mentioned yesterday the creation of these three new military groups, which will be named after three sectors that, more than two and a half years after the Russian invasion, Moscow has understood are vulnerable to attacks from Ukraine.

Until now, Russia had relied on the apparent unwritten agreement it believed it had with the United States to contain the war on Ukrainian territory and had reacted by sending reinforcements to expel the small and poorly trained and prepared formations sent by Kirilo Budanov's GUR in Belgorod. Moscow had not yet understood that Washington's only objective was to prevent the expansion of the war towards the west and that the adventures of groups like RDK were nothing more than a way of testing the defences in anticipation of a much larger operation such as the one now taking place in Kursk and which continues despite Russian reinforcements. The certain stabilisation does not prevent a new front from being formed, Ukraine from entrenching itself in the areas under its control and threatening "the city of Korenovo", as the press refers to this town of just over 5,000 inhabitants. According to Alexander Syrsky, Ukraine now controls 93 Russian localities (most of them small towns and villages), compared to the 92 Zelensky had mentioned the day before.

Even without really understanding what strategic objectives Kiev might be seeking to achieve with a deep attack on Kursk that risks overextending Ukrainian troops and that may not produce a result spectacular enough to change the course of the war, media such as AFP , citing military experts, claim that “Ukraine’s military incursion into Russia, the first in the two years of the war, has handed Kiev the initiative on the battlefield.” The president’s brief mentions are relegated to the final paragraphs of the war chronicles, who in his last appearance simply mentioned a “difficult situation,” in reference to Russian advances in Donbass. Like Ukraine, Russia also officially announced yesterday the capture of a town, New York, where the then president Poroshenko made a propagandistic appearance with his closest team when his decommunization took place. With the capture of Zeliznoe, Russia is dangerously close to Dzerzhinsk, Toretsk, with a population of 32,000, and is planning to start the battle for the city. And although everything indicates that Russia will focus on advancing south towards Krasnogorovka, Marinka and Ugledar in order to occupy a large area of ​​the Donetsk region, the situation is also very dangerous for Ukraine in Pokrovsk, the most important city on the Eastern Front, which risks a partial collapse of the sector if it is lost or besieged.

The Russian and Ukrainian advances mean that, for the first time in the war, both sides in the conflict have good news to present to their audiences and with which to justify the continuation of their respective tactics. In both cases, this discourse also involves establishing a hierarchy. In the case of Ukraine, it means downplaying the front where its army has been fighting for ten and a half years and ignoring the fact that some of the best-prepared strongholds have been lost or are at risk of being lost during the Minsk peace process in which Kiev never believed. In the case of Russia, it requires giving priority to advancing in Donbass, a territory until now considered foreign and for which the Russian population did not mobilise en masse or demand more from its government during the first eight years of the war, instead of defending its own territories. Kiev and Moscow also agree on the need to seek a strength on the front that guarantees that they cannot be forced to negotiate in a position of weakness.

Despite Ukraine's triumphalism, there is no indication that the current operation in Kursk will change the nature of the war, which has been stuck in a stalemate since the summer of 2022, and which suggests that the conflict is heading for an inconclusive end. War will require negotiations and the search for a treaty in which, if conditions do not change radically, both sides will have to give in. This is where positions differ: while Russia showed itself ready in Istanbul to abandon all territories beyond Donbass and Crimea, Ukraine has always rejected any agreement that required territorial concessions. The precedent of Minsk, according to which Donbass would have returned to Kiev's control, indicates that Ukraine specifically seeks the return of a territory, Crimea, which was not mentioned in that agreement. Although it has been fighting for the territory for ten years, Donbass has never been Ukraine's priority. The reality on the front shows that this is not the case now, when kyiv prefers to transfer units defending Krasnoarmeysk, where thousands of people still reside, to Kursk, which is the absolute priority at the moment.

“Ukraine says its incursion will bring peace. Putin’s plans may be different,” was the headline of The New York Times a few days ago , whose skepticism was based, as usual, on the idea of ​​the Russian president’s unwillingness to reach an agreement. To blame Russia for the postponement of the indirect negotiations with which the mediating countries wanted to seek a partial ceasefire to exclude attacks on electricity production infrastructure, the newspaper cites the words of several Russian representatives, who this week have refused to negotiate under the current conditions, to which they add the usual tagline of the idea that Moscow does not know how to negotiate in good faith. All this without mentioning that the negotiating tool that Kiev has used in the days prior to the planned start of these talks has been to attack one nuclear power plant again and try to approach another, no doubt to create a similar situation. As icing on the cake, accusing Russia of its own actions, Zelensky has described the fire at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant as Russian nuclear blackmail.

However, the Western press as a whole continues to see Zelensky's stance as an opening to diplomacy and a step towards peace, rather than his attempt to recruit his allies in search of a maximalist solution. The media and analysts prefer not to assume that Zelensky 's peace plan , which does not even mention what would become of the population of the territories liberated against the opinion of the population, is a war plan and that his demand for a second peace summit in which the West would force Russia to participate is still a reflection of Ukraine's aspirations for its partners, primarily the United States, to force Moscow to capitulate. This plan requires a position of strength from Kiev that neither exists on the front at present nor are the conditions in place to achieve it, which does not mean that the Ukrainian government is going to give up on it.

“Kiev is making a risky bet: that the incursion gives it new leverage for a favorable deal with the Kremlin, even as its military remains on the defensive along much of the front line in Ukraine. Russians who know Putin expect him to respond harshly, believing his military has the advantage in manpower and weaponry,” wrote The New York Times , which not only failed to understand Ukraine’s position, but also that of Russia, which instead of responding harshly has opted for a tactic similar to that in Donbass: taking the long view and avoiding escalation.

Yesterday, the Ukrainian president responded to this Russian approach by stating that Kursk has shown that Russia's red lines do not exist. "We are witnessing a significant ideological shift: the naive and illusory concept of the so-called red lines with regard to Russia, which dominated the assessment of the war by some partners, has collapsed in recent days." After having crossed practically all of the lines that were proposed in 2022, there are few forms of escalation that can still be introduced, but it is obvious that this is Zelensky's demand, something that is hardly compatible with a ceasefire, negotiation or search for the compromise that a negotiation would require under current conditions. If there was any doubt, Mikhail Podolyak wrote yesterday that there are “three potential challenges that have not yet been resolved and that significantly affect the format and dynamics of the fighting”: speed in the delivery of weapons, increasing the quantity of material sent and prohibitions on the use of Western weapons to carry out “systematic and massive attacks on Russian territory”. Ukraine not only does not think about a ceasefire or negotiations, but is openly betting on escalation.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/21/plane ... contrario/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Summary of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of August 21, 2024) | Main:

- The losses of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the zone of the North group of forces in the Kharkiv region amounted to 100 servicemen per day;

- Air defense systems intercepted 7 Hammer aerial bombs, a Neptune-MD anti-ship missile, 15 HIMARS shells, as well as 63 Ukrainian drones per day;

- Units of the West group took up more advantageous lines and positions, repelled 6 counterattacks, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 470 servicemen and a tank;

- The East group repelled four counterattacks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces per day, the enemy lost up to 130 servicemen;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost more than 700 servicemen per day, a RAK-SA-12 MLRS installation and an ammunition depot as a result of the actions of the South group;

- The Russian Armed Forces destroyed concentrations of Ukrainian Armed Forces manpower in 131 districts.

▫️ Units of the Dnepr group of forces inflicted losses on formations of the 65th Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the 39th Coastal Defense Brigade in the areas of the settlements of Malye Shcherbaki and Novodanilovka in the Zaporizhia region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 30 servicemen, five vehicles and two 152-mm D-20 howitzers .

▫️Operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces destroyed a fuel depot and struck concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in the 131st district .

▫️Air defense systems shot down seven French-made Hammer guided bombs , a Neptune-MD anti-ship missile , 15 US-made HIMARS rockets , and 63 unmanned aerial vehicles.

▫️In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 639 aircraft, 282 helicopters, 30,255 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,348 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,416 multiple launch rocket systems, 13,470 field artillery pieces and mortars, 24,977 units of special military vehicles.

***

Colonelcassad

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Rybar : Kursk direction: fighting along the entire front line, continued attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces
what is known as of 13:00 on August 21, 2024

Heavy fighting is underway in the Kursk region , Ukrainian formations continue to try to advance in several directions.

In the Glushkovsky district, the situation remains tense against the backdrop of the destruction of bridges, but no attempts to advance by Ukrainian formations have yet been observed. But to the east, the enemy is active.

In the Korenevsky district , the Ukrainian Armed Forces are conducting an offensive near Korenevo , Russian troops currently hold the settlement, destroying enemy equipment in the fields to the east. To the northeast, in the Olgovka - Matveyevka section , the enemy also tried to advance in the direction of Matveyevka , but it is unclear how successfully.

To the north, the enemy tried to advance in the direction of Aleksandrovka from the east, but was detected and at least partially destroyed in the area of ​​the 367 km platform .

In addition, there are extremely contradictory news from the outskirts of Snagost , where the enemy has also been attacking for several days.

in the Sudzhansky District . In the Martynovka area , based on objective control footage, the enemy was able to advance to the east of the village, where it was covered by artillery fire.

In the area of ​​​​Spalnoye , a large group of the enemy was captured by the Russian Armed Forces. However, there was no report of the liberation of the village; the village is probably in the gray zone.

Enemy strikes on the rear areas of the region continue. In addition to several drones intercepted at night, in the Bolshesoldatsky District , as a result of a UAV dropping a VOP on a passing car, one local resident was killed and two were injured.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

Time To Save One's Own Ass.

... or, rather, asses. LOL. I warned, remember? Now suddenly The Economist admits:

Russia’s double-punch back against Ukraine’s shock raid. It is bombing Ukrainians in Kursk and advancing in Pokrovsk
It is behind the paywall, but I can tell you what this globalist establishment tabloid proposes in this newly restarted game of blame. They say that it was hapless general Syrsky who hid his plans from the West to attack Kursk Oblast. Which implies, that should he have told that he about to attack Kursk Oblast (a euphemism for what Syrsky does best--kill his best troops), all those moral and military competent people (I am screwing with you) in Washington and London would have certainly prevented it. But poor poor dears have been in a complete darkness and didn't know about those plans, LOL))

Of course, this whole thing is nothing but a heap of bovine manure in a feeble attempt to start deflecting and spreading blame around, after VSU best equipped (practically all of it fresh NATO hardware) and motivated troops, and NATO generals who planned this catastrophe for them, covered part (about 11-12 kilometers) of what is called forefiled (or security zone), which was not prepared (why, we will know in a due time--administration of Kurks Oblast has a lot to answer for) and... drum roll... still drumming... still rolling... ran into the first line of defense of the Russian Army, which, as you may have guessed it by now was in about 11-12 kilometers from the border and... And The Economist still is required to keep abreast of the events along the whole front. Pokrovsk axis is just one of them, where Russians advance very dramatically. How about this?

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Drive to Kupyansk and those lovely narrows of Oskol River where its width is reduced to 25-30 meters. You get my drift, right? And then, of course, there are events at Maryinka-Ugledar chord. So, a lot is unfolding as I type this, but, in the end, it is about sheer military and political stupidity of the NATO planners who needed some "success" and "transfer" of Russian reserves from the front. Boy, they really need to learn what COFM is and get basic math skills going for them. The result was predictable: lines of communications (supply lines) have been cut, the whole force was dispersed and instead of Troops Operation, Counter-Terror Operation was introduced and that means there is NO statute of limitations for terrorism, meaning for anyone involved in this "incursion", including those who planned it. I stress this for the last several days--this is hugely important. And yes, that means NATO planners.

Meanwhile, the removal of trash continues: (Image of dead Ukrainian soldier.)

Anyone thought otherwise? Also, instructive, how losers from London stage Russian "POWs", in reality Ukie "actors", laying on the ground (that even WaPo cannot confirm it), while this is how real POWs identification happens through real military professionals of the Russian Army: (Video at link.)

Heads-up, self-identification: full name (FIO, in Russian) and military unit. Many POWs from VSU, many... courts will decide who will be accepted as POW and who will face terrorism charges.

P.S. Dmitry Kosyrev writes today in RIA (in Russian) about Idiocracy capturing the US. Read it, it is instructive.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2024/08 ... n-ass.html

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Why Might Ukraine Want Russia To Use Nuclear Weapons?

Andrew Korybko
Aug 19, 2024

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This could lead to immense pressure upon Russia’s Global South partners to distance themselves from it and might also result in American retaliation against Russian forces inside of Ukrainian-claimed territory, both of which could reshape the conflict’s dynamics in Kiev’s favor and stave off its defeat.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko warned on Sunday in an interview with leading Russian media that “Such escalation on the part of Ukraine (by invading Kursk) is an attempt to push Russia to asymmetric actions. Well, let's say to use nuclear weapons. I know for sure that Ukraine would be very happy if Russia or we used tactical nuclear weapons there. They will applaud it. Then, probably, we would hardly have allies left. In general, there would be no even sympathetic countries left.”

That sounds absurd on the surface, but it actually makes a lot of sense if one thinks more deeply about it. The use of nuclear weapons is taboo because of the physical and environmental damage that they cause. There are also credible fears that they’d lead to one’s nuclear-armed adversaries retaliating in a tit-for-tat fashion, thus rapidly climbing the escalation ladder to the brink of World War III. Nevertheless, several states still retain nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes in line with their respective doctrines.

As regards Russia’s, they can be employed in the event of a large-scale conventional attack that threatens the existence of the state, among other conditions. That hasn’t yet happened in the Kursk context, but the hypothetical scenario of that region or another being completely captured by Ukraine might be deemed by some decisionmakers as meeting the criterion depending on how rapidly the front lines collapse. To be clear, there’s no credible indication that anything of the sort will unfold.

Nevertheless, Ukraine might capitalize upon its attack there by striking the nearby nuclear power plant. A top Russian military journalist had earlier warned that “[Ukraine] plan[s] to strike the storage sites of spent nuclear fuel of a nuclear power plant” in either Kursk or Zaporozhye. This then prompted the Russian Defense Ministry to officially declare that “tough military and military-technical countermeasures will be taken immediately” in that event.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that such strikes against those targets “could result in a large-scale technogenic catastrophe in Europe”, not to mention in the Russian heartland if the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant melts down in the aftermath. These combined conventional (invasion) and unconventional (de facto dirty bomb) attacks could push Russian decisionmakers closer to seriously considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response as a last resort out of self-defense.

Whether dropped inside of Russia’s own borders or Ukraine’s, they’d send a political shockwave across the world due to breaking the previously mentioned taboo, which could indeed lead to there being “no even sympathetic countries left” in support of Russia barring a few like North Korea. China and India would be under immense pressure to distance themselves from Russia, not just by the West, but also for appearance’s sake since they wouldn’t want to legitimize the use of nuclear weapons by their rivals.

Reports have also swirled that the US might conventionally retaliate against Russian forces inside of Ukrainian-claimed territory if nuclear weapons are used there, thus placing their proxy war on a direct path to World War III if that happens. Ukraine is still losing to Russia despite its sneak attack in Kursk so its leadership might have calculated, however “irrationally” it seems to objective observers, to provoke Russia into raising the stakes to that level.

It's this escalation sequence that Lukashenko likely had in mind when warning that Ukraine wants Russia to use nuclear weapons, which could hypothetically occur if it completely captures a Russian region and/or is responsible for a nuclear catastrophe through its attacks against Russian nuclear power plants. The first probably won’t happen since their offensive appears to have been halted, while the second is entirely in Ukraine’s hands, so it’s incumbent on the West to do its utmost to stop them from doing this.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/why-migh ... -russia-to

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Preferred query language
August 19, 16:25

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Back in the 2000s, it was well known that in Ukraine, more than 80% of people choose Russian in everyday communication.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9330527.html

Ten years ago this was common knowledge, now it's 'Russian propaganda'.

******

Qatar "Talks" Just Another Ukrainian Perception Management Diversion

Simplicius
Aug 20, 2024

The latest lede driving the buzz for the past few days is the claim that Russia and Ukraine were set to meet in Qatar to discuss a mutual ceasefire against hitting each other’s energy grids. The furnished narrative suggests that Russia has been hurting from the “crippling” strikes on its oil and gas infrastructure conducted by Ukrainian drones, and so was willing to stop hitting the Ukrainian electric grid in exchange.

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https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-ku ... ion-qatar/

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https://archive.ph/dvAp3

From the outset, this story smelled fairly fishy for obvious reasons. I’ll let one of the top pro-Ukrainian accounts explain the absurdity of it. Here’s Illia Ponomarenko’s take:

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Read that very carefully:

And yes, it's extremely unlikely that Russia would be interested in halting its large-scale missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in exchange for no more Ukrainian attacks on its oil depots and refineries. Because Russia doesn't need an "energy attacks ceasefire" as badly as Ukraine now. Ukrainian strikes on oil facilities are painful and harmful but not as closely bad as the situation with Ukraine's national energy grid, which is critical now. Ukraine's non-nuclear energy generation has been nullified with Russian missiles at the national level. Down to the point that we had large-scale power outages during peak summer heat. Ukraine's energy transition and importing system is extremely vulnerable to new Russian bombing campaigns. And winter is coming soon. And air defense remains in terrible deficit.

Why would Russia want to stop this now, again? For the sake of saving some oil depots from Ukrainian drones? This is naive af.


Following that, we’ve had several statements from official Russian figures denying any such talks were being planned.

Yuri Ushakov, advisor to the Russian president: (Video at link.)

"As follows from the latest statement by Yuri Ushakov, an aide to the Russian president, Putin's peace plan itself is not being cancelled. However, "at this stage, given this adventure [of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region], we will not talk."


Lavrov: (Video at link.)

In a comment to Pavel Zarubin, Lavrov called reports of "hidden contacts" between Moscow and Kyiv, allegedly mediated by Qatar and Turkey, rumors.

Information about such contacts, according to the minister, is part of the development of the conference on Ukraine in Switzerland, where a decision was made to create working groups.

But for Moscow this process is unacceptable, because its only goal is to promote an ultimatum called the "Zelensky formula," Lavrov emphasized.


Maria Zakharova put the final nail in on the theory:

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https://kyivindependent.com/russia-deni ... y-strikes/

In response to the report, Zakharova claimed that "no one broke anything off because there was nothing to break off."

"There have been no direct or indirect negotiations between Russia and the Kyiv regime on the safety of civilian critical infrastructure facilities," Zakharova added.


Even the Washington Post article which first broke the story quoted a Ukrainian official as stating how catastrophic the energy situation in the country has become:

One of the reasons Ukrainian officials doubted Russia’s sincerity is its extensive bombing campaign of Ukrainian energy infrastructure in recent weeks. More bombardment could leave civilians without power for hours each day during the frigid winter months.

“We have one chance to get through this winter, and that’s if the Russians won’t launch any new attacks on the grid,” a Ukrainian official who was briefed on the talks said.


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So, then if this truly is the case, who is behind the Qatar story, and what is its purpose?

It’s obvious that Ukraine gains the most from promulgating such a story: it seeks to portray Russia as desperate, which in turn makes Ukraine look triumphant in its campaign of strikes against Russian oil processing sites. It makes Putin look like he’s “crawling back” to Ukraine for negotiations. In effect, it seems like nothing more than another leg of ongoing PR management and damage control for Ukraine, with the strategy of always taking the initiative of rolling out stories unfavorable to Russia’s image first, so that Russia is forced to invariably play off the back foot, in a defensive position by perception.

This all ties into the wider information sphere management on the NATO-Ukrainian side as they desperately work to cultivate perceptions of the war favorable to Ukraine, with the European citizenry as the main target audience. As long as Ukraine can be presented as victorious and upbeat, the military-industrial parasite clan grift can continue squeezing out more tax payer funds for the money laundering scheme that is this war.

Unfortunately, cracks continue to grow in that direction:

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Recall I had surmised the “sudden” unearthing of Nord Stream evidence against Ukraine was not coincidental.

Now the foreign correspondent for The Economist even states he was told the recent Nord Stream legal case was in fact part of a new internal shift in Germany, which appears to be trying to extricate itself from Ukraine:

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The above references this article:

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https://www.ft.com/content/35913185-0bb ... 6623743d37

"According to the current budget planning, only the military aid that has already been approved can be delivered [to Ukraine]. Therefore, air defense systems will no longer be purchased."

"Betrayal" on the First German Channel! And the most terrible announcement: Germany has no extra money for Ukraine. But, in order to smooth things over, they are allowed to put in their two cents - both the upset Ukrainian ambassador Makeyev and a couple of experts concerned about the problem. From now on it is like this: the deeper the holes in the German budget, the deeper the sympathy for Ukraine. Bare, dictionary-like.


(Video at link.)

Furthermore, NY Times’ new article also doused water on negotiation theories, stating out right that Putin is not focused on negotiations now but on “revenge”:

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https://archive.ph/isIbr

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If you read the rest of the article above, you’ll note the tone entirely revolves around peace talks for Ukraine, with every interpretation of the Kursk assault coming down to Ukraine trying to force Russia into negotiations. It’s a very shifty game the West is playing: militate in every possible way for negotiations and a cessation of conflict, all the while pinning it on Russia, and claiming Russia is scrabbling desperately for talks.

This is a smokescreen of magnificent proportions, an epic gas lighting campaign only the regime media could pull off with such brazen verve. In actuality, when you cut the noise and closely examine the reality, it becomes clear that Russia is not yenning for talks of any kind and continues to prosecute its military campaign very methodically, with no degree of caginess or contradiction. The more Ukraine pushes this surreal smokescreen, the more it becomes evident that Zelensky must truly be on his last leg, and the internal figures in the AFU must be flashing red.

Interestingly, there continues to be indication that the West may be pushing for the type of desperate armistice we discussed several times a month or two ago. Namely: cutting all the Russian-controlled land off, and immediately whisking rump-state Ukraine off into NATO proper:

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The plan appears to be to create a continuing crescendo of hype and tension around the figment that the situation is deteriorating for Russia on every front—the home front, the northern military front, and soon to be other fronts around Zaporozhye and elsewhere. It’s all to create a sort of tangible wave of pressure against Russia’s leadership, and shift global perceptions about the war in Ukraine’s favor to freight Russia with anxiety coming even from allies toward ending the war.

As we’ve been discussing, the next stage entails potentially activating the Zaporozhye front, with rumors continuing to abound about buildups there:

Dangerous situation on the Zaporozhye site. The enemy is pulling vehicles and fuel trucks to the Orekhovo direction. There is a lot of equipment on the Kamensk site-north of Vasilyevka. The direction of impact is on the Zapad NPP and the Vasilyevka-Tokmak highway with access to Melitopol. At the same time, the Crimean Bridge will be hit. The command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine expects only one thing-to reduce our forces in this area.

But now there’s even another old escalatory master plan being tediously revived: the Transnistria gambit. Suddenly, from several seemingly coordinated vectors at once, we’ve had signals that Ukraine may soon attempt to enflame the Transnistria corridor in their attempt to drown Russia in chaos from every side, perhaps imagining they will freeze the Russian general staff in a kind of indecision crisis doom spiral.

Here we have Ukrainian charity Come Back Alive head Taras Chmut dropping a hint:

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This was suddenly followed by Moldovan ex-Defense Minister Anatole Shalaru declaring that Moldova and Ukraine should jointly “solve” the Transnistria issue once and for all sometime soon: (Video at link.)

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https://espreso.tv/svit-rf-khoche-peret ... ni-shalaru

And then there were other small hints on rumor mill channels like Rezident UA, etc., that Ukraine is considering opening up that front to stoke the flames against Russia’s war.

Of course, as before, this is now the fourth or fifth time Ukraine has threatened to stoke that theater into conflict, and most likely it will come to naught again, but it’s something to keep an eye on as Ukraine enters the ninth inning.

Also, Ukraine has telegraphed its own intentions in the coming nuclear falseflag Zelensky potentially plans to carry out:

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As can be seen by the above, the Kursk diversion allows them to carry out a possible falseflag under the immunity of the lie that it’s a “desperate Russia” that’s responsible. This is why these cognitive campaigns and information psyops are so important, to seed the ground for Western audiences to truly be convinced that it is Russia’s situation that’s slowly deteriorating and causing Putin to turn desperate.



To get back to the Kursk invasion for a moment, one thing that’s been made increasingly visible is that the operation appeared hidden from the US, while in actuality it was the UK taking the lead in goading Ukraine into such a daring foray. This could explain why the US insisted they were not told about it, and ostensibly refuses to allow Ukraine to use its more prestige systems on Russian territory, while the UK is conversely gung ho and all-in on the escalatory ladder.

The British Sunday Times’ new column punctuates this, and the overall schematic does correspond to earlier theories that a rift existed between the US/UK, with UK being the more maximalist, while the more politically-fractured Biden administration leaned toward reeling the conflict in. MoA covered this angle also.

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Of course this has more to do with the fact that the US has more to lose in a superpower exchange with Russia, while the UK gets to hide behind mommy’s skirt; so the US will naturally be the more cautious and wary, while UK gets to play the squealing poodle.

(Much more at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/qat ... -ukrainian

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Talks With Ukraine Impossible After Kursk Attacked: Lavrov

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A Russian soldier, Aug. 2024. Photo: X/ @AFpost

August 20, 2024 Hour: 8:15 am

On Tuesday, Russian forces liberated the town of New York in the Donetsk region.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has asserted that there cannot be any talks with Ukraine after its attack on Russia’s border Kursk region.

“The president made it very clear that following the attacks on the Kursk region, any talks are impossible”, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said and reguted some allegations that the two countries made contacts mediated by the third party, claiming them as pure rumors.

The top Russian diplomat also indicated that the entire process within the frames of the conference on Ukraine in Switzerland is unacceptable for Russia because “it is about promoting the Zelensky formula as an ultimatum.”

On Tuesday, the Russian Defense Ministry reported that its country’s forces liberated the town of New York in the Donetsk region. The troops of the Center military group eliminated a large contingent of Ukrainian troops occupying this town of 3,000 inhabitants.


New York is one of the most important towns and an important logistical hub in the vicinity of the Toretsk stronghold. In 2021, the Ukrainian parliament reinstated the name of New York, which the town received in the mid-19th century.

Toretsk and Pokrovsk are precisely two of the main objectives of the current Russian offensive in Donetsk, which has allowed the Russians to conquer several hundred square kilometers of territory.

The day before, units of the Russian Center group also liberated the town of Zalizne in their advance towards Toretsk.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/talks-wi ... ed-lavrov/

******

About the enemy's plans in the Zaporizhzhya direction
August 20, 17:28

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Regarding the enemy's potential plans.

In addition to active operations in the Kursk region and potential auxiliary strikes on the border of the Belgorod and Bryansk regions, the enemy is taking certain measures to concentrate forces for a potential strike on the Zaporizhzhya NPP. The strike may be a combined operation.

1. The group concentrated in the Primorskoye and Kamenskoye area strikes at the junction of units between the Dnieper and the Rabotinsky salient with the aim of breaking through to the Tokmak-Vasilyevka highway and at least blocking Vasilyevka.

2. Simultaneously with the strike (possibly with a delay of 2-3 days from the first day of the offensive), a landing is carried out in the Energodar or Zaporizhzhya NPP area (Energodar is more likely). In this regard, the Kursk operation will finally be transferred to the category of diversionary.

3. The task is to capture Energodar, Zaporizhzhya NPP, Vasilyevka, Dneprorudny. For these purposes, the enemy can use up to 8 brigades, including 3 marine brigades, up to 100-120 tanks, about 450-500 various armored fighting vehicles + reinforcements.

4. Failure to break through to the Kursk NPP may accelerate the start of the second attempt to turn the tide in the summer campaign, which is developing extremely unsuccessfully for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the moment, there is a concentration of enemy reserves in the area of ​​Zaporozhye and Primorskoye.

5. The likelihood that the enemy will risk it again in this direction is quite high. The enemy's desire to seize the initiative should not be underestimated; they have not squandered all their reserves. In turn, failure to implement this operation will have extremely sad operational and strategic consequences for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In general, there is no need to relax; there is still more than a month left until the end of the summer-autumn campaign, and the enemy still has the resources to try to make at least one more serious move. Our task is not to miss this move and to realize our advantages.

https://t.me/boris_rozhin/134329 - zinc

The broadcast of military operations in Ukraine as usual continues here https://t.me/boris_rozhin (if you are interested, subscribe).
My channel on Rutube - https://rutube.ru/channel/23471524/ (in the process of restoring work, from September there will be constant publications), if you are interested, subscribe

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9332553.html

Medvedev on peace talks with Ukraine
August 21, 10:43

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Medvedev on peace talks with Ukraine.

In my opinion, lately, at least theoretically, there was one danger - a negotiation trap, where our country could fall under certain circumstances. Namely - early unnecessary peace negotiations proposed by the international community and imposed on the Kiev regime. With unclear prospects and
consequences.

After the neo-Nazis committed an act of terrorism in the Kursk region, everything fell into place. The idle chatter of unauthorized mediators on the topic of a wonderful world has ceased. Now everyone understands everything, even if they do not say it out loud. They understand that NO MORE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE ENEMY IS COMPLETELY DEFEATENED!

So let the vile bastard with a nasty mug and disheveled white hair from the country where the terrorist operation was being prepared not rejoice in it. His country has done much worse than the territory under his wardship. Ukraine: there will be significantly more senseless spending, significantly more destroyed military equipment and radically more coffins. And now let the unfortunate Ukrainian serfs kiss the bloody hands of the necrophiliacs who mock them – their Anglo-Saxon masters.


(c) Medvedev

Well, that's good. Otherwise the smell of fixed matches had already begun to hang in the air.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9333763.html

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"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Thu Aug 22, 2024 11:32 am

War is peace
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/22/2024

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Now in the final phase of his mandate as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell seems to want to finish his work in the same way he has done in the five years in which he has been at the head of the bloc's diplomacy : by unconditionally aligning himself with the Ukrainian position. Borrell came to his post, elected when there was no other alternative due to the lack of interest of the countries in opting for him, at a time that lent itself to diplomacy, 2019, the year in which Volodymyr Zelensky came to power. Although his discourse changed quickly, partly due to pressure from the extreme right, but also because of the conviction that he would never fulfill his campaign proposals, the current Ukrainian president obtained his comfortable electoral majority by humiliating his opponent, Petro Poroshenko, by promising peace. The words of candidate Zelensky were never translated into actions seeking dialogue or compromise once he took power, and Ukrainian politics continued along the path begun with the victory at Maidan and the irregular change of government in kyiv in February 2014: nationalism, forced homogenisation of Ukrainian culture and politics and belligerence.

The European Union's policy towards the war in Ukraine and the peace agreements followed the same path. Both before and after Borrell's arrival, EU diplomacy defended the Minsk agreements in words, but never backed up this supposed support with actions. The false optimism of holding a meeting of heads of state and government of the Normandy Format countries - Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine - gave way to silence and the defence of each and every one of Kiev's decisions without a single reproach, criticism or the slightest pressure. As Zelensky admitted years later, it was in December 2019, at the Paris summit, when he announced to his German and French partners, specifically Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, that implementing the Minsk agreements was not possible, a way of admitting that Kiev had no intention of fulfilling the commitments made with its signature in the treaty negotiated by the German chancellor, the then president Hollande, Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin. However, the communiqué that emerged from that meeting was unanimous in its support for the Minsk agreements, which created a mirage of the possibility of progress in a diplomatic process in which Ukraine sought only to gain time and strength to demand unilateral concessions from Russia while refusing to even promise future compliance with its commitments. Like Germany and France individually, the European Union actively contributed to creating the illusion that a peace process existed and to laying the groundwork for claiming that it was Russia, not Ukraine, that was causing the blockade.

“The EU’s support and commitment to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders remains unwavering. We urge Russia to honour its commitments and participate in good faith in the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group,” wrote Josep Borrell when the news broke that, seven years after the signing of agreements that Kiev now admits it never intended to honour, Russia was preparing to recognise the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. Borrell appealed to good faith and the Normandy format, the same one in which Zelensky had made his intentions clear. As usual, the European diplomat referred to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, ignoring the fact that the loss of the Donbass territories was due to Ukraine’s refusal to comply with the agreements and not to any sabotage by Russia, which for years defended the Minsk option, which was not at all popular with the population precisely because it provided for a return to kyiv’s control. “We commend Ukraine for its restraint in the face of this bullying and violations of the Minsk agreements and international law,” Borrell said on 21 February 2022, accusing Russia of all violations – in fact, it was not Moscow that was supposed to comply with the points of the Minsk agreements, but Donetsk and Lugansk – and completely exonerating Ukraine of any wrongdoing.

The media's lack of interest in the peace process and the ease with which any accusation against Russia is considered credible have made all these statements irrelevant, which under other circumstances would have aged badly in the face of the way in which Kiev has subsequently boasted of its lack of interest in fulfilling its part. Following the Ukrainian discourse to the letter, the European Union also quickly forgot that there ever was a peace agreement, a memory that it only brings up at those moments when, due to the demands of the script, it is necessary to argue that, unlike Ukraine, Russia is not capable of negotiating in good faith.

While waiting to be replaced by someone even more belligerent, the former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who has not hesitated to make it clear that the common goal should not only be to defeat Russia at the front but to balkanise the country, Josep Borrell has always been in favour of the “Kursk counteroffensive”. Unlike the United States, Russia or even Ukraine, there has been no hope of negotiation from the European Union during the weeks preceding the start of the Ukrainian adventure in Russia. Despite the American and British perception of the European Union's stance as pacifist - at least during the Minsk years, when neither London nor Washington made any great attempt to defend the peace process - Brussels has become the ally most attached to the military solution.

It is not surprising, then, that Josep Borrell has joined the more bellicose option, the one that is more comfortable with extending the war even further rather than betting on a negotiation process that, as has been learned through the American media, was intended to negotiate a partial ceasefire. The objective was to exclude the electricity production infrastructure from the attacks. Instead of negotiation, Ukraine has chosen to try to approach and threaten the Kursk nuclear power plant and to attack the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant again, under Russian control. An expert in staying out of touch with reality, Borrell has wasted no time in supporting the Ukrainian plan and joining the option of escalation.

“The Kursk offensive is a severe blow to the narrative of Russian President Putin,” wrote the still High Representative of the European Union yesterday. In reality, the use of Western material on Russian territory, the increase in drone attacks on the Russian rear or the images of Ukrainian soldiers looting supermarkets or carrying fascist or Nazi symbols reinforce the Russian discourse of Western harassment and the need to defend itself from an aggressive opponent seeking to destroy the country. However, with a narrative that could have been signed by Mikhail Podolyak, Borrell wanted to focus on the possibilities that the Ukrainian offensive represents in Russia. “The lifting of restrictions on the use of capabilities against Russian military personnel involved in the aggression against Ukraine, in accordance with international law, would have several important effects,” wrote the leader of European diplomacy in his defense of allowing Ukraine to attack Russian territory without limitations and using all the weapons at its disposal.

According to Borrell, such an escalation would mean “strengthening Ukraine’s self-defence by ending Russia’s sanctuary for its attacks and bombings of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure”, a fallacious argument copied strictly from the Ukrainian discourse. In the first hours, Ukraine argued the need to create a buffer zone in Kursk to avoid bombings in Sumy, a region that has not suffered attacks like those suffered, for example, in Donbass, and which, contrary to what Borrell claims, is now suffering more bombings precisely because of the situation in Kursk. The offensive would also help “save lives and reduce destruction in Ukraine”, another falsehood, considering that the real destruction is taking place far from Kursk and that the battle continues there without the new front having modified the parameters at all. Of course, the third consequence of allowing Ukraine to attack Russian territory more strongly and further away would contribute, according to Borrell, to “advancing peace efforts”. War is peace, should consider the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, who advocates an even tougher war as the only proposal for peace .

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/22/guerra-es-paz/

Google Translator

****

From Cassad's telegram account:

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Rybar: Kursk direction: the Ukrainian Armed Forces advance near Snagost,
what is known as of 20:00 on August 21, 2024

Footage continues to arrive from the Kursk region, allowing us to significantly clarify the front line. In the Glushkovsky district , the status quo is maintained by the evening. The enemy is launching strikes, but is not attempting to cross the state border, Russian troops are building pontoon crossings under fire from Ukrainian formations, and airstrikes are carried out on Tetkino from time to time.Fighting continues in the neighboring Korenevsky district . Russian troops are holding Korenevo firmly, but to the south, the enemy, having passed Snagost, entered the neighboring settlement of Vishnevka in a column, where it was covered by UAV and artillery strikes. At the same time, based on the terrain and bridges, Ukrainian formations could not have reached Vishnevo without controlling Snagost , which is confirmed by the absence of the Russian Armed Forces in the village. - The status of Apanasovka , Vnezapnoye and Byakhovo remains in question. The enemy at least entered the first two, and Byakhovo was not mentioned in reports as being under anyone's control or in the context of shelling. Viktorovka and Uspenovka, cut off by the Blyakhovets River , most likely remain in the gray zone if they are not under enemy control.Fighting is also underwayin the Sudzhansky district . Enemy forces in Borki and Spalnoye are subjected to multiple attacks, but apparently, the settlements have not yet been liberated from Ukrainian formations.In addition, Russkiye Konopelki , judging by artillery strikes on houses occupied by the enemy, is also under enemy control.At the same time, Russian troops do not stop artillery and air strikes on the border territory of Sumy Oblast , where the enemy continues to operate large concentrations of personnel and equipment.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

G T

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Back to the Bloodlands: Operation Krepost
Russo-Ukrainian War: The Kursk Operation

Big Serge
Aug 20, 2024

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German tanks in Kursk Oblast, then and now

On Tuesday, August 6, the Russo-Ukrainian War took an unexpected twist with the beginning of a brigade-level Ukrainian assault on Kursk Oblast, across the border from Ukrainian Sumy. The decision by Ukrainian command to willingly open up a new front, at a time when their defenses on critical axes of the Donbas are failing, is both aggressive and fraught with peril. The sensational spectacle of a Ukrainian offensive into prewar Russia in a region that is operationally remote from the critical theater of the war has whipped the peanut gallery into a frenzy, and most commentators and observers seem to have fled straightaway to their base narrative instincts. Russian “doomers” have been quick to denounce the affair as a catastrophic failure of preparedness by the Russian Ministry of Defense, accelerationists have trumpeted the immateriality of Russian red lines, while the more disillusioned pro-Ukrainian commenters have despaired of the operation as a wasteful sideshow which dooms the Donbas line to defeat.

People form opinions very rapidly in the current information ecosystem, and the prospect of excitement often leads them to throw caution to the wind despite the orgy of misinformation and deception that surrounds such events. It is worth noting, however, that only two weeks have passed since the beginning of an operation that apparently nobody was expecting, and we should therefore be cautious of certainty and carefully distinguish between what we think and what we know. With that in mind, let’s take a careful survey of the Ukrainian operation as it stands and attempt to parse out both the strategic concept of the assault and its possible trajectories.

The sudden and unexpected eruption of combat in Kursk oblast has, of course, raised comparisons to the 1943 Battle of Kursk, which is often incorrectly called the “biggest tank battle of all time.” For a variety of reasons, that famous battle is a poor comparison. Germany’s Operation Citadel was a constrained and unambitious operation against a fully alert defense, characterized by a lack of both strategic imagination and strategic surprise. The current Ukrainian endeavor may lay on the opposite end of the spectrum - highly imaginative, and perhaps dangerously so. Nevertheless, the return of German military equipment to the environs of Kursk must raise eyebrows. The current battlefield around the town of Sudzha is precisely the spot where, in 1943, the Soviet 38th and 40th armies coiled for a counteroffensive against the German 4th Army. Russia’s southwestern steppe tastes blood again, and the fertile earth opens wide to accept the dead.

Krepost: Strategic Intentions
Before we talk about the strategic concept behind Ukraine’s operation in Kursk, let us briefly ponder what to call it. Repeating the phrase “Ukraine’s Kursk Operation” will rapidly become tiresome and dry, and calling it “Kursk”, or “The Battle of Kursk” is not a good option - both because it raises some confusion as to whether we mean the city of Kursk or the larger oblast around it, and because there has already been a Battle of Kursk. Therefore, I am suggesting that for now we simply refer to the Ukrainian assault as Operation Krepost. Germany’s 1943 offensive towards Kursk was codenamed Operation Citadel, and Krepost (крепость) is a Slavic word for a fortress or citadel.

Ukraine has made repeated forays across the Russian border throughout this war - generally suicidal thunder runs into Belgorod Oblast which met with disaster. Krepost, however, stands apart from previous episodes in several ways, chief among them being the use of regular AFU brigades rather than the paramilitary fronts stood up by the GRU (that is, the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate, not Steve Carell’s character in the Despicable Me franchise).

For previous expeditions towards Belgorod, the Ukrainians opted to use thinly veiled irregular formations like the “Freedom of Russia Legion” and the “Russian Volunteer Corps”. These are the sort of sheep dipped units that can be useful in certain contexts by allowing states to maintain a token façade of plausible deniability - a good corollary might be Russia’s own use of unmarked special forces in the 2014 annexation of Crimea. In a time of active war, however, these paramilitaries came across as exceptionally lame. Whatever the “Freedom of Russia Legion” called themselves, they were obviously forces stood up by the Ukrainian government, using Ukrainian weaponry, fighting Ukraine’s war. The paint job fooled nobody, and absurdities like the “Belgorod People’s Republic” did not exist beyond a few bad memes on twitter.

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It is notable, however, that the Kursk incursion has been undertaken not by forces disguising themselves (however poorly) as independent Russian paramilitaries but by Ukrainian forces operating as themselves - that is, as regular Ukrainian army brigades. Committing core AFU assets to a ground incursion in Russia, especially during a time of general operational crisis in the Donbas, is something entirely different than flinging a disposable paramilitary battalion at Belgorod.

But why? The obvious thing that stands out about Kursk is how operationally remote it is from the critical theater of the war. The center of gravity in this conflict is the Donbas, and Ukraine’s line of defenses around the cities of Pokrovsk, Kostyantinivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk, with crucial flanking axes in the land bridge and on the Oskil River line. The frontier of Kursk Oblast, where the Ukrainians are now attacking, is more than 130 kilometers away from the subsidiary battles around Kharkov, and more than 200 kilometers away from the main theater of the war. Given the scope of this war and the pace of advances, Kursk may as well be on the moon.

In short, the Ukrainian operation in Kursk bears no possibility of being supportive of the other, critical fronts of the war, and even in the most generous range of outcomes it has no potential to exert a direct operational influence on those fronts. Parsing through the strategic intention behind Krepost, therefore, in that it has no immediate operational bearing on extant fronts. A variety of opportunities have been proposed, which we will review and contemplate in turn.

1) The Atomic Hostage
Sixty kilometers from the Ukrainian border lies the small city of Kurchatov (named after Igor Kurchatov, the father of Soviet nuclear weaponry) and the Kursk Nuclear Powerplant. The proximity of such an obviously significant - and potentially dangerous - installation so close to the scene of the fighting led many to immediately presume that the nuclear plant is the objective of Krepost.

These theories are highly reductive and unsupported, and act as if the powerplant is the object in a game of tag - as if Ukraine can “win” by reaching the plant. It’s not immediately obvious that this is the case. There’s plenty of hand-wringing about Ukraine “capturing” the plant, but the question then remains: to do what with?

The implication would seem to be that Ukraine might use the plant as a hostage, threatening to sabotage it and initiate some sort of radiological disaster. This, however, would seem to be both impractical and unlikely. The Kursk plant is currently in a state of transition, with its four older RBMK reactors (similar to those used at Chernobyl) being phased out and replaced with new VVER reactors. The plant features modern biologic shields, a robust containment building, and other protective mechanisms. Furthermore, nuclear power plants do not explode in the sense that is often feared. Chernobyl, for example, experienced a steam explosion due to particular design flaws which do not exist in currently operable plants. The idea that Ukrainian soldiers could simply flip a bunch of switches and detonate the plant like a nuclear bomb are not realistic.

It is theoretically possible, one supposes, that the Ukrainians could try to bring in colossal amounts of explosives and send the entire plant sky high, spreading radioactive material into the atmosphere. While I am certainly no great admirer of the Kiev regime, I cannot help but doubt the willingness of the Ukrainian government to intentionally create a radiological disaster which would irradiate much of their own country along with swathes of central Europe, particularly because the Kursk region is part of the Dnieper watershed.

The powerplant story sounds scary but is ultimately too phantasmagorical to take seriously. Ukraine is not going to intentionally create a radiological disaster in close proximity to their own border, which would likely poison their own primary river basin and turn them into the most intensely hated international pariah ever seen. Even for a country at the end of its strategic rope, it’s hard to give credence to a harebrained scheme that uses critical maneuver assets of the regular army to capture an enemy nuclear plant and rig it to blow.

2) Diversionary Front
In another formulation, Krepost is construed as an attempt to draw Russian resources away from other, more critical sectors of front. The idea of a “diversion” as such is always appealing, to the point where it becomes something of a trope, but it’s worth considering what this might actually mean in the context of the relative force generation in this war.

We can begin with the more abstract problem here - Ukraine is operating at a serious disadvantage in total force generation, which means that any widening of the front will disproportionately burden the AFU. Extending the frontline with an entirely new - and strategically isolated - axis of combat would be a development that works against the outnumbered force. This is why, in 2022, we saw the Russians contract the frontline by hundreds of kilometers as a prelude to their mobilization. The idea of extending the front becomes a shell game for the Ukrainians - with fewer brigades than the Russians to cover more than 1000 kilometers of frontline, it becomes questionable as to just which army is being “diverted” in Kursk. For example, the spokesman for the 110th Mechanized Brigade (currently defending near Pokrovsk) told Politico that “things have become worse in our part of the front” since Ukraine launched Krepost, with less ammunition coming in as the Russians continue to attack.

The more concrete problem for Ukraine, however, is that the Russians formed an entirely new Northern Army Group covering Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk and is in the process of raising two additional army equivalents. To the extent that Krepost forces the deployment of Russian reserves, it will draw from forces organic to this northern grouping, and not the Russian formations currently attacking in the Donbas. Ukrainian sources are already taking a dour mood, noting that there has been no drawdown of Russia’s grouping in the Donbas. Thus far, the identified Russian units fighting in Kursk have essentially all been drawn from this northern grouping

More to the point, Krepost seems to have meaningfully denuded Ukrainian strength in the Donbas while affecting the Russians very little. A recent piece in the Economist featured interviews with several Ukrainian troops fighting in Kursk, all of whom said that their units had been “pulled, unrested, from under-pressure frontlines in the east with barely a day’s notice.” The article goes on to quote a source in the AFU’s general staff who notes that the Russian units scrambling into Kursk are coming from the northern army group, not the Donbas. A recent New York Times piece, which triumphantly announced the redeployment of Russian forces, admitted that none of Russia’s troop movements are affecting the Donbas - instead, it is deploying resting units from the Dnipro axis.

And this is Ukraine’s problem. Fighting an enemy with superior force generation, attempts to divert or redirect the fighting ultimately threaten to become a shell game. Russia has approximately 50 division equivalents on the line against perhaps 33 for Ukraine - an advantage that will stubbornly persist no matter how they are arranged on the line. Adding 100 extra kilometers of front in Kursk is fundamentally contradictory to the AFU’s fundamental interests at this juncture, which hinge on economizing forces and avoiding overextension.

3) Bargaining Chip
Another strand of thought suggests that Krepost may be an effort to strengthen Ukraine’s position for negotiations with Russia. An anonymous Zelensky advisor allegedly told the Washington Post that the point of the operation was to seize Russian territory to hold as a bargaining chip which could be swapped in negotiations. This view was then corroborated by senior advisor Mykhailo Podolyak.

If we take these claims at face value, we perhaps have arrived at the strategic intention of Krepost. If Ukraine indeed intends to occupy a swathe of Kursk Oblast and use it to bargain for the return of prewar Ukrainian territory in the Donbas, then we must ask the obvious question: have they lost their minds?

Such a plan would instantly founder on two insurmountable problems. The first of these would be an obvious misread of the relative value of the chips on the table. The Donbas - the heart of Russia’s war aims - is a highly urbanized region of nearly seven million inhabitants, which - along with Russian annexed Zaporozhia and Kherson - forms a critical strategic link to Crimea and grants Russia control over the Sea of Azov and much of the Black Sea littoral. The idea that the Kremlin would consider walking away from its aims here simply to bloodlessly recover a few small towns in southwestern Kursk is, in a word, lunacy. It would, in the luminary words of President Trump, be “the worst trade deal in the history of trade deals.”

If Ukraine thought that seizing Russian territory would make Moscow more amenible to peace talks, they badly miscalculated. The Kremlin responded by declaring an Anti-Terror Operation in Kursk, Byransk, and Belgorod Oblasts, and Putin - far from appearing humiliated or cowed - projected anger and defiance, while Foreign Ministry officials have suggested that the Kursk operation now precludes negotiations.

The other problem with trying to hold Kursk as a bargaining chip is, well, that you have to hold it. As we will discuss shortly, this will be very difficult for the AFU. They managed to achieve strategic surprise and make a modest penetration into Kursk, but there are a variety of kinetic factors that make them unlikely to hold it. For something to be useful as a bargaining chip, it must be in your possession - this would therefore compel Ukraine to commit forces to the Kursk front indefinitely, and hold it to the bitter end.

4) Pure Spectacle
Finally, we come to the more nebulous option - that Krepost was conceived purely to scandalize and embarrass the Kremlin. This is certainly the sensationalized solution that much of the commentariat has converged on, with plenty of vicious delight in the reversal of fortunes and the spectacular reverse uno of Ukraine invading Russia.

This all plays well with foreign audiences, of course, but it ultimately does not matter much. There’s no evidence that the Kremlin’s grip on the conflict or the commitment of Russian society to support the war are wavering. This war has seen a long sequence of nominal Russian “embarrassment”, from the 2022 withdrawals from Kharkov and Kherson, to the Ukrainian air strikes on Sevastopol, to drone and terror attacks deep inside Russia, all the way to the bizarre mutiny of the Wagner PMC. None of these things have detracted from the central objectives of the Kremlin’s war, which remain the capture of the Donbas and the steady exhaustion of Ukraine’s military resources. Did the AFU throw a grouping of its dwindling strategic reserves into Kursk Oblast purely to scandalize and embarrass Putin? Possibly. Would it matter? Highly unlikely.

It’s very common, particularly on social media, to see a sort of reveling in the great reversal of Ukraine liberating Russia, and battlefield updates frequently make reference to the AFU “liberating” Kursk oblast. This is, of course, very childish and meaningless. Once one extracts oneself from the spectacle, the entire enterprise seems obviously disconnected from the larger logic of Ukraine’s war. It’s not at all clear how occupying a narrow slice of the Russian frontier correlates to Ukraine’s self-professed war aims of regaining its 1991 borders, or how widening the front is supposed to promote a negotiated end to the settlement, or - for that matter - how the little town of Sudzha could be a fair trade for the Donbas transit hub of Pokrovsk.

Ultimately, we have to acknowledge that Krepost is a very odd military development - an overmatched force, already heaving from the strain of a grinding, 700 kilometer front, voluntarily opened a new, independent axis of combat which has no possibility of operationally synergizing with the war’s critical theaters. There is some satisfaction to be derived from bringing the war into Russia and scandalizing the Kremlin. Perhaps Kiev hopes that simply unsettling the situation will cajole the Russian military into making a mistake or redeploying out of position, but so far the Kursk axis has not denuded Russian strength in other theaters. Perhaps they really do think that they can seize enough ground to bargain with, but to do that they will need to hold it. Or perhaps they are simply losing the war, and desperation breeds strange ideas.

History will probably conclude that Krepost was an inventive, but ultimately far-fetched gambit. The crude calculus on the ground shows that the existing trajectory of the war simply doesn’t work for Ukraine. Russian progress across the contact line in the east has been steady and relentless throughout the spring and summer, and the devastating Ukrainian failure in 2023’s counteroffensive showed that banging away against alert and entrenched Russian defenses is not a good answer. Faced with the prospect between slow strangulation in the east, Ukraine has attempted to unlock the front and introduce a more kinetic and open pace.

On the Ground
The biggest problem with the more fanciful and explosive theories of Operation Krepost are fairly simple: the results on the ground are not very good. The attack has been both limited in scale and constrained in its advance, but the shock and surprise of the operation has allowed the narrative to spin out of control, both on the part of exuberant Ukrainian supporters and the usual doomposters in the Kremlin orbit, who have been bemoaning and expecting imminent Russian defeat for years at this point.

Let’s begin with a brief sketch of Krepost, the units involved, and the state of the advance. We should begin with a note about the composition of the Ukrainian assault grouping, and what this tells us about the state of the AFU.

Very soon after Krepost began, the Ukrainian ORBAT began to materialize in a jumbled mess. The basic problem, to put it in the most elementary terms, is that there are far too many brigades represented in the operation. There are currently no less than five mechanized brigades (22nd, 54th, 61st, 88th, 116th), a territorial defense brigade (103rd), two Air Assault Brigades (80th and 82nd) and a variety of attached battalions - something like a dozen total brigade equivalents. To put it bluntly, there are very clearly not twelve brigades (30,000 personnel) in this section of front - we have a puzzle on our hands.

The mysterious ORBAT grows ever moreso when one considers the astonishing variety of vehicles that have been spotted (and destroyed) in Kursk. The list includes at minimum the following assets:

KrAZ Cougar

Senator

Oshkosh M-ATV

Kozak-2

Bushmaster

Maxxpro MRAP

Stryker

BTR-60M

BTR 70/80

VAB

Marder 1A3

T-64

BAT-2

BREM-1

Ural 4320

AHS Krab

Buk

M777

Grad

2S1 Gvodzika

2k22 Tunguska

2S7 Pion

M88AS2 Hercules

BMP1

PT-91

BTR-4E

MTLB

That is a long list. But what does it mean?

There is a disconnect between the number of brigades and different vehicle types identified in Kursk and the actual size of the AFU grouping. What this suggests is that the Ukrainians stripped down the motor pools from a variety of different brigades and concentrated them in a strike package to attack Kursk, rather than deploying these brigades as such.

The situation would appear to be highly similar to the Second World War German practice of forming Kampfgruppen, or Battle Groups. As the Wehrmacht became more and more overstretched, German commanders became accustomed to forming improvised formations comprised of sub-units stripped from the line as necessary: take an infantry battalion from this division, steal a dozen panzers from that division, commandeer a battery from that regiment, and voila: you have a Kampfgruppe.

In the voluminous masses of World War Two literature, Kamfgruppen were often taken as evidence of Germany’s wonderful improvisational powers, and the ability of their cool-headed commanders to scrape together fighting power from threadbare resources. There’s nothing specifically incorrect about that, but this tends to miss the larger point - Kampfgruppe did not become a phenomenon until late in the war, when Germany was losing, and their regular order of battle (ORBAT) was becoming shredded. Cobbling together mutant formations can help you stave off disaster, but it is not a superior option to deploying organic brigades as such.

We appear to have a Ukrainian Kampfgruppe in Kursk, with elements of a variety of different brigades - bringing with them a whole hodgepodge of different vehicles - forming a grouping that is likely not more than 7-8,000 men. Above and beyond the progress that they are making in Kursk, this does not suggest anything good about the state of the AFU. To launch this offensive, they had to strip down units that were actively fighting in the Donbas and rapidly shuttle them to Sumy to accumulate in an improvised strike group. It is a threadbare grouping for a threadbare army.

In any case, the basic shape of the Ukrainian offensive is fairly clear. The mechanized elements (including the mech and air assault brigades) formed the critical maneuver assets, while territorial defense troops from the 103rd provided flank security on the grouping’s northwestern flank.

The Ukrainian grouping was able to achieve something approximating total surprise - a fact that was surprising to many, given the ubiquity of Russian reconnaissance drones in theaters like the Donbas. In fact, the terrain here was highly conducive for Ukraine. The Ukrainian side of the border on the Sumy-Kursk axis is covered with a thick forest canopy which gives the Ukrainians the rare opportunity to conceal the staging of its forces, while the presence of the city of Sumy only 30 kilometers from the border provides a base of support. The situation is highly similar to Ukraine’s Kharkov operation in 2022 (the AFU’s most impressive achievement of the war), in which the city of Kharkov and the forest belt around it provided the opportunity to stage forces largely undetected. These opportunities do not exist in the flat, mostly treeless Ukrainian south, where Ukraine’s 2023 offensive was heavily surveilled and bombarded on approach.

In any case, with strategic surprise achieved, the Ukrainian force managed to get the jump on the thin Russian defense and penetrate the border in the opening hours. Russian defenses in these regions consist mainly of obstacles like ditches and minefields, and do not feature well prepared fighting positions. The nature of these barriers suggests that the Russians were primarily focused on impeding and interdicting raids, rather than defending against an earnest assault. At the outset, elements of the 88th managed to pin the Russian rifle company stationed at the border crossing and take a substantial number of prisoners. The now famous pictures circulating which show many dozens of surrendered Russians comes from this border checkpoint, located literally on the state border.

Image
Russian rifle company captured at the border checkpoint

The dual effect of strategic surprise, along with images of a large batch of captured Russian personnel, let the narrative on the attack break all containment. In the following days, a host of misinformation began to circulate implying that the Ukrainians had captured the town of Sudzha, some 8 kilometers from the border.

In fact, it quickly became clear that the Ukrainian advance on Sudzha had already begun to bog down with the rapid scrambling of Russian reinforcements into the area. Ukrainian forces spent most of August 7th and 8th consolidating positions to the north of Sudzha and working to envelope the town, which sits at the bottom of a valley. They eventually captured the town, but the delay cost them precious days and allowed the Russians to move reinforcements into the theater.

Image
General Situation: August 7-8

The opening days of the operation were very difficult to get a handle on, largely because the Ukrainians flung motorized columns up the road as far as they could, leading to inflated claims as to the depth of the Ukrainian advance.

It has now become clear that the initial Ukrainian advance hinged on both their mobility and strategic surprise, but both of these factors had been exhausted roughly by day five of the operation. By Friday, August 9, Ukrainian advances had largely stopped as the Russians established effective blocking positions, including in the towns of Korenevo and Bol’shoe Soldatskoe. Many of the furthest Ukrainian penetrations, furthermore, turned out to be isolated mechanized columns which had punched as far up the road as possible before either turning back or running into ambushes (the results of one such encounter are seen in the video below), such that the Ukrainians reached several positions that they never actually controlled.

Put it all together, and what you get is a fairly confined and modest Ukrainian breach into Russian territory, running from the approach to Korenevo (still firmly under Russian control) in the west to Plekhovo in the east - a span of just over 40 kilometers (25 miles). Sudzha is under Ukrainian occupation, but their positions have not extended far beyond it - the total depth of the penetration is some 35 kilometers at the farthest point.

Having captured Sudzha, but failing to break out on either of the main axes out of the area, Ukraine now faces a very unpleasant tactical reality. Their brief glimpse of an open and mobile operation has dissipated, and Kursk is calcifying into another front, with all the attendant difficulties. They now occupy a modest salient within Russia, with the town of Sudzha (population 6,000) at its center.

Image
Kursk Salient: General Situation

With progress stalled, the AFU is currently working to solidify and extend the flanks of the salient. The focal point at the present moment appears to be the inner bend of the Seim river, which winds across the border and runs along a course some 12 kilometers inside Russia. The Ukrainians recently struck several bridges across the Seim with the intention of isolating the southern bank. If their ground advance can push to the Seim south of Korenevo (through a front currently defended by the Russian 155th Marine Infantry brigade) they stand a reasonable chance of cutting off and capturing the Seim’s southern bank, including the villages of Tektino and Glushkovo.

All of this is reasonably interesting, in terms of the tactical minutia, but it does not have much bearing on the two important strategic questions for Ukraine: namely, whether their operational successes in Kursk are worth the tradeoff in the Donbas, and whether their gains are worth the losses they are suffering. We’ll take up the latter question first.

The basic problem for the Ukrainians, tactically speaking, is that the fighting in Kursk leaves them highly exposed to Russian strike systems, for a variety of reasons. The Ukrainian position around Sudzha is a road-poor region, connected to the rear area on the Ukrainian side of the border by only a handful of exposed roads which offer no concealment. This leaves the Ukrainian logistical tail highly vulnerable to strikes by Lancets and FPV drones. Furthermore, attempts to properly support the advance require the AFU to bring precious assets close to the border, exposing them to attack.

Ukrainian’s strikes on the Siem bridges are a good example of this. In theory, dropping the bridges and securing the south bank of the Siem makes good sense as a way to secure the western flank of their position around Sudzha, but the strikes on the bridges involved bringing forward precious HIMARS launchers, which were detected by Russian ISR and destroyed.

(Video at link.)

Trying to provide air defense for the Ukrainian salient is likely to be similarly cost prohibitive, as it entails parking the AFU’s dwindling air defense assets in close proximity to the Russian border. We have already seen the Russians capitalize on this, with a successful hit on a European-provisioned IRIS-T system.

(Video at link.)

By creating a front within Russia itself, the Ukrainians have voluntarily accepted a long and exposed logistical tail, while fighting within the shadow of Russia’s own base of material support. The results have been largely disastrous thus far. A running total of 96 strikes on Ukrainian vehicles and positions have been recorded and geolocated in Kursk thus far, and Ukrainian vehicles losses are on par with the opening weeks of the Ukrainian offensive at Robotyne last summer.

Unlike Robotyne, however, there is not even a strong theoretical case to be made for incurring heavy losses on this axis of advance. Even a generous sketch of the coming weeks leaves Ukraine at an impasse in Kursk. Suppose they push through to the Seim and force the Russians to abandon the southern bank, capture Korenevo, and carve out a 120 kilometer front in Kursk - what then? Is this a fair trade for the Toretsk-New York agglomeration, or Pokrovsk, where the Russians continue to steadily advance?

Krepost thus threatens to turn into another Volchansk, or Krinky - an isolated attrition pit disconnected from the crucial axes of the war. Control over Sudzha does not exert any leverage over Russia’s ability to sustain the fight in the Donbas or around Kharkov, but it does create another vacuum that will suck in precious Ukrainian resources, banging away on a road to nowhere. If you had suggested a month ago that the Russians could contrive a way to draw off and pin the maneuver elements of no less than five Ukrainian mechanized brigades, along with a variety of disparate support elements, this would have been viewed as a beneficial move for them - yet this is precisely what the AFU has voluntarily done with Krepost.

Krepost ultimately reflects a growing Ukrainian frustration with the trajectory of the war in the east, where the AFU has grown weary of the industrial slugfest with its bigger and more powerful neighbor. By flinging a secretly assembled mechanized package at a lightly defended and previously ancillary sector of front, they briefly managed to reopen mobile operations, but the window of mobility was far too small and the gains far too meager. It has now become clear that the decision to divert forces to Kursk has undermined the already precarious defense of the Donbas. Ukraine hold Sudzha and may very well clear the south bank of the Seim, but if it comes at the expense of Pokrovsk and Toretsk, that is a trade that the Russian Army will be happy to make.

The AFU is expending carefully husbanded and scarce resources in the pursuit of operationally inconsequential objectives. The exhilaration of taking the fight to Russia and being on the attack again can certainly work wonders for morale and create a spectacle for western backers, but the effect is short lived - like a broke man gambling away his last dollar, all for the momentary thrill of chance.

https://bigserge.substack.com/p/back-to ... -operation

****

Ukraine SitRep: Western Media Dismiss Ukraine's Kursk Offensive

Two weeks ago, when the Ukrainian army started its incursion into Russia's Kursk region, I had expected the Russia army to dispel the Ukrainians within a few days. That did not happen as it took time to bring enough troops towards that new frontline.

I also underestimated the size of the force the Ukrainians had made available for the operation. It is now estimated to be in the range of 10,000 to 30,000.

For now the Ukrainian army attack has mostly be stopped though it is still trying to expand what it holds in the very rural area.

Be that as it may - the operation, even when sustained longer, makes little sense.

It gives a temporary moral high to the Ukrainian army and may allow Zelenski and the British sponsors of this operation to prolong the war.

The plan in Kiev is not to negotiate but to prolong the war and to convince the west to further finance it. This would have the advantage of moving billions of additional dollar from western sources into the various pockets in Kiev with Zelenski and Yermak cashing in the largest share of it.
But all this comes at the cost of the Ukrainian defense in Donbas.


The Kursk incursion took so many troops from the defense of the Donbas that the front lines there can no longer be held up. It has also diverted scarce artillery ammunition which the Donbas defenders now lack. The Ukrainian defense in Donbas is currently crumbling with the Russian side taking several villages per day.

There was some hope expressed that Russia would divert troops from its Donbas attack towards Kursk. But the Kursk operation is on Russian ground where the Russian army is allowed to use conscript unit to defend the country. Conscripts are not allowed to take part in the operation within Ukraine. This gives the Russian army a large reserve that it can use against the incursion. It should be sufficient to end it.

Even at the beginning of the operation some supporters of Ukraine had feared that the incursion would break the Donbas defense:

Tatarigami_UA @Tatarigami_UA - 14:23 UTC · Aug 6, 2024
The situation in the Pokrovsk direction is critical, with defenses in several areas collapsed and yet to stabilize, largely due to a shortage of personnel. Diverting nearly a brigade to launch an assault on Kursk Oblast, which lacks strategic sense, borders on mental disability.


Various western oriented media have now taken a similar view:

Russia Seeks to Turn Humbling Incursion Into Military Gains (archived) - New York Times
After being initially heralded as a brilliant military stroke, the Kursk operation could end up becoming a trap for the Ukrainian Army, these analysts said.
Ultimately, the expansion of the war to new areas will, over time, favor the side with bigger resources, the analysts said. With triple the population and a larger industrial base, that side remains Russia.

Military briefing: Kursk incursion heaps pressure - Financial Times
One Ukrainian artillery brigade commander in eastern Ukraine told the Financial Times that part of the reason for the Russian advance was Kyiv moving its scarce resources north.
His troops were back to rationing shells for their canons — the first time since US aid to Ukraine was held up by Congress — because ammunition had been reallocated for the incursion into Russia’s Kursk region.
...
While Kyiv does not comment on casualties, the incursion has already come at a material cost: Ukraine lost at least 51 pieces of valuable military equipment, including German Marder vehicles, US-made Stryker vehicles and Himars rockets, compared to 27 such losses on the Russian side, according to the open-source intelligence researcher Naalsio.

Has Zelensky Walked Into Putin's Trap? - Newsweek
"There is a risk of overextending, and there is a risk that precious personnel and resources may be lost and that Putin may use this as a pretext for further escalation," said Michael A. Witt, professor of international business and strategy at King's Business School, London.
...
Emil Kastehelmi, a military expert from the Finland-based open-source intelligence analysis firm Black Bird Group, said that the incursion risks attrition of Ukraine's precious reserves when it still has issues with manpower.
Russia closes in on eastern city despite Ukraine’s successes elsewhere - Washington Post
Hopes that Ukraine’s incursion into Russia would relieve pressure on the eastern front are not being realized as Moscow’s forces approach Pokrovsk.
Ukrainian servicemen in the Pokrovsk region say the Kursk incursion has not altered Russian attack — if anything, the pressure has increased in recent days.


There are many more, including alternative sources, tooting the same horn.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive is a huge strategic error - The Hill
Relentless Russian Assaults Bite Deeper Into Ukraine’s Battered Donbas Defenses - Kyiv Post
Back to the Bloodlands: Operation Krepost - Russo-Ukrainian War: The Kursk Operation - Big Serge
Ukraine BufferZone in Kursk? Disaster Awaits (video) - Col Douglas Macgregor
The Dangerous Obsession with Territory in a War of Attrition - Glenn Diesen
Britain’s Kursk Invasion Backfires? - Kit Klarenberg


I agree that the incursion into Kursk, while tactically successful, makes little strategic sense as it will lead to large losses of men and ground in the Donbas. It is also too costly for the units involved in it.

But that holds only as long as Ukraine does not have another high card to play.

Could it be that it has more reserves or tricks that it could apply elsewhere?

I doubt this as I do not see where additional reserves could have been formed or come from.

Posted by b on August 21, 2024 at 15:02 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/08/u ... .html#more

*****

Britain’s Kursk Invasion Backfires
Posted by Internationalist 360° on August 20, 2024
Kit Klarenberg

Image

The determination of Washington’s self-appointed “junior partner” to escalate the proxy conflict into all-out hot war between Russia and the West has only intensified under Starmer’s new Labour government.

British Challenger 2 tanks reached Ukraine with enormous fanfare, ahead of Kiev’s long-delayed, ultimately catastrophic 2023 “counteroffensive”. On top of encouraging other proxy war sponsors to provide Ukraine with armoured fighting vehicles, Western audiences were widely told the tank – hitherto marketed to international buyers as “indestructible” – made Kiev’s ultimate victory a fait accompli. As it was, Challenger 2 tanks deployed to Robotnye in September were almost instantly incinerated by Russian fire, then very quietly withdrawn from combat altogether.

Hence, many online commentators were surprised when footage of the tank in action in Kursk began to circulate widely on August 13th. Furthermore, numerous mainstream outlets dramatically drew attention to the Challenger 2’s deployment. Several were explicitly briefed by British military sources that it marked the first time in history London’s tanks “have been used in combat on Russian territory.” Disquietingly, The Times now reveals this was a deliberate propaganda and lobbying strategy, spearheaded by Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

Prior to the Challenger 2’s presence in Kursk breaking, Starmer and Defence Secretary John Healey had reportedly “been in talks about how far to go to confirm growing British involvement in the incursion towards Kursk.” Ultimately, they decided “to be more open about Britain’s role in a bid to persuade key allies to do more to help – and convince the public that Britain’s security and economic prosperity is affected by events on the fields of Ukraine.” A “senior Whitehall source” added:

“There won’t be shying away from the idea of British weapons being used in Russia as part of Ukraine’s defence. We don’t want any uncertainty or nervousness over Britain’s support at this critical moment and a half-hearted or uncertain response might have indicated that.”

In other words, London is taking the lead in effectively marking itself out as a formal belligerent in the proxy war, in the hope other Western countries – in particular, the US – will follow suit. What’s more The Times strongly hints that Kursk is to all intents and purposes a British invasion. The outlet records:

“Unseen by the world, British equipment, including drones, have played a central role in Ukraine’s new offensive and British personnel have been closely advising the Ukrainian military…on a scale matched by no other country.”

Britain’s grand plans don’t stop there. Healey and Foreign Secretary David Lammy “have set up a joint Ukraine unit,” divided between the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. The pair “held a joint briefing, with officials, for a cross-party group of 60 MPs on Ukraine,” while “Starmer has also asked the National Security Council to draw up plans to provide Ukraine with a broader range of support.” On top of military assistance, “industrial, economic, and diplomatic support” are also being explored.

The Times adds that in coming weeks, “Healey will attend a new meeting of the Ukraine Defence Coordination Group,” an international alliance of 57 countries overseeing the Western weaponry flooding into Kiev. There, “Britain will press European allies to send more equipment and give Kyiv more leeway to use them in Russia.” The British Defence Ministry also reportedly “spoke last week to Lloyd Austin, the US defence secretary, and has been wooing Boris Pistorius, his German opposite number.”

Evidently, the new Labour government has an ambitious vision for the proxy war’s continuation. Yet, if the “counterinvasion” is anything to go by, it’s already dead in the water. As The Times notes, the imbroglio is primarily “designed to boost morale at home and shore up Zelensky’s position,” while relieving pressure on the collapsing Donbass frontline by forcing Russia to redirect forces to Kursk. Instead, Moscow “has capitalised on the absence of four crack Ukrainian regiments to press their attacks around Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar.”

Similarly, commenting on Starmer’s wideranging efforts to compel overt Western action against Russia, a “defence expert” told The Times: “if it looks as if the Brits [are] too far ahead of their NATO allies, it might be counterproductive.” This analysis is prescient, for there are ample indications London’s latest attempt to ratchet tensions and drag the US and Europe ever-deeper into the proxy war quagmire has already been highly “counterproductive”, and boomeranged quite spectacularly. Indeed, it appears Washington has finally had enough of London’s escalatory connivances.

In repeated press conferences and media briefings since August 6th, US officials have firmly distanced themselves from the Kursk incursion, denying any involvement in its planning or execution, or even being forewarned by Kiev. Empire house journal Foreign Policy has reported that Ukraine’s swoop caught the Pentagon, State Department, and White House off-guard. The Biden administration was not only enormously unhappy “to have been kept out of the loop,” but “skeptical of the military logic” behind the “counterinvasion”.

On top being a clear suicide mission, the eagerly advertised presence of Western weapons and vehicles on Russian soil “has put the Biden administration in an extremely awkward position.” Washington has since the proxy war erupted been wary of provoking retaliations against Western countries and their overseas assets, and the conflict spilling outside Ukraine’s borders. Adding to US irritations, the British-directed Kursk misadventure also torpedoed ongoing efforts to secure an agreement to halt “strikes on energy and power infrastructure on both sides.”

This comes as Kiev prepares for a harrowing winter without heat or light, due to devastating Russian attacks on its neighbour’s energy grid. Putin has moreover made clear that Ukrainian actions in Kursk mean there is now no scope for a wider negotiated settlement at all. Which is to say Moscow will only accept its adversary’s unconditional surrender. The US has also seemingly changed course as a result of the “counterinvasion”.

On August 16th, it was reported that Washington had prohibited Ukraine’s use of British-made, long-range Storm Shadow missiles against Russian territory. Given The Times reports securing wider Western acquiescence to such strikes is a core objective for Starmer, this can only be considered a harsh rebuke, before the Labour government’s escalatory lobbying efforts have even properly taken off. The Biden administration had in May granted permission for Kiev to conduct limited strikes in Russia, using guided munitions up to a 40-mile range.

Even that mild authorisation may be rescinded in due course. Berlin, which like Britain had initially proudly promoted the presence of its tanks in Kursk, is now decisively shifting away from the proxy war. On August 17th, German Finance Minister Christian Lindner announced a halt to any and all new military aid to Ukraine as part of a wider initiative to slash government spending. The Wall Street Journal reporting three days earlier that Kiev was responsible for Nord Stream II’s destruction may be no coincidence.

The narrative of the Russo-German pipeline’s bombing detailed by the outlet was absurd in the extreme. Conveniently too, the WSJ acknowledged that admissions of “Ukrainian officials who participated in or are familiar with the plot” aside, “all arrangements” to strike Nord Stream “were made verbally, leaving no paper trail.” As such, the paper’s sources “believe it would be impossible to put any of the commanding officers on trial, because no evidence exists beyond conversations among top officials.”

Such an evidentiary deficit provides Berlin with an ideal pretext to step away from the proxy war, while insulating Kiev from any legal repercussions. The narrative of Ukraine’s unilateral culpability for the Nord Stream bombings also helpfully distracts from the attack’s most likely perpetrators. This journalist has exposed how a shadowy cabal of British intelligence operatives were the masterminds, and potential executors, of the October 2022 Kerch Bridge bombing.

That escalatory incident, like Nord Stream’s destruction, was known about in advance, and apparently opposed, by the CIA. Chris Donnelly, the British military intelligence veteran who orchestrated the Kerch Bridge attack, has privately condemned Washington’s reluctance to embroil itself further in the proxy war, declaring “this US position must be challenged, firmly and at once.” In December that year, the BBC confirmed that British officials were worried about the Biden administration’s “innate caution”, and had “stiffened the US resolve at all levels”, via “pressure.”

The determination of Washington’s self-appointed “junior partner” to escalate the proxy conflict into all-out hot war between Russia and the West has only intensified under Starmer’s new Labour government. Yet, the Empire gives every appearance of refusing to take the bait, while seeking to curb London’s belligerent fantasies. This may be an encouraging sign that the proxy war is at last reaching its end. But we must remain vigilant. British intelligence is unlikely to allow the US to withdraw without a fight.



https://libya360.wordpress.com/2024/08/ ... backfires/
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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Fri Aug 23, 2024 11:45 am

Military strength and media discourse
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/23/2024

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“Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Ukraine of trying to attack the Kursk nuclear power plant on Thursday,” wrote AFP in a headline yesterday, stating that he did so “without presenting any evidence.” The situation on the front remains the same, with Russia advancing dangerously on important towns in Donbass and Ukraine doing the same in Kursk. All this maintains the tendency that any Russian accusation needs evidence to be considered valid – as it should be to maintain journalistic standards – while the Ukrainian story is perceived as credible and publishable even if it makes no sense at all. This is the case of nuclear security, an issue in which the media accepted last week's accusation by Volodymyr Zelensky, who, without any evidence, accused Russia of causing a fire at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, located in Energodar and under Russian control since March 2022. Accusations of self-bombing have been recurrent in the last ten years and the major media do not seem to have considered the possibility that all this is propaganda to justify the escalation of the war, make demands or simply demonize Moscow.

Western media discourse remains focused on speculation about what strategic objective Ukraine is seeking in Kursk. Opposition is divided between those who view the offensive with skepticism and perceive the risks, and those who only see the benefits. “More than two weeks after the start of its surprise offensive in western Russia, Ukraine’s advance has slowed and its troops have made only marginal gains in territory they already control,” lamented, for example, The New York Times . The reality is that the successes in Kursk are coming at the cost of losses in Donbass, the original front of this conflict and where Kiev’s troops have been fighting for a decade. Referring to the situation in the Donetsk region, Maksym Zhoryin, deputy commander of the already famous Third Assault Brigade – the umpteenth formation born from the Azov movement and commanded by its leader, Colonel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Andriy Biletsky – has stated that “war is never fought for territory, but to destroy the enemy. Once the enemy is not in those territories, we will liberate them.” The magical thinking of the argument does not hide the fact that it is not Russia that is in danger of disappearing from the territory and that it is Ukraine that is managing, albeit as a last resort, the strategic withdrawal of a part of that front that for eight years was the raison d’être of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and groups like Azov.

However, for the political authorities, Donetsk seems to have ceased to exist and they have opted for the triumphalism of their Russian adventure in order to demand more from their partners and to present a completely distorted image of the war. “The administration of the Russian Federation realizes that it is currently unable to counteract the actions of the Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region. Traditionally, in situations of its own military failure, the Kremlin emphasizes information operations, directed primarily against its own citizens. To calm the growing anxiety among the population, the loss of territory and the advance of the Ukrainian army in the country are being presented as a “new normal.” “Russians are asked to remember the experience of their grandfathers, agree to send recruits into combat, make donations to humanitarian aid for refugees, and then turn on the TV and forget about the bad,” Mikhail Podolyak wrote on social media yesterday in a text in which he imagines an internal destabilization in Russia that does not exist and that he prefers to forget that Ukraine is unable to counteract the actions of Russian forces in the Donbass region, that it works hard to emphasize information operations, has been sending recruits into combat for years, demands humanitarian aid not only for refugees but even to pay salaries and pensions, and has “unified” television news to maintain complete control of the view of the war that citizens get. Reading Podolyak’s message, no one would imagine that almost 20% of the territory that Ukraine considers its own is outside the control of the government, part of it since 2014.

Ukrainian troops are struggling to prevent a breakthrough in the most important direction, Krasnoarmeysk, the loss of which could be disastrous for Kiev, and they are doing so at the cost of huge losses and innumerable resources that always need to be replenished by requesting more weapons and funding from their Western partners, whose patience with Ukraine seems to be infinite. Even so, beyond the military objectives of the Kursk adventure, where Ukraine is advancing again, although not as quickly as it did in the first days, what Kiev clearly hopes to achieve is to show an image of strength far beyond the real one. Hence, the tactic that the Ukrainian government and its allies, who are less afraid of manipulating reality, are using is to use the successes of Kursk to defend that it is a step towards the just peace that Kiev claims to be seeking.

The reality of war and the certainty that, under current conditions, neither side will be able to completely defeat its opponent make a negotiation process that would lead to a ceasefire, armistice or a treaty that would end the conflict essential. For weeks, American media close to the White House have been referring to the possibility of partial negotiations, mediated by third countries. This option, postponed by Russia due to the start of the Kursk offensive and the attacks on the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, has been wrongly seen as an opening to compromise. Nothing could be further from the truth; the statements of the Ukrainian authorities these days point to not paying attention to Russian red lines - among which are the attack on its territory or nuclear security - in a not-so-veiled suggestion of escalation of the war.

Recovering the idea of ​​a fair peace – only for Kiev, always without taking into account the population whose territories Ukraine wants to reconquer – the Ukrainian government intends to use its renewed strength, whether real or not, to once again push forward Zelensky’s failed peace plan . In its tendency to offer talks at times when it is not possible and to reject them when it is (the seven years of Minsk, the Istanbul talks or even September 2022 after the Russian debacle in Kharkiv and the loss of Kherson, when Kiev would have negotiated from a position of strength), Ukraine wants to negotiate. Of course, it does not want to do so with Russia, but with third countries that will subsequently negotiate with Moscow. According to Politico , “the basis of what Ukraine wants is a 10-point plan drawn up by President Volodymyr Zelensky in 2022, which covers a series of issues such as food and energy security, the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Andriy Yermak, head of the presidential office and Zelensky’s top foreign policy official, told European Pravda that 10 working groups, with ambassadors and experts, are being created to draw up action plans and timetables.

The fact that the plan is completely unrealistic, since it calls for Russia’s unilateral surrender, is not a factor to be taken into account by the media, which, lending credibility to the propagandistic format of the summit in Switzerland, claims that “Zelensky wants a joint peace proposal to emerge from the meetings that Ukraine initiated during this summit. Countries friendly to Russia that participate in the implementation of the peace program are supposed to present their proposals to Moscow during a second peace summit that Kiev wants to organize at the end of this year.” The plan could not be clearer: the preparation of a roadmap to capitulation that would be presented to Moscow. For obvious reasons, Russia has refused to participate in this simulation of a just peace , so, as Politico adds , “the Ukrainians have decided that Moscow needs a push” and quotes a spokesman for the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry as saying that “as soon as Russia agrees to the restoration of a just peace, specifically based on the peace formula that leads to such a peace, the sooner the raids of the Ukrainian defense forces on Russian territory will disappear.”

For peace, Russia facilitated a negotiation that led to the Minsk agreements, forcing the Donetsk and Lugansk militias not to advance on Mariupol in September 2014 and beyond Debaltsevo in 2015. The terms of that agreement, which the West has considered a victor’s peace to justify Ukraine’s flagrant non-compliance, implied the return of the DPR and LPR to Ukrainian control in exchange for a series of political rights that Ukraine never intended to grant. Ukraine’s response to perfectly acceptable terms was the continuation of the economic blockade, the use of front-line bombing as a tool of pressure and the refusal to comply with its commitments. In 2022, following the Russian invasion, Moscow withdrew its troops from all of northern Ukraine to facilitate negotiations in which kyiv sought to gain time for its partners to initiate the flow of arms that would allow it to achieve its objectives without territorial concessions - Crimea and Donbass - and, above all, the neutrality with security guarantees that Russia offered.

Now, pretending to be in a position of strength and hoping to recover the lost territories as Zhoryn claimed, with the magical Russian withdrawal, Ukraine simply offers surrender. Beyond the triumphalist media discourse, in which not even some of its allies believe, Kiev lacks the strength of military, economic and political supremacy that requires demanding capitulation from its enemy, which it will continue to demand based on its great media power. As long as its partners continue to provide funding for the armed forces and the maintenance of the state, Ukraine will continue to try. The precedent of the last ten years indicates that the only peace that kyiv is willing to accept is the one imposed under its dictation without taking into account the opinion of populations such as those of Crimea or Donbass.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/23/30429/

Google Translator

From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
⚡️Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 22 August 2024)

— Units of the North group of forces in the Volchansk and Liptsov directions inflicted losses on formations of the 57th motorised infantry, 92nd assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the 36th marine brigade in the areas of the settlements of Glubokoe, Liptsy and Volchansk in the Kharkiv region.

The enemy lost up to 80 servicemen, a combat vehicle of a multiple launch rocket system, three 122-mm D-30 howitzers and an Anklav-N electronic warfare station .

— Units of the West group of forces improved their tactical position, defeated the manpower and equipment of the 44th, 67th, 115th mechanized, 3rd assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the 103rd, 110th territorial defense brigades and the 1st National Guard brigade in the areas of the settlements of Tabayevka in the Kharkiv region, Stelmakhovka, Rozovka, Nadiya, Nevskoye of the Luhansk People's Republic, Torskoye of the Donetsk People's Republic, as well as Serebryanskoye forestry. They repelled four counterattacks by assault units of the 12th special forces brigade "Azov" and the 23rd separate rifle battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The enemy's losses amounted to 440 servicemen, two combat armored vehicles, 11 cars, two Grad multiple launch rocket system combat vehicles , a US-made 155-mm howitzer M198 , two UK-made 155-mm howitzers FH-70 , a 122-mm self-propelled artillery unit Gvozdika and a 122-mm howitzer D-30 .

— The units of the "Southern" group of forces occupied more advantageous lines and positions, inflicted losses on the manpower and equipment of the 24th, 28th, 54th, 69th mechanized, 56th, 59th motorized infantry, 143rd, 144th infantry, 10th mountain assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the 116th and 117th territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Verkhnekamenskoye, Pereyezdnoye, Grigorovka, Chasov Yar, Krasnogorovka, Maksimilyanovka and Konstantinovka of the Donetsk People's Republic. The Armed Forces

of Ukraine lost up to 765 servicemen, four pickup trucks, a Grad multiple launch rocket system combat vehicle , US-made 155-mm howitzers M198 and M777 , a 155-mm howitzerFH-70 produced in the UK, 152-mm howitzer "Msta-B" , 122-mm self-propelled artillery unit "Gvozdika" , two 122-mm howitzers D-30 and three 105-mm guns M119 produced in the USA. Seven field ammunition depots were destroyed.

- As a result of the successful actions of units of the "Center" group of forces , the settlement of Mezhevoye of the Donetsk People's Republic was liberated. Formations of the 32nd, 47th, 100th mechanized, 68th infantry, 25th airborne, 95th airborne assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the 109th territorial defense brigade

were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Dzerzhinsk, Panteleimonovka, Rozovka, Grodovka, Sergeyevka and Vozdvizhenka of the Donetsk People's Republic. Five counterattacks by units of the 53rd and 151st Mechanized Brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the 15th Brigade of the National Guard and the "Lyut" Assault Brigade of the National Police of Ukraine were repelled . The enemy's losses amounted to 640 servicemen, two "Kazak" combat armored vehicles , nine cars, a 155-mm howitzer M777 made in the USA, two 152- mm howitzers "Msta-B" , two 152-mm guns D-20 , four 122-mm howitzers D-30 and a 105-mm gun M119 made in the USA. — Units of the Vostok group of forces defeated concentrations of manpower and equipment of the 72nd mechanized, 58th motorized infantry brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the 105th and 127th territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Vodyane, Razdolne, Makarovka and Rivnepil of the Donetsk People's Republic. The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 130 servicemen, eight vehicles and a 152-mm D-20 gun . — Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated formations of the 141st infantry, 128th mountain assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the 35th marine brigade in the areas of the settlements of Stepnoye, Kamenskoye in the Zaporizhia region, Tokarevka and Kamyshany in the Kherson region.

▫️Units of the Dnepr group of forces inflicted losses on formations of the 141st Infantry, 128th Mountain Assault Brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the 35th Marine Brigade in the areas of the settlements of Stepnoye, Kamenskoye in the Zaporizhia region, Tokarevka and Kamyshany in the Kherson region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 70 servicemen, five vehicles, a 152-mm D-20 gun and a 122-mm D-30 howitzer. The Anklav-N electronic warfare station and a field ammunition depot were destroyed .

▫️Operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups have struck concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 138 areas.

▫️ Air defense systems shot down a MiG-29 aircraft of the Ukrainian Air Force, three French-made Hammer guided aerial bombs , 11 US-made HIMARS rockets and 91 unmanned aerial vehicles, including 53 outside the special military operation zone.

▫️ In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 640 aircraft, 282 helicopters, 30,346 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,352 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,420 multiple launch rocket systems, 13,530 field artillery pieces and mortars, and 25,014 units of special military vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

*****

Unknown victims and universal lessons
Reflections on identity, motivation and politics. Soros and me. Epistemically alienated and trigger warned

Events in Ukraine
Aug 22, 2024
A voice in the dark
Nowadays, most political conversations are filtered through the lens of identity. Have an issue about what’s happening in Palestine? Well, why don’t you shut up and listen to this ‘decolonial Arab/Jewish scholar’ who just so happens to have the same line on the matter as the US state department? Unsure about war with China? Shut up and listen to this Taiwanese activist who coincidentally is just fine with his or her territory becoming the staging ground for a war between two nuclear powers.

Of course, Ukraine might just be the pioneer in this field. Or at the very least, the most experienced user of this informational technology. Oh, you have good things to say about socialism in xyz country?

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Of course, there are several things one could say in response. First, that the person making the meme probably didn’t live through communism. Second, that most former socialist countries have laws forbidding ‘propaganda praising the socialist totalitarian regimes’. Legislation enforced quite strictly in the Baltics, Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine.

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A window-washer who got a 1 year suspended sentence in 2019 in Ukraine for wearing a USSR shirt.

Third, that those who actually lived through socialism and those who materially lost out because of the end of socialism neither know English nor have the time or interest to be posting memes on twitter or facebook.

And naturally, when it comes to more present matters (not that wars over history are any less so), then any insufficiently militaristic opinion about the war in Ukraine on social media will instantly be swarming in duly indignant ‘Ukrainian voices’ informing you of the need to support arming Ukraine to the hilt, no negotiations, Putler the clinically insane warmonger, and so on and on.

Or rather, you’ll get a bunch of NATO country citizens with this profile picture informing you of the above.

Can NAFO's Success in Ukraine Benefit Taiwan?
Volodymyr Ishchenko has published an excellent article on the topic, titled ‘Ukrainian Voices’. I can’t agree enough with him when he advocates to

instead, starting from the tragedy of Ukraine, set out to articulate the questions of global relevance, search for their solutions, and contribute to universal human knowledge. Paradoxically, this requires a much deeper and more genuine engagement with Ukraine than happens now.

Universal lessons
To begin with, I can echo Ishchenko’s arguments about Ukraine’s status as a sort of experimental field for modern neoliberal capitalism. Understanding the economic shock therapy wreaked upon Ukraine sheds light on the same process across the world. The Ukrainization of the world proceeds apace.

One important thing Ukraine shows is that neoliberalism is hardly an unthinking machine. Instead, it has its own subjectivized activists - the Mustafa Naiems, the Vitaly Shabunins, the anti-corruption NGOs that I write so much about here. The ‘new nobility’, as they are often called, are totally confident in their political mission, and consider the task of privatization and economic liberalization to be identical with that of historical progress in general. Their pernicious economic role was perhaps most obvious in the fate of bill 3739, which I wrote about in an old article I still often return to.

Neoliberalism can even have revolutions launched in favor of it - as happened in Ukraine’s 2014 maidan, a revolution whose aim was trade liberalization (the EU trade agreement) and economic privatization. Aims fully achieved, though its nationalist ones are generally focused on in dissident English-language media.

A revolution which demonstrates yet again that a relatively small but ideologically committed and violent group can overthrow a government in conditions of general political apathy.

All of which shows that just because someone is young, good-looking and politically sincere, doesn’t necessarily mean that they should be trusted. A common ironic refrain is that ‘we are for everything that is good and against everything that is bad’. Euromaidan defined itself as against corruption, against police violence, against dictatorship, and for transparency, democracy, and everything else good and pure.

Yet what happened? As Volodymyr Chemerys said, one of Ukraine’s oldest human rights defenders, now under investigation and beaten by Ukraine’s secret services for his pacifist views:


I might rephrase that in the following way: those with an unpleasant concrete economic program often dress it up with wonderful phrases about abstract human rights. Bourgeois formalism, as the classics said.

Which brings me to another point - dwelling on Ukraine’s neo-nazis can be an optical illusion. Not that I am one to underplay their murderous actions or political power. But that ultimately, they are junior partners to Ukraine’s liberals. And Ukraine’s liberals at time may be even more militaristic than the nationalists, who more often have their lives under risk at the frontline. Even if liberal slogans may not seem quite so openly bloodthirsty as whatever rightwinger yelling about the Jewish conspiracy.

The political convergence between extreme ethno-nationalism and neo-liberalism is one of my favorite universal lessons from Ukraine. In Ukraine, it’s quite simple: the nationalists care more about cultural policy and the right to shoot those they dislike than economic policy. And the liberals need someone to shoot those they dislike.

They also share the common ideology of eurocentrism. With more of an accent on its white nationalist/moustache man aspects for the nationalists, and more of an accent on its EU/berghain aspects for the liberals. Note that in practice, I knew plenty of Azovites whose main hobby was trendy club-hopping, and my ultra-liberal family could give any US republican a run for their money when it comes to hating black people.

The optical illusion about Ukraine’s liberals often comes from the fact that they look so clean-shaven, so well-dressed, that they’re such hipsters, that they spout such progressive ‘decolonial’ rhetoric and the like.

But belonging to a ‘non-hierarchical, non-state organization’ doesn’t automatically turn you into a saint (I’ll add, also, that neither does defining one’s politics by anti-liberalism, though that’s another topic).

Dmitry Dzhangirov, a Ukrainian political analyst I used to love to watch before he was abducted, publicly humiliated and forever disappeared in March 2022, put it well: in the modern world, perhaps the most powerful form of fascism is liberal fascism, because a great network of well-organized activists is much more effective at investigating thought crimes than any half-blind state leviathan.

And describing oneself as a ‘non-governmental’ organization is hardly accurate. The NGOs who provide their employees with salaries well above the ordinary survival level are certainly funded by certain countries - though they often hide that on their websites.

Statewatch, for instance, is an anti-corruption NGO in Ukraine. Its Ukrainian ‘partners’ page shows that the US embassy and George Soros’s Renaissance Foundation is among its sponsors. No such ‘partners’ page exists on the English version of the site. When doing research, I have found the same pattern repeated over and over.

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Me
When you talk about Soros, you often get some funny looks. Anti-Semitic propaganda and so on. But both my parents worked for the man and would meet with him constantly back in the ‘wild 90s’. There are few NGOs in Ukraine and the region who don’t have him to thank. His Transparency International wields huge influence over Ukrainian government decisions, as shown by the successful rollback of economic legislation like bill 3739.

One of my favorite books of this year was Aaron Moulton’s ‘the Influencing Machine’, on the post-socialist ‘Soros Contemporary Art Centers’. I need to make a post about it soon. But suffice to say that I agree entirely with him about how the mystification of the name ‘Soros’ is itself a means of erasing the entirely material way he has transformed the political landscape of Eastern Europe. His name sounds scandalous and ridiculous to even mention in the west. It’s simply an obvious fact of life in other countries.

Talking about Soros brings things back to me. The topic of Soros makes me think of my general relationship to Ukraine. No matter what I ever wanted, Ukraine, Soros, and plenty of other important names/things have always had me involved in them. Family, history, whatever you want to call it.

Of course, at a certain point I made a choice to go deeper into it. But what makes that any more or less legitimate than getting interested in any other country? I have been and remained interested in the history of a range of other countries and regions. I know Ukraine, I know the languages, so I write mostly about it. But as long as you can justify your opinions, I don’t think there’s anything wrong with writing about a country you have nothing to do with. All people are related if you go back far enough. Beyond political biases, plenty of locals in any country are blinded by parochialism.

Anyway, I feel obligated to talk about my identity since every so often I get introduced as a ‘Ukrainian voice’. ‘Go read Events in Ukraine, he’s a Ukrainian so it checks out’.

I am not a Ukrainian and never have been. Part of my family lives in Ukraine - some were born there, others weren’t. Plenty of them were born in the dreaded enemy country - Russia. Nowadays, they stress that they hate Russia more than anyone else in Ukraine.

I just said that all people are related. Here’s another way that Ukraine distills in a pure form some universal truths - everyone here is related with their neighbors. What Ukrainian family lacks relatives in Russia or Poland. The history of Ukraine is one of endless migrations and ethnic inter-mingling. The Cossacks, that great Ukrainian symbol, were comprised of men who had fled the laws and obligations of their ‘native’ lands in Poland or Russia. There is still little historical data on just how many people in modern-day Ukraine survived the Mongol invasion and sacking of ancient Rus in the 13th century.

Which perhaps is another reason Ukraine fascinates me - because I, too, have a confusing identity. I eventually gave up on trying to find a national identity, and have only been the happier for it.

I visited Ukraine ever since 2013 to visit my family members there. They even took me along to the Kharkov Euromaidan meeting in December 2013. I didn’t know much Russian then, so I didn’t understand much. I was also fairly confused at what I was supposed to be looking at during the Kharkov euromaidan ‘meeting’, as post-soviet liberals call their outdoor protests/get-togethers - the only people there was two of my relatives and 5 or so of their journalist friends.

Anyway, I kept on going back to visit family there. They got quite a social lift after 2014 - friends with the right people. A certain very important person in Ukraine that I’ve written about on here before. Resident of a small obscure country. A very dangerous man with a suitably sinister nickname. Anyway, this Russian-speaker and my Russian-speaking family in Ukraine were quite busy after 2014.

None were born in Ukraine either - if not Russia, then other obscure Soviet republics. Because my liberal dissident nationalist family, and the similar families they married into, all share one thing: their parents were in the Soviet elite, and hence they were born in far-flung military bases. Hardly unique among the brave dissidents of the last Soviet generation.

Each time I went there, my Russian improved, and I started becoming more and more interested in events… in Ukraine. Not that I was particularly political back then, I was more interested in literature and philosophy. But certain things kept leaping out at me. Why was there a young man wearing a shirt saying ‘freikorps’ in the main hipster district of the capital? What are all these strange advertisements in the metro of warriors, blood and soil? What do all these new Cossack statues mean? Why is it that all the Russian-language signs in Kharkov (now Kharkiv) got changed to Ukrainian ones? And why is it that my family members there got so enraged when I started reading communist literature?

One thing which particularly stumped me had to do with the stumps of trees. Why was it that all of sudden every single tree in poor little Ukraine got painted yellow and blue? Along with every other pole, bridge, or other hapless public object. I remember asking my father how people found time to do that. I don’t remember the answer.

I eventually moved there in 2019, wishing to be closer to my family, and increasingly fascinated by the country. My command of Ukraine’s languages improved, I made more interesting friends there, and I got more immersed into the country’s events. And I eventually made this substack.

Political motivations
I’ve always found identity fairly confusing. My parents had totally different background and I was born and grew up in two countries that had as little possibly imaginable to do with my parents (or the topic of this substack).

So I don’t write here out of any sense of patriotic duty. Yet I still do feel a certain amount of cringe when I’m referred to as ‘the Ukrainian substacker’. In reality, I know a lot more about the country than plenty of people who wear the ‘Ukrainian’ label front and center. I just don’t want people reading my work to be trusting me for any reason other than the citations and logical arguments I provide.

Earlier I went over the universal lessons to be learned from Ukraine. When I feel particularly hopeless about political prospects in Ukraine, I focus on them. But in reality, I do have political hopes. And I’ve always been a firm believer that any writing has some kind of political goal or function, even if unconscious.

So I’ll be explicit about it here as well. At the very minimum, I want the war in Ukraine to end. I don’t want my friends in Ukraine to continue being under constant threat of mobilization into a deadly, hopeless war. Those friends unlucky enough to have a Ukrainian passport.

And those lacking good political connections. Since I know plenty of ‘true patriots’ with good political connections who illegally left the country as soon as the war started, or who have been peacefully draft-dodging ever since. The hypocrisy of it all is one of my main motivations in writing here.

I think the best way to do that is for Ukraine to give legal guarantees that it will not enter NATO or increase military cooperation with NATO. There’s no point giving evidence for why I think that here, since it isn’t the point of this reflective piece. The militarists can keep insisting on schizophrenic Putler’s lack of goals other than his thirst for genocide. They don’t want to listen, and their political status is based on the war continuing forever. They can keep denying it and calling me a Putlerist traitor, and in the meantime countless tens of thousands will die, if not more.

The fact is, that all wars end. At some point, Ukraine will sign something like ‘Minsk-3’. An agreement which makes nationalists. An agreement signed because of Russia’s greater military strength. An agreement where Ukraine formally loses the territory it lost ever since 2022. Territory it could have kept if it had negotiated earlier. Lives that could have been saved. At that point, I will look to the fervent nationalists on facebook, my family and their friends - and I am sure that instead of self-criticism of repentance, they will begin the murderous hunt for traitors within.

It’s also possible that there will be no agreement. There might not be any more territory upon which to launch the hunt for traitors. At which point we will get a replay of the Ukrainian diaspora abroad after 1920, or after 1945. In either case, I’ll be able to think - I told you so.

Besides the war, I want to bring attention to those who are unjustly killed, tortured and imprisoned in Ukraine. Like Dnipro’s leftwing activist Oleksandr Matyushenko, kidnapped by Azov on the spurious, unproven grounds of ‘correcting Russian rocket fire’ on March 26, 2022. His brutal beating was approvingly shared to social media. His supposed cooperation with the Russian army was never proven, and he was later sentenced to prison on a different charge - the thought crime of ‘questioning Ukraine’s territorial integrity’. He remains imprisoned. (Video at link.)

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The telegram channel ‘Repression of the left and dissenters in Ukraine’ published this information and much more. It found, for instance, that public records showed that 34,323 Ukrainians had been criminally charged with collaborationism, ‘encroachment on territorial integrity’ and other political thought-crimes from February 24 to July 15, 2022.

Volodymyr Chemerys was soon after visited by the Secret Services (SBU). They were accompanied by masked rightwingers, who broke one of his ribs. He was then charged with state treason. Their main claim - that he managed the ‘repression of the left’ telegram channel.

According to the Guardian in February this year:

Ukraine’s SBU security service says it has opened more than 8,100 criminal proceedings “related to collaboration and aiding and abetting the aggressor state” and Ukrainians convicted on these counts are only held in certain prisons, where they are kept away from other inmates.

The article illustrated its coverage with a photo of a person who had had ‘orc’ carved into their head. Note how casual the article itself is. And how all those imprisoned are described as industrial workers, cleaners… In a word, people who don’t speak English and hence can’t be classified as ‘Ukrainian voices’ in western media.

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Who knows how many more are imprisoned in various other ‘institutions’ - like the secret SBU black sites whose depraved sexual torture was described by humanrightswatch in 2016. Or the various other dungeons privately maintained by nationalist organizations. Where, as they so often boast online, enemies are forced to get familiar with glass bottles.

There’s no point going into all the civilian murders enthusiastically publicized by nationalists and government structures. Maybe in another post. At hand at the moment is a recent event - another twist in the case of the fitness trainer brutally beaten and forcibly mobilized in Odessa for criticizing soldiers. A couple days back, a video was published where he was tied to a tree, stating:

I am a faggot. I have just been fucked in the ass. I will serve the armed forces of Ukraine (Video at link.)

Note that the word he said was ‘otymeli', not exactly fucked. It’s Russian criminal jargon for particularly humiliating, dominating rape.

Ukrainian mainstream social media was divided - some praised it, some worried it wasn’t the best PR for the army. But the veracity wasn’t questioned.

The story of the fitness trainer makes me think of two things.

That any talk about ‘listening to Ukrainian voices’ is somewhat simplistic. What is a voice? In Ukraine, one’s thoughts, let alone one’s voice, can be very incriminating. The trainer’s voice - he swore at some mobilization officers who came into his gym to take away his clients - cost him a great deal. Is it any wonder that the ‘Ukrainian voices’ that make their way into the oh-so-free western media space enthusiastically repeat the militarist slogans that allow one to stay on the right side of the glass bottle?

And finally, one of the most basic motivations behind this substack. A feeling of intense gaslighting. I am lucky enough to have been able to escape Ukraine - I lacked a Ukrainian passport, though I was actually planning to acquire citizenship for whatever reason in 2022. My family there also did their best to prevent me from leaving, and then shaming me for leaving. While their more favored relatives (with Ukrainian passports and of military age) left long before me.

Since then, I have found myself in the western media space, surrounded by oh-so well-meaning western citizens. And everything I see on the news, in the responses of people if I am forced to reveal that I was living in Ukraine until 2022 - everything makes me feel as if I had and have access to some sort of parallel reality.

On the one hand, the most democratic country on earth. On the other hand, a man beaten, raped, and soon to probably die (if he is even still alive) because he swore at the wrong people in public. At the very least, I hope my readers are infected with the same cognitive dissonance, the same epistemic alienation.

I’ll try finish on a positive note. Earlier, I mentioned that one of the things I liked about Ukraine is its cosmopolitanism. It sounds a bit absurd now, but it’s true. The very hostility of Ukrainian nationalism is itself a reaction to the real diversity of the country. Its hysteria an attempt to deny reality. Its paranoia and anger caused by self-hatred.

What I would like is to see a return to that cosmopolitanism. Because it’s a more pleasant environment to live in, at least for most people. I assume it also creates a better context in which to push for a more universal politics. One focused on improving the economic conditions of all, rather than witch-hunts for those who speak the wrong language.

And while it might seem unlikely now, Ukraine’s history - itself not so unique - also shows that periods of nationalist fervor don’t last forever. Ukraine had the chance to become a bridge between east and west, and lost it - at its own citizens’ cost.

I don’t know if the categories of east and west will survive into the future, but I do think that what currently exists in Ukraine can’t last forever. It can last for a very long time, don’t get me wrong. But it will end at some point - the question is when. A question which is also that of how many will die in the meantime.

https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/ ... al-lessons

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As Conflict Escalates, Secret Russian Files Reportedly Reveal Lowered Nuclear Threshold Training

Plus: delving into NATO's growing stranglehold of confrontation with Russia, aimed at continuing the European war indefinitely.

Simplicius
Aug 22, 2024

This is a paid subscriber piece for a timely, and urgently-developing issue, given recent events surrounding nuclear provocations. It will cover new documents about secret Russian training involving unprecedentedly lowered tactical nuclear thresholds, as well as the general outlook for the US and NATO militaries and defense industries in the medium term future.

It’s another whopping 5,700+ word piece in size with a ton of scintillating information, of which I’ll leave a generously copious ~2,200 free to my appreciated free subscribers.


The reason this report felt urgently timely was because of all the ongoing escalations surrounding Ukraine, which are clearly aimed by Zelensky’s regime at raising tensions as high as possible and preferably stoking a much larger conflict that could give his forces relief. Thus, in light of these recent actions, the following reports have taken on a particularly significant tint.

To kick things off, coming on the heels of the tensions surrounding Ukraine’s escalatory invasion into Kursk and attendant nuclear threats against the ZNPP and KNPP, Financial Times decided to break the story of how Russia has secretly trained to conduct vast crippling tactical nuclear strikes on European infrastructure, presumably on first strike basis:

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https://archive.ph/dD1H9

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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ ... -documents

But first, to get past the initial screen of clickbait sensationalism that usually clouds nuanced understanding of the facts of such reports.

FT admits the “secret stash of documents” they examined surrounds plans drawn up by Russia way back in the 2008-2014 period and is obviously being trotted out now for reasons of drumming up tensions:

The cache consists of 29 secret Russian military files drawn up between 2008 and 2014, including scenarios for war-gaming and presentations for naval officers, which discuss operating principles for the use of nuclear weapons.

However, it must be said that the concern is not entirely unfounded, given that just last month Putin had triggered rare exercises specifically of Russia’s tactical nuclear forces, which included the arming and simulated launch of special nuclear-tipped Iskander-M missiles, amongst others. The article acknowledges this:

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This means it’s plausible that Russia’s recent exercises could have infact been in accordance with the procedures and doctrines outlined in the mentioned documents. Note that the topic of nuclear war, nuclear exchange, etc., has become quite passé these days—but that is only in reference to the classic strategic ICBM nuclear ‘exchange’ with the U.S. The topic at hand here is entirely different and very rarely studied or discussed: a type of lower intensity nuclear war conducted mostly via tactical nuclear weapons, which in this case extends to intermediate range missiles of the kind that can reach all of the UK, as shipyards in Farrow-in-Burness and Hull were said to be part of the target list:

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Delving into the description of the report from the FT article, there are a few eye-opening and little-known facts worth exploring.

Firstly, they state that Russia retains the capability to carry nukes on surface ships in order to strike pre-emptive blows on enemies from various unexpected directions:

The presentation also indicates that Russia has retained the capability to carry nuclear weapons on surface ships, a capacity that experts said carries significant extra risks of escalation or accidents.

The document notes the navy’s “high manoeuvrability” allows it to conduct “sudden and pre-emptive blows” and “massive missile strikes . . . from various directions”. It adds that nuclear weapons are “as a rule” designated for use “in combination with other means of destruction” to achieve Russia’s goals.

The leaked documents also indicate that Russia has retained the capability to carry tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships despite a 1991 agreement between the Soviet Union and the US to remove them.

Among Russia’s carriers of tactical nuclear weapons, it lists “anti-submarine missiles with nuclear warheads placed on surface ships and submarines” and “ship and shore-based anti-aircraft guided missiles with nuclear warheads to defeat enemy air defence groups”.


This likely refers to missiles like the Oniks P-800, Kalibr, and hypersonic Zircon, all which have nuclear variants. Each Russian fleet has a list of its own designated targets for nuclear attack: the Northern Fleet would hit defense-industrial targets in the UK, while the Baltic Fleet would hit Norway and Germany.

But William Alberque, a former Nato official now at the Stimson Center, said the sample was a small portion of “hundreds, if not thousands, of targets mapped across Europe . . . including military and critical infrastructure targets”.

Russia’s capacity to strike across Europe means that targets all over the continent would be at risk as soon as its army engaged with Nato forces in frontline countries such as the Baltic states and Poland, said analysts and former officials.


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The first truly eye-opening detail is the claim that these secret internal Russian documents include plans for a potential nuclear “demonstration” strike, if things really begin escalating:

The presentation also references the option of a so-called demonstration strike — detonating a nuclear weapon in a remote area “in a period of immediate threat of aggression” before an actual conflict to scare western countries. Russia has never acknowledged such strikes are in its doctrine.

Such a strike, the files say, would show “the availability and readiness for use of precision non-strategic nuclear weapons” and the “intention to use nuclear weapons”.


To clarify: we’ve often talked about Russia doing a demonstrative nuclear test in order to get NATO’s attention in the Ukrainian conflict. That is something entirely different. A nuclear test would be something run by scientists for measuring purposes, conducted in a safe and controlled way, with a nuclear device usually detonated in a stationary mode somewhere on or near the ground.

That is why this is particularly eye-opening because it is something far more aggressive and threatening. It would entail Russia not setting up a test, but actually live-firing a real tactical nuke from one of their many systems into a remote area. The simple acknowledgment that Russia even has such contingencies drawn up is fairly startling and clearly draws a heavy shadow over the now-escalating Ukrainian conflict, where NATO’s involvement continues to grow more out of control each day.

The article states that NATO admits they have less than 5% of required air defense capacities to even consider stopping such a Russian attack:

According to Nato’s calculations, countries in the alliance have less than 5 per cent of the air defence capacities required to protect the alliance’s eastern flank against a full-scale attack from Russia.

Putin said in June that Europe would be “more or less defenceless” against Russian missile strikes.


This is an important point to punctuate because people like to point out how Russia is being demilitarized by NATO in Ukraine, yet forget to include the grave demilitarization of NATO countries’ premiere systems taking place on the Ukrainian side. This particularly concerns air defense because such systems are not only not very numerous in Europe, but they are not even manufactured in great quantity; and they are precisely the systems essential to blunting even a fraction of a potential Russian attack.

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The report links another previous article of theirs with even more details.

It includes the revelation that Russia secretly harbors much lower thresholds for using tactical nukes than ‘ever publicly admitted’:

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These include:

Criteria for a potential nuclear response range from an enemy incursion on Russian territory to more specific triggers, such as the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines.

“This is the first time that we have seen documents like this reported in the public domain,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. “They show that the operational threshold for using nuclear weapons is pretty low if the desired result can’t be achieved through conventional means.”


An enemy incursion into Russian territory, one that does not even necessarily present an “existential threat” to the sovereignty of the state, as we’ve previously believed? One can quickly see why this is more relevant than ever, given Ukraine’s recent Kursk incursion.

Russia currently maintains 12 ballistic missile submarines, so the 20% destruction trigger threshold listed above would represent destroying as few as 2 of them.

The most relevant to the ongoing Ukraine operation is the following segment:

A separate training presentation for naval officers… outlines broader criteria for a potential nuclear strike, including an enemy landing on Russian territory, the defeat of units responsible for securing border areas, or an imminent enemy attack using conventional weapons.

The slides summarise the threshold as a combination of factors where losses suffered by Russian forces “would irrevocably lead to their failure to stop major enemy aggression”, a “critical situation for the state security of Russia”.


In short, it appears to suggest that if an invading force breaches Russia’s initial line of border defenses and seems to threaten Russia a larger expansion into Russia, this could trigger potential tactical nuclear usage.

This is precisely what’s happening in Kursk right now: Ukraine has already breached the border garrisons and continues to pile on more breakthrough reserves to go even deeper. The most noteworthy fact is not only that Ukraine potentially seeks to capture a nuclear power station in Kurchatov to carry out nuclear blackmail against Russia, but there were hints of other ulterior objectives, like capturing Russia’s nuclear storage site at 50.558061, 35.754448, called Belgorod-22—though it’s claimed Russia has long removed the nuclear weapons stored there.

Furthermore, we must take into account the fact that Ukraine has already struck Russian strategic sites, not only hitting strategic bombers at airfields, but the strategic missile defense radar network several months ago. Even as of this writing, the Russian strategic Tu-95 airfield Olenya in Murmansk has reportedly been hit, or an attempt was made. Not to mention the recent attack on Morozovsk airbase in the Rostov region located at 48.317297522288435, 41.78966336425716. This airbase was said to be an official nuclear weapons storage site. Outlined in red below is said to be the section of the base for nuclear weapons storage:

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And the square object to the right of it, full of munitions and fuel warehouses, was entirely destroyed by a Ukrainian strike just a couple weeks back, in early August: (Video at link.)

Granted, it’s once again rumored that Russia has already removed the nuclear weapons from there. But the fact that Ukraine is brazenly striking known Russian nuclear deterrence sites while now fulfilling one of the other key conditions—according to the report—of Russia’s tactical nuclear defense, by breaking through Russia’s border regions in Kursk—these things combined should give us pause, and force us to wonder how close Russian defense officials could be to secretly discussing some measure of nuclear retaliation.

Given that, as stated before, Putin has already triggered tactical nuclear exercises, we can only assume there’s at least some form of a Defcon level change in the defense ministry.

Just for the record, this was the previous American “red line” officially given Russia—that if Russia ever used a nuclear device in Ukraine, NATO would destroy the entire Black Sea Fleet and every object of importance within the SMO sphere via a massive shock and awe attack:

[i\Such a move makes no political sense for Putin, who is understood to have been restrained by his Chinese allies. They have made clear that their support is dependent on no nuclear deployment. But Russia has also been warned of a massive US-led conventional response if they go nuclear. In October 2022 General David Petraeus, the former director of the CIA, who commanded US forces in Afghanistan, issued a public warning to Putin. He said: “We would respond by leading a Nato (collective) effort that would take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the battlefield in Ukraine and also in Crimea and every ship in the Black Sea.”[/i]

Just two days ago, Lukashenko stated in an interview that Ukraine is trying to get Russia to use tactical nukes against it: (Video at link.)

“Ukraine would be very happy if Russia used tactical nuclear weapons against it. It would be a blessing [for Ukraine].”

By the way, for those wondering how powerful such tactical nukes are, here are two pieces of official information:

Targeting a “moderately concentrated” brigade of 5,000 troops would need “five or six” nuclear warheads, the source said, an ineffective strategy. (source https://archive.ph/zNwR5)

Former US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said that to destroy one division of the Republican Guard of Iraq, according to his calculations, 17 tactical nuclear charges (warheads) were needed. This roughly corresponds to the number of 3-4 brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Defense experts at the UK’s Times magazine stated five or six tactical nukes are needed for a single brigade, while Cheney has been quoted with a similar ratio: that 17 tactical nukes are needed to destroy 3-4 brigades:

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https://archive.ph/zNwR5.

Budanov has previously stated tactical battlefield nukes would be mostly useless because the AFU forces are so dispersed that the nukes would hardly inflict much casualties—and this is true. In short: there is much more to lose than gain for Russia in using tactical battlefield nukes, other than perhaps a demonstrative one. Intermediate nukes against NATO bases on the other hand are a different story. That would certainly have an effect but could obviously trigger a full strategic nuclear exchange, and thus Armageddon itself.

(More, for subscribers. But you can view for free IF you have one of them thar 'smart phones'. I Don't...))

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/as- ... et-russian
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sat Aug 24, 2024 12:04 pm

Present and future concerns
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/24/2024

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The search for ways to achieve the return of refugees, especially those of working age, has been a constant throughout the last year. Each survey in which families abroad showed their reluctance to return to the country has been an added concern for Ukraine, which sees its population as its guarantees for the future. It would be of no use to Kiev to obtain a territory with a viable State and security guarantees if a sufficient percentage of the population that has fled the country does not return due not only to the war, but to the economic situation in general. However, unlike economic emigration, which was already a concern in the years before the Russian invasion, the refugee population has obtained certain facilities of access to the labour market, in the educational field and, in general, greater social acceptance, important when it comes to the integration of families and the possibility of creating ties that replace those that united them to their country of origin. The fact that Ukraine is seeking help from its partners to ensure that the stay of the several million Ukrainians who have left the country in recent years is not permanent is an indicator of the nervousness caused by the prospect of a huge population loss.

“Ukraine is holding exploratory talks with EU officials on the bloc’s future migration rules to try to ensure more of its citizens return home next year and bolster the economy now that the war effort is putting enormous strain on resources,” Politico wrote last January. That attempt to appeal even to the anti-immigration sentiments that the far right is currently using on the continent is just one of the initiatives with which Ukraine has tried to obtain restrictive measures from its partners to encourage return. The Ukrainian government has defended initiatives to reduce social benefits for refugees and the cancellation of free access to higher education in countries such as Lithuania, as well as requiring countries to collaborate in the repatriation, voluntary or not, of men of age to be drafted for war. Reducing consular services, including passport renewals, for men of military age is just one of the measures aimed at encouraging return. And although Ukraine is currently trying to regain its male population of conscription age, the lack of manpower is also beginning to be a serious problem. kyiv not only needs a mass of population to support its army, but also to cover, for example, the needs of production of war material, the only industry that really matters at the moment.

“Real reconstruction will only take place after the end of the war,” Zelensky said, stating an obvious fact that has already been proven in Donbass in both phases of the war, the current one since the Russian invasion and the previous eight years: there is no possibility of carrying out a complete reconstruction process if there is a risk of renewed hostilities. But the reconstruction of the country and its economy depends, as the Ukrainian president has repeatedly said, on the return of the population. If the goal is currently to recover troops to fight on the front or pay taxes that make it possible to continue the fight, in the future, the key aspect will also be the workforce. Zelensky hopes to obtain investments and the presence of Western capital to rebuild and refound the country as he wishes, but to do so , he needs a population that Ukraine does not have today.

Part of the refugee population returned to Ukraine in 2023. The Wall Street Journal estimated at the beginning of 2024 that one million people who had left the country at some point had returned. However, the same source estimates the number of Ukrainian refugees abroad at six and a half million, a number it defines as around 15% of the population. This estimate assumes that Ukraine would have a population of 43 million, an optimistic figure compared to the figures given by the latest population projections that have been published in recent weeks. These United Nations data estimate the current population at around 37 million, with a forecast of some recovery in the coming years to around 40 million.

Short-term forecasts do not contradict the forecasts of the Central Bank of Ukraine, which last week admitted that it expects a further loss of population of around 700,000 more people to emigration. “According to the NBU report, the main reason for the expected increase in emigration is the difficult energy situation and the associated insecurities during the coming winter, as well as the slow stabilization of economic processes due to security risks,” wrote The Kyiv Independent . The current situation and poor short- and medium-term prospects do not encourage people to return but rather to leave the country, which is becoming increasingly difficult for men, but also for women, who no longer find in the European Union the solidarity that those who fled the war in 2022 did enjoy.

Emigration is not the only demographic problem Ukraine is currently facing. As Ukrainska Pravda reported this week , the birth and death figures are not encouraging either. “Mortality in Ukraine in 2024 is three times higher than birth rate,” the newspaper headlined on Monday, putting the number of births in the first half of 2024 at 87,655, a 9% drop compared to last year, and the number of deaths at 250,972. The war explains part of this imbalance between birth and death, although not all of it. According to the same source, which cites official data, deaths were already twice as high as births in the period 2018-2020.

Ukraine’s demographic problem is not new, but is inherited from the country’s industrial and economic decline since independence. The fact that Kiev has preferred to maintain the fiction of a population of 44 million rather than conduct a census – the last one, in 2001, is completely outdated and provides no reliable information on the situation in Ukraine even before the population exodus following the war – shows that Ukraine has no answer to a problem that has long been chronic. And despite the overflowing, possibly false, hopes of Zelensky and his team for the massive return of the refugee population and also part of the diaspora, whether or not born in Ukraine, the projections of the United Nations present a picture of continued decline for the coming decades. “The popular television advertisement of the early 90s “We are 52 million” was part of the identity of Ukrainians of my generation. “Now even the most optimistic scenarios predict half that,” wrote Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko, not hiding his nostalgia, commenting on the average projection of 25 million people in 2100. Although these are only projections, which can fluctuate depending on conditions in Ukraine and in other countries, the trend of population loss is clear and is an urgent concern for the Ukrainian government, which has so far been unable to reverse the trend.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/24/preoc ... -y-futuro/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Summary of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of August 24, 2024) | Main points:

- The West group of forces improved its tactical position in 24 hours and repelled six counterattacks, the enemy lost up to 520 soldiers;

- Units of the Southern group of forces took up more advantageous positions, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 690 soldiers;

- The East group of forces repelled four counterattacks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 24 hours, the enemy lost up to 130 soldiers;

- The Center group improved its tactical position, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost over 580 soldiers;

- The Russian Armed Forces destroyed a Ukrainian S-125 air defense missile system launcher, two electronic warfare stations, a fuel and lubricants depot, and a drone production workshop in 24 hours.

▫️Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated formations of the 3rd 5th Marine Brigade, the 39th Coastal Defense Brigade and the 124th Territorial Defense Brigade in the areas of the settlements of Ivanovka, Tokarevka in the Kherson region and Mala Tokmachka in the Zaporizhia region. The

enemy's losses amounted to more than 65 servicemen, an armored combat vehicle, three cars, a 155-mm M198 gun made in the USA, a 122-mm D-30 howitzer and two electronic warfare stations.

▫️ Operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile troops and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups hit a launcher of the S-125 anti-aircraft missile system, two electronic warfare stations, a fuel and lubricants warehouse, an unmanned aerial vehicle production workshop, as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 138 districts.

▫️ Air defense systems shot down three US-made ATACMS operational-tactical missiles, five French-made Hammer guided air bombs, 12 US-made HIMARS rockets and 44 unmanned aerial vehicles, including 16 outside the special military operation zone.

▫️ In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 640 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 30,434 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,557 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,425 multiple launch rocket systems, 13,594 field artillery pieces and mortars, 25,139 units of special military vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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Surrounded...

... Here is today's freshest from around Toretsk (and New York, ahem). As you can see the area roughly 3 by 3 kilometers is completely blocked.

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So, while completely surrounded, the job is not over and many people have to understand that reduction of such a cauldron requires not only forces turned INTO this cauldron such as this scheme of blocking shows, in this particular case platoon size force...

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But also requires considerable forces looking OUTWARD and blocking any de-blocking attempts by enemy. As you can see yourself ion this picture:

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This is a whole operation with division + force involved. But most famous de-blocking attempt was Manstein's Operation Wintergewitter, who tried to save Paulus' 6th Army encircled at Stalingrad. I provide here the link to WiKi's article only for registering the event:

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This was large,defeated by blocking Red Army force, attempt (do not take WiKi's "numbers" seriously--most of the time it is Wehrmacht's propaganda) by a serious Wehrmacht force. That is why you have forces looking INTO--reducing cauldron--and OUTWARD--repelling any de-blocking attempts by the enemy. So, encircling is a seriously complex operation, especially when you are dealing with the world-class force. Walter Model was a premier Wehrmacht specialist in extricating at least some surviving Axis forces from Red Army cauldrons, but even his operational genius didn't save Army Group Center during Operation Bagration.

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It was utterly demolished. And, of course, who can forget Avdeevka.

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Out of recent encirclements of "great" proxies of Washington and London's military "planners". There are no Mansteins or Walter Models among them, come to think about it--no Rokossovskys or Vatutins either. Mostly Pattons and Petraeuses.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2024/08/surrounded.html

Now, Ukraine Surely Is Going To Win...

... because British strategic thought and might is fully behind 404.


]David Lammy was mocked last night for urging people to stomp their feet in a show of support for Ukraine. His 'Make Noise for Ukraine' campaign has been launched despite Kyiv remaining desperately short of military equipment in its war with Russia. So while Ukrainian commanders are forced to ration artillery shells, Foreign Secretary Mr Lammy's focus appeared to be on hashtags and social media posts. The promotion also calls on UK military personnel to beep car horns and bang pots together, supposedly to send a morale-boosting message to Ukraine. But senior British defence figures said clips uploaded on to X and Facebook were no substitute for weapons, including the UK's deadly Storm Shadow missiles.

UK long ago became a joke and now we get recycling of imbeciles in UK's military-political top. Plus, it has to be stated, Storm Shadow missiles while having a leaker once in a while are no match for Russian air defense. But then again... we saw British operational planning--to manage to lose a division in about 10 days in Kursk. It takes special talent and 44 week in Sandhurst pretending being militarily educated.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2024/08 ... o-win.html

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Kiev’s Plan To Ban The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Shows How Insecure It Is About National Identity

Andrew Korybko
Aug 22, 2024

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Kiev hates that a significant share of the population refuses to conform with the “negative nationalism” that they’ve aggressively enforced upon them since 2014 by continuing to worship at the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches’ sites instead of the government-backed Orthodox Church of Ukraine’s.

The Rada passed a law earlier this week for banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) by the middle of next year if it doesn’t sever all ties with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Kiev has accused the UOC of being under the ROC’s sway even though the UOC declared full autonomy from the ROC in early 2022. The authorities envisage replacing the UOC with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) that was controversially recognized as autocephalous by the Ecumenical Patriarchy in 2019.

Readers can learn more about this complicated subject in RT’s detailed article from last August about “The Last Crusade: How the conflict between Russia and the West has fueled a major split in the Orthodox Christian Church”. All that’s sufficient for average folks to know though is that the OCU is part of post-2014 Ukraine’s Western-backed efforts to craft an anti-Russian national identity, which includes restricting Russian-language rights and arbitrarily persecuting those who still speak it in public.

Putin’s magnum opus from summer 2021 “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” is worth reading for those who’d like to understand how Ukraine’s separate, though originally not radically anti-Russian, identity came to be. In brief, it was largely the result of the erstwhile Kievan Rus’ collapse, after which its heartland that’s nowadays known as Ukraine fell under Lithuanian and then Polish influence. This was then followed by some Austrian, Imperial German, Nazi, and now American influences too.

Throughout the centuries, linguistic differences developed between the indigenous inhabitants from this part of that former civilization-state and its northeastern reaches from where the future Russian Empire emerged, and these paired with different historical experiences to form a separate Ukrainian identity. Instead of celebrating its closeness with Russia’s due to their shared roots, ultra-nationalists became hellbent on exaggerating and even manufacturing differences in order to form a “negative nationalism”.

What’s meant by this is that Ukrainian identity, both on its own due to some local demagogues but also especially as a result of the aforementioned foreign influences, came to be defined by how different it supposedly is from Russia’s. That trend turned Ukraine and those of its people who adhered to this particular form of identity into foreign powers’ geopolitical proxies against Russia, with the associated process unprecedentedly accelerating with American support in the aftermath of “EuroMaidan”.

To be clear, Putin isn’t against a separate Ukrainian identity per se as proven by what he wrote in his magnum opus about this: “Things change: countries and communities are no exception. Of course, some part of a people in the process of its development, influenced by a number of reasons and historical circumstances, can become aware of itself as a separate nation at a certain moment. How should we treat that? There is only one answer: with respect!”

He immediately added though that this newly formed identity mustn’t be weaponized against Russia, though that’s regrettably what happened with Ukraine’s. The latest example of this is the law that was described at the beginning of this analysis about banning the UOC by the middle of next year on the false pretext that it’s operating as the ROC’s proxy inside the country. The real reason, which the reader can now better understand after the preceding paragraphs’ worth of background, is Ukraine’s insecurity.

Its leaders hate that a significant share of the population refuses to conform with the “negative nationalism” that they’ve aggressively enforced upon them since 2014 with American support by continuing to worship at the UOC’s churches instead of the OCU’s. They accordingly suspect that their ideological mission hasn’t been anywhere near as successful as they’ve publicly presented it as being and fear that everything that they did over the past decade could be reversed if they lost power.

Basically, a large portion of Ukrainians don’t believe in obsessing over their identity differences with Russia, which doesn’t necessarily mean that they’re “pro-Russian” in a political sense but they’re also not ethnic Russophobes like the Azov Battalion is either. They might disapprove of the special operation while also disliking their post-2014 regime. These so-called “moderates” don’t want to fight for Ukraine against Russia, but they also don’t want to engage in sabotage against their government either.

Some might secretly hope that Russia overthrows Zelensky, but they’ve also reconciled themselves with living under him and his successors if that doesn’t happen. Their government considers them a threat precisely because they don’t hate Russia, which the authorities suspect is due to the UOC allegedly being under the ROC’s influence and therefore indoctrinating them with “Kremlin propaganda”. The reality though is that these people independently arrived at their views.

Nevertheless, Kiev is hellbent on destroying the UOC in order to then force those of its citizens who worship at its churches to do so at the OCU’s, from where they’d then be exposed to anti-Russian propaganda in the expectation that they’d eventually come to hate Russia. If this plan doesn’t succeed, then Kiev will remain paranoid that these “moderates” might one day be radicalized by their regime’s forcible conscription policy, deteriorating economic conditions, and “Kremlin propaganda” into rebelling.

What Zelensky and his clique can never accept is that these “moderates” embrace the original Ukrainian identity, which considers itself separate from Russia but still friendly with it, while their regime espouses the weaponized version that was artificially manufactured under demagogic and foreign influences. The very fact that the UOC remains the country’s largest in spite of everything that Kiev has done over the past decade proves how genuinely popular the “moderate” version is compared to the radical one.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/kievs-pl ... n-orthodox

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Russia Foils Ukrainian Incursion Attempt in Bryansk Region

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Ukrainian troops in the Bryansk region, Aug. 21, 2024. Photo: x/ @AlexCoh

August 22, 2024 Hour: 7:55 am

Russian forces downed 28 drones over Volgograd, Rostov, Belgorod, Voronezh, Bryansk, and Kursk regions.
On Wednesday, Bryansk Governor Alexander Bogomaz confirmed that Russia thwarted an attempted incursion by a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group in the Klimovsky district.

The breach was successfully prevented by the forces of the country’s Federal Security Service and units of the Russian armed forces. The Ukrainian group sustained fire damage during the encounter.

“The situation at the clash site has now been stabilized and is under the control of the regional operational headquarters,” said Bogomaz.

Former Ukrainian opposition MP who has taken refuge in Russia, Oleg Tsariov, said the incident took place near the town of Zabrama at around 19:10 Moscow time, when Ukrainian forces tried to advance with the support of three armoured vehicles, but retreated after half an hour of fighting.


An hour later, Ukrainian forces attacked again, but were also repelled. “In total, according to local sources, there were about 200 Ukrainian army personnel,” Tsariov said.

Bogomaz said that after the fighting “the situation is stable and is under the control of the regional operational staff.” The incident could be a warning sign for the authorities in Bryansk in the context of the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk, which Russian forces have not managed to expel after two weeks of fighting.

On Thursday, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that its forces downed 28 drones over “the Volgograd, Rostov, Belgorod, Voronezh, Bryansk, and Kursk regions, highlighting the escalating aerial and ground confrontations between the two nations,” as reported by WorldEcho.


teleSUR/ JF Source: Xinhua – WorldEcho

https://www.telesurenglish.net/russia-f ... sk-region/

(Is that tank towing or being towed?)

******

‘Judging Freedom’ resumes on youtube.com: today’s chat with Judge Andrew Napolitano

After spending a week in the ‘penalty box,’ Judging Freedom is now once again back on youtube.com and is operating at full power, as anyone looking at their outstanding list of interviewees today will understand at once. I am pleased to present the link to my own half-hour with The Judge in a discussion that focuses on the Kursk Operation, otherwise known in Russia as the NATO invasion of their country.

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6s6k7r0lbs

The to-and-fro of this discussion was very useful to elucidate features of the ongoing fighting in Kursk that surely confuse many consumers of major media reporting, as well as consumers of alternative media reporting. I have in mind such questions as why the Russians did not anticipate the invasion and protect themselves better against it; whether the United States was the guiding hand behind the Ukrainian forces move into Kursk or was it, for example, the United Kingdom; were the 200,000 Russians who have had to leave their homes in the territory of Kursk now occupied by Ukrainians ‘expelled’ or ‘evacuated’ by their government in consideration of the methods it will use to vanquish the Ukrainians; and how long it will take before the Ukrainian invasion is totally quelled by Russian armed forces.

I used the opportunity to express my disagreement with the confident remarks of some of my peers in the Opposition, who insist that President Putin would never use tactical nuclear weapons first against the Ukrainians or NATO countries however many ‘red lines’ they cross.

Transcript submitted by a reader below followed by translation into German (Andreas Mylaeus)

Transcription below by a reader

Judge Andrew Napolitano: 0:33
Hi, everyone, Judge Andrew Napolitano here for Judging Freedom. Today is Thursday, August 22nd, 2024. Professor Gilbert Doctorow will be here in just a moment on who or what invaded Russia.

2:04
Professor Doctorow, my dear friend, welcome back to the show. Who or what invaded Russia at Kursk?

Doctorow:
I think I understand your question to be: is it Ukrainians alone? Is it, as the Russians are saying, a NATO invasion of their country? And yes–

Napolitano:
And just to add a third part to that question for your very smart brain, was the United States behind it?

That is also a subject of conjecture. I think there is a significant feeling among expert commentators that the lead has been taken by the United Kingdom. And so although the United States would be in the background, I think in the foreground you have UK. And the new Labour government has been particularly active to demonstrate its key leadership position in the global West. They’re not just acting as lapdogs following what the United States tells them to do, they’re running well ahead of what the United States would do by itself. And there may be a conflict in the background between the British and the Americans because this latest move, which I understand also from Russian analysis, who also point a finger at the United Kingdom, that the possible blowback in terms of the United States is very real.

3:49
The Russians consider this an invasion. And that has changed the nature of the war, the psychology within Russia has changed by that fact. “It’s not simply that we’re fighting on a new 160-kilometer line of confrontation with the Ukrainians, but we’re fighting it on our own territory.” And Russia has been, as the major media have said, has not experienced a foreign invasion of its territory since World War II. So this is a new situation. The proxy war is a very thin fig leaf for the presence of NATO advisors, both in the background by remote control of operations in Kursk, and on the ground in terms of advisors and trainers and technicians who are operating some of the more sophisticated equipment. All of these different facets of the Kursk operation changed the nature of the war as seen from Moscow.

Napolitano: 5:02
What actually happened? I mean, can you describe what took place? Do we know how many Western troops entered the country and how did they get there? I mean, stated differently, was this a Ukrainian invasion or a Russian failure?

Dotorow:
That’s very difficult to answer. Of course, there are open questions why the Russians didn’t see this coming. Or, I think, let’s refine that a little bit. I understand that the Russian military intelligence did see this coming. It was, it is said to have been a decision at the top level, at the head of their Joint chiefs of staff, that the decision was taken that this was not a serious threat, it was a rumor, it was– or it was such a cockeyed idea, that it was not credible. And there’s no reason to make special provisions for it.

6:03
Whatever the actual thinking, a complete failure of military intelligence can be ruled out. It is a failure of judgment on the part of the very apex of the military command. And that means General Gerasimov. How long he will survive this bad judgment remains to be seen. I think the Russians, like most any other political and military leadership, are averse to removing key military commanders in the midst of operations. But I think that he is in the doghouse. The command of the Kursk operation was transferred from Gerasimov to a man who is described with some ridicule as Putin’s former main bodyguard or head of his security detail. But this is a man with considerable experience and considerable, not just loyalty of his boss, but experience in administration. And this seems to have been administrative failure, that they did not act on proper intelligence. We’ll see where this goes.

Napolitano: 7:22
I would like you to respond to Larry Johnson’s argument. And his argument goes like this. American intel planned this along with Ukrainian intel, American equipment was used, manned by American technicians, American ammunition was used to kill Russian soldiers, and we believe American human beings set foot into Russia as part of this incursion. Therefore, Larry concludes, America, the United States of America invaded Russia. Now as incendiary as that sounds, there’s nothing in the press about it. What does Gilbert Doctorow think about that?

Doctorow: 8:12
Look, there’s plenty of room for divergent opinions among experts because this is the fog of war. And let me just give you one little counter-argument. When I said the British are leads, some of the most fancy equipment that is being used are the Challenger 2 tanks from Britain. The British Prime Minister boasted about this a couple of days ago, that yes, we’ve sent in [these] wonderful game-changing tanks. That is probably the single biggest innovation in terms of equipment on the ground in this Kursk operation, compared to other places on the line of confrontation between Russia and Ukraine.

8:59
So– then another factor. Yes, American military [is] there, but I think the largest contingent out of what’s talked about as 2,000 foreign troops, mercenaries, whether they are actually members of the armed forces of NATO countries or they are– that have been seconded to Ukraine– whatever their actual technical situation is, we understand something like 2,000 out of the 11 or 12,000 men who have been deployed in the Kursk operation are, in fact, foreigners. And of that, I believe, the single biggest contingent is not Americans, not Brits, Poles. Poles and French. So–

Napolitano: 9:50
Are there Americans among that contingent, whether they’re intelligence agents, contractors, American military in somebody else’s uniform?

Doctorow:
Without a doubt. If the Russians were intent on declaring war on the United States, they have a casus belli. That we can assume. But it is not in the interest of the Kremlin at this point to do that. In point of fact, the present situation is being described in Kursk, is being described by major media as a war of attrition. Well, here we go. The war, the main battlefield is a war of attrition. And guess what? What the present standoff or fierce fighting, in fact, in Kursk is played out as a war of attrition.

10:46
The single biggest factor operating against the Ukrainians is they have no air cover. They’re doing what is normally done under NATO practice with air domination. Quite the contrary. These forces that are being sent in, all these wonderful Challenger 2 tanks and Bradleys and all the lovely armored cars for personnel that the United States has supplied, all of this is subject to helicopter attacks, not just artillery and not just drones, but helicopter attacks. Not to mention the use of these multi-tonne glide bombs that are being delivered by Russian bombers on the Ukrainian positions on the Ukrainian side of the border, on the Sumy [oblast] side of the border.

11:45
So, the situation that they have put themselves in is dire. If the West were to rush in all kinds of assistance tomorrow, then perhaps they could sustain themselves. But in the present conditions where significant support, either in men and materiel from the West to assist the operation in Kursk is not very likely.

Napolitano: 12:12
Are the invaders isolated? Have the Russians cut off their supply routes, whether it’s human beings, food, ammunition, from Ukraine?

Doctorow:
The single most important cutoff has been of fuel. One reader of my articles– because this is something I’ve mentioned in recent days in my blog pages– and one reader in the comments said, “Oh, but they can always use the gas stations that are in this, the Russian side of the border.” Well, I suppose if they have the right credit cards, if you know what I mean. That’s not going to take them very far. Fuel is a big issue.

Other supplies, of course. It is reasonable to assume that there is chaos on the Ukrainian side of the border because of the heavy bombing and heavy artillery strikes on all of their positions by the Russian forces from within the Russian Federation.

Napolitano: 13:19
And what strategic objectives might NATO have had by concocting and executing this incursion into Russian real estate?

Doctorow:
Well, the story has changed day by day as to what the real mission was. Mr. Zelensky has changed his storyline in several different explanations, each of which has been contrary to the realities on the ground, which make a mockery of his intentions. The latest one is whether it’s to – “We don’t want to keep this territory; we want to use it as a bargaining chip for negotiations.”

14:02
But as we know, the Kremlin has specifically ruled out any negotiations of any kind, because it considers this latest operation by what they call the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev to have crossed the final red line and to make this regime a party that they do not want to deal with. They want to see the regime change in Kiev before they open discussion with anybody.

Napolitano: 14:38
How has this, if at all, affected the movement, western movement towards the west of the main Russian military approaching the Dnieper River?

Doctorow:
Well, there’s some distance from the Dnieper River, at least in the area in the north. and they’re near the Dnieper River in the southwest. Kherson is on the Dnieper River. But the action is not taking around, is not going on in the south at Kherson. The main action remains in the Donetsk region, and that is nowhere near the Dnieper. Nonetheless, your point is very important. By depriving the defenders of the thousand-kilometer-long line of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, of their best elite forces, their most war-experienced soldiers and most advanced equipment they received from the West– by depriving the line of confrontation at Donetsk of those very elements, they have weakened substantially their possibilities of resistance. And they have had no ability to dig in and to provide secure positions of defense as they are facing ever more ferocious Russian attackers in the Donetsk area. And precisely around the biggest fighting is over Pokrovsk. If you go back six months to a year every town in Ukraine that was under siege or under attack by the Russians was declared to be of no particular value and was only another example of the Russians supposedly throwing waves of soldiers to their deaths for the sake of gathering a few more square inches, if not meters, from the enemy.

16:44
That storyline has disappeared. You won’t see it anywhere in discussions of Kursk or of the present conflict as it is in Donetsk. Instead, we hear correctly in major media that Pokrovsk is a very important transportation nexus for Ukrainian supplies going from the west of Ukraine, from the main Ukraine territory to supply their front lines. So, the Russian conquest of Pokrovsk, which is probably a matter of some days from now, will be dealing a devastating blow to the logistics of supply for the whole Ukrainian army along that 1,000-kilometer-long frontier.

Napolitano: 17:34
Tell us, Professor Doctorow, about Russian media and how it is treating this. I think the Kremlin called it a CTO in English, a Counter Terrorist Operation. So what is a Counter Terrorist Operation? What is the media saying about it? I’m sorry for the triple question. And is there pressure on President Putin to come down with a heavy hand against the invaders?

Doctorow: 18:08
Let’s start with the last one, pressure. this question of what kind of pressure Mr. Putin is under in general from the Russian nation, from the Russian public to put a quick end to the war with Ukraine, I’d just like to dissect that. I think we’re talking about the chattering classes, we’re talking about politically engaged people, as there are in Russian society, as there are in every democratic country. That is not the whole people. The people at large are, I believe, are not as engaged, are not as focused on the day-to-day battle results, or on having revenge against the invaders.

19:07
So the pressure on Mr. Putin is from his circles in the Kremlin and in greater Moscow. That is where the influential people, politically influential people, are voicing on major media because they appear as guests. Who would I mean, “they appear”? That is to say, the heads of Duma committees, like Defense Committee, who happens to be a Communist, by the way, a Russian Communist Party of the Russian Federation. They appear on programs, or the two of them, that are most important for this. Either it’s Vladimir Solovyov’s “Evenings with [Solovyov]”, or it is “The Great Game” that has three presenters, the most significant of which is one Duma member, Vyacheslav Nikonov.

20:05
They have guests from the Duma, and not just rank-and-file Duma members, but of Duma committee chairmen, and particularly chairmen related to defense or other state security.

Napolitano:
Is there a consensus amongst this elite as to what they want President Putin to do?

Doctorow:
Consensus, no. Other than there is a certain discussion, which has been quite lively, over whether the they should have a nuclear strike against NATO forces. I’ve mentioned this in the past, whether or not F-16 bases, for example in Moldova, should be bombed. Should they bomb in Romania? Should they bomb in Germany, Wiesbaden, the new coordination center for all European military aid to Ukraine is about to be coordinated.

21:00
These questions are openly discussed, which is a very big move forward from a year ago when that type of talk was only among a very few ultra-nationalists. Now it is common currency among the more level-headed but strategically thinking Russian expert elites and politicians in the Duma. Whether or not this exerts pressure on Mr. Putin that he cannot resist, whether it in fact goes contrary to his gradualist approach or “softly, softly” approach, it’s too early to say.

21:46
But I reserve one point, and this is, I take a stand a bit different from some of my colleagues who say, “Ah, Mr. Putin would never do something violent. He would never do something like a nuclear strike.” I don’t agree. The Russian behavior throughout this war has been dictated by Western behavior. And if Russia senses an existential threat to its existence, which nuclear weapons or potentially nuclear-carrying missiles supplied to Ukraine by the United States would present them, as they say in Washington, all options are on the table, even for the very calm and rational and humane Mr. Putin.

Napolitano: 22:43
I don’t get it why the invaders are still there. Haven’t they actually expelled a few hundred thousand Russians from their homes and villages?

Doctorow:
“Expelled” is only partially true. Yes, there are some people who left under duress. There were some people who left their villages when Ukrainian and mercenary forces went down their streets firing machine guns at anything that moved. And so they, at the opportune moment, they got out of those towns and headed for safety. But the largest part of these refugees, or displaced persons, who are numbering as much as 200,000, they were evacuated, not expelled. There’s a difference there.

Napolitano:
Okay.

Doctorow:
They were– yes, they took their dogs and cats.

Napolitano:
But the invasion precipitated their involuntary removal from their homes and businesses, and the invaders are still there, so that’s why I’m scratching my head.

Doctorow: 23:51
Again, this is more complicated than you’re presenting it. They were evacuated because the Russian government wanted to evacuate them, meaning that it’s not just they were pushed out, but it has something to say with how the Russians expect to deal with the invaders. [There] will be massive destruction, which is not tolerable if civilians were still in the area. So, as I say, it’s a little bit more subtle than that. The net result is, as you say, these people have been forced out, but partly forced out by their government for the sake of the way it’s going to conduct its counter-offensive.

Napolitano: 24:32
Are Zelensky’s people crazy enough to attack Russian nuclear facilities?

Doctorow::
If they have the ability, yes. That is, of course, questionable. They already have. They caused a fire at one of the cooling towers of the nuclear power plant in Kursk province. So they have done a little bit. There was a sign. It was more symbolic than actually threatening the viability of that nuclear power plant.

25:06
Let’s go back to this question. What would trigger a violent reaction from Putin, including the use of nuclear arms? An attack on a nuclear power plant is one of them. Further demonstration of what the Russians are calling terrorism, that is to say if these marauders– who call themselves Ukrainian soldiers and who are now in the Kursk region– if they were to kill a significant number of civilians or if they were to stage some bombing either in Kursk or elsewhere in Russia that caused many civilian casualties, then you can anticipate that Mr. Putin’s calm and reserve will be history, and we will see some massive destruction. Whether this means massive destruction of Kiev, it’s unlikely for reasons as some of my colleagues have explained, however, removing the rada–

Napolitano: 26:18
Yeah, we seem to have lost him. All right, you’re back with us. Removing–

Doctorow:
Removing critical decision-making institutions and personalities cannot be excluded. I think it is doing our cause as a voice of reason and opposition to this war that’s being waged by NATO on Russia. I think it’s in our interests not to dismiss the Russians’ ability and willingness to escalate on their own if they are provoked in a way that is not symbolic but is genuinely perceived as threatening them.

I don’t think that we on our part should be saying that the Russians did not protect or … defend themselves when their red lines are crossed, because we’re doing ourselves a disservice in saying that. We don’t know, none of us knows, exactly what the Russians will do next, what– none of us has a microphone under Mr Putin’s pillow.

Napolitano: 27:28
So if I were to ask you if the invaders will still be there when you are next on this show about a week from now, you’re unable to answer that. No one is.

Doctorow:
No one is. I think some of us– There will be, again to come back to the question you posed before, there are no big concentrations of Ukrainian infantry or other armed forces in Kursk for the obvious reason, because they would then be subjected to these glide bombs and to artillery attacks, and they would be devastated. So the whole force, the 10,000 men, is not concentrated in any identifiable way. They are in groups, in small groups.

28:14
And certainly, even if large numbers are destroyed– and we hear that more than 3,500 have been killed or so wounded that they are no longer battle worthy– even if there are remaining small groups, yes, the area will not be liberated until it is finally fully flushed out. The Russian Ministry of Defense does not declare any city in Donetsk as being in their possession until they have sent through their troops that cover every inch of the ground. So, a similar thing will be true of Kursk. I think a week from now it’s safe to say there will still not be an end to the Kursk conflict.

Napolitano: 29:05
Professor Doctorow, a pleasure, my dear friend. Thank you very much for joining us. Thanks for your insight. We look forward to seeing you again next week.

Doctorow:
Well, thank you so much for having me.

Napolitano:
Of course. Coming up later today at 12 noon Eastern, Ambassador Charles Freeman; at 2 o’clock Eastern, Scott Ritter; at 3 o’clock Eastern, Professor John Mearsheimer; and at 4 o’clock Eastern, Professor Jeffrey Sachs.

https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/08/22/ ... apolitano/
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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sun Aug 25, 2024 12:39 pm

Revenge
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/25/2024

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“Russia sought only one thing: to destroy us. Instead, today we celebrate the 33rd Independence Day of Ukraine. And what the enemy brought to our land has now returned home,” Volodymyr Zelensky said yesterday in his message to commemorate Ukraine’s Independence Day. The Ukrainian president boasted about the Ukrainian operation in Kursk, which in recent days seems to have significantly slowed down its military progress, although that does not prevent media triumphalism, and ignored the situation on the rest of the front. The Ukrainian narrative also avoids maintaining even a minimum contact with reality regarding Russian objectives, which must be analyzed not only through words, but especially through actions. Just a few hours after the Russian invasion, Moscow began direct talks with Ukraine in search of an agreement that, according to Russian, Ukrainian and even American academic sources, came close to achieving a peace treaty proposal.

At that time, the most decisive given the weakness of Kiev, which had not yet begun to receive the flow of heavy weapons that began as that process failed, Russia’s demands contrasted markedly with the desire to destroy Ukraine that Zelensky and his Western allies attribute to it. Russian demands were limited to neutrality, respect for culturally and linguistically Russian minorities and territorial concessions that implied accepting the loss of Crimea, which occurred eight years earlier, and Donbass, a territory of such little interest to Ukraine that it loses all prominence in Kiev’s discourse as soon as a new front is opened. Kiev’s current priority remains, despite the skepticism of some of its allies, the Kursk adventure, even if it has to be carried out at the expense of the territory for which Ukraine has been fighting for ten years. “The hope that Russia could respond by moving troops from Pokrovsk has been replaced by the certainty that it has not done so,” writes Oliver Carroll this week in The Economist . “Ukrainian security sources confirm that while Russia has moved troops from other sections of the eastern front, it has reinforced itself around Pokrovsk,” he added.

The loss of Krasnoarmeysk-Pokrovsk would be disastrous for Ukrainian logistics across a wide swath of the line of contact and would endanger the rest of the territory west of Donetsk, which has been poorly fortified amid overconfidence that Russia would not be able to breach the defences at Avdeevka and other strongholds along the 2014-2015 line. At the cost of much time, effort and – no doubt – many casualties, Russia has advanced into areas where Ukraine was fully consolidated. “Ukraine, however, has moved special forces units into Kursk and is shoring up the Pokrovsk front with inexperienced units,” Carroll explains. In The Washington Post , the deputy commander of the 68th Brigade claims not to have felt such intense fighting at any point and admits that his troops have been pushed back about six miles in just a week. According to DeepState , commanders are sending drone operators into the trenches due to a lack of infantrymen. “Drone operators are in short supply and it takes time and resources to train new ones,” Leonid Ragozin said yesterday, questioning “the wisdom of the Kursk operation.”

The difference is that Russia is seeking a strategic objective on the Donetsk front, while Ukraine hopes to gain a fundamentally political advantage in Kursk. Several articles published in recent days suggest that one of Kiev’s objectives is to obtain US permission to use Western weapons, not only in Russia’s border regions, but throughout the country. “There is no chance that the United States was unaware of the Kursk operation,” wrote Ukrainian-Canadian professor Ivan Katchanovski during the first days of the offensive. Shortly afterwards, Politico headlined that Ukraine had “more or less the green light” to attack Russian territory. Now, the same media outlet is acting as a tool of pressure to get the Biden administration to allow the use of the heaviest weapons that the West has delivered or is going to deliver to Kiev in the way it sees fit. The latest posts by Mikhail Podolyak, one of the most prominent figures in the President’s Office, indicate that Ukraine is seeking permission to attack any “militarized asset” – not just military, which, despite the ambiguity, can indicate, for example, any part of industry – anywhere on the territory of the Russian Federation. Referring to the Russian population, Zelensky confirmed this ambition, stating that “they will know that sooner or later a Ukrainian response will reach any point in the Russian Federation that is a source of danger to the life of our state and our people.” Considering that in recent years the definition of a threat to the Ukrainian state has included books, songs or films in Russian, Soviet symbols or even acts of homage to the soldiers who liberated the territory in World War II, it cannot be assumed from his words that these are only military targets. After all, Ukraine has not hesitated to use its artillery against hospitals and universities in Donbass, civilian industry, the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, a square in Belgorod during the winter holidays, or purely residential areas in Donbass or Belgorod.

Having the weapons and permission to use them anywhere in the Russian Federation is not, however, the main objective of the Kursk show of force. In the first days of the offensive, the media reported that “Ukraine has stated that its incursion into Russian territory is aimed at forcing Russia to negotiate fair terms .” The idea that the recovery of the initiative on the front thanks to the operation in Kursk brought the war closer to negotiations and the path of peace has also been repeated by certain Western media that have preferred not to look at the situation on the front as a whole nor do they seem to remember the precedents of the negotiations that have taken place throughout this conflict. In view of the visit that Narendra Modi made to Kiev on Friday, the Indian media The Wire recalled that India had not joined the final communiqué of the summit in Switzerland, arguing that “the resolution requires a sincere and practical commitment between the two parties in conflict.” Despite kyiv's hope to present the Indian president's visit as a change of stance and a way of adhering to Zelensky's proposals, the need for direct negotiations was the message that Modi wanted to convey to his Ukrainian counterpart. "Without wasting time, both sides should sit down in this direction and find a way out of this crisis," he said to an uncomfortable Zelensky, who at no point showed interest in negotiations.

“The joint bilateral statement released at the end of the visit makes it clear that India and Ukraine did not agree, as there are two separate paragraphs outlining the position that the two leaders had maintained,” The Wire adds , clarifying that while Modi stuck to the negotiation proposal, Kiev stood firm on the idea of ​​using “the joint statement” from the Swiss summit “as a basis for future efforts to promote a just peace through dialogue, diplomacy and international law.” In the jargon of the Office of the President, this statement is intended to reaffirm the idea of ​​Zelensky’s peace plan – in reality a war plan that demands Russia’s unilateral surrender – as the only possible path to resolution. The dialogue referred to is the phase in which Moscow would be notified of the terms it must accept. It should not be forgotten that Ukraine has even aspired to hold a peace summit organized by the United Nations, explicitly excluding the Russian Federation. Strengthening this position by means of military force is the real objective of any Ukrainian offensive, whether the current one in Kursk or the one a year ago in Zaporozhye.

Russia is aware that in war, strength is demonstrated on the front. Ukraine, on the other hand, hopes that diplomacy , i.e. coercion, from its partners will put pressure on Moscow to yield to Kiev's dictates. This is the aim of both the displays of victory, which seek more weapons from its partners by promising victory, and the attempt to bring countries such as India or China, with which Ukraine has recently met, closer to its position. The same objective, pressure, is what Zelensky's words during his speech yesterday have. "Ukrainians always pay their debts. And whoever has wished misery on our land will find it in their own home. With interest. Whoever wants to sow evil on our land will reap the fruits on their own territory. This is not a prophecy, nor gloating, nor blind revenge; it is a guideline. It is justice. A boomerang for evil," he said. In recent years, Ukraine's thirst for revenge has not been limited to the Russian population but has also extended to the population of Crimea and Donbass, to whom, in addition to past grievances - water supply cuts, military siege or economic blockade - Ukraine never tires of promising punishment, repression and limitation of rights. Zelensky's justice, like his just peace , is only for the part of the population that in 2014 accepted the irregular change of government and now advocates a political, economic, cultural and social break with Russ

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/25/30443/

Google Translator

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SITREP 8/23/24: Despite Russian Fumbles, Ukraine Continues to Unspool

Simplicius
Aug 24, 2024
Things continue apace in Ukraine, with Zelensky seemingly losing his nerve about the inability to improve his position in the Kursk region. Thus Ukraine has again flirted with danger by sending an FPV drone to the nearby Kursk nuclear power plant.

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https://www.rt.com/russia/602975-attack ... ear-plant/

More and more the West is drumming up the ‘nuclear threat’, which included a new video reportedly made in the US showing a Russian nuke’s impact on Kiev, all of which continues the timely discussion I began in the paid subscriber piece two days ago.

Now there’s rumor that Putin has decided to punish the wicked responsible for Kursk, and some sort of large scale attack on Kiev government infrastructure is imminent. Several countries issued a security alert

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https://ua.usembassy.gov/security-alert ... s-ukraine/

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https://www.newsweek.com/american-embas ... ay-1942882

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From the official US embassy in Kiev above:

Security Alert: U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine (August 21, 2024)

Location: Ukraine, all districts

Event: The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv assesses that during the next several days and through the weekend there is an increased risk of both nighttime and daytime Russian drone and missile attacks throughout Ukraine in connection with Ukraine’s Independence Day on August 24.


What gave it some semblance of credibility was Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov’s statement that Putin has made a “decision” on how to ‘severely punish’ the ones responsible—presumably Ukrainian leadership—for the Kursk invasion:

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https://www.rt.com/russia/602985-putin- ... -response/

Commenting on Moscow’s future steps in response to the invasion, the ambassador stated that president Putin has already “made a decision.” He also said that he is “firmly convinced that everyone will be severely punished for what happened in Kursk Region.”

It remains to be seen what kind of punishment we’re talking about. But it’s now expected that Ukraine will occupy Kursk for at least several months, if not half a year or so, with Ukrainian sources claiming the Russian government is massaging the ‘state media’ to introduce this idea as a ‘new normal’.

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Ukraine has blown the bridges on the Seym, which means the AFU themselves cannot use them, which implies Ukraine is happy to dig in and occupy the parcel of land they’ve already taken as a thorn in Russia’s side, so that they can continue the information campaign that ‘Ukraine now controls part of Russia, and Putin’s regime is collapsing’ indefinitely. They’ve also begun destroying Russian pontoon attempts, both with FPV and HIMARS:
(Video at link.)

In fact, several new psyops have been rolled out, including the likely fake announcement that Ukraine intends to hold a referendum on Kursk territory to annex it as a tit-for-tat. Russian forces on the other hand, are digging a large trenchworks outside of the Kursk nuclear power plant:

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The reason this is a modest PR victory for Ukraine in the near term future is because not only can they continue claiming they hold Russian territory in an attempt to weaken Putin’s approval, but also continue staging provocations on Russian territory, which include hitting the nuclear plant area with drones, artillery, etc., now that they’re within range of it.

Not to mention it has bolstered morale in the West:

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This has had some effect on Russian society, with many media figures now criticizing the government for its soft-handed approach to the war.

Political scientist Professor Evstafyev on Soloviev Live epitomized this with his fiery polemic against Russia’s elites: (Video at link.)

This was echoed by Russian military expert Shurygin, who called to finally switch from the SMO format to full-scale war:: (Video at link.)

"War is war. Either go to war or surrender. The enemy has now been on our territory for 2 weeks."

State TV: Russian military expert Vladislav Shurygin is pushing for Russia to switch from Special Military Operation to full scale war in light of Ukraine's recent invasion of the Kursk region.


Some people have begun to view Russia’s elites as being in a state of paralysis when it comes to escalation management. I will admit that I don’t think Putin and his ruling class’s handling particularly of the border regions has been ideal. In a way, it does feel like he tries too hard in keeping society at large sanitized or shielded away from the conflict as it grows on Russia’s own borders. And when he does make statements on the matter, they are usually uninspired and boilerplate, with little demonstrated accountability for anyone involved.

Another way of saying it is that, Russia’s handling of the war comes into its starkest relief during times like this, when Ukraine thrusts the conflict in the face of Russian society, forcing its elites to respond. And the odd nature of Russia’s management of the “SMO” becomes quickly apparent in such cases.

For instance, drones are literally crashing around Russia’s nuclear power plant in Kursk, and yet there are hardly any major statements or actions, just the usual anodyne composure. This is coupled with the striking fact that Russian long range missile attacks on Ukraine have recently been paltry at precisely the time one would think they would be peaking.

However, I do believe there are reasons for most of this. In the case of the missile strikes, Russia likely continues saving up a larger stockpile just in case, given that a potential NATO confrontation edges closer to reality each day.

This is not full-on criticism on my part because I think Russia is still doing what it needs to do in Ukraine at the moment. I simply think that the current highpoint of the conflict’s tension is exposing some of the shakier approaches to the war, but they in no way represent some kind of ‘defeat’ for Russia. It simply exposes some cracks in the foundation—but are those cracks as big as the ones in both Ukraine and the West? No, not even close—which is why context is always important. If you’re stuck in an information bubble watching only Russian doomporn, then you won’t be properly informed.

But what is the real reason for this uptick in anxiousness amidst the Russian commentariat? It isn’t the Kursk incursion itself, particularly given that it’s been stopped for now, with no new Ukrainian gains, and in fact some Russian rollbacks.

No, the other big prompt has been the series of destructive Ukrainian attacks carried out on a wide array of Russian infrastructure. In the past month alone, Ukraine has dealt serious damage to at least three Russian airfields—Lipetsk, Morozovsk, and the Marinovka base in Volgograd just yesterday. Then there have been the new oil terminal hits, with the Rostov one a few days ago being a particularly grievous example.

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Though Russia has been adding anti-drone netting, it’s unclear how effective it’s been thus far:

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Now they’ve destroyed, what’s being called by some, one of the last functioning oil ferries in Crimea with a hit last night in Kavkaz.

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These combined paint a swelling picture of Russia under fire, such that alarmist titles like the following are given some semblance of notional validation:

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And it’s easy to see how some even on the Russian side could begin feeling shaky about Russia’s ongoing war effort, but I have a different take on the ongoing situation. While the latest events have exposed some of the corruptions and shortcomings of the Russian military-state apparatus, at the same time they must be viewed as an accelerated psychological campaign on the part of the West, which is emptying its tank to create a sense of peaking paranoia and an atmosphere of crisis for Russia.

Ukraine has for now abandoned its objectives on the ground—in the real war—and has gone all in on the PR element. Granted, we’ve said this many times before, but even in the past Ukraine still balanced the two to a degree: for instance, last year to earlier this year, they still attempted moving forward in areas like Klescheyevka and around Bakhmut, pressing advancements in certain other regions in Zaporozhye. But now, they’ve gone on full retreat, and repurposed the vast majority of their resources to carrying out asymmetric attacks deep inside Russia for the sole purpose of destabilizing Putin’s public concensus.

There is a grave danger in doing this for Ukraine, the consequences of which we’re already beginning to see.

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https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/0 ... inian-town

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https://archive.ph/bYFx1

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From the Economist article above:

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From the author of the article:

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The point is that, the collapse around Pokrovsk direction in particular is picking up speed. Yesterday, Ben Hodges downplayed the advances, claiming Russia only gained 50km since the fall of Avdeevka in February of this year. But I examined the timing more closely and found that from February to June, Russia gained about 10km going from around Berdychi, in west Avdeevka area, to somewhere between Sokil and Prohres; so, that’s 10km in 4 months. However, from June to August they’ve now gone 10km+ from there to the current line hear Grodovka, and upwards of 15-20km a bit further south.

That means they are now gaining in 2 months what they previously gained in 4 months. If such an acceleration picks up even more speed, then the collapse could get truly disastrous for Ukraine. At the current pace, Russia would potentially reach Pavlograd by this time next year, itself already not far from Dnipro.

Russians With Attitude had a good breakdown for what the outlook could be after Pokrovsk:

It is the central supply artery for all supply that reaches the Ukrainian forces in the Donbass (there's still the M03 from Kharkov, but it's less convenient and has always been secondary, particularly for the southern half of the Donbass).

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West of Pokrovsk, there are a hundred kilometers of nothing. Empty steppes until you hit Pavlograd in the northwest, Zaporozhye in the southwest. There are various operations RuAF could employ after capturing Pokrovsk; we will look at them later, when the deed is actually done. But what's important is that it opens up operational space for the Russian "Center" group and gives them freedom of movement.

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Ukrainian Rada MP Bezuglaya actually validated this viewpoint with a long post of her own; read the highlighted portion:

"Our units are being withdrawn from there, leaving entire front lines to their fate, ammunition is not being added, the Russians are passing through empty fortifications. In such circumstances, the occupation of Pokrovsk is a matter of the near future, and Toretsk is living out its last days. It looks as if we are giving up Donetsk Oblast," she wrote.

"Beyond Pokrovsk is a direct route to Pavlograd, where there are no fortifications at all, then the Dnieper. Beyond Toretsk is the Kramatorsk agglomeration, a[/img]nd then the Kharkiv Oblast... No equipment has been made for the administrative border of Donetsk Oblast," Bezuglaya added.

According to Bezuglaya, "Syrsky is taking the war to a new level of maneuvers from the times of World War II, where the stakes are on losing or gaining entire regions."

"But what is the price and what are the prospects? I am sure that he does not have clear answers either. It is a do-or-die game. The surprises are not over. The maneuvers of the Ukrainian Zhukov continue,” the MP said.


And UK’s Sky News says “Russians could take all of Donbass”: (Video at link.)

Though it’s collapsing less slowly, the New York - Toretsk front is also undergoing fairly rapid advancement by Russian forces—here’s a map of just the past month:


Toretsk proper has even finally been entered, with Russian forces capturing some preliminary positions inside the city itself:

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Ukrainian ‘journalist’ Yuri Butusov exhibited panic: (Video at link.)

Ukraine is on the verge of losing Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) and the surrounding settlements. This is an important logistical hub for supplying the AFU, and its loss would signify a strategic defeat — Ukrainian propagandist Yuriy Butusov:

"In the past month of fighting, the enemy has completely captured the city of Krasnogorovka, taken control of 80% of the city of New York, entered Toretsk and is engaged in combat there, entered the city of Chasov Yar and is fighting there, and advanced within two kilometers of the dominant slagheap, which controls the approaches to Mirnograd, Pokrovsk, and Selidovo. There is a threat that the enemy may soon advance and engage in battles for these cities."

"In other words, we are facing the threat of losing a whole series of, or have already lost, or are on the verge of losing, a whole series of important, and as for Pokrovsk, key settlements and cities in the Donbass. Of course, this is a cause for great concern," Butusov said.
(Video at link.)

Meanwhile, former Ukrainian presidential advisor Oleg Soskin believes Zelensky’s regime will collapse by October: (Video at link.)

Former Kuchma adviser Soskin predicted Zelensky's imminent collapse "We can say by many indicators - political, economic, financial, military, logistical - that Zelensky's regime will be completely exhausted by October," he calculated. (Video at link.)


Interestingly, Apti Alaudinov states that not only will Ukraine’s Kursk incursion be over in 2-3 months, but the entire SMO will end at the same time:


In another video he clarified the statement: (Video at link.)

In short: he says this year either Ukraine will be entirely exhausted and the SMO will end, or NATO will have to get involved to save Ukraine, and WWIII will begin.

What all these predictions have in common is the sense that we all can feel, that something has shifted, that Ukraine is acting extremely irrationally, pushed by some urgent time-sensitive need. That urgency can only logically be the knowledge that something is running out—whether it’s manpower, ammunition, Western partner support, or a combination of all the above.

Russian frontline reporter Kharchenko’s poignant take:

The Ukrainian counteroffensive near Sudzha is increasingly reminiscent of the battle for Rabotino. We must give credit to the Ukrainian generals, they were able to create conditions under which the Ukrainian army regained its spirit.

A year ago, the enemy was moving forward in Zaporozhye because it dreamed of reaching Crimea and ending this conflict on its own terms. Those dreams were dashed against the Russian defense, and the Ukrainian army began to fade away. Despite all efforts, they surrendered territory and saved reserves.

The breakthrough on the Kursk front gave the Ukrainian troops strength and now they are throwing more and more units into the heat of battle, regardless of losses. The initial raids for tens of kilometers have now been replaced by positional battles. Artillery is increasingly firing in both directions. The sky is saturated with drones. Footage from the front is increasingly reminiscent of the battles for Verbovoye or Rabotino.

The enemy is now intoxicated with its successes, so it is acting reactively. Catching a single enemy vehicle in other directions was considered a great success, but near Kursk they move in groups. If we hold the front, and the enemy continues to burn their reserves, then we will be able to repeat the success near Rabotino.

Ukrainian society is not made of iron, the surrender of Pokrovsk and a second Rabotino can finally nullify their offensive potential. So we have a chance to turn our betrayal into a victory. The only thing that bothers me is that the battles are being fought on our soil. The same events in the Sumy region would be perceived by Russians completely differently.

Alexander Kharchenko


While it’s true that Ukraine is losing a far larger amount of equipment in Kursk than usual, I’m not convinced it still represents a dangerous expenditure simply because the vast majority of it is expendable light armor that is virtually unlimited in the West, though of course there have been some painful prestige system hits as well.

Russian MOD just estimated the AFU’s losses there as follows:

Total Ukrainian losses since the beginning of their attack in Kursk region of Russia.

—4,400 troops

—65 tanks, 27 infantry fighting vehicles

—53 armoured personnel carriers ● 316 armoured fighting vehicles —133 motor vehicles —31 artillery guns

—5 SAM launchers

—9 MLRS launchers, including three of HIMARS system and one MLRS system

—6 electronic warfare stations

—units of engineering vehicles, including two counterobstacle vehicles and one UR-77 mine clearing vehicle.


A more independent analysis could only find 100-150 confirmed destroyed vehicles, so it’s impossible to know where the real number lies—probably somewhere in the middle as usual.

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Now that the Kursk offensive has stalled, the only next step Zelensky has up the escalation ladder is begging the US for ‘permission’ to conduct longer range strikes with US weaponry. The key point everyone misses about this though is that this approval is not about accurately or powerfully hitting Russian targets. No, it’s all about simply getting NATO as involved as possible in crossing Russia’s ‘red lines’ in order to provoke a conflict between the two.

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https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/2 ... s-00176210

Not only does the new Politico article above imply this, it even offers us an interesting insight about why the US is hesitant to lift restrictions:

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In reality, Ukraine has far better success hitting deep Russian sites with low-tech drones which are much harder for Russia to take down, owing not only to their large number and swarm ability but also to how low and slow they can fly, bypassing radar nets. Even Rob Lee just came close to admitting the more premier systems have been mostly useless in hitting Russian territory as Russia easily shoots down ATACMS, Storm Shadows, etc.:

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Read the Politico quote below again:

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The small drones are a much harder problem also because they’re often made of flimsy materials which are nearly invisible to radar, as the radar waves pass through them—like the infamous cardboard drones.

(Much more at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sit ... an-fumbles

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Pressure from Russians on Vladimir Putin to escalate?

In my latest chat with Judge Andrew Napolitano on his program Judging Freedom this past Thursday, I made an off-the-cuff answer to his question about whether Russian society is pressuring Vladimir Putin to be more cruel, more dramatic, more effective in responding to provocations engineered by the West, the most recent example of which is the invasion of the RF province of Kursk by Ukrainian forces.

The show has come and gone but while I was perusing the last, 18 August show of Sunday evening with Vladimir Solovyov before the host went off on summer vacation, I heard a very authoritative answer to Judge Napolitano’s question from, shall we say, “the horse’s mouth.”

https://smotrim.ru/video/2851978

Solovyov is at the apex of Russian journalism and has close ties to the Kremlin. Over time, he has conducted several lengthy interviews with President Putin. Therefore what he said on air in his characterization of Putin’s decision making processes in times of crisis, like in the aftermath of the Ukrainian incursion/invasion of the Kursk province, may be taken to be very well informed.

Said Solovyov: “Our Commander in Chief does not submit to either outside pressure or to his own emotions.” Solovyov insists that Putin’s decisions are made in an absolutely rational way. One might say in an autocratic manner, if we use the original meaning of that word to be self-reliant and independent.

Political talk shows generally do not age well, given that the assumptions of the day rest on ever changing circumstances. However, to my surprise, I found the 18 August edition of Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovyov to be very useful for coming to terms with a number of other issues surrounding the invasion of Kursk and the Russian response that have developed in the six days since it was aired..

I will set these observations out first and then move on to discuss briefly how and why the Solovyov show differs from the other authoritative state television talk show, The Great Game, which I have used these past several weeks as my principal source of information about Russia’s chattering classes, who are concentrated in the capital and form whatever forces of domestic political pressure may be said to exist with respect to Kremlin policy.

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One of the most valuable insights that I found in the typically long introductory remarks of host Vladimir Solovyov before he turned the microphone over to his guests was a direct answer to the question that several interviewers have posed to me in the past week: namely what were the objectives of the Ukrainian raid into, later invasion of the Kursk province.

I have answered this question by saying that the accounts of Kiev’s objectives have been constantly changing if you take President Zelensky’s words as having any substance to them. We have heard most recently that they wanted to capture some RF territory that might be used to compel the Russians to give back some of the Ukrainian land they have occupied since the start of the Special Military Operation. Thus, the aim is said to have been to prepare for peace talks on a ‘fair basis.’

However, Solovyov presented a different story, one which he surely received from senior officials in the Russian military with whom he is in close contact. He said that the main objective of the invaders had been to capture the nuclear power plant in Kursk, situated perhaps 70 km in from the border.

If the Ukrainians had succeeded on that mission, they would indeed have improved their overall chances of bringing the Russians to the peace table on more favorable terms to themselves. And this logic of their mission is confirmed by the large concentration of the most modern NATO tanks (British Challenger 2) and other heavy equipment appropriate to an irresistible cut through Russian defenses to their target. That equipment was certainly not brought together for the sake of taking and holding the thinly populated farm country which is the predominant character of the 1,000 square kilometers along the Kursk-Ukraine border that the Kiev forces have occupied since the first days of the incursion.

Indeed, the Russians, who were taken by surprise, did scramble to bring to bear their overwhelming air domination and artillery plus drone forces to stop the Ukrainians in their tracks before they got more than 15 km or so inland in Kursk from the international border. They have, by all accounts, utterly destroyed all of the NATO equipment used by the invaders, so that the survivors, i.e., the 7,000 from the initial 12,000 who are still breathing, are scattered in small groups operating on foot and awaiting their extermination or opportunity to surrender, which are sure to come in the days ahead. Their escape routes west, across the border, have been sealed by the Russians.

By evacuating all the civilian population, Russia made the entire territory of the Ukrainian occupation a free fire zone, thus depriving Kiev’s forces of shelter in residential houses that they enjoy in the territory upon which the Russians are advancing along the main line of confrontation in Donetsk.

Like Napoleon’s forces which took Moscow in 1812, the Ukrainians in Kursk have degenerated from elite brigades into armed marauders breaking into houses to steal and machine-gunning any civilians who were foolish enough not to heed Moscow’s evacuation orders. We know that from the testimony of some evacuees before Russian television war reporters. Of course, not everyone got out in time, and we heard today about a heavily pregnant Russian woman who was wantonly murdered in the hospital where she lived by the invaders.

We are told by Russian military spokesmen that the toll on the Ukrainian forces in Kursk this past week has been around 2,000. That is a high proportion of the contingent fighting in Kursk. But it is a small part of overall Ukrainian losses on the battlefield in the past 7 days, which these same Russian spokesmen put at 16,000. Sixteen thousand! This very high number results directly from losses on the main line of confrontation, in Donetsk, and particularly around the city of Pokrovsk, losses which rose precisely because the most capable Ukrainian defenders there were shipped out to Kursk and their places were taken by new conscripts, many of whom were dragooned off the streets of Kiev and elsewhere and given very little training before they were handed their rifles and delivered to the front.

Finally, a word must be addressed to the fate of the surviving foreign troops now engaged in Kursk should they be taken alive by the Russians. As some of my colleagues have said on air in latest interviews, these ‘mercenaries’ will not be dealt with in the same manner as any Ukrainian POWs. They will not be exchanged for Russian soldiers held by the Ukrainians. By international law they do not enjoy the same protection as regular troops. Some of my peers have said these mercenaries will be executed by the Russians. At this moment, that is not true. Russia still has an official moratorium on the death penalty. However, there is currently discussion in the Duma of a bill which would remove the protection of this moratorium from captured foreign fighters.

*****

There are important differences between the talk shows hosted by Russia’s top journalist Vladimir Solovyov and the talk show hosted by Duma member Vyacheslav Nikonov (The Great Game).

I have not listened to Solovyov for a while because he is an aggressive nationalist, because he takes too much pleasure speaking ersatz German as if every German politician is a practitioner of Hitler’s histrionics, because he is often a bully with his panelists, using some as punching bags, and because he interrupts them, takes them off subject all too often.

However, in his favor, some of his guests are to be seen only on his show. I have in mind chairmen and deputy chairs of key Duma committees such as Finance, Taxation and Defense. He also presents Duma members from the Communist Party, from the Liberal Democrats, and independents, which is a great service to those of us who are interested in the role given to the Duma ‘fractions’ outside of the governing United Russia party. And he has very highly regarded military men, retired colonels who are also prominent in the Duma. In this last category, I would name Andrei Gurulyov, whose views I have occasionally quoted on these pages.

By contrast, Nikonov is very much the gentlemen. He never interrupts his guests. He never puts forward extravagant views or reads lectures to his audience. This is not to say that he does not deliver to his audience clearly articulated views on key subjects of the day, often in a drole manner. I think, for example, of his remarks following presentation on screen of the latest antics at the Democratic National Convention. He pointed out at some length the procedures by which Kamela Harris was anointed as the party’s candidate without ever having won a primary or won a single delegate for that matter. He did not shrink from saying this was a flagrant violation of all principles of democracy. He put up on screen some of the points in her radical economic program such as measures against price gouging. And he concluded that the Kremlin definitely favors Kamala Harris in the election because she and her policies will continue and accelerate America’s precipitate decline as a world economic and military power.

The panelists on The Great Game tend to be think tank senior personnel, pundits and representatives of civil society NGOs, not politicians. That being said, many of the think tank spokesmen and academics are exactly the same people who appear regularly on Vladimir Solovyov’s shows. That conforms to the tradition of Russian political talk shows that I witnessed back in 2016 when I was an invited guest on several of them. There were always these ‘experts’ who seemed to spend their entire days going from one television studio to another to take part in the discussions of current events.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2024

https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/08/24/ ... -escalate/

*****

SitRep From Larry.

Concise and to the point.


Lots of scripted negotiation Kabuki theater going on in Ukraine and Israel. On the Ukrainian front, Indian President Modi made a pilgrimage to Kiev to try to talk some sense into the cocaine comedian, Mr. Zelensky, but went away with no agreement or concession from the Ukrainian side. At the same time, Antony Blinken was worming his way between Israel, Egypt and possibly Qatar ,frantically trying to get some acceptance of the US proposal for a ceasefire without taking time to meet with the Hamas negotiators. These efforts to secure movement on the negotiation front share one thing in common — both are doomed to fail. The Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region has torpedoed any chance of Moscow entering into negotiations with Kiev. Russia will no longer entertain any overture other than the unconditional surrender of Ukraine. Ukraine’s options are simple and stark — surrender and keep some of Ukraine intact as a nation or continue the war and face political and military annihilation.


Read and watch the whole thing at Larry's blog.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2024/08 ... larry.html

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Why the Ukrainian Armed Forces' fortifications in the Krasnoarmeysk direction did not work
August 24, 21:15

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Ukrainian Armed Forces' Fortifications in the Pokrovsk Direction: How the Operational Crisis Is Neutralizing the Advantages of Ukrainian Armed Forces' Defensive Lines

The rapid advance of Russian troops in the Pokrovsk direction often encounters fierce resistance from the enemy, who has set up hundreds of kilometers of fortifications in the occupied part of the DPR. Most of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' fortifications are platoon and company strongholds with a developed fire control system and camouflage, which turns each assault on such a fortification into a separate operation.

Sometimes Russian units encounter truly monstrous fortifications in size, which play the role of key defense nodes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A

striking example of this is a large stronghold to the east of Zhelanny Pervye, taken by the Russian Armed Forces during fighting in this area in July. This defensive node was supposedly started to be built by the enemy shortly before the Ukrainian Armed Forces retreated from Avdiivka, and was supposed to become an impassable obstacle for Russian units due to its location and size.

A large system of trenches and equipped firing points, located in an "open field" and covered by UAVs and artillery, is really capable of stopping the advance of even large military units for a long time in conditions of air superiority of various types of drones.

Even smaller fortifications, with proper defense and established communication between units, are capable of holding back advances on entire sections of the front for years - Nevelskoye, located to the south, the battle for which lasted more than a year, is proof of this.

Nevertheless, a large stronghold to the east of Novoselovka Pervaya was successfully captured by Russian troops in less than a week of combat. In the conditions of an operational crisis and the inability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces command to competently build interaction between units, this defense node turned into a huge target for Russian aviation and drones.

An additional factor was the fact that assault units of the Russian Armed Forces attacked the enemy stronghold from the northeast, leveling many of the advantages of the fortification, erected with the aim of holding back the advance of Russian troops from the east.

Coordinates: 48.215605, 37.475699

Another large stronghold of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was encountered by Russian units to the southwest of Timofeevka. The enemy fortifications were erected in the area of ​​the S-05-09-07 highway and covered the crossing over the Kazeny Torets, located in the village. The enemy defensive node was a system of trenches and firing points and, apparently, was adapted for all-round defense.

In the conditions of a stable front, such a line could have stopped the advance of Russian troops to Timofeevka and Lisichny and would have required significant forces to capture it. However, without established communication between units and cover from UAVs, the stronghold was under threat of encirclement and was captured by the Russian Armed Forces within a few days.

Coordinates: 48.276491, 37.479241

During the special operation, we have repeatedly witnessed how even smaller defensive lines held back the advance of advancing troops in one or another section of the front for a long time.

The enemy fortifications in the Kupyansk-Svatovsky, Limansky and Seversky directions have been causing significant problems for the Russian Armed Forces for over a year now due to the geographical features of the terrain and the positional nature of the fighting.

However, many of the advantages of such fortifications are lost in the conditions of an operational crisis, similar to what is happening with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Pokrovsky direction. Even the most powerful enemy defensive positions, in the absence of sufficient infantry and support assets to hold them, turn into an easy target for Russian attack aircraft. A

separate problem for Ukrainian formations is the low morale and psychological state of units, regularly subjected to attacks by Russian Aerospace Forces and artillery and forced to hold unfavorable positions.

High resolution map ( https://rybar.ru/piwigo/upload/2024/08/ ... e04a9b.jpg )

@rybar - zinc

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9340955.html

Google Translator

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10 Reflections On Ukraine After Its Latest Independence Day Celebrations

Andrew Korybko
Aug 25, 2024

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Post-independence Ukraine failed to fulfill its initially promising socio-economic potential due to incorrigible corruption, and when people finally began to protest this systemic problem, their movements were co-opted by the West as part of a geopolitical power play against Russia.

Ukraine celebrated its 33rd Independence Day on Saturday, during which time Zelensky made a hyper-aggressive speech boasting about his forces’ ongoing invasion of Kursk. So much has happened in the over 900 days since the latest phase of this already decade-long conflict began that many have forgotten how everything got to this point. The one-third of a century since Ukraine declared its independence from the USSR is therefore a fitting time to share some reflections about this country:

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1. A Country That Grew Out Of A Concept

“Ukraine” means “borderland”, but it used to be the heartland of Kievan Rus. It was only after that civilization’s destruction by the Mongols, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s subsequent control over its central-western remnants, and then that polity’s merger with Poland that the borderland concept began to take shape once what’s nowadays Ukraine became the frontier between their Commonwealth and Russia. This centuries-long process led to the creation of a distinct identity and eventually a country.

2. National Identity Remains Contentious

Two schools of thought arose with regards to national identity: the radical one obsesses over their differences with Russia and fiercely hates it while the moderate one is more focused on socio-economic development and won’t rule out cooperation with Russia. The struggle between these two has defined the Ukrainian national movement since its inception. The radicals are predominant right now, but they’re nervous that the moderates might make a comeback, ergo why they continue persecuting them.

3. Socio-Economic Collapse Was Avoidable

Ukraine had over 50 million people at the time of independence and a rich Soviet industrial inheritance that was then fueled by generously subsidized Russian resources, all of which could have turned it into one of the most prosperous countries in Europe, but the opportunity was squandered. Its population is now estimated to be 36 million people and its non-stop deindustrialization made it the poorest country in Europe. All credible forecasts suggest that Ukraine’s socio-economic collapse will further worsen.

4. Incorrigible Corruption Killed The Country

The abovementioned collapse was caused by Ukraine’s incorrigible corruption since competing oligarchic cliques cared more about their personal economic interests than the nation’s objective ones. Different ones came to control different Ukrainian leaders, and with time, these cliques and their politicians came to be influenced – and in some cases outright controlled – by foreign forces too. Widespread awareness of this systemic problem gave rise to well-intentioned protest movements that were also later co-opted.

5. Color Revolutions Were Never The Solution

Many Ukrainians sincerely thought that the Color Revolutions of 2004-2005 and 2013-2014 would liberate their country from corrupt oligarchs and finally give them the future they deserved since 1991, but that was never the solution since these were really weaponized protests orchestrated by the West. The whole point was to co-opt the public’s anger by capitalizing upon legitimate grievances in order to aid their allied oligarchic factions in a coup de grace against Russia’s as part of a geopolitical power play.

6. Hegemonic Goals Predetermined The Proxy War

“EuroMaidan” was a ploy to pivot Ukraine towards the US at Russia’s expense by turning it into NATO’s easternmost vanguard. This hegemonic goal aimed to coerce Russia into a series of incessant concessions that would ultimately neutralize its sovereignty and was influenced by Brzezinski’s precept that Russia ceases to be an “empire” without Ukraine in its sphere of influence. The largest conflict in Europe since World War II would never have broken out had it not been for the US’ pursuit of this.

7. From Faux Democracy To Actual Dictatorship

Ukraine was a faux democracy before “EuroMaidan”, but it wasn’t until that Western-backed Color Revolution that it finally became a dictatorship. Additionally, the US ensured that the radical school of thought on Ukrainian national identity became the country’s de facto ideology, which coupled with the newly imposed dictatorship to prevent their Russian-friendly moderate rivals from ever returning to power. Ukraine is now much less politically free today than it was a decade ago.

8. Burning Europe’s Land Bridge To China

Regional military and domestic political changes in post-“EuroMaidan” Ukraine were also accompanied by broader geo-economic ones with regard to ruining the possibility of Ukraine ever functioning as Europe’s bridge to China. Western-encouraged Russian-Ukrainian tensions precluded the possibility of them cooperating along the “Eurasian Land Bridge”, thus advancing the US’ grand strategic goal of “decoupling” the EU from Russia and China.

9. The Western Elite’s Neoliberal Playground

Ukraine’s accelerated socio-economic collapse from “EuroMaidan” onward led to the logical culmination of its dictatorial oligarchic regime after the country sold itself out over the past two and a half years to become the Western elite’s neoliberal playground. The G7 countries, BlackRock, foreign agricultural investors, and others now control strategic sectors of the economy. Ukraine’s sovereignty has thus become nominal since it’ll likely never be able to regain national control over those industries.

10. Are Ukrainians Approaching Their Breaking Point?

Ukrainians have experienced such devastation and disappointment since independence that one can’t help but wonder whether they’ll ever reach a breaking point. They hadn’t hitherto since they weren’t literally dying for their dictatorial oligarchic regime, but growing resistance to its forcible conscription policy suggests that some folks have finally decided to fight back. It’s unclear whether this could evolve into a full-fledged revolt, however, since the secret police brutally suppress all forms of opposition.

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Post-independence Ukraine failed to fulfill its initially promising socio-economic potential due to incorrigible corruption, and when people finally began to protest this systemic problem, their movements were co-opted by the West as part of a geopolitical power play against Russia. The country is now a shell of its former self after having surrendered its sovereignty, sold out its industries, and descended into an oligarchic dictatorship that’s obsessed with its role as the anti-Russia.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/10-refle ... -after-its
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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