Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Mon Aug 26, 2024 12:09 pm

«A German problem»
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/26/2024

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The latest revelations about the authorship and motives of the attack on Nord Stream have once again highlighted the weakness of Germany's position, which has not only been forced to remain silent in the face of a direct attack, but is also under pressure to continue arming and financing the country that, according to the Western press and secret services, attacked its critical infrastructure. The insistence of Boris Pistorius, Minister of Defence, on the possibility that it was all a false Russian flag, has been of no use, a version that was always a way of clinging to a burning nail and gaining time in the face of evidence that it was not an enemy, but an ally who committed the attack. The certainty with which the press points to Ukraine in the Nord Stream case - a way of exonerating the United States of any doubt that Seymour Hersh's version could have created - has not relieved the pressure that has existed since 2022 on Germany, the former engine of the European Union, treated in these last two and a half years as the weakest link.

Without a grace period following the publication of a lengthy report in which The Wall Street Journal gave a detailed description of how and why the Nord Stream explosions were planned, the pressure campaign against Berlin, which is always being asked for more, seems to have resumed. “Ukraine has a German problem,” ran Bloomberg’s headline last week , not referring to the need to repair relations that may have been damaged by what happened in the Baltic Sea, but instead presenting Berlin as an obstacle to Kiev achieving its goals. “Kiev’s operation in Kursk is not so much directed at the front but at Berlin and other allies,” the article said, adding that “not for the first time, Ukraine is having problems with Berlin’s support,” adding that Ukraine “also has a problem with France, the United States and even the United Kingdom.” It is at them that the latest actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are directed. The continuation of the proxy war requires that the quantities of weapons not only do not decline, but that the tendency to escalate continues. Bloomberg 's text is one of many examples of the argument for abandoning the idea of ​​​​gradually increasing pressure on Russia in favor of a policy that, in practice - although not in rhetoric, which only uses the term escalation for Russian actions - is a step towards total war.

The logic is to take the Ukrainian speech at face value and believe it without any further evidence than the words of an ally. “Zelensky said that the entire Kursk operation would not have been necessary if the allies had lifted restrictions on the use of long-range missiles to attack Russia’s essential weapons assets where they are located, i.e. far from the front lines.” This logic clashes with experience and with the promises that Kiev has made at every turn. Initially, Ukraine demanded long-range missiles to attack Crimea, the most important territory for kyiv, which would fall almost automatically based on making the situation of Russian troops on the peninsula untenable. Ukraine attacked and put out of use for a long period of time the railway connection of the Kerch bridge, the most important part in terms of military supplies. Ukrainian troops managed to get hold of Western missiles with which it would be possible not only to break through the front, but to approach Crimea and endanger Russian control. Months later, with periodic attacks on the peninsula and extensive use of missiles, the situation has not changed. Nor have the promises. Yesterday a representative of Ukrainian military intelligence insisted again that there is a plan for the deoccupation of Crimea and the destruction of the bridge linking the peninsula to mainland Russia, a dream that persists despite evidence that long-range strikes cause losses but are not definitive. That lesson can be applied to the Ukrainian idea that the removal of restrictions on attacks against remote Russian military targets anywhere on Russian territory will mark a turning point in the war, an argument that is nothing more than a reformulation of the miracle weapons idea that has so failed in this war. The reality is that, with intelligence from its allies and long-range weapons, Ukraine can hope to undermine the Russian military effort by increasing costs. Even if kyiv were to force Moscow to limit the use of military bases close to the border, Russia would still have infrastructure at a greater distance, which increases the cost but also limits the effectiveness of hypothetical attacks. Obviously, the greater the distance, the longer the flight time and, therefore, the easier it is for Russian defenses to shoot down such missiles.

However, the argument that permission to use missiles on Russian territory would be the decisive element for Ukrainian victory remains common in the media, with experts and lobbyists insisting that Western restrictions are the reason Ukraine is failing to win the war. “The American ATACMS surface-to-surface missiles and the British, French and German Storm Shadow, SCALP_EG and Taurus cruise missiles, respectively, would allow Ukraine to more effectively destroy bridges, weapons depots and, above all, the airfields from which Russian planes armed with gliding bombs take off,” Bloomberg says , without adding further context or qualifying the effectiveness of Ukraine’s missiles so far. “It’s easy to pick on Germany, the nation that initially only offered Ukraine helmets to defend itself against a full-scale invasion in February 2022,” the article states in the preceding paragraphs. In the task of blaming Ukraine's allies for its inferiority to the Russian army, Berlin is the easiest scapegoat, not only because of Chancellor Scholz's initial reluctance, but also because of its current refusal to send Taurus missiles, with a range capable of attacking even Moscow. It is not a coincidence, but a tool of pressure, that the article mentions German missiles alongside the Western models that Ukraine already has. Although kyiv seems to have temporarily given up its demands on Berlin, at least publicly, those who defend the logic of escalation have not forgotten the refusal of the German head of government. Although Scholz denied at the time that the refusal to send Taurus missiles to Ukraine was due to a lack of confidence in Kiev, suspicions about who had attacked the Nord Stream were already clear. Yet Western media, experts and lobbyists continue to demand that Germany send long-range missiles to the country it suspects of carrying out a terrorist act against its vital infrastructure – a detail that much of the media prefers to forget.

Ultimately, the prevailing theory in the European establishment today is that the attack is justified as an act of justice against Russia and especially against those who opted for the policy of economic rapprochement between the powers of the continent. Czech President Petr Pavel summed up this idea perfectly when referring to what happened in the Nord Stream. “When an armed conflict occurs, not only military targets are attacked, but also strategic ones. Oil pipelines are a strategic target. If the aim of the attack was to stop the supply of gas and oil to Europe and return the money to Russia, then – and I specifically use the term “conditionally” – it would be a legitimate target,” he explained in a recent interview. Everything is justified, even attacking an ally, who must now ensure that the attacker has missiles to further escalate the war.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/26/30450/

Google translator

******

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Forwarded from
War Correspondent Kitten
Military expert Boris Rozhin on the main points in the course of the SVO by 21:31 Moscow time on 25.08.2024, especially for the Voenkor Kotenok channel @voenkorKotenok :

1.
Zaporizhia direction.
No significant changes.
Fighting continues north of Rabotino and Verbovoye .

2.
Vremyevsk salient.
Positional battles north and east of Urozhaynoye .
No serious progress.

3.
Ugledar direction.
The Russian Armed Forces advanced to the eastern and southern part of Konstantinovka.
The Russian flag was planted on the southern outskirts.
The control zone in the area of ​​the highway near Vodyanoye has been expanded .
Landings south of Konstantinovka have been occupied .
Minor advancement west of Paraskoveyevka.

4.
Krasnogorovka.
Minor advancement near the southwestern outskirts of the city.
The clearing of the private sector north of the city also continues.

5.
Krasnoarmeyskoye direction.
The Russian Armed Forces control more than 60% of Novogrodovka and about 20% of Grodovka . Novogrodovka , apparently, will come under the control of the Russian Armed Forces in a few days.
Fighting continues in the Vozdvizhenka area.
The Russian Armed Forces are encircling Kalinovo, reaching the flank and rear of the Karlovka group.
The Krasnoarmeysk-Karlovka road is under fire control.
The situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces here is systematically deteriorating. After the fall of Grodovka and Novogrodovka, we can expect the imminent start of fighting for Mirnograd and Selidovo.
Karlovka will be abandoned by the enemy in the near future due to the threat of encirclement.

6.
Dzerzhinsk.
The Russian Armed Forces continued to advance in Dzerzhinsk itself + occupied the territory between Artemovo/Kirovo and Dzerzhinsk.
Fighting continues for Druzhba and Nelepovka.
Novgorodskoye has advanced to the west of the city.

7.
Chasov Yar.
The Russian Armed Forces continue to expand the bridgehead behind the Seversky Donets-Donbass Canal.
There is also some advancement north of Kalinovka.
In the Kleshcheyevka area, there are no changes after the recent advance.

8.
Seversky salient.
No significant changes.
Fighting continues on the outskirts of Pereyezdnoye and in the Vyemka area.
No changes near Belogorovka and Spornoye.

9.
Krasnolimanskoye direction.
No significant changes.
Positional battles continue in the Serebryanskoye forestry, near Torskoye and near Terna.

10.
Svatovo-Kupyanskoye direction.
The Russian Armed Forces continued to expand their zone of control in the Peschannoye area. Fighting continued on the outskirts of Stelmakhovka and in the center of Makeyevka. The enemy consolidated its recently captured positions near Novovodanoye.

11.
Kharkov direction.
Fighting continued in the area of ​​Glubokoye and Liptsy.
After the recent attack of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on Glubokoye, the situation is again developing in a positional key.
In Vovchansk, the Russian Armed Forces captured a couple more houses in the city center.

12.
Kursk direction.
The enemy continued its offensive, trying to break through at Korenevo, Kauchuk, Verkhnyaya Lokna and in the Martynovka area.
Nowhere did they achieve decisive results, suffering heavy losses.
The Russian Armed Forces, in turn, recaptured Olgovka.
It is too early to talk about stabilization of the situation.
The enemy continues to transfer reserves to the Kursk direction , hoping to reverse the current trends and maintain the pace of the slowing offensive.

In general, the Russian Armed Forces retain the operational initiative in most directions. The most problematic areas are the Krasnoarmeyskoye direction , the Dzerzhinsk area and the Ugledar area.
However, the enemy is betting on the Kursk offensive, hoping to achieve success before the front in the southwestern part of Donbass begins to fall apart.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

Ukraine Weekly Update
23rd August 2024

Dr. Rob Campbell
Aug 23, 2024

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Kursk - beginning of the end?

The ongoing incursion into or ‘invasion’ of Russian soil in Kursk has commanded much attention and prompted much analysis among commentators this week, including b at the MoA (21st August). What was first thought to have been some sort of raid turned out to have been an invasion of sorts since it aimed to retain Russian ground. However, this was not the Napoleon of 1812 or the Hitler of 1941: it was the Zelensky of 2024 and was a reflection of the man and his approach to war. The capture of ground that will continue to cost the Ukrainians dear was sought for a number of reasons but a desire to generate outstanding newspaper headlines such as Russia Invaded! was among them. Zelensky did not have a serious plan to capture vast swathes of Russian territory as Napoleon and Hitler did. But for many Russian people, Zelensky has become the latest in a long line of invaders and they have responded with the unity and determination that Alexander 1st asked of them more than 200 years ago (see below). The weakening of other sectors of front arising from this misadventure is already becoming evident as Pokrovsk, in particular, is on the verge of a very costly collapse.

<snip>

General Alaudinov - Kursk Battle Will End in Three Months

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We will smash them all before Christmas - you’ll see.

Major General Apti Alaudinov claims that the war in Kursk and the entire north-east military district will end in two-three months - or so he told a Chinese war correspondent.

Putin Visits Azerbaijan

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Firm friends - whatever the weather (from a year ago)
This is the first time a Russian President has visited Azerbaijan and is a sign that Putin wants closer relations with President Aliyev and his country - according to RT. Azerbaijan is considering becoming a full member of the SCO and BRICS.

Russia Will Retaliate Against Polish Interference

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Scowling Sikorski

Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, has said that Poland is considering whether to shoot down Russian missiles over Ukraine. Oleg Tyapkin, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman has warned that the Russian response would be ‘adequate and specific’, according to Sputnik. It seems to me that Poland and many other Western countries should be considered as combatants in consequence of their current level of involvement. Maybe the Russians are ignoring this because they are trying to avoid escalation. I don’t think Poland is seriously considering such a dangerous move: this is all huffing and puffing imv.

Can I suggest Mr. Sikorski, that if you are a trainer outside the ropes of a boxing arena and reach into the ring to punch your fighter’s opponent then you have become a participant in the contest. Therefore, you can expect the fighter you have just punched to trade a blow or two with you. To me, Sikorski’s position appears cowardly in a sense. It is definitely not brave to punch an opponent in the knowledge that he will not hit back. If Russia does retaliate, I have no idea whether an attack on Poland under such circumstances would lead to further escalation. But Putin has to tell Poland and the West that if Poland intervenes in this way, Russia will attack Polish (and NATO) territory.

Deluded Podolyak

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You just have to believe!

Zelensky adviser, Mykhailo Podolyak, ‘strongly believes’ that the capture of settlements in Kursk will force Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table. In truth, the Kursk incursion has hardened the hearts of Putin and the Russian people who will be determined to evict the Ukrainians from their territory by force, not by talking. And who can blame them.

If this was poor old Ukraine attacking a predator which had tormented it, striking at its weak underbelly (i.e. defenceless civilians in Kursk) - then some would offer some sympathy. But reality is so, so different. In the years following the CIA led Maidan coup, Ukraine, militarily bloated by NATO, attacked those oblasts that did not want illegitimate rule from Kiev in which they, their language and their culture would be suppressed. So, the Militias of the DPR and the LPR fought off their oppressors for years before the Russians intervened militarily. The people in the DPR and the LPR are the good guys, not the Ukrainians. I’m summarising.

However, the situation has now changed fundamentally because the conflict is no longer between the breakaway oblasts and Ukraine: it is between Russia and NATO - at a military level - and between Russia (as part of the emerging MPWO) and the decaying Uni-Polar World Order. This latter can best be represented by the current decrepit ‘leader’ of the unfree world. Sleepy Joe represents both the decay and the decadence of the West. This corrupt, sleazy man who appears to take an unnatural interest in children’s hair, and ice cream: arrogant beyond his abilities and sadly deteriorating in his faculties - is - the decaying US Empire - personified.

EU Countries Refuse To Send Refugees Into a War Zone
Zelensky has been trying to persuade European countries to send back men of military age but they have refused to send refugees back into a war zone. For some countries this is a self-interested move since they have come to rely on Ukrainian labour.

Did Kursk ‘Invasion’ Derail Partial Ceasefire?

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‘Negotiations with Ukraine are excluded’ - Lavrov

The Washington Post is claiming that prior to the Kursk incursion, Qatar was facilitating talks between Russia and Ukraine on a partial ceasefire that would have seen both sides refraining from attacks on energy infrastructure. If agreement had been reached on this, Ukraine may have made it through another winter. However, the Kursk incursion ended Russian interest in talks or so it is alleged. b from the MoA writes about this on 17th August. Maria Zakharova has denied that any such negotiations have taken place regarding strikes on infrastructure. I have to say that I find it hard to believe that the Russians would negotiate with Ukraine but it is possible that Zakharova was not in the loop or maybe she has been asked to deny the claims.

b from the MoA explored this issue in an article (19th August). It is possible, he says, that the UK became involved in the Kursk incursion without US approval (in order to lengthen the war) and that revelations about the Qatar talks were made by the US as a slap on the wrist to the UK and Ukraine. But I’m not convinced that the Qatar talks took place. The allegations/revelations of Ukrainian involvement in Nord Stream that came from the Germans may have been ordered by the US for the same reason. But b points out that it is not credible that the US did not know about the incursion - and I agree. If the UK were able to act independently of the US, this would say much about American leadership in this crisis or the crisis of American leadership. But I am convinced that the UK acted - as always - on US instructions. Of course, I could be wrong. Simplicius provides some detailed analysis here.

Sergei Lavrov has made it clear that: ‘After the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the Kursk region, negotiations with Ukraine are excluded’.

Ukraine To Create Buffer Zone In Kursk

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Proposed wall for the ‘buffer zone’ - but will it ever be built?

If you have failed miserably in all the objectives you claim to have been aiming at - and wish to avoid criticism and ridicule, all you need do is change your objectives. This is what the once great Z, wishing to be great again, has done. Forget about the Kursk NPP, forget about pulling Russian troops from the Donbass and so on: the real purpose of the costly Kursk offensive was to create a buffer zone - which is something Zelensky believes is a legitimate and achievable objective towards which he can reasonably ask the West for money and materiel. I wonder, does anyone believe him?

Z Criticises Britain

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I really need to smash Russian supermarkets, pal - you know, squash them like that.

Zelensky has become very critical of Britain for refusing permission to use its Stormshadows to attack Russian territory - according to a Ukrainian source. It seems that sleepy Joe Biden hasn’t yet given his permission. RT reports on the matter here.

UK Trained Kursk Terrorists

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Ukrainian troops in the UK - greeted by the king. Fascist sympathies are not unheard of in the Windsor family.

British newspaper the Times has reported that Ukrainian soldiers were trained in Britain to assault high rise buildings in preparation for the Kursk attack - according to RT.

Kursk NPP Could Be Attacked

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Russian intelligence services claim to have evidence that an attack on the Kursk Nuclear Plant is being planned. This is quite scary because such an attack could result in another Chernobyl. You can read more at RT. By way of reassurance, they say that the plant is well protected by air defence.

Alex Christoforou made an interesting observation in this connection when he criticised the IAEA for failing to see that ‘Ukraine is trying to cause a nuclear meltdown’. And that is a very real possibility - though I believe Russian air defences are up to it - cross fingers.

<snip>

Plots Thicken

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Poroshenko - part of a power struggle?

Ukrainian Telegram Channel rezident is reporting that Rada Minister and former PM Petro Poroshenko is preparing a campaign against Zelensky and Yermak accusing them of betraying the country by opening the Kursk offensive thereby allowing the Russians to conquer the Donbass. Another Ukrainian source claims that Zelensky will deny that Kursk was his idea and blame it all on Syrsky. It is also claimed that Zelensky ordered the offensive to make sure that negotiations would not take place. In that sense, he has been successful.

Bezuglaya Still Chasing Syrsky

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I reported some weeks ago that Rada deputy Mariana Bezuglaya (pictured) was being very critical of General Syrsky and it appears that the Kursk operation has given her the opportunity to dig the knife in a little deeper.

Our units are withdrawing from the parts of the DPR that are under the control of Kiev, leaving the entire front lines at the mercy of fate. Ammunition is not being delivered there and the Russians are passing through empty fortification. It seems as if we are giving Donetsk region away.

Toretsk and Pokrovsk will soon yield and it’s all Syrsky’s fault, she said. She is not alone in believing that the Donbass will fall once the Russians capture Pokrovsk. Some Ukrainians are not optimistic that Pokrovsk can hold out and reports of manpower/equipment shortages and refuseniks are multiplying.

The People Fight Back

Ivano-Frankovsk

The people of Ivano-Frankovsk (West of Kiev) are fighting back against mobilisation by blocking the road in front of a bus carrying ‘recruits’ to the Ukrainian Hades. You can see some brief footage here if you have Telegram.

Ternopil

In Ternopil, the TCC attempted to kidnap a man but local people intervened, saving the man from almost certain death/mutilation. You can see some footage here courtesy of legitimniy. The Ukrainians are saying that such incidents have become commonplace.

Kiev

On the 22nd August, Kiev residents blocked the streets and demanded that their men be returned from the front. You can see some footage here. Many troops have not been rotated in over a year. On the 23rd August, a Ukrainian soldier’s care was burned down. You can see footage here.

Ukraine Bans Canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church

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St. Michael’s Cathedral - Kiev

This church is closely associated with the Russian Orthodox Church so the Ukrainian parliament voted to ban it by 322 votes to 265. Maria Zakharova said that this amounts to the beginning of the end for Christian Orthodoxy in Ukraine. According to one report, this law breaks articles 11, 24 and 35 of the constitution. You can read more detail here. The move has attracted criticism from many Christians - especially in Italy.

Tuberculosis in Ukrainian Army
A Ukrainian source has reported that TB is becoming a huge problem in the army, due in part to the practice of sending sick people to the front. The situation is expected to get worse in the autumn.

Ukraine Taking Hostages in Kursk
I have seen a number of reports of Ukrainian forces taking civilian hostages in Kursk region. You can see some footage here. The Ukrainians who filmed themselves taking hostages were later captured and subjected to re-education by Chechen troops as you can see here. Some hostages have been taken to Sumy, according to this report.

Ukraine Food Prices to Rise in Fall
A Ukrainian source has warned that food prices will rise considerably this autumn with bread rising by 40%. Some commodities will rise by 50%.

(Much more at link,)

https://robcampbell.substack.com/p/ukra ... update-1b0

******

Kursk: Fighting Russia to the Last Ukrainian
Posted by Internationalist 360° on August 24, 2024
Brian Berletic

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Kursk: Fighting Russia to the Last Ukrainian In the lead up to the Ukrainian military’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, even Western headlines were dominated by reports of Ukraine’s gradual demise. Ukraine is admittedly suffering arms and ammunition shortages, as well as facing an unsolvable manpower crisis. Russia has been destroying Ukrainian military power faster than Ukraine and its Western sponsors can reconstitute it.

Western headlines have also been admitting the scale on which Russia is expanding its own military power as its Special Military Operation (SMO) continues into its third year.

While the launch of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk has diverted attention away from Ukraine’s collapsing fighting capacity, the incursion itself has not only failed to address the factors leading to this collapse, it is already accelerating it.

Politico in an August 15, 2024 article titled, “As Kyiv makes gains in Kursk, Russia strikes back in Donetsk,” cites the spokesman of Ukraine’s 110th Mechanized Brigade who would admit, “since Ukraine launched the Kursk offensive I would say things have become worse in our part of the front. We have been getting even less ammo than before, and the Russians are pushing.”

The same article would also cite “Deep State,” a mapping project Politico claims is “close” to Ukraine Ministry of Defense, claiming, “over the past 24 hours, Russia occupied the villages of Zhelanne and Orlivka and made advances in New York, Krasnohorivka, Mykolaivka and Zhuravka in Donetsk.”

Thus, while Ukraine claims gains in Kursk, it comes at the expense of territory everywhere else along the line of contact.

Because of the nature of the fighting in Kursk where Ukrainian forces have come out from behind extensive defensive lines and are operating out in the open, they are suffering much greater losses than Ukrainian units being pushed back along the line of contact, according to even the Western media.

Superficial Success, Strategic Suicide

Despite this reality, the Western media has invested heavily in depicting Ukraine’s Kursk incursion as a turning point in the fighting.
CNN in its August 15, 2024 article, “Russia appears to have diverted several thousand troops from occupied Ukraine to counter Kursk offensive, US officials say,” attempts at first glance to portray the Ukrainian operation as having successfully diverted Russian forces from the front lines.

Buried deeper in the article, however, CNN reveals that whatever troops Russia is moving are relatively insignificant compared to the number of Russian forces still fighting along the line of contact primarily in Kherson, Zaporozhye, the Donbass, and Kharkov.

In the short-term, experienced forces utilized as a mobile reserve are likely being moved to Kursk until Russian reserves within Russia itself can be sufficiently mobilized and moved to the area of fighting. The vast majority of Russia’s forces not only remain along the actual line of contact, they continue making progress at an accelerated rate.

The same CNN article would quote US officials, saying:

Some officials also raised concerns that Ukraine, which one western official said has sent some of its more experienced forces into Kursk, may have created weaknesses along its own frontlines that Russia may be able to exploit to gain more ground inside Ukraine.

“It’s impressive from a military point of view,” the official said of the Kursk operation. But Ukraine is “committing pretty experienced troops to this, and they can’t afford to lose those troops.”

“And having diverted them from the front line creates opportunities for Russia to seize advantage and break through,” this person added.

Buried under optimistic headlines across the Western media regarding this latest incursion is an ominous truth – that an operation aimed at humiliating Russia, boosting morale, and raising the political, territorial, and military costs for Russia, has only brought Ukraine deeper into its growing arms, ammunition, and manpower crisis.

Toward what end does an incursion accelerating the collapse of Ukraine’s fighting capacity serve?



Washington’s, Not Kiev’s Ends

CNN would also attempt to convince readers that the Kursk incursion took the US itself entirely by surprise. This is untrue.

The United States, following its political capture of Ukraine in 2014, admittedly took over Ukraine’s intelligence networks. These are the same networks that would have been required to organize this most recent incursion.

A New York Times article, “The Spy War: How the C.I.A. Secretly Helps Ukraine Fight Putin,” not only admits to the CIA’s role in training, shaping, and directing Ukrainian intelligence operations, but also admits to a network of CIA bases along the Ukrainian-Russian border and the fact that the CIA stood up covert military units specifically for crossing over into Russian territory and conducting operations there.

The CIA and other US military and intelligence agencies have been involved in Ukrainian military operations leading up to and all throughout the duration of Russia’s SMO. The Washington Post admits that the US worked with Ukraine to “build a campaign plan” ahead of the failed 2023 Ukrainian offensive.

It is inconceivable Ukraine moved multiple brigades of manpower and equipment, including US-European trained soldiers and Western military equipment to Sumy where the Kursk incursion was launched without Washington’s involvement, let alone without Washington’s knowledge.

Why then did the US organize such an incursion, one admittedly overstretching Ukrainian forces already crumbling under the growing weight of Russian military power? Why, amid Russia’s strategy of attrition, have US planners decided to launch an incursion that will accelerate the loss of Ukrainian manpower, arms, and ammunition it does not have to spare?

In a much wider geopolitical context – Washington’s geopolitical context – the incursion helps raise the cost of victory for Russia in Ukraine as the US seeks to place pressure on and overextend Russia elsewhere within and along its borders.

Years before the SMO even began, as far back as at least 2019, US policymakers openly sought to draw Russia into a costly conflict in Ukraine, just one among many other proposals meant to overextend Russia.

The RAND Corporation in its 2019 paper “Extending Russia” would explain the benefits of “providing lethal aid to Ukraine,” stating:

Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. More Russian aid to the separatists and an additional Russian troop presence would likely be required, leading to larger expenditures, equipment losses, and Russian casualties. The latter could become quite controversial at home, as it did when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk has – at a minimum – raised the political cost of Russia’s ongoing SMO. This most recent incursion into Kursk almost certainly had hoped to reach the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, just 35 kilometers beyond the furthest extent the incursion has reached as of this writing. Had Ukrainian forces reached the power plant, the price would have been even higher.

In many ways, however, the Kursk incursion has created a much greater strategic dilemma for Ukraine that it has for Russia. While it has unfolded on the wrong side of the border, the outcome is the same as the Kharkov front Russia opened earlier this year.

Regarding the Kharkov front, the New York Times in its May 2024 article, “Facing Russian Advance, a Top Ukrainian General Paints a Bleak Picture,” would admit, “the Russian attacks in the northeast are intended to stretch Ukraine’s already thin reserves of soldiers and divert them from fighting elsewhere,” and that, “the Ukrainian army was trying to redirect troops from other front-line areas to shore up its defenses in the northeast, but that it had been difficult to find the personnel.”

By committing thousands of Ukrainian troops and large amounts of Ukraine’s best military equipment to an incursion into Kursk, it is creating the same overextension of its own forces Russia had created in Kharkov last May, but with the added complication of needing to extend logistics and other means of supporting Ukrainian operations beyond Ukrainian territory itself.

The same RAND Corporation paper proposing to draw Russia into a costly conflict with Ukraine would also discuss the consequences this conflict would have for Ukraine itself, explaining:

…such a move might also come at a significant cost to Ukraine and to U.S. prestige and credibility. This could produce disproportionately large Ukrainian casualties, territorial losses, and refugee flows. It might even lead Ukraine into a disadvantageous peace.

The plan from the very beginning was to lure Russia into a costly conflict in the hopes of precipitating a Soviet-style collapse, but at the expense of Ukraine’s own survival. Thus, what we see unfolding in Ukraine today is simply the consequences predicted by the RAND Corporation in 2019.

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Pope Francis, Aug. 2024. Photo: X/ @Malek65At

August 25, 2024 Hour: 9:23 am

‘Let those who want to pray do so in the church they consider their own,’ he said.
On Sunday, Pope Francis demanded that no Christian church be abolished “directly or indirectly” in Ukraine following the approval of a law that prohibits ties with the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate.

“Churches must not be touched,” declared the Argentine pontiff after the recitation of the Sunday Angelus from the window of the Apostolic Palace.

Francis acknowledged before the faithful gathered in St. Peter’s Square that he continues to “follow with sorrow the fighting in Ukraine and the Russian Federation” and expressed his concern “for the freedom of those who pray” following “the recently approved regulations in Kyiv.”

“Anyone who truly prays, prays for everyone. No harm is done by praying, and if someone commits harm against their people, they will be guilty of that, but they cannot have done wrong by praying. Therefore, let those who want to pray do so in the church they consider their own… Please, let no Christian church be suppressed directly or indirectly. Churches must not be touched,” Francis said.


Zelensky signs law threatening ban of Ukraine’s largest Christian church

The bill outlaws any religious organizations considered to have ties to Moscowhttps://t.co/sqwWZ04btB pic.twitter.com/9i2VBxhl7W

— RT (@RT_com) August 25, 2024
On August 20, the Ukrainian Parliament approved a law that prohibits the operation of religious organizations with strong ties to Russia, paving the way for a possible ban on the activities of the Orthodox Church.

The law will come into effect 30 days after the Parliament publishes the text. From that moment, parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate will have a period of nine months to sever ties with the Russian Orthodox Church.

The goal of the Ukrainian authorities is to advance what has been termed “Spiritual Independence” and cut ties with Patriarch Kirill, who yesterday appealed to Pope Francis for support for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

President Volodymyr Zelensky, however, views the church linked to Moscow as an appendage of the Kremlin aimed at weakening the Ukrainian cause and promoting pro-Russian ideology.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/pope-fra ... n-ukraine/

(File under 'Plausible Deniability'. Proly been in the Jesuit Game Plan for the last 400 years at least...)

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The Czech President Shared Some Interesting Insight Into The Ukrainian Conflict

Andrew Korybko
Aug 26, 2024

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Pavel’s former high-ranking position in NATO imbues him with deep insight into Western military-strategic thinking, which is why his interview is worth reviewing.

Czech President Petr Pavel, who previously served as the Chair of the NATO Military Committee and is among the bloc’s staunchest anti-Russian hawks, was recently interviewed about the Ukrainian Conflict. Some of what he said has already made headlines, such as his defense of the Nord Stream bombing and proposal to let Ukraine join NATO without first regaining control of its pre-2014 borders, but other parts of his interview that weren’t widely reported are pretty important too. Here are the top five takeaways:

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* Pipelines, And by Extension Other Infrastructure, Are Legitimate Targets

Pavel’s defense of the Nord Stream bombing was predicated on his explicitly stated view that “Product pipelines have always been and will be a target because they have the potential to influence the conflict in one direction or another.” Extrapolating from this, it can therefore be said that suspected acts of Russian sabotage in Europe against military-industrial and other targets are also legitimate for that same reason related to influencing the course of the conflict, though the West will never acknowledge this.

* Unspecified Russian Partners Are Allegedly Arming Ukraine In Secret

It was earlier reported that Pakistan and Sudan, whose relations with Russia could become strategic if an energy and naval base deal are respectively clinched, are among the countries that are allegedly arming Ukraine in secret. Although Pavel didn’t namedrop them, he still claimed that some Russian partners are indeed involved in this trade but don’t want to ruin their ties, which is why he rejected his interlocutor’s request to release more information about the ammo that Czechia is procuring from abroad for Ukraine.

* The Ukrainian Conflict Might Continue Raging For A Few More Years

Pavel is of the opinion that the Ukrainian Conflict won’t end for at least a few more years when both sides supposedly realize that neither is capable of achieving their maximum objectives. The US, the EU, and China could then make significant contributions to the peace process. This reveals that the West expects a prolonged conflict, the peace process will be internationalized to an extent, and China has a role to play in that regard, with the innuendo being that the West expects it to pressure Russia.

* The West Already Knows That A Compromise Of Some Sort Is Inevitable

The prior rhetoric about Ukraine’s maximum victory that characterized the first year and a half before its failed counteroffensive was conspicuously absent from Pavel’s interview and replaced with him explaining why a so-called “just peace” is an “illusion” in his words. He instead expects that “we will very likely be talking about Russia occupying a part of Ukrainian territory for a long time”, with the West’s aim only being for “Ukraine to liberate as much of its territory as possible” before peace talks resume.

* The West German Precedent For Joining NATO Could Be Applied To Ukraine

The most significant part of Pavel’s interview was when he explained how the West German precedent of joining NATO without first restoring control over the borders that it claims as its own could be applied towards Ukraine in the event that the conflict freezes. The only real difference that this would make after the slew of “security guarantees” that Ukraine reached with NATO states though is that it could – but wouldn’t automatically – lead to them dispatching troops if hostilities with Russia were to re-erupt.

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Pavel’s former high-ranking position in NATO imbues him with deep insight into Western military-strategic thinking, which is why his interview was worth reviewing. It wasn’t a surprise that he defended the Nord Stream bombing or expects the conflict to last a few more years, but few could have foreseen that he’d admit that a compromise is inevitable and then propose the West German precedent for Ukraine joining NATO. Russia must therefore be careful that future talks don’t make this a fait accompli.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-czec ... nteresting
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Tue Aug 27, 2024 11:31 am

The Russian response
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/27/2024

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“Ignoring Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk, Russian regiments still set their sights on a big Ukrainian prize,” Forbes headlined on Sunday , referring to Krasnoarmeysk in an article that, like many others, insists that Russia is sacrificing part of Kursk for Donbass while Ukraine is sacrificing Donbass for Kursk. Despite the international media mockery of Ukraine controlling part of a Russian region, Moscow appears to have chosen to go ahead with the plan and not change its priorities. “Recent Russian advances east of Pokrovsk, northwest of Donetsk, should sound an alarm in Kiev,” the American outlet insists, adding that “on Friday, Russian infantry entered Novohrodivka, 11 kilometers east of Pokrovsk.” Since then, advances at Novogrodovka, as well as on other axes of the semicircular advance from Ocheretino, have not only continued, but seemingly accelerated, especially compared to the slow speed at which the Donbass front has moved these past few years. “Pokrovsk sits astride the main Ukrainian supply lines west of Donetsk. After weeks of steady Russian advances, the city is increasingly in danger,” Forbes assumes of the situation in Krasnoarmeysk. Since then, the situation has worsened further for Ukraine, and as the article admits, “not even the Ukrainian army’s elite 47th Mechanized Brigade, with its two dozen surviving M-1 Abrams tanks, has been able to stop the Russian advance.”

Given the certainty that battle is approaching and the city's fate could be that of Artyomovsk or Chasov Yar, as various media outlets reported last week, not all the population is willing to leave their homes. A CNN article, for example, last Friday referred to families who are hiding their children, claiming that they have already been evacuated, in order to avoid the mandatory evacuation order for minors. On Saturday, Al Jazeera also referred to the part of the population that is not considering leaving the city. In addition to those people, especially the elderly, who have nowhere to go or who, due to lack of mobility, cannot even consider it, the article refers, in a somewhat insulting way, to those who have chosen to remain in the city awaiting the Russian troops. “While many pro-Ukrainian youth have not left and are hoping that Mykolaivka will hold, the pro-Moscow crowd is emboldened by the advance of the Russian troops,” writes the article about one of the Donbass towns that the front is increasingly approaching.

Giving voice only to Ukrainian voices speaking from a distance – from Kiev – the outlet quotes the partner of a soldier as saying that “they say I don’t understand, that the oligarchs are to blame, that Ukraine is not a nation and never was.” The same interlocutor adds that “the older ones keep talking about the Soviet Union, that it was better, that everyone worked better, that people lived better. And that Ukraine ruined everything.” “They give long, quasi-racist, caricatured descriptions of irrational old people who remember the Soviet Union and watch Russian television, but they never try to talk to them to make a comment,” commented Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko, annoyed by the way in which more than questionable arguments – the idea that Ukraine is not a nation is particularly hard to believe as a common conversation – are used to define a part of the population of Donbass. However, caricature is the easiest way to explain a conflict that is full of nuances, but which requires a certain knowledge of what has happened in the last ten years. The idea of ​​a population blinded by Russian propaganda and unable to accept reality has persisted since 2014 and has been maintained over time as a protective shield to avoid seeing the internal civil conflict at the heart of the war that broke out ten years ago.

Ignoring what happened at the time, with a significant part of the population demonstrating and even taking up arms against the coup in Kiev and the nationalist drift that Ukraine had taken, also makes it easier to present the current war as a fight between good and evil. For example, yesterday, LFI and France24 correspondent in Ukraine Emmanuelle Chaze wrote a “reminder that the whole ‘this is revenge for the Kursk raids’ narrative is a Kremlin narrative. Russia has bombed Ukraine constantly for the past two and a half years, and its eastern regions for more than ten years. This is not a reprisal, but gratuitous destruction and terror.” Magically, Ukraine does not have to bear even a part of the blame for that war – launched by an anti-terrorist operation to resolve a political problem by military means – nor, of course, for the Ukrainian bombings that did not stop on the front line even during a ceasefire.

The French journalist was referring in her post to the drone and missile attack, a hundred of each according to the Ukrainian president, with which Russia resumed its campaign aimed at undermining Ukraine's electrical and industrial production capacities. Emmanuelle Chaze is not wrong in her assessment that yesterday's attack, which according to Ukrainian sources caused four deaths - a remarkably low number considering that it was one of the largest missile attacks in recent months - was not a retaliation for the Ukrainian adventure in Kursk but the continuation of something that had been paralyzed by the possibility of a negotiation. Unlike in 2022, this year Moscow had begun to attack not only the electricity distribution infrastructure, but its production, something that has already caused numerous problems for the civilian population and threatens to worsen as winter approaches and energy demand increases. The Russian objective is to paralyze industry, primarily military, which cannot produce in the absence of energy. However, the clearest consequences are the restrictions on the population, which is already suffering periodic power cuts that will worsen as more infrastructure is destroyed. However, Chaze agrees with the theory put forward yesterday by Zelensky's entourage that a gratuitous attack was used to ignore the fact that what happened yesterday could have been avoided. That was what was sought in the talks between Kiev and Moscow that were to be held with the mediation of Qatar and that have been postponed indefinitely due to the Ukrainian adventure in Kursk and the resumption of attacks against the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. Between negotiation and escalation, Ukraine consciously chose the latter despite knowing that the partial ceasefire that was sought was specifically to protect the electricity production infrastructure.

Yesterday, after the attack, Mikhail Podolyak, who saw “unconditionally genocidal intentions” in the attack, wrote that “if someone is still willing to talk about negotiating with the Putin collective entity , it means that such attacks are acceptable under international law and can go unpunished.” After acting in a way that made negotiation impossible, Ukraine is now using the foreseeable consequences to reject any kind of diplomacy – a childish attitude that is, however, accepted by the media without adding the context of the negotiations that never took place.

Yesterday’s attack has also been used by Volodymyr Zelensky and Mikhail Podolyak for their campaign of demands. Once again, the Ukrainian president insisted that his allies act in the same way as the United States, the United Kingdom and France did in defending Israel from Iranian missiles, while the adviser to the Office of the President insisted on the need to obtain Western permission to attack any point in the Russian Federation “so that Russia cannot reproduce ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles.” Ukraine does not hide that it aspires to destroy Russian industry and demands Western weapons to do so, using both the argument of its successes in Kursk and its defensive shortcomings. That is the objective of the Kursk mission, which is having good results: Ukraine already knows that it has the green light from its allies for a ground attack on Russia and aspires to achieve another milestone. On Sunday, the Washington Post , insisting that the United States was not aware of Ukraine’s plans — a questionable claim given the presence of intelligence and ties between the two countries — claimed that “the Pentagon has asked the Ukrainians what they need to make its gamble successful” and raised the possibility that bi-monthly arms shipments could be modified to include the material Ukraine deems necessary for its Russian adventure. Washington says it has not provided Kiev with intelligence for the offensive, but the White House appears willing to provide the means by which Ukraine can achieve its objectives on this front, which has proven to be the priority.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/27/30457/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad

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❗️On the possible plans of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kherson direction

Continuing the topic of a possible offensive by Ukrainian formations in the south of the country, the enemy command is focusing not only on Zaporizhia, but also on the Kherson direction - it is there that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been hatching plans for a new landing operation for a long time.

At the same time, unlike the previous plans - the establishment and holding of a bridgehead in the same Krynki - the new plan of the Ukrainian leadership is much more daring, albeit, frankly speaking, suicidal. Nevertheless, against the background of general failures in other areas of the front, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are ready to take risks, regardless of losses.

As in the neighboring Zaporizhia direction, satellite reconnaissance assets are actively working in the interests of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, filming air defense position areas, potential locations of headquarters and possible landing sites for both boat and helicopter landings.

At the same time, in Odessa, personnel and BEKs are being accumulated for the future operation. Only in open sources there are hundreds of unmanned boats and UAVs, in reality their number may approach a thousand (it is worth considering that there have been no massive strikes by UAVs for a long time, so the Ukrainian Armed Forces have certainly managed to accumulate them).

The enemy is considering the possibility of a combined attack with drones and UAVs on Crimea, as well as on objects on the Tendrovskaya and Kinburnskaya spits. Judging by the plan, they will be followed by a boat landing in several places with a subsequent attempt to expand the control zone.

Another stage of the plan involves the landing of several sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the area of ​​large settlements in the south of the region with the aim of attacking headquarters for the general disorganization of command. One of such areas may be the Zhelezny Port - Lazurnoe - Skadovsk line (if we assess the security of the coastline as a whole, then this option certainly cannot be ruled out).

As for the Dnieper island zone, a repeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' operations following the example of Krynki and Kazachiy Lagery is unlikely - according to incoming information, Russian servicemen confidently hold a significant part of the islands, while the Ukrainian command is preparing for an offensive on the spits.

At the same time, the probable losses do not particularly worry the leadership of the so-called Ukraine. Moreover, even several hundred members of the Ukrainian formations will be enough to "cause some noise" until the moment of blocking.

And given the problems of the local group of the Russian Armed Forces and in the event of a combination of the operation with the beginning of the offensive in the Zaporizhia region, the situation may take on a much more threatening character. This is exactly what the Ukrainian command is counting on.

At the same time, the fact that some enemy plans are being gossiped about in almost every smoking room in the south of Russia does not rule out a deliberate leak of information about preparations for an offensive. Everyone is on alert, the danger level is heightened for a certain number of days, and in the end nothing will happen. But when everyone relaxes, it will be possible to bring the plan into reality.

***

Colonelcassad

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❗️Kursk direction: Fighting in Korenevsky and Sudzhansky districts, new attempts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to advance

Fighting continues in the Kursk region, Ukrainian formations continue their attacks, while simultaneously transferring reinforcements to the region.

In the Glushkovsky district, the situation remains tense, Ukrainian formations continue to strike military and civilian vehicles with UAVs. At the same time, no attempts to violate the state border have been recorded so far.

In the Korenevsky district, fighting continues in the area of ​​Komarovka, and in the area of ​​the neighboring settlements of Vishnevka, Snagost and Apananasovka, according to statements by the Russian Defense Ministry, strikes were carried out on Ukrainian Armed Forces positions.

Taking into account reports of new attempts by Ukrainian formations to attack Komarovka and Krasnooktyabrskoye, the settlements to the east are under the confident control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A similar situation is developing in the Viktorovka area. In addition, information is being received about the presence of the enemy in Byakhovo and Vnezapnoye, but so far there is no confirmation of this.

In the area of ​​Korenevo itself and in the neighboring Olgovka-Kremyanoye area, fighting is underway, the enemy is trying to advance in small groups. According to incoming information, some time ago, Ukrainian formations established control over Matveyevka. At the same time, the situation in the Zhuravli area and to the north remains unclear, at least enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups were spotted there earlier, and there were no reports of a cleanup.

In the Sudzhansky district, Ukrainian formations also tried to attack in the area of ​​Malaya Loknya and Pogrebki, but without much success. At the same time, according to the Ministry of Defense, a strike was carried out on Ukrainian Armed Forces positions in the area of ​​Novaya Sorochina and Kruglenky.

Another attack was thwarted in the Nechayev area of ​​the Bolshesoldatsky district, where the enemy maintains a presence to the southwest of the settlement and has entrenched itself in the nearby forest. In addition, information appeared in the media about the liberation of the settlement of Nizhnyaya Parovaya, however, no one had previously reported the capture of the village by the enemy.

In addition, based on objective control footage, another enemy armored group was subjected to several attacks to the east of Malaya Loknya.

In addition, information about Cherkasskoye Porechny, in the area of ​​which several attacks were previously repelled, has become somewhat clearer. Based on footage that has appeared online, the settlement is currently under enemy control. At the same time, UAV and artillery strikes are being carried out on the Ukrainian Armed Forces infantry.

Fighting is also underway in Borki and Spalnoye. Despite ongoing attempts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to attack, no progress has been recorded here, however, there are no reports of the liberation of settlements.

***

Forwarded from
War on fakes
The Russian Armed Forces carried out a series of pinpoint strikes on military and infrastructure facilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A series of targeted attacks on facilities belonging to or supporting Ukrainian militants was carried out using cruise missiles launched from the air and sea, as well as UAVs.

🟢An air raid alert has been declared throughout Ukraine;

🟢Power outages have occurred across the country, and many areas are experiencing water supply disruptions;

🟢Pinpoint strikes were carried out on Ukrainian Armed Forces ammunition depots, radar stations, temporary personnel deployment points, air defense facilities and airfields;

🟢More than 40 energy facilities were affected, including in the Kyiv, Odessa, Nikolaev, Vinnytsia regions and Lviv;

🟢More missiles are reported to have reached their targets than before, which is attributed to Ukraine's air defense shortage;

🟢Eyewitnesses write about explosions in the area of ​​the Zhulyany airport in Kyiv. It was previously claimed that the American Patriot air defense system is based there;

🟢In the Ivano-Frankivsk region, an airfield was hit, where F-16 fighters were presumably located;

🟢Ukrainian Energy Minister German Galushchenko reported that the energy sector is in a “difficult” situation following a massive missile attack;

🟢Due to power outages on railway infrastructure, commuter train delays are being observed in various regions.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google translator

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KURSK, BELGOROD, BRYANSK — IS PRESIDENT PUTIN PREPARING FOR ISTANBUL-II?

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by John Helmer, Moscow @bears_with

Remember the old adage — sticks and stones will break my bones but words will never harm me.

In the war by the US and its Anglo-European allies to destroy Russia since 1945, the propaganda war has been lost by the Russians many times over. That war is still being lost.

But for the first time since 1945, the battlefield war is being won by the Russian General Staff.

The uncertainty which remains is whether President Vladimir Putin will continue to restrict the General Staff’s war plans in order that Putin can go to negotiations with the Americans on terms which will forego the demilitarization and denazification of the Ukrainian territory between Kiev and the Polish border, and concede to the Kiev regime unhindered control of the cities to the east — Kharkov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk.

Call those terms Istanbul-II. As with the draft terms initialled in Istanbul at the end of March 2022, Istanbul-II amounts to an exchange of dominant Russian military power for US and Ukrainian signatures on paper with false intention and temporary duration.

The US administration says it believes Putin will concede. It also believes that by staging its war of pinpricks — that’s the drone, artillery and missile barrages fired by the Ukrainian military, directed by the US and UK – in the Black Sea and Russia’s western border regions, Putin’s red lines and threats of retaliation are exposed as empty bluff. The same interpretation of Putin, and confidence that he will accept US terms, are the foundation of the Ukraine “peace plan” of Donald Trump’s advisors. The Trump plan’s offer of “some limited sanctions relief” reflects the conviction in Washington that Putin’s oligarch constituency can be bribed to push Putin into the same “frozen war” concessions as Roman Abramovich got Putin to accept at Istanbul-I – until the General Staff stopped them both.

Putin’s restrictions on the General Staff’s proposals for neutralizing the US and British air surveillance and electronic warfare operations; and his orders to stand by while the Ukrainians have assembled several thousand forces, first to cross into Kursk, and then into Bryansk and Belgorod, are now as visible in Moscow as they have been in Washington.

Moscow sources believe it was the Kremlin which was taken by surprise by the Kursk attack on August 6, but not the General Staff and the military intelligence agency GRU. They understood the battlefield intelligence as it was coming in and requested Putin’s agreement to respond. In retrospect, they say “we told you so”; they imply their hands were tied by the Kremlin orders.

“My understanding for now,” says one of the sources, “is that these are pinpricks that feel painful but they are not life threatening. Russia will not take any land, for now, other than the four regions. It should be the eight regions but it’s obvious Putin doesn’t have the will and the military does not have the capacity to hold. So we will see Ukrainians inside Kursk for a while. But it should be downplayed because it should not be allowed to be a bargain chip in negotiations the other side is aiming at.”

Putin said this himself, the source points out at his meeting on August 12 with the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, and others. “These [Kursk] actions clearly aim to achieve a primary military objective: to halt the advance of our forces in their effort to fully liberate the territories of the Lugansk and Donetsk people’s republics, the Novorossiya region.” Putin also said: “It is now becoming increasingly clear why the Kiev regime rejected our proposals for a peaceful settlement, as well as those from interested and neutral mediators…. It seems the opponent is aiming to strengthen their negotiating position for the future. However, what kind of negotiations can we have with those who indiscriminately attack civilians and civilian infrastructure, or pose threats to nuclear power facilities? What is there to discuss with such parties?”

“It’s obvious at this point,” comments a military source, “that the Americans and Ukrainians have decided that Putin will come to terms if they snatch enough Russian territory and keep up their strikes behind the Russian lines…The Ukrainians are going for broke in the north while the centre collapses. But they know, no matter how expensive it is, the longer they remain on the attack, the worse it looks for the Russian leadership. They also have the measure of Putin who gives orders for half measures.”

This is also obvious in the Security Council in Moscow. The Council’s deputy secretary, ex-president Dmitri Medvedev, made the point explicitly in his Telegram account declaration on August 21, implying that until he had said it, no one else dared: “In my opinion, recently, even theoretically, there has been one danger – the negotiation trap, into which our country could fall under certain circumstances; for example. Namely, the early unnecessary peace talks proposed by the international community and imposed on the Kiev regime with unclear prospects and consequences.” Medvedev was referring to Istanbul-I. “After the neo-Nazis committed an act of terrorism in the Kursk region, everything has fallen into place. The idle chatter of unauthorized intermediaries on the topic of the beautiful world has been stopped. Now everyone understands everything, even if they don’t say it out loud. They understand that there will BE NO MORE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE COMPLETE DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY! [Medvedev’s caps]”

Medvedev’s reference to the “idle chatter of unauthorized intermediaries” is to the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban, whom Putin endorsed at the Kremlin on July 5 for the ill-concealed purpose of sending a message to presidential candidate Trump with whom Orban talked on July 10. For that story, click.

Days before his meeting with Orban, Putin had announced his abandonment of the demilitarization, denazification objectives of the Special Military Operation in exchange for “the complete withdrawal of all Ukrainian troops from the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics and from the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions.”

This change of objective has not yet been acknowledged by the Kremlin media; it is opposed by the Russian military and by the majority of Russian voters. “War is war — either we go to war or surrender” – is a popular slogan on Russian social media for Putin to stop restricting the General Staff.

“The problem for the Russians,” comments a military source, “is that they, especially the Kremlin, the Defense Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry have lost the propaganda war. This puts them in a bad spot as they need more than stopping, then pushing the Ukrainians back in Kursk, or a Donbass victory, in order to recover. They need to knock the Ukrainians out of the war. But on that Putin says one thing — he does another.”

The Ukrainian border crossing began between 5 and 5:30 in the morning of August 6.

The first reports from the Defense Ministry in Moscow were false. On the afternoon of August 7, Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, in a public briefing of the president and other officials, claimed: “At 5.30 am on August 6, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine numbering up to 1,000 people went on the offensive with the aim of capturing a section of the territory of the Sudzha District in the Kursk Region. The joint actions by the state border covering units together with border guards and reinforcement units, air strikes, missile forces, and artillery fire stopped the enemy’s advance into the territory in the Kursk direction…We will complete the operation by defeating the enemy and reaching the state border.”

This Ukraine force count was much too low; their advance was not stopped; the restoration of the state border has not been achieved after three weeks of fighting. Either Gerasimov knew much better and was lying to Putin for public propaganda; or else he didn’t know what the true situation was.

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General Gerasimov (left) on video link reads his report to Putin seated with Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, Federal Security Service director Alexander Bortnikov and Sergei Shoigu, ex-Defense Minister and now Security Council head. The report had been edited by the Kremlin in advance which is why Gerasimov’s eyes did not stray from the script. Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/ -- at 16:48. Reported with a delay of three hours by Boris Rozhin on Colonel Cassad -- 20:08. Rozhin and his military sources were skeptical; Rozhin was told to stick to Gerasimov’s script. For as long as he could, he did.

The General Staff’s misdirections were repeated by the only independent Russian media sources not directly under state control – the military bloggers, the best of whom are Boris Rozhin (Colonel Cassad) and Mikhail Zvinchuk (Rybar). Rozhin tried to downplay the attack through the first day, relying on Defense Ministry and region official releases. Rozhin’s first report appeared at 10:12 on the morning of August 6: “The governor of the Kursk region reported an attempt by the enemy forces to break through on the territory of the region. The attack was carried out by limited forces and was repulsed. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the FSB did not allow the breakthrough of the enemy’s forces”. This was false.

Gerasimov’s report to Putin exposed himself, the General Staff, and the Defense Ministry to a round of allegations of incompetence and negligence which were published a week later by media under Kremlin control. These allegations include a failure by Russian intelligence to detect the concentration of Ukrainian forces in advance of the border crossing, and a personal failure by Gerasimov to “ignore several warnings about a Ukrainian buildup near the Kursk border. ” An anonymously sourced report by a non-Russian reporter with a record of plagiarism and fabrication claims to be based on “hawks in the siloviki apparatus [who] don’t make it a secret that Gerasimov should be fired” and replaced, the reporter claimed, by a combination of the discredited General Sergei Surovikin and the head of the Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov.

The campaign against Gerasimov also appears to be a defence of Putin’s advance knowledge and his operational orders to Gerasimov before August 6: “President Putin’s reaction to the Kursk invasion was visible in his body language. He was furious for the flagrant military/intel failure; for the obvious loss of face; and for the fact that this buries any possibility of rational dialogue about ending the war.”

Moscow sources explain these are Kremlin claims aimed at whitewashing Putin’s refusal to allow the General Staff to extend their operations into the Ukrainian Sumy region to break up the attack concentration in advance; and at concealing Putin’s purpose in preparing for the Istanbul-II negotiations. The sources also point out that the National Guard, the well-armed and highly mobile presidential force, has failed to appear in any role in the Kursk region, not even in defence of the predictable target of the Kurchatov nuclear power plant. The Guard commander, Victor Zolotov, Putin’s former bodyguard, did not appear in the Kremlin meetings on the Kursk operation until August 12, when he was at the bottom of the table on Putin’s right, sitting opposite Gerasimov; in the Kremlin record Zolotov had nothing to say.

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Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/

The seating arrangement reveals that on Putin’s right he had placed the four officials he has trusted to enforce the limits of military operations and protect Putin from the recriminations now arising – from left to right, Victor Zolotov; Emergencies Minister Alexander Kurenkov; General Alexei Dyumin, the former presidential bodyguard presidential and assistant whom Putin appointed six days into the operation to oversee the Kursk operations; and Sergei Shoigu, the ex-defense minister and currently Security Council head. On Putin’s left, there were Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin; Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Federal Security Service director Alexander Bortnikov, and General Gerasimov.

The sponsored attack on Gerasimov has not been repeated by the military bloggers, although they were slow to acknowledge the size of the attacking force, its breakthrough successes, the effectiveness of the US-Ukrainian electronic warfare systems, and the slowness of the Russian counter operations.

Through the first day Rozhin continued: “The attack was accompanied by massive use of drones and artillery fire. It looked like a demonstrative distraction with PR goals. As usual, it’s expensive… The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported that the Ukrainian DRG retreated to its territory, some of the militants who tried to gain a foothold from the Kursk state border, blocked by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation [17:54]…The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported that the Ukrainian DRG retreated to its territory, some of the militants who tried to gain a foothold from the Kursk state border, blocked by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. [19:19]… The purpose of this compound is to distract attention, to unload the pressure of our troops from Belgorod and impose a new small front [20:58]… due to the lack of personnel of objective control, it is difficult to establish the exact configuration of the front on these areas [20:59].”

Rozhin’s use of the Russian acronym DRG is revealing. It stands for Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group, meaning a hybrid of small units of scouts, special forces, and terrorists. The acronym had been used in reporting many Ukrainian incursions across the border for more than a year. Applied to the August 6 invasion of Kursk, this was false.

Just before midnight on August 6, Rozhin acknowledged the attack was far more serious. “a sufficiently large-scale operation, where the enemy is still using forces up to two brigades that are covered by a significant number of air defense systems (2 air defense systems were destroyed by our military in the afternoon) [23:27]” No precise number of Ukrainian forces was published.

Alexander Kots was claiming in a re-post by Rozhin: “According to the Big Soldier. The opposition today really tried there to act with the forces of a small armour group (up to 5 units of equipment) By the evening, the situation there was controlled by our military. War correspondent Kots and military sources from the spot confirm that the Big Soldier is behind us.” — 20:08 This was wishful thinking.

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War correspondents, left to right: Boris Rozhin, Mikhail Zvinchuk, Alexander Kots, Yevgeny Krutikov.

It was not until 13:38 of August 7 that Rozhin managed to report that the Ukrainian forces were moving into Kursk in large numbers at high speed. “Ukrainian formations continue to strike all over the whole Kursk region which is still under the most massive fire, especially at Sudzh… Meanwhile, in another part of the Sumy region, the concentration of enemy forces is observed in the forest areas near the village of Privole, east of Glukhov city.” If such a concentration was reportable on August 7, it is inconceivable that the General Staff was not aware of the concentration forty-eight hours earlier.

It was not until August 20 that an American military writer publishing with the pen name Big Serge after the tsarist minister, Sergei Witte (1849-1915), reported a comprehensive and also accurate summary of the positional and tactical operations on both sides. Both Gerasimov and Putin are protected in this account.

The alibi for the alleged Russian intelligence failure is tree cover. “The Ukrainian grouping was able to achieve something approximating total surprise – a fact that was surprising to many, given the ubiquity of Russian reconnaissance drones in theaters like the Donbas. In fact, the terrain here was highly conducive for Ukraine. The Ukrainian side of the border on the Sumy-Kursk axis is covered with a thick forest canopy which gives the Ukrainians the rare opportunity to conceal the staging of its forces, while the presence of the city of Sumy only 30 kilometers from the border provides a base of support. The situation is highly similar to Ukraine’s Kharkov operation in 2022 (the AFU’s most impressive achievement of the war), in which the city of Kharkov and the forest belt around it provided the opportunity to stage forces largely undetected. These opportunities do not exist in the flat, mostly treeless Ukrainian south, where Ukraine’s 2023 offensive was heavily surveilled and bombarded on approach.”

Russian war reporters familiar with the heat signatures of trees, and with Russian infra-red and other technologies used in the army’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), dismiss the alibi; believe there was ample advance warning; suspect command failure at the Kremlin, not the General Staff.

The Moscow analyst who is closest to the GRU, Yevgeny Krutikov, initially reported at 09:19 of August 6 that “in the morning, the situation on the state border sharply escalated in Kursk Region areas (Sudzha direction). The Ukrainian force went to the breach of the border using reserves. It is not yet clear whether it is a display of troops for the media PR, or a real attempt to divert Russian forces on to a new direction.” The next day, Krutikov claimed “the enemy has no serious tactical reserves. At night, the enemy suffered heavy losses in armoured vehicles, but still tried to adjust the maximum to the border. Geographical objective: Sudzh…Tactical goal: fixing on a piece of territory for PR.” Krutikov reported the “real number” of the Ukrainian invasion force was “900 men” [09:08]. Two days later, he admitted the number was “two brigades” – “by the weekend, they will lose two brigades, and then gradually Sumy. That area has already begun to be evacuated.”

On August 8 Krutikov decided “on the third day of the invasion of the Kursk region, the plan of the Ukrainian offensive on this site became finally clarified…All this operation, although it has signs of combined-flying based on the number and composition of the forces involved, technically resembles a major raid or a powerful salvo or a breakout with an element of suicide. After three days of euphoria, the AFU [Armed Forces of the Ukraine] was on the verge of losing two strike brigades and in the future, part of the Sumy region. [This is] too expensive a price for the demonstration of the AFU’s ‘capacity’ and its pursuit of a ‘profitable position for negotiations.’ “

On August 9 Krutikov conceded “in the [battle] area, it is very bad with communication except for the military, so the assessment of operational information is delayed and does not accurately display the picture”. He had no situation reports to publish until August 12, but then Krutikov stopped publishing entirely for what he called “a technical break”. His blackout continued until August 20.

MAPPING THE COURSE OF THE KURSK OPERATIONS – AUGUST 6
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Source: Bild, republished by Russian milblogger The Militarist

TERRITORIAL MOVEMENT BY THE UKRAINIAN FORCES — AUGUST 6-20
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Source: Kommersant

CONCENTRATION OF NEW UKRAINIAN FORCES ALONG THE BRYANSK AND KURSK BORDER AS OF AUGUST 21
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Source: Military Summary blog, August 22.

It is noteworthy that according to the Military Summary, “33% of the Ukrainian army is now concentrated in this area – to force Putin to negotiations”. Precise numbers of men and equipment were not reported, nor a source for the estimate.

The Russian author of Military Summary has been virulently attacked by the Seattle-based Rusian emigré, Andrei Martyanov, a competing milbologger who calls Military Summary one of a “number of major Russian media who started pointing out to all those military ‘experts’ (how’s Dima from the Military Bullshit Summary doing? Is he in Russia?) as effectively propaganda outlets for own enrichment on hype based on outright fantasies or being straight TSIPSO [Center for Information and Psychological Operations of Ukraine, a unit of the Ukrainian Special Forces] assets.”

Martyanov began claiming on August 7 that the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk was a trap set by the Russian General Staff. “Russians actually love to have them more because obviously it’s much more difficult to get those guys out of their concrete bunkers than when they are in the open…Obviously, in the times of the modern ISR [Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance] – and Russia has very advanced ISR – it was all anticipated.” At that time, Martyanov denied there was a “massive attack”; he claimed there was only a single brigade – no numbers.

A day later, reporting an Su-34 heavy bombardment in the Sumy region, Martyanov said “the Russian military detected a fat target–a concentration of personnel and their armor worthy of visit of this lovely instrument of hell. My today’s video about this and more is coming. Did the General Staff have a plan? It increasingly looks like.”

After ten days of fighting in Kursk, on August 16, Martyanov reported his verification by retrospection. “We can get now the clear picture…what was expected is happening now. The first expectation was that they would be sucked in, because it was planned by people who do not understand what modern operations are, and that they would be sucked into this tactical surprise…So once it wears off, it will end up as it is ending up with this total annihilation of every single significant force or group which was streaming through the border of Russia.”

Another eight days of fighting later, on August 24, Martyanov celebrated the 81st anniversary of the Red Army victory over the Germans at the Battle of Kursk, July 5 to August 23, 1943. That carefully planned tactical operation, and strategic victory, were being repeated now on a smaller scale in Kursk by the General Staff, Martyanov implied.

Martyanov is an exceptionalist of the Russian variety. Exceptionalism is an ideology of superiority based on fabricated racial, ethnic, religious, financial, or other characteristics, employing fascist methods extending to genocide in the Turkish-Armenian, British-Indian, German-Jewish, and Israeli-Palestinian cases. In the US there is no exception to American exceptionaliasm – not in the pro-war parties, nor in the anti-war opposition, nor in the professoriat. In Russia, exceptionalism is based on the military — Martyanov’s case — the Church, the oligarchs.

Russian exceptionalists believe it is impossible for them to be deceived, defrauded, or defeated. (For American exceptionalists, it is the same.) And so to the US side, the record of steady escalation in US-Ukrainian cross-border operations over the fifteen months since May 23, 2023, signifies success at asymmetrical or hybrid warfighting; at the same time, on the Russian side, the record signifies suicidal failure at terrorism. For the distinction which the Kremlin insists on drawing between “terrorism” and “war”, read this.

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Source: https://acleddata.com/

On the map of the Russian border regions, this escalation has concentrated on Bryansk, Belgorod, and Kursk.

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Source: https://acleddata.com/

As the Russian analysts struggle to explain what has happened at Kursk, they have largely ignored the history illustrated in this chart and this map. In order to blame the regional administrations and scapegoat the governors, as the Kremlin has encouraged, the record of repeated requests to put the regions on a war footing in advance – not an anti-terrorism operation after the event – has been censored, along with the record of Putin’s temporizing, procrastination, and refusal. For Putin’s comparable form in responding to high-casualty coalmine accidents in Kemerovo region and to coke and steel plant pollution in Chelyabinsk, both of them caused by oligarch supporters of the president, click to read this and this.

Because Martyanov is based in the US, he has used his military reports to imply political blame at the level of the civilian regional administrations. “The best equipped Ukrainian (practically all of it fresh NATO hardware) and motivated troops, and NATO generals who planned this catastrophe for them, covered part (about 11-12 kilometers) of what is called the security zone, which was not prepared (why, we will know in a due time–administration of Kursk Oblast has a lot to answer for)…”

The national politician closest to the war front has carefully reversed the scapegoating down the command line, and at the same time held the Kremlin to account for its insistence on the war as an anti-terrorist operation. This is Dmitri Rogozin – at one time the civilian minister in charge of the military-industrial complex, a potential presidential successor, and currently senator for Zaporozhye . According to Rogozin as early as August 7, “the transfer of responsibility for restoring order and legality in these territories to the National Anti-Terrorist Committee, which is headed by the FSB and which includes or involves all those who are necessary for the case, including the Ministry of Defense, is also a recognition of the fact that in the person of the Kiev regime we are dealing with terrorists, and not with the state. With all the consequences…”


By that last phrase Rogozin meant that since the Kursk attack was a terrorist operation directed by terrorists in Kiev, the Russian anti- terrorist operation should extend to Kiev, Putin’s restrictive orders to the General Staff should be lifted, and the “terrorist regime” should be destroyed throughout the territory to the Polish, Romanian and Hungarian borders. “The situation in the world and in our country
has changed radically, and these decisions are urgently needed.” Rogozin was addressing Putin as the decision-maker.

“[Alexander] Syrsky is not a Ukrainian,” Rogozin said on August 11, referring to the Russian- born Ukrainian general staff chief. “He’s one of our traitors. Zelensky is also not a Ukrainian. He’s one of the Jewish traitors. They don’t feel sorry for Ukrainians. They’ll definitely throw them at us… Zelensky is threatening us with a series of terrorist attacks across the country, including the Urals, Siberia and the Far East. That’s how you should understand his words. If his threats are not military, but terrorist in nature, he positions himself as the leader of a state terrorist organization and is subject to liquidation. I hope that my logic is clear and obvious to those who should immediately make a decision to start planning an operation to eliminate Zelensky.”

This is as close as a national politician has come so far to reverse the logic of Putin’s proposals for Istanbul-II, and instead to empty the territory of its “terrorists” and their weapons to the full limits of the demilitarization and denazification goals of February 2022.

“Whoever is to blame on the Russian side for the invasion of Kursk,” comments a military source, “this is officially now a tar baby for the Ukrainians. They can’t afford to stay but they can’t afford to leave either. They should thank their lucky stars for Putin. It not for him, they’d have no place to leave for or return to.”

Reversing the operational logic of the anti-terrorism operation has a domestic political corollary which Rozhin admitted ruefully on August 24. “Many people are already talking about the need to use useful organizational solutions of the Stalinist period, especially in terms of mobilizing the country and society in war conditions, starting with the former de-stalinizer [Dmitri] Medvedev, who now scares the directors of defense factories with Stalin’s letters from the Second World War. The reason for this is simple — referring to the previous historical experience, in the 20th century, in terms of decisions in a difficult period for the country, there is no one to turn to except Stalin. Well, not to Gorbachev nor to Nicholas II.”

For “organizational solutions of the Stalinist period”, read the end of the Russian oligarchy.

An oligarch source in Moscow denies this. “The oligarchs are having the best time in the last two decades inside Russia,” the source says. “None of them wants to leave for the west and no one is asking Putin to make any compromise with the US. Everyone understands the money is not coming back; they have written off their London, their Sardinia properties. Their children are fine in the US and UK with their new nationalities, but they were not going to return anyway. So no, there is no real pressure from oligarchs on Putin for a war settlement. But everyone wants some sanctions softened.”

https://johnhelmer.net/kursk-belgorod-b ... more-90243

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Ukraine Develops 'Its Own' Cruise Missile

On the Ukrainian independence day former President Zelenski announced that Ukraine's forces would soon use a "rocket driven drone":

On 24 August, during the Saturday ceremonies for Ukraine's Independence Day, Volodymyr Zelensky stated that today, Ukrainian forces for the first time targeted enemy troops with a new long-range drone.
- This is our new method of retaliating against the aggressor. The enemy was hit. Thank you to everyone who made this possible. All the developers, manufacturers, and our soldiers. I am proud of you, Zelensky said during his speech, quoted by the Ukrainska Pravda portal.

The rocket-drone system, produced indigenously by Ukraine and gracefully named "Paljanica" (like the traditional Ukrainian wheat flour bread, which symbolizes hospitality and happiness), is a military innovation. During the official ceremonies, Zelensky stressed that it is a weapon of a "completely new class". He emphasized that "it is difficult to counteract it, but very easy to understand why."

The work on the rocket-drone was carried out in secrecy.


Zelenski published a video that shows a second of the cruise missile in flight.

HI Sutton of Covert Shores created this picture from it.

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This is not a drone but a turbojet driven cruise missile. Ukraine announced that it has been tested and could be used soon:

Defense Minister Rustem Umerov promised Monday the weapon would be used again soon in response to the overnight attack on Ukraine.
“Ukraine is preparing its response. Weapons of its own production,” he wrote on his Facebook page. “This once again proves that for victory, we need long-range capabilities and the lifting of restrictions on strikes on the enemy’s military facilities.”

A Ukrainian military video hinted that its range is up to 700 kilometers (430 miles) — on par with the U.S.-supplied ATACMS. It showed a map with various airfields, including Russia’s Savasleyka air base, which lies within that range, adding that the Palianytsia can reach at least 20 Russian airfields.


Russia has expected longer range missile strikes for some time and its defenses are positioned appropriately. Another Ukrainian 'wonder weapon' will not impress it. Ukraine claims that the cruise missile was developed by itself:

One of the specialists involved in the long-range missile project said it was “a completely new development, from scratch” that began about 18 months ago.
“This is not an extension of an old Soviet project,” said the specialist, speaking on condition of anonymity to safeguard the project’s secrecy. The missile has a solid-fuel booster that accelerates it, followed by a jet engine, the specialist said.
...
The specialist and Fedorov said each missile costs less than $1 million, and the military is turning to the private sector to bring down production costs further. “The private market generates solutions incredibly quickly,” the minister said.


I doubt that Ukraine has created its own cruise missile. There are too many parts of such systems, especially the navigation and targeting modules, that need high end solutions to be able to counter Russian electronic warfare measures and to deceive Russian air defenses. It expect that these will be derivatives from western projects.

Aside from that all Ukraine's weapon and especially missile manufacturing facilities have been hit several times by Russian missiles. This morning a new large missile and drone attack again hit "the critical power infrastructure of Ukrainian defence industry". Next to other infrastructure today's strike damaged three irreplaceable 750 kilovolt transformer stations and several 330 kv stations.

The new Ukrainian cruise missile was probably designed by the U.S. or UK and its various modules will likely be assembled in Poland instead of Ukraine. Still, it will be a hassle to produce many of these. That is likely the reason why the Ukrainian leadership is begging daily to allow it to use long range missiles produced by the U.S. or Britain to hit targets within Russia.

So far the U.S. has blocked such moves because it fears retaliation by Russia. Russia has threatened to deliver such weapons from Russian production to U.S. enemies should the U.S. proceed and allow Ukraine to hit with U.S. weapons within Russia.

A "Ukrainian" cruise missile would of course eliminate that problem.

Posted by b on August 26, 2024 at 16:01 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/08/u ... l#comments

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Larry Wilkerson's Valuable Insight...

... on Judge Nap's show. On culpability. Which only buttresses my constant point that neither Pentagon, let alone CIA, nor, let alone kindergarten in London know what real operations are and act on an amateurish template of Operational Manuals written for fighting people who cannot shoot back.



Now, today Russian MoD provided the "score" for Kursk.

"Всего за время боевых действий на Курском направлении противник потерял более 5800 военнослужащих, 72 танка, 31 боевую машину пехоты, 58 бронетранспортеров, 383 боевых бронированных машины, 177 автомобилей, 37 артиллерийских орудий", - говорится в сообщении ведомства. Кроме того, ВСУ потеряли пять установок зенитных ракетных комплексов, 11 пусковых установок реактивных систем залпового огня, в том числе три РСЗО HIMARS и одну MLRS, девять станций радиоэлектронной борьбы, РЛС контрбатарейной борьбы, РЛС противовоздушной обороны, пять единиц инженерной техники, в том числе две инженерные машины разграждения и одну установку разминирования УР-77. "Операция по уничтожению формирований ВСУ продолжается", - добавили в МО РФ.

Translation: "In total, during the military actions in the Kursk direction, the enemy lost more than 5,800 servicemen, 72 tanks, 31 infantry fighting vehicles, 58 armored personnel carriers, 383 armored combat vehicles, 177 cars, 37 artillery pieces," the ministry said in a statement. In addition, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost five anti-aircraft missile systems, 11 multiple launch rocket system launchers, including three HIMARS and one MLRS, nine electronic warfare stations, a counter-battery radar, an air defense radar, five units of engineering equipment, including two engineering vehicles and one UR-77 mine clearing unit. "The operation to destroy the Ukrainian Armed Forces formations continues," the Russian Ministry of Defense added.

Basically, a division has been wiped off the order of battle for VSU and Russian Army gladly continues to wipe out other reserves which are being thrown into this meat-grinder. As I stress all the time--the numbers of VSU losses are very conservative to put it mildly. E.g. double strike on VSU facility and concentration on VSU troops in Slavyansk today. Nobody would even count their 200s and 300s and they will not be included by Russian MoD into statistics.



That's the template thinking.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2024/08 ... sight.html

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Ukraine Might Be Gearing Up To Attack Or Cut Off Belarus’ Southeastern City Of Gomel

Andrew Korybko
Aug 26, 2024

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Its Foreign Ministry’s ominously implied ultimatum to Minsk and reaffirmation of Ukraine’s right to self-defense suggest that Kiev might invade Belarus’ Gomel Region and/or Russia’s Bryansk Region.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry released a statement on Sunday warning about what it described as the “threat” posed by Belarus’ military buildup along the border, the motivations of which were analyzed here in early August. Belarusian President Lukashenko also drew attention last week to the whopping 120,000 Ukrainian troops that he claims were the first to deploy there. For reference, Belarus only has around 65,000 active soldiers, one-third of whom are stationed along the Ukrainian border.

Less than a week ago, a small Ukrainian force unsuccessfully tried to invade a tiny village in Russia’s Bryansk Region that’s only 30 kilometers from the Belarusian border. It was likely a probing attempt in hindsight, but any Kursk-like invasion along that front could risk impeding or even cutting off Russia’s military logistics to Belarus’ southeastern city of Gomel. That’s because there’s a nearby highway running between there and Bryansk’s eponymous capital just 30-50 kilometers inside of Russia from the border.

Ukraine might be gearing up to either attack Gomel (which is just 30 kilometers from the border) or at least threaten Russia’s military logistics to there from Bryansk judging by its Foreign Ministry’s statement, which the “Kyiv Independent” noted was the first about Belarus since last September. They ominously implied an ultimatum by writing that “we urge its armed forces to cease unfriendly actions and withdraw forces away from Ukraine's state border to a distance greater than the firing range of Belarus' systems.”

This was backed up by them reminding Belarus that “We warn that in case of a violation of Ukraine's state border by Belarus, our state will take all necessary measures to exercise the right to self-defense guaranteed by the UN Charter. Consequently, all troop concentrations, military facilities, and supply routes in Belarus will become legitimate targets for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” The stage is therefore set for opening up another front on this false pretext if Kiev has the political will to do so.

There are arguments for and against the five most likely scenarios. The first one is that Ukraine doesn’t invade either Gomel or Bryansk Regions, instead remaining content to continue sending drones across the former’s border and possibly continuing to carry out small-scale raids in the second. The advantage is that Ukraine wouldn’t further extend itself, but the disadvantage is that also wouldn’t further extend its adversaries either. This is the least risky scenario of the five.

As for the second scenario, Ukraine might provoke Belarus into initiating conventional hostilities or orchestrate a false flag to that end. Either could pressure the West into conventionally intervening like Italy’s La Repubblica newspaper reported that it would do if Belarus formally got involved in this conflict. Ukraine might desperately need the pressure relief that such an intervention could bring, but it might either be hung out to dry or the intervention could lead to tensions spiraling out of control.

The third, fourth, and fifth scenarios are similar in that Ukraine could either attack Gomel, Bryansk, or both. This would pose the same risks that the first one would avert with regards to either further extending its own forces and/or its adversaries’. It’s the most dramatic set of scenarios due to how much it would worsen the conflict, but that might be precisely what Ukraine wants if it believes that this could get the West to conventionally intervene in its support, thus implying that it’ll soon lose if they won’t.

Out of these five, while the first would arguably be the best, it appears to be the least likely. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry wouldn’t have made its first statement about Belarus in almost a year if it didn’t believe that this would bring it some sort of benefit, let alone ominously imply an ultimatum and then reaffirm its right to self-defense, which would be twisted to justify aggression in the event that it decides to attack Gomel and/or Bryansk. Something is cooking, and it doesn’t bode well for Belarus.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/ukraine- ... -to-attack

Ukraine would have to be crazy to over-extend themselves even more. Oh, wait...
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Wed Aug 28, 2024 11:36 am

Plans for victory
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/28/2024

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“Everything looks critical and catastrophic,” said yesterday the well-known Ukrainian politician Oleksander Goncharenko, a former hopeful of the Party of Regions and now a deputy for Petro Poroshenko’s party. In one of the increasingly common displays of nervousness, the politician, who became famous for his walk through the House of Trade Unions in Odessa when the burned bodies of the victims of May 2 had not yet been removed, added that “after Pokrovsk, the road to the Dnieper will be open.” In just one year, Goncharenko has gone from claiming in the first hours of the 2023 counteroffensive that Ukrainian troops already controlled Donetsk airport (from which Ukrainian troops were expelled in January 2015) and assuming that the battle for control of the main city of Donbass had begun, to doubting the ability of the Ukrainian army to maintain control of the left bank of the Dnieper. The comment has, of course, an element of direct criticism of General Syrsky, who replaced Valery Zaluzhny, much closer to the nationalist groups close to Poroshenko, but it is also directed at Zelensky. In war, the border between political and military arguments is blurred to the point of practically disappearing. “I don’t understand what Syrsky and Zelensky’s plan is,” Goncharenko said, expressing the common position of his party, which is using the current situation to promote itself and implicitly defend both Poroshenko and Zaluzhny.

Despite the problems on the Donetsk front, which are becoming increasingly evident in the face of the acceleration of the Russian advance in several directions, Syrsky and Zelensky have a plan and yesterday they wanted to demonstrate it. In reality, for both of them, the plan involves the Kursk operation, a relatively stable front within gravity, in which Ukraine advances slightly in some areas, while Russia regains ground in others. Kursk serves, at the same time, to partially hide the poor situation of the Ukrainian troops in Donbass and to show muscle by presenting itself to its allies as the reliable and capable proxy that must continue to be armed. In military terms, kyiv has not yet achieved any strategic achievement with its Kursk adventure. And even the secondary objectives, such as Russia being forced to transfer large numbers of troops to the new front to ease the pressure on Krasnoarmeysk, have only been partially fulfilled. Oleksander Syrsky said yesterday that Russia has relocated 30,000 troops from other locations, a figure that cannot be verified and is most likely exaggerated. However, in a tone of obvious disappointment, the Ukrainian general specified that “the enemy is trying to withdraw its units from other directions and, on the contrary, is increasing its efforts in the Pokrovsk sectors.”

The trend in Donetsk is not only not reversing nor stabilising the front, but the speed of advance is increasing slightly (always within the trend of slow progress in this war and especially on this front). “The momentum of the Russian offensive is heading south, towards Kurakhove. There is more and more room to manoeuvre and fewer Ukrainian defences in the way. At this rate, it can go far. On the map, it looks like a wave that is about to engulf the west of the Donetsk region,” commented yesterday the Russian opposition journalist Leonid Ragozin, who was hardly surprised that Russia had captured Novogrodovka in just three days, a town whose municipality has a population more than four times that of Suya, the main Ukrainian success in Kursk. The Russian authorities have not yet taken the town for granted, although Russian sources said yesterday morning that the Ukrainian forces had de facto withdrawn due to the impossibility of defending themselves.

However, Zelensky and Syrsky's plan does not, at least for the moment, involve Donbass, where Ukraine is no longer able to maintain the reliable and rock-solid defence that caused the front to stagnate in the summer of 2022. Yesterday, several media outlets reported the Ukrainian president's statements and Andriy Ermak's intentions regarding the current situation and the approach for the immediate future. Kursk has given Ukraine a confidence that, although it does not correspond to the general situation on the front, is useful for achieving political objectives that have become clear in recent days: obtaining permission to use Western weapons anywhere on the territory of the Russian Federation and obtaining political and diplomatic support to seek a negotiation in a position of strength.

Both objectives are closely linked, since politically achieving the result that Ukraine wants to achieve in the offices requires a clear victory situation on the front. Although Zelensky's intentions were always clear to those who understood that Kiev's way of negotiating in Minsk and Istanbul excluded any possibility of an agreed resolution of the conflict if this involved concessions (especially, but not only, territorial), the Ukrainian president and his closest entourage have insisted on this in recent hours. "I am not willing to exchange our territories within the framework of any negotiation," he said to make it clear that his conditions have not changed and that there will be no compromise in exchange for security guarantees. In other words, the Ukrainian president insists on recovering the internationally recognized territories according to its 1991 borders, including Crimea, the peninsula that Ukraine lost ten years ago and where the population, which clearly positioned itself in favor of Moscow, is unlikely to want to voluntarily return under the control of the country that for years prevented the supply of water. The mention of security guarantees implies that kyiv is insisting on integration into Western security structures, namely NATO, thereby refuting an idea that has been spreading recently and which originally came from the President's Office: the possibility of temporarily giving up lost territories in exchange for immediate integration into the Atlantic Alliance.

Not only is Kiev not giving up on anything, but it wants more, even if it does so with the usual contradictions. Media such as Politico and the Financial Times reported yesterday that a visit to the United States by the head of the President's Office, Andriy Ermak, is being prepared, in which Zelensky's right-hand man will present a list of targets located in the Russian Federation that Ukraine aspires to destroy. To do so, Kiev needs the weapons and permission to use them. The objective is the same as that of the Kursk and Zaporozhye offensives a year ago: to make the situation as bad as possible in order to force Russia to yield to the Ukrainian diktat . "Ukraine wants permission from the West to use Storm Shadow long-range missiles to destroy targets in deep Russia, believing that this could force Moscow to the negotiating table to stop the battle," stated The Guardian yesterday , adhering to the statements of Zelensky, who insists that he will present Joe Biden, possibly in September, with his peace plan to stop the war this year. “There is a plan for Ukraine to win. It will be fair if I first present this plan to the US president,” the Ukrainian president said, according to Ukrainska Pravda .

Yermak's words yesterday make it clear that this plan is actually the 10-point roadmap that Zelensky presented months ago, with points 5 and 6 calling for the restoration of territorial integrity and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the entire territory. The approach could be considered an initial negotiating position if it were not for the main precedent of this war, Minsk, where Ukraine always preferred to risk a worsening rather than opt for the path of a compromise that, at that time, did not even require territorial concessions but political rights for the population. As now, the Ukrainian position not only did not moderate, but hardened. "In a few months, a joint plan for the implementation of President Zelensky's Peace Formula will be drawn up. This is the main condition for holding the Second Peace Summit. Today we already have the preliminary interest of some countries that are willing to host this Summit," said the de facto vice president of Ukraine. Ukraine's just peace was always just for Kiev and never for the population of those territories, whose opinion is absolutely irrelevant and who demand that it be abandoned by Moscow to the mercy of the intentions of a government that has only promised them sanctions, limitation of rights and collective punishment.

Despite acting as if Ukraine were in a position to dictate the terms of peace in a war in which neither side has been defeated, Kiev insists on an absolutely unviable programme as the only possible way out of the conflict. Aware of this, or perhaps simply exploiting the ability to contradict itself in a single media appearance, while highlighting its diplomatic solution - demanding the unilateral surrender of the opponent - Zelensky made it clear that his priority is the military route. As Europa Press reported yesterday , the Ukrainian leader pointed out that "its chances of defeating Russia on the battlefield will depend on Ukraine's allies." "I hope they work harder and faster," he demanded. Kiev has not stopped proposing the path of escalation as the only possible response at every moment of the war and is doing so again now, when it is known that the start of talks was planned that sought to protect energy infrastructure, vital for the civilian population, from attacks.

Ukraine’s priority remains the same as it was a year ago, when Kiev naively saw itself capable of breaking through the Zaporozhye front and breaking into Crimea. The idea of ​​crossing Russia’s red line of endangering Crimea failed, so Ukraine is now looking for a new one. “The idea, according to a senior government official, is that Russia will consider negotiating only if it believes Ukraine has the capacity to threaten Moscow or St Petersburg,” The Guardian said yesterday , adding that “it is a high-risk strategy and, for now, it does not have US support.” That is what Yermak hopes to change with his visit. Zelensky has already insisted that Russia’s red lines “are a bluff,” so the risk seems worth it for the Ukrainian government, willing to subject its population to increased danger by fighting for a result, a complete victory, in which even its allies in the Pentagon do not believe. Ukraine does not want a negotiated solution, but rather wants to make the situation as bad as possible and have its partners force its enemy to surrender by sending more weapons and imposing more sanctions.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/28/30465/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad

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Rybar: Ukrainian UAV raid on Russian regions Ukrainian formations carried out a new UAV raid on the territory of the Voronezh, Kirov and Rostov regions

within 24 hours. One of the oil industry facilities in the south of the country was hit, and the threat of repeated attacks remains in the Republic of Tatarstan .- In the Voronezh region, air defense forces intercepted eight Ukrainian UAVs, one of them was shot down over the territory of the Rossosh district . The target of the attack was probably the territory of the large Minudobreniya enterprise to the south of Rossosh itself .The facility is one of the largest producers of ammonia and ammonium nitrate, and a thermal power plant operating to meet the needs of the plant is also located on its territory. This makes it an important target for Ukrainian formations seeking to destabilize the Russian economy and disrupt the export of mineral fertilizers.- In the Rostov region, four enemy drones were intercepted overnight, the wreckage of one of them fell on the territory of the Atlas oil depot . This facility is strategic and belongs to the state reserve, designed for both military and civilian use. In the footage from the scene, it can be seen that the fire occurred in the area of ​​one of the technical buildings and partially spread to the tanks with flammable materials.- In the morning, another attack was recorded in the Kirov region . As a result, a tank for storing oil products at one of the facilities in the area of ​​the city of Kotelnich was damaged . The target could have been the Zenit plant , which also belongs to the Federal Reserve. The governor of the region reported an attack by one enemy drone, but casualties and fire were avoided. Ukrainian formations, against the backdrop of a fire at an oil depot in Proletarsk that has been going on for nine days , are trying to repeat their "success". Once again, the enemy's target is critical infrastructure enterprises that are important for supplying fuel and lubricants to Russian troops in the special military operation zone. The "Carpet" plan has been introduced at the airports of Kazan and Nizhnekamsk due to the threat of a UAV attack. All aircraft flying in this direction are being redirected to a reserve airfield in Samara , while at the same time, there have been no reports of drone attacks in the region at the moment.

Despite all the measures taken, the Ukrainian Armed Forces still retain the ability to strike oil industry facilities, which again raises the issue of strengthening the air defense system in the "old" regions of Russia and developing new methods of combating UAVs, the number of attacks from which is increasing from month to month.

***

Summary of the Russian Ministry of Defence on the progress of the special military operation (as of 28 August 2024) Key points:

- Units of the Vostok group improved their tactical position, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 115 servicemen;

- The South group of forces took up more advantageous positions in 24 hours, the enemy lost up to 690 servicemen;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 165 people in 24 hours in the Vovchansk and Liptsov directions;

- Russian air defence systems shot down two Hammer guided aerial bombs and 49 Ukrainian drones;

- The West group of forces repelled five counterattacks, including Azov (recognised as a terrorist organisation and banned in the Russian Federation), the enemy's losses amounted to 490 servicemen;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 475 servicemen, an American armored personnel carrier, and 7 field artillery pieces in one day in the Center grouping zone

- The Russian Armed Forces destroyed a camp of foreign mercenaries in the special operation zone

Units of the "East" group of forces improved their tactical position, defeated the manpower and equipment of the 65th, 72nd mechanized, 58th motorized infantry brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Vodyane, Ugledar and Shakhtarskoye of the Donetsk People's Republic. They repelled three counterattacks by the 118th and 125th territorial defense brigades.

The enemy lost up to 115 servicemen, six vehicles, a 155-mm self-propelled artillery unit "Krab" of Polish manufacture, a 122-mm howitzer D-30 and a 100-mm anti-tank gun "Rapira" .

▫️ Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated formations of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the 37th Marine Brigade and the 123rd Territorial Defense Brigade in the areas of the settlements of Zherebyanka, Kamenskoye in the Zaporizhia region, Dneprovskoye and Udarnik in the Kherson region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 50 servicemen, nine vehicles, a 155-mm howitzer M777 made in the USA, a 152-mm gun Giatsint-B and a 122-mm self-propelled artillery unit Gvozdika . An ammunition depot of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was destroyed .

▫️Operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups struck a camp of foreign mercenaries , as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 148 areas.

Air defense systems shot down two French-made Hammer guided air bombs , three US-made HIMARS rockets and 49 unmanned aerial vehicles.

▫️ In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed : 640 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 30,613 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,589 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,426 multiple launch rocket systems, 13,720 field artillery pieces and mortars, 25,312 units of special military vehicles.

https://t.me/mod_russia/42680

Google Translator

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Powerful Russian Strikes Usher in Season of Ukrainian Discontent

Simplicius
Aug 27, 2024
This past morning Russia struck Ukraine with what was said to be the largest air strikes of the war. That could be an exaggeration but it was likely in the top 3-5 at least. (Video at link.)

The main object of the strikes appeared to be important energy substations, particularly of the 750kv variety—which, as I understand, are far more significant and irreplaceable than the smaller run-of-the-mill substations.

Official statement from the Russian Defense Ministry regarding today's strikes on Ukrainian territory: "This morning, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation launched a massive strike with long-range precision weapons of air and sea origin, operational-tactical aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, and strike unmanned aerial vehicles against critical energy infrastructure facilities that ensure the operation of Ukraine's military-industrial complex."

Affected:

— electrical substations in Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhitomir, Khmelnytskyi, Dnepropetrovsk, Poltava, Nikolaev, Kirovograd and Odessa regions;

— gas compressor stations in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kharkiv regions, ensuring the functioning of the gas transportation system of Ukraine;

— storage sites for aviation weapons transferred to Kyiv by Western countries at airfields in the Kyiv and Dnepropetrovsk regions.

The most significant hit of course was on the Kiev hydroelectric plant at geolocation: 50.588256, 30.512125


(Video at link.)

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Immediately every region of Ukraine plunged into darkness, with Zelensky promising that they’re working on restoring power. News stations even lost power live on air:(Video at link.)

Most had assumed this was the awaited payback for Kursk, but interestingly, in an interview after the strikes had already commenced, Peskov stated that the Kursk retribution was still in the works:

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https://www.anews.com.tr/world/2024/08/ ... rsk-attack

This would seem to suggest that today’s strikes had nothing to do with Kursk but were in fact the preplanned resumption of Ukraine’s electric grid debasement, which was meant to have started around fall as per rumors. And in fact one Ukrainian figure espoused this very thought on X, wherein he stated such an operation can be planned for weeks or months, and likely had its intelligence gathering phase stemming from even before Kursk had occurred, which would give credence to the idea the strikes were in fact routine.

Rumors abounded that the strikes were particularly painful as Kiev pulled a lot of its remaining air defense assets toward the Sumy-Kursk axis, thinking Russia to be low on missiles. More significant even than electricity, the water went out in many urban areas, which is one of the big predicted milestones that would happen for when the grid really buckles this winter.

It will be interesting to see how many people remain in Ukraine by next year, given that a new report claims SIM card data shows the population decline has already dipped to catastrophic levels, if true:

Half of Ukraine’s population is gone! “According to closed data, the number of active mobile users in Ukraine is 16 million, active SIM cards about 25 million. There are now about 18-19 million people left in Ukraine” — former Ukr. PM, Azarov Ukraine had 38 million in 2022\

The “destroyed” Black Sea Fleet also played a major part, launching dozens of Kalibr missiles yesterday: (Video at link.)



This could be the beginning of the next phase, and the beginning of Ukraine’s demise, if Russia continues the systematic pressure on the power grid from here on out until next year.

In the meantime, Kursk remains stalled with Ukraine claiming to have captured another small settlement or two while Russian forces likewise recaptured some as well, with the overall front not shifting significantly. For instance, here’s Russian 1427th Regiment and “Arbat” unit liberating Nizhnyaya Parovaya today: (Video at link.)


Which is about here on this map centered on Sudzha:

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The only real change happening on this front is that Russian forces now regularly pick the Ukrainians apart, dealing heavy losses to them each day in the familiar static positional warfare.

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Wagner affiliated account:

Condottiero writes: The Ukrainian Armed Forces are in a sad state in the border area. They have occupied the territory, they cannot move forward, the places of concentration of forces for a breakthrough have all been copied, in particular, the place of concentration of manpower in the Glukhovsky district of the Sumy region, from where the enemy intended to jump to Rylsk and Lgov, has been copied and ironed. There, everything is still difficult, but the enemy is in a critical situation, reserves are melting away. The price of the issue looks catastrophic.

On the other hand, significant advancement continues to be made on the Pokrovsk-New York-Toretsk front. Ukrainian military accounts remain furious at the wasteful operation in Kursk, which comes at the expense of every other front:

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Remarkably, Julian Ropcke points out that Russian forces hardly even have to damage the towns anymore, and are capturing them clean as Ukrainian forces simply flee for their lives:

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This was confirmed by another popular Ukrainian military account, which laments that Russian forces aren’t even taking losses as they steamroll through AFU positions:

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Here Ropcke even points out that AFU on this front are forced to use drone operators as infantry due to dire lack of manpower:

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https://archive.ph/SuwIF

The above Sunday Times article retreads a familiar story:

In phone calls with The Sunday Times, Ukrainian military commanders were at pains to explain the apparent collapse around Pokrovsk, some blaming a lack of artillery shells, others new Russian tactics or the use of glide bombs and electronic warfare. They agreed, however, that one of the biggest problems they face is being greatly outnumbered.

“The situation is difficult, we are losing positions, the enemy is pushing us back,” said Captain Dzvenyslava Rymar of the 47th brigade, which is involved in combat near Pokrovsk.

“People are exhausted,” she added. “We need fresh people. No matter how well-trained our fighters are, the Russians still manage to crush us with their numbers. It’s not possible to hold the line when there are just two or three of you and ten to 20 of them coming at you.”


They inevitably confirm the fatal truth about the Kursk operation’s effect on Pokrovsk:

Ukraine had hoped its recent cross-border invasion of Russia’s Kursk region, 200 miles to the northwest, might relieve the strain on its troops in the Donbas region, where Moscow’s forces have been held at bay for most of the war, but are now applying almost intolerable pressure.

It did not. “It has had no effect on our part of the front line,” said Rymar. “Russian assaults are continuing permanently.”


As a needed reminder, they note that Pokrovsk will be the largest city Russia’s taken in almost 1.5 years:

If Pokrovsk falls, it will be the largest population centre taken by the enemy since the Russians seized Bakhmut in May last year. The local administration has left and its 53,000 inhabitants are preparing for the worst.

Avdeevka only had about ~30,000 pre-war. In fact, Bakhmut was only slightly larger than Pokrovsk at 60,000 vs. 53,000. And given the fact that right next to Pokrovsk is Mirnograd—a city of some 43,000—which Russian forces may have to capture first, it would represent a nearly 100,000 urban agglomerate.

One last interesting thing the article hints at is that the Kursk operation is now all about getting allies to push Putin’s red lines by authorizing long range strikes on Russian territory—a narrative that has now completely taken over the discourse, as per the plan. It gives us insight into what the remaining strategy seems to be: Zelensky merely wants to use the Kursk incursion as a springboard for inching NATO one step closer to confrontation with Russia by utilizing ATACMS and Storm Shadows on some sensitive object deep within Russian territory.

But it seems one of the reasons the US remains cold-footed is the dawning realization that Russia’s red lines were actually real, and the more they’re crossed, the less chance there is of any negotiations—a ‘no turning back’ some in the US establishment deeply fear. Peskov already stated today that as of right now, negotiations are completely off the table.


One other important development I wanted to cover is the factor behind some of Russia’s recent mass destructions of Ukrainian equipment on the Kursk front. First, for context: we now know that Ukraine used highly elite brigades, which included many Western mercenaries armed with state of the art equipment, to breach Russia’s borders, guarded by lower tier conscripts and border guards.

They were initially overrun, partly owing to the Ukrainian side having many sophisticated EW systems for jamming drones, communications, etc. There’s even rumor that they brought with them some more secretive, highly advanced European EW systems to test out, which fried a lot of Russian comms. In short: the area was flooded with the highest saturation of Ukrainian electronic warfare of any of the fronts.

In the Orekhovsky direction, an electronic warfare system from Europe appeared, which was used in early August by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to break through in Sudzha. NATO systems that selectively jam Russian communications and drone frequencies, but do not block Ukrainian ones. They put them on the lead vehicles of columns and mobile groups.

So how did Russian forces deal with this? As if expecting it, they immediately trotted out a revolutionary new system of FPV drones which operate on optical cables which are totally immune to jamming. These are drones which act as ATGMs, connected with a thin wire for up to 5-10km which transmits high fidelity signals impervious to electronic countermeasures.

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Forbes was even forced to do a story on these new drones:

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https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambl ... offensive/

Here’s one video showcasing the drones—you’ll note the high quality of the video signal even as it descends to its terminal point, where usually the FPVs blink out of signal range and begin fogging up with static-noise: (Video at link.)

In this video, pay close attention to the exact 1:20 mark—look at the bottom of the video as the drone enters, you can see the sunlight glinting off the thin wire trailing behind it: (Video at link.)

Here’s a video even demonstrating the two different video feeds side by side—one is via wireless signal, the other at the bottom transmits via the optical cable: (Video at link.)

From the Forbes article:

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It seems Russia has for once leapt ahead in FPV technology. Though DIY versions of such drones were used periodically before, this was the first serially produced variant seen in combat. The Russians call this new drone line the “Knyas Vandal of Novgorod” or Prince Vandal of Novgorod (KVN).

For those curious to see how they really work, here’s a video of a similar, modular Chinese design called Skywalker which shows the concept more clearly: (Video at link.)

These drones are said to have some limitations, such as not being quite as maneuverable in the current configuration, but in an EW contested environment they are the chef’s kiss.

The other big underrated advantage of these drones is they do not bleed any signal into the environment, which means they are also totally stealth and undetectable as they approach:

Because no radio signals are involved, fiber-optic drones and their operators are impossible to detect and locate via the usual direction-finding techniques. They are of course immune to the electronic jamming and spoofing measures used to protect civilian sites from drones. Civilian use of these drones is likely to be severely restricted.

That means the common drone detectors both sides wear to ping the soldier when an FPV is nearby would not work against these. Ultimately, this is proof positive that much of the Western propaganda about Russia being so far ‘behind’ even specifically in the FPV field is bunk, as I have been saying countless times here. Sure, it’s still behind by a bit in a general sense, in terms of the systematization and integration of drone warfare into small unit structures, but it’s no where near as clear cut or black and white as some will have you believe.

(More at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/pow ... s-usher-in

*******

Ukraine's Air Defense Success Numbers Are Likely Fake

Whenever the Russian forces conduct mass missiles strikes against Ukraine the Ukrainian air defense troops claim that the shot down a lot of them, often the majority.

After yesterday's wave of strikes which hit Ukrainian energy infrastructure Ukrainian media repeated such claims:

Russia's largest attack: Ukraine's defence forces destroy over 200 out of 236 Russian missiles and drones - Ukrainska Pravda

Russia launched 236 aerial weapons on Ukraine on Monday, 26 August. Ukraine's air defence downed 102 missiles and 99 attack drones.
Source: Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, Commander of Ukraine’s Air Force, on social media.
...
All available weapons and equipment were used to repel the air attack: aircraft, anti-aircraft missile troops of the Air Force, mobile fire groups of the Ukrainian defence forces, and electronic warfare units. A total of 201 air targets were shot down in the air combat: 102 missiles and 99 attack UAVs:
- 1 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile;
- 1 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile;
- 1 Kh-22 cruise missile;
- 99 Kh-101, Kalibr cruise missiles, and Kh-59/69 guided missiles;
- 99 Shahed-131/136 attack UAVs.

This adds up to a claimed success rate of 80.3% against missiles and 90.8% against drones.

These numbers are fantasy.

At the same time the Ukrainian government walks around hat in hand to collect money for more air defense systems. If the historically high success rates were real there would be no need to ask for more systems.

That all does not sum up. (There are additional reasons to doubt these claims.)

Just a week ago the Ukrainian commander-in-chief General Syrski had published more realistic numbers.

Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces reveals how many military facilities in Ukraine were hit by Russian missiles - Ukrainska Pravda

Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said that since 24 February 2022, Russian missiles and drones have hit 11,879 facilities in Ukraine. Most of them are civilian facilities (6,203), and the rest are military (5,676).
Source: Syrskyi, during his report at the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Defence Express reports.

Details: The Commander-in-Chief also specified the number of missiles and drones the Russians used against Ukraine, and how many of them were shot down.

Syrskyi said that the Russians used 9,590 missiles and 13,997 drones to attack Ukraine, of which 2,429 missiles and 5,972 drones were shot down.


(The original Defence Express report is here.)

These more realistic, but likely still way too high numbers add up to a success rate of 25.3% against missiles and 42.6% against drones.

According to Syrski 15.186 Russia missiles and drone passed through the Ukrainian air defenses to then damage 11.879 facilities in Ukraine. But what about damage created by air defense missiles which often miss to then come down to hit this or that?

General Oleshchuk should be asked why his claimed success numbers differ from those his boss has presented. He should also be asked how much damage his troops create with the use of their air defense systems.

Posted by b on August 27, 2024 at 13:40 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/08/u ... .html#more

******

For Russia, recovering Kursk is no walk in the rose garden

In my last appearance on Judging Freedom, Judge Napolitano asked me whether the Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region would be ended by the time of our next chat, two days from today. The implicit assumption behind this question is that the Russians were doing so well destroying all the NATO-supplied tanks, personnel carriers and other advanced equipment, they were killing and maiming so many Ukrainian troops by their carpet bombing and heavy glide bombing of the region, that none but a rag tag collection of invaders would be left to liquidate or take prisoner in the several days ahead.

This assumption was founded in the confident declarations of my peers in the Opposition or, shall we say, ‘dissident’ movement in the United States. And their certainty, which was reflected in the over-hyped titles given to the recordings of their interviews on youtube came from back channels in Russia that my peers have been using for their public statements.

For example, the very widely watched Scott Ritter revealed in a recent interview that he has been in touch with the commander of the Chechen forces now engaged in Kursk, Alaudinov. Such contact is entirely credible given the fact that Ritter visited Grozny earlier this year, met with the republic’s leader Kadyrov, participated in a review of the Chechen troops and surely met with some of their military chiefs.

Indeed, in view of the seeming consensus that the Russian recovery of Kursk is proceeding apace, with 4,000 of the estimated 12,000 invaders having been killed up to last Thursday, I also foresaw an early end to the conflict, though not necessarily measured in one week. As I explained, the Russian Ministry of Defense only claims territorial gains when it has thoroughly combed the territory and assured itself there are no enemy forces hiding out here or there. The 1,000 square kilometers initially occupied by the Ukrainians are a lot of ground to comb

However, I have had my reasonable doubts about the value of using such back channels as Alaudinov. Back in the days of the battle for Bakhmut, we saw a lot of Alaudinov on the Sixty Minutes news and talk show. Each day presenter Olga Skabeyeva warmly welcomed him on air and he handled himself very well, speaking optimistically of Russia’s progress but giving no specifics that could be of use to the enemy. In short, his lips were sealed. I find it hard to believe that such a professional soldier and patriot would give anything of use to a foreigner, however friendly he or she might be to the Russian cause.

Last night’s edition of the talk show The Great Game gave a very different picture of the state of conflict in Kursk from what my peers are saying and of where this proxy war may be headed NOW, not in some distant future.

See https://rutube.ru/video/f8abcf8a37c4356 ... 025726934/

The key personality in this discussion was Frants Klintsevich, identified on the video as leader of the Russian Union of Veterans of Afghanistan. His Wikipedia entry further informs us that after serving as a Duma member for many years he is now a Senator, i.e., a member of the upper chamber of Russia’s bicameral legislature. He has represented the city administration of Smolensk in the western part of the Russian Federation, where he is no stranger, having been born just across the border in what is now the independent state of Belarus.

For 22 years ending in 1997, Klintsevich was an officer in Russia’s Armed Forces, serving primarily with the parachutists, meaning that he has guts and knows what it means to face battle. He retired with the rank of colonel, but continued his military education in the Military Academy of the General Staff, graduating in 2004. He also has a Ph.D. in psychology and is a gifted linguist, with command of German, Polish, and Belarussian. He is a member of the steering committee of the ruling United Russia party. I bring this out to make the point that Klintsevich is no garden variety ‘talking head’ but a very authoritative source.

And his testimony on The Great Game is the kind of Open Source on which I rely to say what I do about current Russian affairs.

Klintsevich’s commentary last night was intended to sober up the television audience and explain why the fight in Kursk is far more complicated and challenging than anyone is saying either on Russian or on Western news. It suggests that Russian casualties among its armed forces may be far more serious than anyone would suppose.

Klintsevich’s commentary lays the foundation for a dramatic Russian escalation of the proxy war into a hot war threatening to become WWIII. Why? Because the so-called Zelensky gambit in Kursk is fully enabled by the United States and its NATO allies, using skills, satellite and airborne reconnaissance, command and control resources in real time that are superior to anything the Russians possess. It also has Western including U.S. boots on the ground. And in conditions like this, the disadvantaged side faces a strong temptation to go for the great equalizer, nuclear arms, to defend itself and to assure its victory.

Klintsevich also said what I have not seen elsewhere, given the ubiquitous belief in Opposition interviews that the Ukrainians in Kursk are cut off from sources of supply: that Kiev has now raised the number of its forces sent to Kursk from 12,000 to 20,000.

In short, the Zelensky gambit that is being enabled fully by the United States is not a PR stunt but a full-blown invasion intended to be the vanguard of what will be an air assault on Russia’s strategic assets far in the rear using JASSM, Storm Shadow and other long-range missiles launched from F16s.

Klintsevich has further intimated that the two U.S. aircraft carriers and their escorts now in the Eastern Mediterranean may be there not to contain Iran but for an all-out attack on Russia using their jets to deliver nuclear strikes. I add to his analysis that this may explain the knock-out of Russia’s early warning radar stations in the south of the country by Ukrainian drones acting on orders from Washington.

So far, the Russian response to these gathering storm clouds has been two days in succession of massive missile and drone attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine. But let us not have any illusions: if the Russians sense that the United States is about to pounce on them, to use the assets in Ukraine and beyond not just against Russian planes, which have been moved back beyond the 900 km range of the JASSM and Storm Shadows, but on critical civilian infrastructure to disable the war effort, then a preventive Russian attack on NATO, on the continental United States. not to mince words, is entirely conceivable.

All of this is sure to play out in the weeks before 4 November and the U.S. elections. The Biden administration is evidently committed to a struggle to the death. Who will flinch? Who will “win” is an open question. Washington, you have been forewarned by Mr. Klintsevich, who is surely speaking on behalf of the Kremlin.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2024

https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/08/27/ ... se-garden/

Is Klintsevich speaking on behalf of the administration or a faction looking to prod Putin to kick out the jams? I doubt Gilbert really knows but his testimony agrees with Doctorow's predilections.

******
August 27, 2024 by M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
Ukraine’s complicated history with neighbours

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Poland’s government announced last year the discovery of a mass burial pit in Ukraine containing remains of ethnic Poles murdered by pro-Nazi Ukrainian nationalists in waves of World War 2 massacres.

A bizarre geopolitical thesis in the Indian media last week characterised Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent 7-hour trip to Ukraine via Poland as part of an effort “to plug a missing link — Central Europe — in India’s European policy.” Per this thesis, PM’s trip signified an Indian “push” into Central / Eastern Europe “disentangling New Delhi’s engagement with the region from its relationship with Russia.”

This bizarre thesis, by implication, carries the imprimatur of Modi government but External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s cerebral mind never publicly vented such a stream of consciousness. Funnily enough, coaching academies who prepare candidates for the upcoming Civil Services Examination have also jumped into the fray with tutorials on the pernicious thesis!

Since the exponent of this thesis is a well-known senior journalist, Indian press lost no time to savour the exotica that sounded out of the ordinary. Whereas, the absurdity of the thesis should have been apparent at first glance to any erudite mind.

To delve into modern European history, Central Europe and Eastern Europe are not really interchangeable as geopolitical constructs. Central Europe is more of a geographical expression, as the region is culturally very diverse — even while sharing some historical and cultural similarities — whose “strategic awakening” actually begins only with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

The region broadly refers to the swathe of Europe that was historically part of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires comprising present-day Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia.

But Eastern Europe has been a sub-region of the European continent even with a wide range of geopolitical, geographical, ethnic, cultural, and socio-economic connotations. It includes present-day Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Romania plus the Balkans, the Baltic states and the Caucasus.

Geographically speaking, the region is defined by the Ural Mountains (in Russia) in the east while the western boundary remains nebulous, without any definite edges. (Hence the “German Question” in European history.) Eastern Europe is a significant part of European culture through millennia but distinguishable by the traditions of the Slavs and Greeks who are followers of Eastern Christianity where Eastern Orthodox forms the largest body.

Of course, the Iron Curtain gave Eastern Europe an entirely new redefinition. Indeed, redefinition has been a constant feature of Eastern European countries. Thus, the rubric Warsaw Pact came to be associated with Poland, but even then, the Visegrad Group didn’t fly — the politico-military alliance that Poland sought to create in 1991 with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary as a counterweight to the Old Europeans’ hegemony in the European Union. The Visegrad Group lost traction once Poland and Hungary elected national-conservative governments while the Czech Republic and Slovakia continued as liberal democracies.

The paradox is, when the Visegrad alliance finally split, it was over the four countries’ divergent reactions to Russia’s special military operations in Ukraine in 2022. While Poland and the Czech Republic adhered firmly to the US-led NATO strategy to wage a proxy war against Russia, Slovakia and Hungary remain ambivalent and increasingly question the raison d’état of the war and have lately begun opposing the war.

Thus, when Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán as the chairman of the rotating EU presidency floated a peace plan recently in consultation with Donald Trump to end the Ukraine war, the EU promptly disowned it (at US behest, of course.)

On the other hand, Slovakian PM Robert Fico who survived an assassination attempt in May due to his refusal to back the Kiev regime stands shoulder to shoulder with Orbán. Incidentally, there is a school of thought that the needle of suspicion in the assassination attempt on Fico in May points to Ukraine’s military intelligence. So much for a common Eastern European stance on Ukraine war– or Russia for that matter !

In fact, both Orbán and Fico advocate good relations and resumption of beneficial ties with Russia. They thoroughly disapprove the EU’s sanctions against Russia. Such being the state of play, how could Modi government have been so incredibly foolish as to imagine that India’s route to European engagement lies through Kiev and/or disengagement from Russia? Evidently, it is a lie.

The problem is not that India’s stance on Ukraine hinders the expansion of economic relations with Europe but the absence of an imaginative, robust economic diplomacy in a long-term perspective.

Although EU is India’s largest trading partner, accounting for €124 billion worth of trade in goods in 2023 (or 12.2% of total Indian trade), trade negotiations with EU have been dragging on for well over a decade. The EU’s stated objective is “to work towards a sound, transparent, open, non-discriminatory and predictable regulatory and business environment for European companies trading with or investing in India.”

But Delhi is in no hurry as trade is growing impressively (by almost 90% in the last decade) and trade in services between the EU and India reached €50.8 billion in 2023, up from €30.4 billion in 2020 — and, most important, the balance of trade remains in India’s favour.

In reality, Without waiting for the Ukraine war to end, Delhi can take a look at China’s strategy to enter the European market through the East European gateway. China created a platform with Central and Eastern European countries known as the “14+1.” Hungary, Slovakia and Poland are important partners for China in this framework.

Orbán has been embracing Chinese investments despite the EU’s call for “derisking” while Fico is set to visit China. And the most interesting part is that it’s not just the pair of leaders currently viewed as the EU’s pro-Russian wild cards who are playing this game. Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, a tough critic of Moscow’s war against Ukraine, also just concluded a state visit hosted by his counterpart Xi Jinping in China.

Indeed, China continues to be on a charm offensive in Central and Eastern Europe. A new study from the European Think Tank Network on China says Hungary is an “outlier” regarding national measures on derisking from China. The report says that “Orbán’s government takes pride in attracting a growing number of Chinese investors to the country.”

Indeed, Hungary is becoming Europe’s electric vehicle hub – by courting Chinese carmakers. Fico is attracted to Orbán’s route and plans to conclude a strategic partnership agreement with China during his planned visit in fall. Now, don’t Hungary, Slovakia and Poland know that China and Russia have a quasi-alliance today, which is at an all-time level and only strengthening by the day because of the fallouts of Ukraine war such as western sanctions?

Our media pundits are clueless about Eastern Europe. Yet they are advocating India’s disengagement from Russia as a prerequisite of warm relations with that region! Why are they doing this? Such perverted logic only promotes American interests to erode India-Russia partnership and thereby erode the country’s strategic autonomy.

Going forward, it’s too really to tell now as to what form Ukraine takes as it emerges from this war. Ukraine has unresolved nationality questions. And territories in western Ukraine previously belonged to Poland (which was of course compensated with territories of defeated Germany) and Hungary before World War 2.

Poland says the 1943-44 massacre of some 100,000 Poles by Ukrainian nationalists was genocide. And today, the crux of the matter, from Russian perspective too, is that Ukraine’s identity as a sovereign state itself is built around the same neo-Nazi organisations that collaborated with Hitler’s occupation army to massacre Poles. Truly, this is a can of worms. India has no good reason to meddle with it.

https://www.indianpunchline.com/ukraine ... eighbours/

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Zelensky signs law to ban Ukraine’s largest church
August 25, 2024
RT, 8/24/24

Vladimir Zelensky has signed a law that calls for the banning of any religious group suspected of having ties to Russia. It threatens to effectively shut down the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) – the largest faith-based organization in the country.

The Ukrainian parliament introduced the legislation earlier this week; it is expected to take effect in 30 days. After that, all the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and all affiliated religious organizations will be outlawed.

The UOC will have nine months to sever all ties with the ROC, despite the Ukrainian church having already declared full autonomy from the Moscow Patriarchate in 2022, following the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict.

After signing the legislation on Saturday, the country’s Independence Day, Zelensky released a video address stating that “Ukrainian Orthodoxy is today taking a step towards liberation from Moscow’s devils.”

Moscow has condemned Ukraine’s crackdown on religious communities; the Holy Synod of the ROC issued a statement on Thursday comparing the new legislation with Soviet-style repression and other historical persecutions of Christians.

“The purpose of this law is to liquidate [the UOC] and all its communities and to forcibly transfer them to other religious organizations,” the Synod surmised, noting that “hundreds of monasteries, thousands of communities, and millions of Orthodox believers in Ukraine will find themselves outlawed and will lose their property and place of prayer.”

The Synod stated that it would appeal Kiev’s actions with international human rights organizations and call on them to immediately and objectively respond to the “flagrant persecution of believers in Ukraine.”

Meanwhile, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev responded to the new law by stating that Zelensky has “no religious identity” and describing the crackdown as “full-fledged Satanism,” supported by Ukraine’s Western backers.

“This story will not go unpunished for Ukraine,” Medvedev wrote, stating “the country will be destroyed, like Sodom and Gomorrah,” referring to the Old Testament story of two cities obliterated by divine intervention for their wickedness. “The demons will inevitably fall,” he continued, adding that their punishment will be “earthly, cruel, painful and will happen soon.”

Religious tensions have plagued the country for a long time, with a number of entities claiming to be the true Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The two main rival factions are the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Kiev-backed Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which is considered by the Russian Orthodox Church to be schismatic.

The UOC remains the largest Orthodox church in Ukraine, with more than 8,000 parishes across the country. However, since the 2010s, some of these have been choosing to transfer to the jurisdiction of the OCU under pressure from authorities in Kiev.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2024/08/zel ... st-church/

("Those whom the gods would destroy first they make mad.")
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Thu Aug 29, 2024 12:02 pm

Ukraine demands missiles to attack Russia
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/29/2024

Image

“President Volodymyr Zelensky has stepped up his calls for allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons against targets on Russian soil after Moscow launched one of its largest massive missile and drone attacks on Ukraine since February 2022,” wrote the Financial Times yesterday , referring to the main political effort currently underway in Kiev. The Ukrainian government, which is attempting an impossible balancing act between announcing an upcoming peace summit and demanding from its allies the means to bomb targets in Moscow or St Petersburg, has decided that making the situation in Russia as bad as possible is the way to achieve the position of strength with which to apply coercive diplomacy and force Moscow to accept Ukrainian conditions. “Zelensky has made it Ukraine’s top diplomatic priority to convince Washington and other Western capitals to allow him to attack air bases and other military sites that are used to launch attacks against Ukraine deep inside Russian territory,” adds the American media, which does not take into account that, judging by the words of officials such as Mikhail Podolyak, among those targets would also be the Russian military (or militarized, to use their words) industry. This is, today, Zelensky’s plan for peace and victory, for which he needs a significant increase in Western assistance, even more funding and, above all, the green light to continue with a plan of escalation that would bring the conflict one step closer to the total war that Ukraine seems to be seeking for months.

On Tuesday, Zelensky announced the first test of a new Ukrainian ballistic missile, a weapon for which kyiv would not need permission from its partners to attack Russian territory. However, despite the timid attempt to resume industrial production in order to gain a certain autonomy from its Western bosses, neither the quantity that Ukraine might be able to produce nor the power of the missiles may be sufficient to achieve the government's maximalist objective. Ukraine would not only need the permission of its partners, but large quantities of long-range missiles that different countries may not even have in their arsenals. The lack of material has been one of Ukraine's major complaints over the past two years, in which it has repeatedly insisted on the need to increase production. To do so, kyiv has not hesitated to exaggerate the successes of those it perceives as its enemies in order to take a dig at its allies. This is the case, for example, with North Korean ammunition production. Ukraine has not hesitated to exaggerate the industrial capabilities of the People's Republic of Korea to contrast the supposedly huge quantities of ammunition that Pyongyang has sold to Russia while the European Union failed to keep its promise to supply Kiev with one million rounds in one year. Lack of sufficient material or production problems have also been arguments that countries such as Germany have used to deny Ukraine long-range missiles.

However, aside from the supply problems that may exist in the different countries, Zelensky is aware that the decision is much more political than logistical. “The United States, the United Kingdom, France and other partners have the power to help us stop terror,” said Zelensky, whose plan is to bring the same terror he criticizes to Russian territory in the hope that Russia will give in and, instead of striking back, simply surrender. In the list of countries mentioned, Germany is surprisingly absent, having been so vehemently demanded in the past to supply Taurus missiles, capable of reaching territories as far away as Moscow. “Kiev wants the German-made Taurus, which have a range of 500 kilometers, twice that of the Storm Shadow and a more powerful warhead. But, so far, Berlin has refused to supply them,” explains the Financial Times. Perhaps the latest revelations about Nord Stream are now making it more difficult for Ukraine to put pressure on its favourite scapegoat, Olaf Scholz, who has so far stood firm in refusing to send such material to war. This is despite pressure not only from Ukraine, but especially from France and the United Kingdom, the two countries that previously supplied missiles to Kiev and have always sought to have other countries follow their example. In the end, it was the United States that did so, though not Germany, where there is an internal division at government level over the appropriateness of such deliveries. Chancellor Scholz, on whose opinion the approval of the deliveries depends, has repeatedly been singled out as the man who prevents Ukraine from having Taurus missiles, while other members of his cabinet and the military establishment are in favour of the supply.

The divisions that occurred in the past over the sending of missiles to Ukraine are now being repeated, as the issue is no longer the supply of the material, but its use. It is no longer a question of attacking targets in Ukrainian territories under Russian control, on the Crimean peninsula or the Kerch bridge, Kiev's most desired target, but in the Russian Federation. The red line of allowing attacks in Russia has already been crossed and what is now being discussed is being able to do so beyond the relatively limited border strip that Biden authorized a few weeks ago. “The issue has divided allies,” explains the Financial Times , adding that “the United Kingdom and France are in favor of allowing Ukraine to hit military targets in areas far from the Russian Federation while the United States and Germany are opposed.” To the question of why, the article answers that “in short, because the Biden administration and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz are concerned about the risk of escalation if Western weapons attack Russia.” As a counterpoint, the media outlet quotes the most common response, the argument that Zelensky has used this week: the idea that Russian threats and the red lines drawn by the Kremlin are a bluff. “Just because Russia has not responded to something does not mean that they cannot or will not do so in the future,” responded Sabrina Singh, one of the Pentagon spokespeople, to this reasoning, which in practice means risking an even tougher war or the possibility of direct confrontation with Russia by allowing Kiev to bomb with Western missiles and using its F16s without Moscow feeling that it is being attacked, not by Ukraine, but by the West.

According to The Telegraph , the UK is in favour of allowing Ukraine to attack targets in Russia using Western weapons, although it is not prepared to do so publicly for fear of causing friction with its American allies. The Financial Times adds that “London has been advocating to Washington for months that Ukraine be allowed to fire British Storm Shadows at targets inside Russia. Well-placed people have told the FT that the British government sent a request to that effect to both Washington and Paris earlier in the summer.” The division is clear: London and Paris are seeking to support Ukraine in its escalation in Russia, while the United States and Germany have expressed doubts. In Washington’s case, the position may be changing. As The Washington Post reported this week , the Biden administration is considering supporting such attacks. Its doubt is no longer about the danger of escalation by attacking a major nuclear power, but about the effectiveness of the Ukrainian plan. Russia is capable, the White House argues, of moving its most important assets (such as strategic aviation) out of the reach of Ukraine. This, and not the potential danger, is the reason for the United States' reluctance.

“On previous occasions, the UK and France have stepped in when the US was reluctant,” the Financial Times recalls , arguing that “it is quite possible” that Ukraine will receive permission to use long-range missiles against targets in Russia. In reality, London has acted as an advance guard in this war , taking steps such as sending tanks and later missiles, to open a path that other countries would quickly follow, mainly the US, which in this way presents itself as a more responsible and cautious power. In fact, only Germany has publicly argued that it is not in favour of sending missiles to Ukraine – or allowing their use – because that would imply crossing the line of belligerence, with the obvious risk that this entails of walking irresponsibly towards a direct confrontation with Russia. The fact that only one of the supplier countries is capable of seeing this danger makes it practically inevitable that Kiev will receive, sooner rather than later, Western permission to go one step further and attack any part of Russian territory, not only the border areas, with Western weapons.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/29/ucran ... car-rusia/

Google Translator

*******

From Cassad's telegram account:

📝 Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 29 August 2024)

— Units of the North group of forces in the Volchansk, Bryansk and Liptsov directions defeated the formations of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the 36th Marine Brigade and the 118th Territorial Defence Brigade in the areas of the settlements of Pustogorod in the Sumy region, Volchansk and Liptsy in the Kharkiv region. Two counterattacks of the assault groups of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were repelled.

— Units of the West group of forces, as a result of decisive actions, liberated the settlement of Stelmakhovka in the Luhansk People's Republic, defeated the manpower and equipment of the 14th Mechanized and 4th Tank Brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of the settlements of Petrovpavlovka, Kupyansk in the Kharkiv region, Torskoye and Serebryanka in the Donetsk People's Republic. Repulsed six counterattacks by units of the 1st National Guard Brigade, the 110th and 117th Territorial Defense Brigades, and the 12th Azov Special Forces Brigade.

The enemy suffered up to 520 servicemen, six vehicles, a 155 mm M198 howitzer made in the USA, a 152 mm Msta-B howitzer, two 122 mm D-30 guns, two Anklav-N and Kvertus electronic warfare stations. Three ammunition depots were also destroyed .

— Units of the Southern Group of Forces occupied more advantageous positions, inflicted losses on the manpower and equipment of the 24th, 54th, 93rd Mechanized, 56th Motorized Infantry, and 4th Tank Brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Chasov Yar, Krasnogorovka, Karpovka, Stupochki, and Konstantinovka of the Donetsk People's Republic.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 740 servicemen, a US-made M113 armored personnel carrier, two vehicles, a UK-made 155 mm FH-70 howitzer, a 152 mm D-20 gun, four 122 mm D-30 howitzers, two US-made 105 mm M119 guns, and three electronic warfare stations.

— Units of the Center group of forces actively liberated the settlement of Nikolaevka in the Donetsk People's Republic and continue to advance deep into the enemy's defenses.

Formations of the 44th, 53rd mechanized, 95th airborne assault brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the 15th National Guard Brigade were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Rozovka, Grodovka, Karlovka, and Mykhailivka in the Donetsk People's Republic. Repulsed seven counterattacks by assault groups of the 32nd, 100th Mechanized, 68th Jaeger, 25th Airborne Brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the 15th National Guard Brigade.

The enemy's losses amounted

to 530 servicemen, a US-made M113 armored personnel carrier, six vehicles, two 152 mm D-20 guns, a 122 mm D-30 howitzer and a 100 mm Rapira anti - tank gun.Units of the "East" force grouping improved their tactical position, defeated the manpower and equipment of the 58th motorized infantry brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the 128th territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Velyka Novosilka and Novoukrainka of the Donetsk People's Republic. They repelled three counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The enemy lost up to 105 servicemen, an infantry fighting vehicle, six cars, a 155 mm howitzer M777 made in the USA and an electronic warfare station.

— Units of the "Dnepr" force grouping defeated the formations of the 128th mountain assault and 44th artillery brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Pavlovka and Stepovoye in the Zaporizhia region.

The enemy lost up to 45 servicemen, a US-made M113 armored personnel carrier, a US-made 155 mm Paladin self-propelled artillery unit, and two electronic warfare stations. An ammunition depot was destroyed. — Within 24 hours

, operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces, and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groupings destroyed: a depot of UK-made Storm Shadow long-range cruise missiles, an oil depot that supplied fuel for the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ military equipment, as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 135 areas.

▫️Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated formations of the 128th mountain assault and 44th artillery brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the areas of the settlements of Pavlovka and Stepovoye in the Zaporizhia region.

The enemy's losses amounted to 45 servicemen, an M113 armored personnel carrier made in the USA, a 155-mm self-propelled artillery unit "Paladin" made in the USA and two electronic warfare stations. An ammunition depot was destroyed.

▫️Within 24 hours, operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups struck: a warehouse of long-range cruise missiles "Storm Shadow" made in Great Britain, an oil depot that supplied fuel for the military equipment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 135 areas.

▫️Air defense systems shot down three French-made Hammer guided bombs, a US-made HIMARS rocket, and 36 unmanned aerial vehicles.

The Black Sea Fleet destroyed three Ukrainian unmanned boats in the Black Sea.

▫️ In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed : 640 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 30,649 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,593 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,426 multiple launch rocket systems, 13,741 field artillery and mortar guns, 25,335 units of special military vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

Ukraine SitRep: The Collapse Of The Donbas Front

The former advisor to the former Ukrainian President Zelenski, Alexey Arestovich, posted this map:

Image

Arestovich expects two Russian operations to envelope the Ukrainian troops on the frontline.

Here is the same area as seen on the Ukraine friendly LiveUAmap:

Image

Over the last weeks the Russian operation west of Avdivka towards Pokrovsk has been accelerating. Currently the Russian forces are taking three or more towns per day. Cities with some 15,000 pre-war inhabitants, like Novogrodivka, are falling within 24 hours.

The Ukrainian parliament member Mariana Bezuglaya had recently visited Novogrodivka and complained that the trenches which had been build to defend the town were empty (machine translation):

The city was captured because " the trenches in front of Novogrodovka were empty." In the city, too, "there were no signs of preparation for defense and the presence of our military."
"In the once twenty-thousandth city, there was practically no Ukrainian army. The 31st brigade in front of the city was removed, the brigade commander for whom the team asked was removed, and criminal proceedings were opened against him (I remind you, there are still no cases against Sodol). Instead, an inexperienced unit was sent here, " Bezuglaya wrote.
...
"A week ago, I went out on the outskirts of Selidovo in the direction of Novogrodovka and saw fortifications in front of the city. There was nothing in the city, just an ordinary civilian settlement. I went into the trenches, no one was guarding them, no one was there. I went underground and went out into the field. The Russians were already behind the field. There was no one else. I didn't get blown up by land mines, I didn't meet any territorial defense fighters – only single insects were the only life in the prepared fortifications around Selidovo, which the Russians had been striving for for ten years. Any civilian could have done what I did, " the MP said and posted a photo of empty trenches near Selidovo.


The Ukrainian army in the Donbas region, or whatever is left of it, is currently on the run. There is little fighting - and damage - in the settlements. The Ukrainian artillery seems to be out of ammunition.

The Ukrainian casualties are still high. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported today of 2,345 Ukrainian casualties (within Ukraine and the Kursk region of Russia.) Since the Ukrainian attack on Kursk the number of casualties has generally exceeded 2,000 per day, a number that was rarely seen previously.

The Ukraine leadership had sent its best troops, pulled from the Donbas frontline, and reserves to attack within Russia into the direction of the Kursk nuclear power plant. Some 15 kilometer into Russia the troops got stuck. They are now on the defense and will slowly be eradicated. Such an operation against Russia, which likely knew what was coming, never had a chance to develop into something bigger.

Arestovich commented the map (machine translation):

Well, the Kursk holiday is slowly fading into the background:
- the enemy cut off the Pokrovsk-Karlovka highway.
His intentions are obvious:
- that is why the Pokrovsky ledge is being driven in, in order to cut off Kurakhovsky and Toretsky with flank attacks.

Thus (if he succeeds) the enemy will seize the central regions of the Donetsk region, which are also the southern ones that are still under our control.

Unclear at this time:
- Will the enemy have enough strength to carry out these plans without additional mobilization?
- Do we have enough strength to counter these plans with our own, with or without mobilization?..

However, the pace of its advance in the Pokrovsky direction can no longer be described as anything other than an “operational crisis.”

The state of affairs is such that even the top headquarters in the Donetsk direction have a poor understanding of what:
a) is happening?..
b) Is Headquarters going to do anything about this?..


Zelenski has asked for an emergency meeting with NATO. He will get the meeting but no results. I doubt that any NATO country is willing to fight for him.

The U.S. is not allowing Ukraine to use long range weapons against Russia. Terrorizing the Russian population is Petersburg and Moscow is what Zelenski would like to do.

The U.S. is well advised to refrain from that.

Posted by b on August 28, 2024 at 13:14 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/08/u ... .html#more

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The western way of war – Owning the narrative trumps reality

Alastair Crooke

August 26, 2024

German equipment visible in Kursk has raised old ghosts, and consolidated awareness of the hostile western intentions toward Russia. “Never again” is the unspoken riposte.

War propaganda and feint are as old as the hills. Nothing new. But what is new is that infowar is no longer the adjunct to wider war objectives – but has become an end in and of itself.

The West has come to view ‘owning’ the winning narrative – and presenting the Other’s as clunky, dissonant, and extremist – as being more important than facing facts-on-the ground. Owning the winning narrative is to win, in this view. Virtual ‘victory’ thus trumps ‘real’ reality.

So, war becomes rather the setting for imposing ideological alignment across a wide global alliance and enforcing it via compliant media.

This objective enjoys a higher priority than, say, ensuring a manufacturing capacity sufficient to sustain military objectives. Crafting an imagined ‘reality’ has taken precedence over shaping the ground reality.

The point here is that this approach – being a function of whole of society alignment (both at home and abroad) – creates entrapments into false realities, false expectations, from which an exit (when such becomes necessary), turns near impossible, precisely because imposed alignment has ossified public sentiment. The possibility for a State to change course as events unfold becomes curtailed or lost, and the accurate reading of facts on the ground veers toward the politically correct and away from reality.

The cumulative effect of ‘a winning virtual narrative’ holds the risk nonetheless, of sliding incrementally toward inadvertent ‘real war’.

Take, for example, the NATO-orchestrated and equipped incursion into the symbolically significant Kursk Oblast. In terms of a ‘winning narrative’, its appeal to the West is obvious: Ukraine ‘takes the war to into Russia’.

Had the Ukrainian forces succeeded in capturing the Kursk Nuclear Power Station, they then would have had a significant bargaining chip, and might well have syphoned away Russian forces from the steadily collapsing Ukrainian ‘Line’ in Donbas.

And to top it off, (in infowar terms), the western media was prepped and aligned to show President Putin as “frozen” by the surprise incursion, and “wobbling” with anxiety that the Russian public would turn against him in their anger at the humiliation.

Bill Burns, head of CIA, opined that “Russia would offer no concessions on Ukraine, until Putin’s over-confidence was challenged, and Ukraine could show strength”. Other U.S. officials added that the Kursk incursion – in itself – would not bring Russia to the negotiating table; It would be necessary to build on the Kursk operation with other daring operations (to shake Moscow’s sang froid).

Of course, the overall aim was to show Russia as fragile and vulnerable, in line with the narrative that, at any moment Russia, could crack apart and scatter to the wind, in fragments. Leaving the West as winner, of course.

In fact, the Kursk incursion was a huge NATO gamble: It involved mortgaging Ukraine’s military reserves and armour, as chips on the roulette table, as a bet that an ephemeral success in Kursk would upend the strategic balance. The bet was lost, and the chips forfeit.

Plainly put, this Kursk affair exemplifies the West’s problem with ‘winning narratives’: Their inherent flaw is that they are grounded in emotivism and eschew argumentation. Inevitably, they are simplistic. They are simply intended to fuel a ‘whole of society’ common alignment. Which is to say that across MSM; business, federal agencies, NGOs and the security sector, all should adhere to opposing all ‘extremisms’ threatening ‘our democracy’.

This aim, of itself, dictates that the narrative be undemanding and relatively uncontentious: ‘Our Democracy, Our Values and Our Consensus’. The Democratic National Convention, for example, embraces ‘Joy’ (repeated endlessly), ‘moving Forward’ and ‘opposing weirdness’ as key statements. They are banal, however, these memes are given their energy and momentum, not by content so much, as by the deliberate Hollywood setting lending them razzamatazz and glamour.

It is not hard to see how this one-dimensional zeitgeist may have contributed to the U.S. and its allies’ misreading the impact of today’s Kursk ‘daring adventure’ on ordinary Russians.

‘Kursk’ has history. In 1943, Germany invaded Russia in Kursk to divert from its own losses, with Germany ultimately defeated at the Battle of Kursk. The return of German military equipment to the environs of Kursk must have left many gaping; the current battlefield around the town of Sudzha is precisely the spot where, in 1943, the Soviet 38th and 40th armies coiled for a counteroffensive against the German 4th Army.

Over the centuries, Russia has been variously attacked on its vulnerable flank from the West. And more recently by Napoleon and Hitler. Unsurprisingly, Russians are acutely sensitive to this bloody history. Did Bill Burns et al think this through? Did they imagine that NATO invading Russia itself would make Putin feel ‘challenged’, and that with one further shove, he would fold, and agree to a ‘frozen’ outcome in Ukraine – with the latter entering NATO? Maybe they did.

Ultimately the message that western services sent was that the West (NATO) is coming for Russia. This is the meaning of deliberately choosing Kursk. Reading the runes of Bill Burns message says prepare for war with NATO.

Just to be clear, this genre of ‘winning narrative’ surrounding Kursk is neither deceit nor feint. The Minsk Accords were examples of deceit, but they were deceits grounded in rational strategy (i.e. they were historically normal). The Minsk deceits were intended to buy the West time to further Ukraine’s militarisation – before attacking the Donbas. The deceit worked, but only at the price of a rupture of trust between Russia and the West. The Minsk deceits however, also accelerated an end to the 200-year era of the westification of Russia.

Kursk rather, is a different ‘fish’. It is grounded in the notions of western exceptionalism. The West perceives itself as tacking to ‘the right side of History’. ‘Winning narratives’ essentially assert – in secular format – the inevitability of the western eschatological Mission for global redemption and convergence. In this new narrative context, facts-on-the-ground become mere irritants, and not realities that must be taken into account.

This their Achilles’ Heel.

The DNC convention in Chicago however, underscored a further concern:

Just as the hegemonic West arose out of the Cold War era shaped and invigorated through dialectic opposition to communism (in the western mythology), so we see today, a (claimed) totalising ‘extremism’ (whether of MAGA mode; or of the external variety: Iran, Russia, etc.) – posed in Chicago in a similar Hegelian dialectic opposition to the former capitalism versus communism; but in today’s case, it is “extremism” in conflict with “Our Democracy”.

The DNC Chicago narrative-thesis is itself a tautology of identity differentiation posing as ‘togetherness’ under a diversity banner and in conflict with ‘whiteness’ and ‘extremism’. ‘Extremism’ effectively plainly is being set up as the successor to the former Cold War antithesis – communism.

The Chicago ‘back-room’ may be imagining that a confrontation with extremism – writ widely – will again, as it did in the post-Cold War era, yield an American rejuvenation. Which is to say that a conflict with Iran, Russia, and China (in a different way) may come onto the agenda. The telltale signs are there (plus the West’s need for a re-set of its economy, which war regularly provides).

The Kursk ploy no doubt seemed clever and audacious to London and Washington. Yet with what result? It achieved neither objective of taking Kursk NPP, nor of syphoning Russian troops from the Contact Line. The Ukrainian presence in the Kursk Oblast will be eliminated.

What it did do, however, is put an end to all prospects of an eventual negotiated settlement in Ukraine. Distrust of the U.S. in Russia is now absolute. It has made Moscow more determined to prosecute the special operation to conclusion. German equipment visible in Kursk has raised old ghosts, and consolidated awareness of the hostile western intentions toward Russia. ‘Never again’ is the unspoken riposte.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/ ... s-reality/

Western media tries to soften Zelensky’s crime by talking about banning the “Russian” Orthodox Church

Lucas Leiroz

August 28, 2024

It is not just the criminalization of a church linked to the Moscow Patriarchate, but true persecution of the faith of more than 80% of Ukrainians

Recently, Ukraine finally passed a total ban on the Orthodox Church, making the faith of more than 80% of the Ukrainian people illegal. The decision did not surprise anyone, as several laws restricting the Church’s activities had already been approved in the country since 2022 – in addition to the de facto persecution of Orthodoxy taking place since the Maidan coup in 2014. However, even so, the Western media continues trying to soften the crimes of its proxy regime.

The current main narrative in the Western media is that Ukraine has banned the “Russian Orthodox Church”. By calling the Orthodox Church on Ukrainian soil “Russian”, the media induces public opinion to believe that the ban only affects a specific religious group linked to Moscow, and does not harm the Orthodox faithful as a whole. However, this is an easily refutable lie.

Unlike the Catholic Church, Orthodoxy does not have a “universal bishop” – like a “Pope” – and its administration is therefore divided into regional jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction of the Church is absolutely sovereign, with Orthodoxy being a Communion of Faith between different Autocephalous Churches. Each Autocephalous Church administers a canonical territory, with no Church being authorized to interfere in the internal affairs of another’s territory.

The canonical territory of an Autocephalous Church is not necessarily restricted to the borders of nation states. Canonical territorial delimitation concerns the historical development of Orthodoxy in a region. State borders are much more unstable than canonical borders – which, although they can change, require much more time to develop such reconfigurations.

In the case of the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate, Russian jurisdiction extends to almost the entire post-Soviet space, in addition to some regions of Far Asia, such as China and Japan. Ukraine, for obvious reasons, has always been part of the canonical jurisdiction of Moscow and never wanted to stop being so. There are even reports that canonical autocephaly was already offered to Ukrainians by the Russians, being rejected.

In the case of very large canonical territories, such as Russia’s, it is common for there to be division into local “sub-jurisdictions”. These sub-jurisdictions sometimes correspond to the specific territories of some nation states. This is precisely the case with the Orthodox Church of Japan and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, for example – both sub-jurisdictions subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. These regional churches have broad administrative autonomy, but do not have canonical sovereignty (autocephaly).

It is important to emphasize how these divisions are purely administrative in nature, although they correspond to historical, cultural and political factors. There is no such a thing as an “ethnic division” of Orthodoxy, being this type of segregationist mentality – known as “phyletism” – banned as a heresy in the Orthodox Communion.

So, it must be said very clearly that by banning the canonical Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) on Ukrainian soil, the Kiev regime simply banned the Ukrainian Orthodox Church itself. In other words, the faith of 80% of the Ukrainian people has become illegal in the country.

Zelensky did not simply banish the Church. He also called the Orthodox Christians of the Moscow Patriarchate “Muscovite demons” in his speech on Ukraine’s “independence day.” Furthermore, Artyom Dmitruk, a Ukrainian parliamentarian who voted against the Church ban, is being persecuted by the regime, having even suffered attacks on members of his family. The police are also reacting with violence against all demonstrators protesting against the ban on the Church, having then an official situation of religious persecution in the neo-Nazi regime.

It is also interesting to mention that there are efforts by the Western media to promote an ultranationalist Ukrainian schismatic sect – the so-called “Kiev Patriarchate”. The group was created by some former Ukrainian ultranationalist clerics in the 1990s following unsuccessful minority demands of autocephaly for Kiev. Since 2014, the sect has become a kind of Ukrainian “state church”, receiving strong support from the Maidan Junta – including the handover of canonical Church assets confiscated by the Ukrainian state.

This sect is known for venerating as saints the so-called “national heroes” of Ukraine, such as SS member and Holocaust collaborator Stepan Bandera. Furthermore, the group carries out several blasphemous acts against Orthodox Christianity, preaching a kind of Russophobic “anti-Orthodoxy”.

Unfortunately, however, political interference in religion has been strong in Ukraine, mainly from external actors. The “Kiev Patriarchate” was recently “recognized” by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in an illegal intervention maneuver in the canonical territory of Moscow. Constantinople is fortunately isolated in its decision, being supported only by the Autocephalous Churches of Athens and Alexandria.

There is a political explanation for this process. The Patriarch of Constantinople is always a Turkish citizen. It is law in Turkey that only a Turkish bishop is elected Patriarch – which, in practice, means that only bishops who were soldiers in the Turkish Army (and consequently in NATO itself) are qualified to command the local church. The current Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, is a former Turkish/NATO soldier, having certainly gone through a process of Western brainwashing in his youth. Furthermore, for decades the Patriarchate of Constantinople has been recognized by Orthodox theologians as an institution heavily infiltrated by doctrines condemned by the Church, being in a gradual process of separation from the rest of the Canonical Communion.

There is also a political explanation for the fact that only Athens and Alexandria “supported” Constantinople on the Ukrainian issue. At first, both churches, as well as the rest of the Orthodox world, condemned Constantinople, but political blackmail was used to make them review their decisions. Greece is an Orthodox state, where clerics are like “public servants”. Being a member of NATO and the EU, the Greek state threatened to cut financial support to the Church in case of condemnation of Bartholomew’s anti-canonical actions – which would leave clerics without a salary for their basic expenses. In the same sense, Alexandria is an economically weak Patriarchate, dependent on Turkish and Greek money for its financing, which led the local jurisdiction to “support” Constantinople.

Bartholomew has strongly influenced events in Ukraine. He has participated in several meetings and telephone calls with Turkish, American, European and Ukrainian diplomats, military personnel and intelligence officers, always helping to develop plans to weaponize religion in Ukraine in favor of the West. Unfortunately, this anti-canonical situation made communion between Moscow and Constantinople impossible to be maintained. There is currently a crisis in Orthodoxy similar to that of the Middle Ages that led to the rupture between Western Roman jurisdiction and the rest of the Church.

All of these topics are extremely complex for the Western public, who are not familiar to the traditions, rules and nomenclature of the Orthodox Church. But it is important that these clarifications are made because only then is it possible to debunk the fallacy spread by the mainstream media that the “Russian” Church was banned in Ukraine. In fact, Kiev banned the Ukrainian Orthodox Church itself, which has always been part of the Moscow Patriarchate, this canonical union not being a reflection of any political tie, but of a common historical-cultural development.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/ ... ox-church/

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Kursk Gambit: The Samson Option
Posted by Internationalist 360° on August 27, 2024
Sputnik

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Ukraine’s attempts to attack the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant and “the fact that hostilities are taking place a few kilometers from the nuclear power plant raises great concern,” International Atomic Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said after visiting the facility on Tuesday.

Dr. Chris Busby, a renowned physical chemist, scientific secretary of the European Committee on Radiation Risk and former member of the UK Defense Ministry’s Oversight Committee on Depleted Uranium, shares his concerns about the situation around the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant with Sputnik.


The recent major Ukrainian military incursion across the Russia border in the Kursk oblast has left everyone scratching their heads in puzzlement. What possible advantage is gained in this war by invading an area of no apparent strategic importance? When it is clear that full-on defense is necessary in the East. But from the beginning, a number of commentators identified the obvious target in the area: the Kursk nuclear power station.

I will share some thoughts about the serious dangers associated with targeting nuclear power stations. Or the existence of NPPs in war zones in time of war. In a previous article I wrote about the Ukraine attacks on the Zaporozhye Nuclear Plant, I mentioned the Samson option. Like [the Biblical hero] Samson, who pulled the pillars down and killed everyone including himself, it is all you have left when everything is lost. Although here it may have a more strategic component.

A nuclear disaster in Zaporozhye with a melt-down or an explosion releasing fission-products like Chernobyl to Europe and the world would invite the invasion of the area by Europe (by NATO) to ‘save’ the Europeans from the downstream effects of any exacerbation. It seems that Ukraine continues to shoot missiles and drones at the Zaporozhye plant. But that plant itself is a pressurized water reactor with thick concrete walls that would be pretty hard to penetrate. Of course, the spent fuel pools are easy to hit, and the supplementary control systems, the cooling, and those things are vulnerable.

But Kursk is another matter. This nuclear site has the RBMK reactors like Chernobyl, and these have no thick concrete shielding. They are therefore vulnerable to missile and drone attacks which could damage the reactor systems directly. Unlike Zaporozhye, where the reactors are in shutdown, in Kursk, one of these is apparently operating. And it appears that Ukraine is shooting missiles and drones at the Kursk plant.

As with Zaporozhye, the Russians have sent for the cavalry, in the form of IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. He has visited and agreed that there is indeed danger of a nuclear incident. That he was shown evidence of military activity near the plant and agreed that this was a bad thing. Well, what else could he say? He is apparently going to Kiev to talk to President Zelensky.

Given the serious situation, I’m personally leading tomorrow’s @IAEAorg mission to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia.

My statement: https://t.co/pIRdPMrlzA pic.twitter.com/3DpI3jTJAk

— Rafael MarianoGrossi (@rafaelmgrossi) August 26, 2024

Was at 🇷🇺 Kursk NPP today, where the situation is serious.
Preventing a nuclear accident in this terrible war is vital & attacking any NPP is unacceptable, no matter the location. @IAEAorg will continue to promote nuclear safety and security everywhere. pic.twitter.com/J7neI2Wtkr

— Rafael MarianoGrossi (@rafaelmgrossi) August 27, 2024


There are two things I think about this. First, following all the arguments about who blew up the Nord Stream pipelines, it seems clear that Ukraine is not one organization, but many. There are inputs from a range of actors in the West and also different ideas about what to do held by actors and groups inside Ukraine itself.

Who is in charge? It seems to me that no-one really has control of everything that happens and that there are independent chaotic elements in play here with aims and strategies that are hard to fathom. The possibilities in this new Kursk theater are therefore scary. For example, it is an obvious Great Game strategy to pop a cruise missile into the critical Kursk reactor, cause a nuclear explosion and then call in NATO to ‘save’ Europe. That’s the one [thing] I fear. And having Grossi visit Kiev seems to me to have no real value except to keep the issue on the front pages for a while. Grossi is not a policeman. We do not need Grossi to tell everyone that there are serious downstream effects associated with firing missiles at a vulnerable and operating nuclear reactor.

What is the solution? It is to do whatever it takes to stop Ukraine or those actors inside (or outside) Ukraine from arranging attacks on either of the nuclear plants. If one of those reactors goes up, Europe is in deep trouble.





https://libya360.wordpress.com/2024/08/ ... on-option/

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Ukraine’s New Long-Range Weapon Won’t Be The Wunderwaffe That Some Imagine

Andrew Korybko
Aug 28, 2024

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The Palianytsia is more of a psychological weapon than a tactical one due to its envisaged role in reshaping perceptions and getting America to lift its restrictions on using the ATACMS to strike deep inside Russian territory.

The Associated Press reported that “Ukraine counts on new long-range weapon to bypass Western restrictions and hit deep into Russia” after Zelensky announced the “Palianytsia” during Ukraine’s 33rd Independence Day celebrations on Saturday. Defense Minister Umerov was also quoted as writing on Facebook that “This once again proves that for victory, we need long-range capabilities and the lifting of restrictions on strikes on the enemy’s military facilities.” Palianytsia’s range is equivalent to the ATACMS’.

Therein lies the reason behind the media hype over this new weapon. Although Kiev claims that it was an entirely indigenous creation, it’s difficult to believe that NATO countries didn’t contribute to it. More than likely, Western military-technical specialists participated in its production, though this might have been done without their political leadership being aware. The goal appears to have been to pressure them into lifting restrictions by Ukraine on the use of their weapons after this fait accompli.

Chinese Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs Li strongly implied as much after he warned earlier this week that Western “super hawks” and members of the military-industrial complex are behind the push for letting Ukraine use their weapons to hit deep inside of Russian territory. About that scenario, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov also chimed in and accused Zelensky of “blackmailing” the West, which he said would amount to “playing with fire” if they end up going through with it.

The US still doesn’t let Ukraine strike targets deep inside of Russia, even though the precedent is for it to always give Kiev whatever it demands after some time. This delay is attributable both to a desire to control escalation with Russia and to simple pragmatism. After all, if the best weapons were given and deployed right away (after training was completed of course) but didn’t make much of a difference, then there’d be nothing better to give them once they ran out and defeat would soon follow.

It therefore makes sense to start small and exercise restraint before scaling up and easing restrictions. As regards the Palianytsia, while it might have an important tactical purpose if its claimed range is accurate, its real significance is to justify the easing of those aforesaid restrictions on the use of American arms. Ukraine wants policymakers and the public to believe that the Palianytsia was already used and Russia didn’t “overreact” like some expected, so it also won’t “overreact” if ATACMS restrictions are soon lifted.

While this ploy might prove successful, two of the implied points contained within the preceding narrative are counterproductive to Ukraine’s soft power cause. For example, some might question the need for more American arms and financing if Ukraine is already able to supposedly create long-range missiles on its own without any help like it claims just happened. There’s also the question of why the lifting of restrictions is so urgent if Ukraine is winning like it also claims is the case too.

If its military-industrial complex is carrying on just fine without any Western support and its invasion of Kursk has truly been the game-changer that some have presented it as being, then it follows that foreign aid could be curtailed and there’s no reason to risk an escalation with Russia by easing restrictions. Neither is obviously true, but the fact that Ukraine is still pushing this narrative shows how much more desperate it’s becoming as well as the importance of elite and public opinion on this sensitive issue.

The Palianytsia is therefore more of a psychological weapon than a tactical one due to its envisaged role in reshaping perceptions and getting America to lift its restrictions on using the ATACMS to strike deep inside Russian territory. Even if it succeeds, however, that probably won’t change the military-strategic dynamics of this conflict in Kiev’s favor since Russia continues to gradually gain ground in Donbass, and its impending capture of Pokrovsk could lead to a chain reaction of victories in the coming future.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/ukraines ... eapon-wont

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A Spaniard about Kursk and Krasnoarmeysk
August 28, 2:56 p.m

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A Spaniard about Kursk and Krasnoarmeysk

(Video at link, Russian.)

Well, this is of course funny.

P.S. But I would still like to warn against excessively throwing up caps in connection with the collapse of the enemy front in the Krasnoarmeysk direction. The enemy will most likely try to reverse the negative trends at the front in the remaining 1.5 months before the thaw.

1. Either try to break through the front in the Kursk region (the situation there is still far from complete stabilization) by increasing the load on the operation and introducing new reserves into the battle, in the expectation that, unlike Rabotino and Pyatikhatki, it will be possible to push through somewhere with mass.
2. Or attack somewhere else in the Bryansk/Belgorod regions (signs of preparation for such attempts are recorded by intelligence)
3. Or return to the plan with an attempt to strike at Energodar and the Zaporizhzhya NPP, betting everything that is left on this.

He still has certain resources for this. Plus NATO will try with all its might to support such actions.
A wounded beast is dangerous and should not be underestimated. If our command does not let the enemy strike in other directions and continues to draw the Ukrainian Armed Forces into protracted positional battles in the southern regions of the Kursk region (which will become the second Rabotin salient for the Ukrainian Armed Forces), then the coming months will become a source of systematic bad news for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9348712.html

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"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Fri Aug 30, 2024 11:53 am

The shadow of the Soviet Union
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/30/2024

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“Fucking communists from the 114th Brigade occupied Kalinovo yesterday,” wrote the Ukrainian source DeepState , affiliated with the Ministry of Defense and with whom it shares anti-communist hatred, evidently upset. The presence of red flags in Russian troops is a minority, although it is not marginal either, since they have always coexisted with the current official symbols and even with imperial flags. Despite the doses of anti-communism of the Russian state, there is no fanatic attempt in Russia to erase all the symbolism or the memory of the socialist era, so the Victory Banner has not only not been banned, as it has been in Ukraine, but it has a certain presence in the war and in any act linked to the memory of the Second World War. “These lunatics took a flag with a hammer and sickle and planted it in the village,” DeepState complained about the image of one of the unit’s soldiers placing the red flag with the name of the brigade and the hammer and sickle on one of the buildings of the destroyed village, now abandoned by Ukrainian troops. As can be seen in the photo, taken several months ago, this is not the first time that the unit has captured a town and celebrated with its flag.

“The survivability of the 114th Brigade shows the level of hidden mobilization that continues in Moscow. This brigade has been conducting full-fledged assault operations for the last 8 months and cannot be erased in any way. It is hard to imagine the losses that have occurred during this period, but the katsaps do not care, because there are still many fools willing to die for the interests of the Kremlin,” the text adds, accompanied by an emoji created as a hammer and sickle prohibition road sign. Although more useful than most Ukrainian media, DeepState suffers from the same blindness that prevents it from remembering the origin of this war, a detail that, in this case, is even more important, since the origin of the 114th goes back to the summer of 2014 and the Vostok battalion, formed, not by mobilized recruits, but by volunteers, among whom were a good number of people who went to Donbass to support the population and fight, from an international perspective, against the reactionary government in Kiev that would soon begin to ban some of the symbols they carried. The survivability of these units and those they have become - upon integration into the army of the People's Republics and later into Russia, the names have changed - over the years is not due to a willingness to die for the interests of the Kremlin , as they were formed at a time when Moscow was primarily interested in ensuring minimum political rights for the population of Donetsk and Luhansk and maintaining the territorial status quo .

The curious episode of Ukrainian anger at the sighting of communist symbols is a reflection of the fact that anti-communist hatred, although present in both countries, has only reached levels of fanaticism in post-Maidan Ukraine. The presence of red flags among regular Russian troops also shows that, after three decades, neither liberal nor nationalist Russia has managed to erase the positive memory of socialist Russia in a part of the ex-Soviet population. Now, Ukraine is trying to contribute to the suppression of Soviet symbols in the towns of Kursk to which it has access with units that openly pay homage to German divisions in which its current heroes fought. Although in a very different way, the Soviet Union has not disappeared from the memory of the Ukrainian authorities either, who use it at will whenever the occasion allows. This is the case of Mijailo Podolyak, who yesterday insisted on the obvious fact that Russia is not the Soviet Union.

“According to official statistics, 417 Soviet soldiers were captured and disappeared during the ten years of war in Afghanistan. In the few weeks of the Ukrainian defense operation in the Kursk region, 594 Russian soldiers have already surrendered,” Podolyak wrote yesterday, adding that “this is another indication of the low morale in the enemy ranks. They refuse to fight when the command does not put barrier battalions behind them. Therefore, any comparison between the armies of the USSR and the Russian Federation seems extremely inappropriate, and the superpower status inherited by the Russian Federation from the Soviet Union seems like a cartoonish exaggeration.” Suddenly, the Soviet data is correct and the USSR, denigrated as a practically archaic civilization by current Ukrainian propaganda, was a superpower. And of course, the President's Office adviser prefers to avoid thinking about what it says about Ukraine or the morale of its troops that it is Russia, not Ukraine, that has the most prisoners of war in its custody, or that thousands of soldiers surrendered to Russian and Republican troops in Mariupol after weeks in which their only protection was the Soviet factory in which they had entrenched themselves, with their government unable to do anything for them.

The aim of Podolyak's text is the same as that of almost all of his texts and media appearances: to demand more weapons from his allies and to obtain permission from Ukraine to take a step closer to total war by being able to bomb military and industrial targets in the Russian Federation. The basis of his speech is formed by three aspects: Russia is the aggressor country, so attacking its territory is not contrary to international law; from the Ukrainian point of view, there is a possibility of victory; attacking Russian territory does not imply any additional risk or crossing the border of belligerence. Until now, Ukraine has actively exploited the spirit of the Cold War by appealing to the struggle of the free world or to the actions of Ronald Reagan, a line of argument that it will continue to use when it is useful, especially to justify failures by citing the Soviet legacy .

However, the President's Office is now faced with the need to argue that there is no real risk if Western countries finally decide to allow Ukraine to attack targets anywhere on Russian territory. The logic of the period of the world of the two opposing superpowers does not apply in this context, as it recalls mutual assured destruction (MAD) and suggests that the nuclear danger remains. Of course, Russia is not the Soviet Union, it does not have the economic, territorial and demographic base, nor the political power that the USSR could project, but it does have its nuclear arsenal, the dangers of which are exactly the same as during the missile crisis. The difference is that we are not talking now about missiles placed too close to the enemy - in Cuba or Turkey - but about bombing a nuclear power. Hence the need to elevate the hated USSR to the status of a power and relegate Russia to the shadow of whatever it was.

“Ukraine has destroyed not only a significant part of the pseudo-empire ’s military potential , but also its international reputation,” Podolyak says, without realizing that Russia has also destroyed Ukraine’s military potential. The President’s Adviser insists that “the king is naked and the tiger is made of paper” and states that “the Soviet Union, with Ukraine as part of it, could win world wars or create and arm powerful blocs of allied states.” The mention of Ukraine is curious, as it has been trying for years to forget that it was once part of the USSR, although on this occasion it seems useful in his speech to justify praising Soviet capabilities in the war. After all, Ukraine has already tried in the past to take credit for the liberation of Auschwitz, claiming that it was not the Soviet Union but the “Ukrainian front,” trying to hide the fact that the name did not refer to the nationality of the soldiers but to the direction of the offensive. In any case, taking advantage of the idea of ​​Zbig Brzezinski, whose main contribution to the theory of international relations was to assert that without Ukraine, Russia would cease to be an empire, Ukraine seems to be the reason for the strength of the USSR. Without it, the paper tiger is not a danger, so “it is time to stop treating that country as a global threat (that must be contained)”, says Podolyak, contradicting one of the maxims of the Ukrainian narrative: the idea that, if successful in Ukraine, Russia will invade member countries of NATO and the European Union. All this to demand that “Ukraine be allowed to establish peace and order in the region”, that is, to bomb Russia until it forces Russia to surrender, an objective as crude as the historical manipulation that Kiev is now using to justify it.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/30/la-so ... sovietica/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's telegram account:


Colonelcassad

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Rybar : Kursk direction. Counter battles in Korenevsky district, attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kamyshevka-Kireyevka sector Heavy fighting continues in the Kursk region.

Ukrainian formations are building up reserves and continuing attacks in several areas. At the same time, the concentration of enemy forces remains high even taking into account the active work of the Russian Aerospace Forces aviation. The situation in the Glushkovsky district remains difficult. The information that appeared yesterday about cutting off Tetkino by destroying bridges has not yet been confirmed and, in all likelihood, is a fake. Ukrainian formations are conducting reconnaissance and inflicting damage on the positions of the Russian Armed Forces and crossings.

In the Korenevsky district, fighting continues in the vicinity of the administrative center; the enemy does not stop trying to advance with both infantry and armored groups. To the south, fighting is underway in the Korenevo - Krasnooktyabrskoye - Snagost triangle.

Clashes also continue in the Sudzhansky district . In the Kamyshevka-Kireyevka sector,Russian troops repelled an attack by an armored group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Another small infantry group was scattered by artillery fire as it advanced from Nechayevo , where the enemy had dug in in the forest to the southwest of the village. The village itself had previously been liberated by the Russian Armed Forces.

Further south, in the areas of the villages of Borki , Plekhovo and Cherkasskaya Konopelka , the Russian Armed Forces are searching for and destroying the invading forces. There have been no reports of the liberation of the villages at this time.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

*****

SITREP 8/28/24: Tangible Panic Grows in Ukraine Amid Donbass-front Collapse

Simplicius
Aug 29, 2024
Ukraine is slowly descending into a panic regarding the collapse of the Donbass front, and in fact that collapse is seemingly accelerating. Some semblance of a normalcy bias continues to grip the more obdurate observers, but the keen-eyed are seeing the writing on the wall.

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Head of the top Ukrainian channel “Deepstate UA”—which is basically the Ukrainian ‘Rybar’—calls the situation complete chaos: (Video at link.)


Arestovich wrote a long post on his official account where he called the situation around Pokrovsk an “operational crisis”.

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Rada deputy Goncharenko was beside himself, calling the situation catastrophic. He added that after Pokrovsk, the road to the entire Dnieper will be wide open:

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It’s almost pointless even updating the exact captures and advances anymore because right now they’re simply happening so fast that within hours of the Sitrep’s release, the information is already obsolete, and Russians have advanced even more. But suffice it to say, this time there were even several major captures in areas other than Pokrovsk.

Russian forces captured the remainder of Konstantinovka on the Ugledar line:

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Ugledar is now becoming in danger of being surrounded for the AFU in the near future.

Ukrainian military channel:

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Then Russians captured most of Grodovka, after having just entered it days ago:

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At this pace, it will be captured in the next day or two it seems.

After capturing New York, they’ve already entered the next settlement north of it, Nelipovka. And nearby, they’ve advanced deeper into Toretsk, gaining hundreds of meters inside the important city.

As of now, they’re mere kilometers from Pokrovsk, and right at the outskirts of its neighboring city of Mirnograd:

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Nearby, they’ve now entered Selidov for the first time, and are already working through it:

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UA account:

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Another Ukrainian account:

"Battles for Selidove have begun! The enemy is actively pushing our defenses on the eastern outskirts of the city, the fighting continues in the area of ​​the stadium and the park, slowly moving towards the high-rises, also the podars are trying to level the front and are starting to press from Mykhailivka to the south and push from the highway in the east. The same squeeze situation occurred in New York."

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‘Celery’ above is meant to be Selidove.

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As of this writing, there’s already word that Russian forces have begun storming Mirnograd:

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Here’s the best current write up with good maps of the Pokrovsk situation from one of the more level-headed and critical-thinking Ukrainians, Tatarigami: https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/08/28/ ... r-ukraine/


In light of the ongoing collapse, the potential for dangerous escalation rises because Zelensky gets increasingly desperate to engineer some kind of black swan event that could overturn the table and upend events.

With this in mind there continue to be a slew of rumors for what Zelensky’s next move might be. For instance, there continue to be reports of AFU preparations on the Zaporozhye front:

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There is some credence to the above given that in the past few days the Russian airforce has carried out at least 2 separate air strikes along the Black Sea toward Odessa—one was at Snake Island, and another at oil platforms just east of there which Ukrainian GUR was using to stage landings toward Crimea.

This is roughly how Zelensky’s potential plan is meant to play out:

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A simultaneous mass landing by special forces around the Kinburn Spit area to harass the ‘rears’ of Russia’s Dnieper grouping, while other amphibious forces directly strike at the Energodar plant and then the main logistics force tries to wrap around from Zaporozhye city along the river to connect with them.

There’s an undercurrent of tension now running through events as other somewhat peculiar happenings have gone on. For instance, Belarus suddenly moved a lot of forces to the Ukrainian border again, and for the first time they appear to have a tactical symbol of a ‘B’ on them, as if they are preparing for direct combat:

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No one quite knows why this happened, but there are a few potential conjectures:

1.Lukashenko foresees Ukraine attempting to create some provocation as part of the earlier mentioned ‘black swan’ to involve NATO forces, and is taking appropriate deterrence measures

2.Lukashenko is trying to help Russian troops by pinning or ‘fixing’ Ukrainian border guards along the Belarus border, given that Ukraine was said to have removed many of the border forces to use them in Kursk

3.Least likely: Russia and Belarus plan some kind of joint final decapitation invasion to finish off the war

Most likely it’s a combination of 1 and 2.

Partly related to the heightening tensions, we now have a new very interesting statement by Lavrov which appears to vindicate my recent reporting about potential changes to the Russian nuclear doctrine, given the West’s unceasing escalations against Russia’s red lines.

Recall the recent piece:
As Conflict Escalates, Secret Russian Files Reportedly Reveal Lowered Nuclear Threshold Training
Simplicius
·
Aug 22
As Conflict Escalates, Secret Russian Files Reportedly Reveal Lowered Nuclear Threshold Training
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This is a paid subscriber piece for a timely, and urgently-developing issue, given recent events surrounding nuclear provocations. It will cover new documents about secret Russian training involving unprecedentedly lowered tactical nuclear thresholds, as well as the general outlook for the US and NATO militaries and defense industries in the medium term future.

Read full story
Well, lo and behold, at his latest press conference, Lavrov just stated that Russia is currently “fine tuning” or “refining” its nuclear doctrine—what could that mean?

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https://www.rt.com/russia/603156-lavrov ... -children/

Listen closely at 0:35: (Video at link.)

From the RT article:

Russia’s nuclear doctrine allows the deployment of the weapons in retaliation for a first strike by the enemy or when the existence of the Russian nation state is at risk. The government has indicated in recent months that the key document may be altered in the face of what it perceives as an existential threat posed to Russia by NATO.

I think it’s only natural given that Ukraine is on the final precipice of potentially being given permission to use intermediate range strategic weapons against Russian strategic sites—i.e. ATACMS, Storm Shadows, etc., potentially hitting deep Russian bases, nuclear plants, or even Moscow itself. Furthermore, the introduction of the F-16 into Ukraine, which is nuclear-capable, and which Russia must doctrinally treat as a possible nuclear threat if it ever comes close to Russian borders.

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As such, it’s par for the course that Russia will likely have to adjust its doctrine to allow for some kind of limited nuclear response in accordance with the training doctrines I outlined in the paywalled piece above.

And for the careful listeners, you’ll note Lavrov seemed to drop a hint about what the doctrinal changes could be. He said in the same video above that Americans think they will be safe from a nuclear war in Europe, but that Russia is adjusting its doctrine. The hint seems to imply that if America stokes some type of nuclear exchange within Ukraine, then Russia may have to look at direct nuclear strikes at the US itself as part of its response.

Another analysis on the situation:

Russian telegram channel "Pinta of Reason" (https://t.me/pintofmind/3892):

According to the latest statements by Sergey Lavrov, Russia is currently clarifying its nuclear doctrine. It is clear that this was said in response to the circulating information about the negotiations currently underway between the United States and Ukraine regarding Washington's permission to strike Russian territory at strategic depth.

There is only one unpleasant thing here: how could Moscow have gotten to the point where such American-Ukrainian negotiations became possible? This simply should not have happened if Russia had adequately responded to the escalation from Ukraine's Western allies. But Moscow has chosen the tactics of the notorious "red lines", which are now gradually turning into an incomprehensible vinaigrette. That is, they are slowly being crossed and moved on.

The only way to change the situation now is through an escalation that is ahead of schedule. That is, the stakes will have to be raised sharply, unilaterally, and higher than the US and EU countries have done. Of course, we are talking about nuclear weapons. What is needed now is not just vague statements that Russia reserves the right to attack some NATO facilities in the event of long-range weapons strikes on its strategic facilities.

It is now necessary to declare that in the event of such attacks, Russia will immediately and without fail strike military facilities of countries supplying weapons to Ukraine. And if the North Atlantic Alliance reacts in response, it will respond with nuclear weapons (initially limited, in a tactical manner).

That is, the Biden administration and the Brussels bureaucracy must be clearly presented with a choice: either a limited nuclear war in Europe (with a possible expansion of the theater of military operations), or a refusal to use NATO weapons against Russia to a strategic depth.

As a result, the "red lines" of the collective West will be tested: will they agree to a limited nuclear war? Are the US and its European allies ready to risk their existence for the sake of Ukraine? Let us recall that Washington faced a similar dilemma (of course, in relation to the European members of NATO, not Ukraine) in the distant 1960s, and then the answer to the answer was unambiguous: no, not at all. Now, little has changed.


I don’t fully agree with it, but present it here for reflection. Just as NATO has adopted a deliberate strategy of “strategic ambiguity”, Russia too can be argued to profit from its own strategic ambiguity in letting the enemy guess what the response can really be. If Russia were to precisely outline its exact red lines and the response their trampling would provoke, then it would potentially give the adversary the chance to fully prepare its own counter-response so that they will remain a step ahead. If it gets down to actual nuclear war, it’s best to have the element of surprise so you win and survive, rather than telegraphing your exact moves to your enemy so that he has a full response package already waiting to neutralize you in the event.

No one strategy is necessarily exactly right, but it’s simply something to think about—each has its pros and cons.

As a final note, the US has concocted an interesting excuse to keep Zelensky at bay:

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https://kyivindependent.com/russia-move ... al-claims/

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They’re effectively saying Ukraine doesn’t need to do long range strikes because Russia has moved its planes out of the ATACMS’ range and that Ukraine will have better luck using drones to strike Russian territory:

The U.S. official also told the WSJ that Ukrainian forces may have better success striking Russian airbases using its own long-range drones.

It’s mostly a cop out to ensure Ukraine doesn’t do anything stupid in pulling the US into a nuclear war. The ATACMS/HIMARS system may be one of the few that the US can actually control to keep Ukraine from using it in unauthorized ways, as US officials had previously revealed HIMARS were once hard-coded to not be able to strike Russian territory; the system simply would not allow Ukraine to set a target within Russia—and they may now have done the same for the ATACMS.

(Much more at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sit ... anic-grows

******

The jokes are over: shoot to kill

Mobilization updates. The wartime racketeering market: who's the real Russian. Time for a 10hour working day. Military corruption. Mobilize the youth. The mysterious benefactor of the NGO nobility.

Events in Ukraine
Aug 29, 2024

The conveyer-belt continues
In case you thought that amidst the Kursk drama everyone’s forgotten about mobilization, don’t worry. Here’s a video from August 18 showing a man dying of epilepsy in a mobilization office in the capital: (Video at link.)


Or another from August 29 in Kharkov: (Video at link.)

As usual, Odessans aren’t taking things lying down (August 21):

Show us your documents

Fuck off!

Show us your documents

I’ll fucking destroy you you fucks *pulls out gun


At which point the mobilization officers retreated to their minibus (Video at link.)

And on July 27, the Volyn mobilization office stated on facebook that a man in the Lutsk region had opened fire on mobilization officers at a blockpost:

❗During the night, during curfew hours, an armed attack occurred on the guard post of the Lutsk Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center (TRSSC)!

On the night of August 27, an unknown individual opened fire on the guard post of the Lutsk TRSSC. As a result of the attack, Senior Soldier M. was injured and is currently receiving treatment in a hospital.

The soldiers of the guard company, who were on duty at the time, acted decisively according to the circumstances and returned fire. The perpetrator managed to flee the scene. Law enforcement officers are now searching for him.

Now, let's talk seriously.

❗The TRSSC is a restricted area. In case of a threat to the lives of military personnel, they will open fire to kill.

❗The servicemen who were on guard duty yesterday are experienced soldiers who, after being wounded, were transferred to serve at the Lutsk TRSSC. They are all locals who heroically went to defend our land from the very beginning of the Russian invasion. They were wounded and transferred to serve in the rear. "We expected anything from the Russians, but from our own...," they said today.

❗All those who like to shoot at the military will be punished according to the law. Law enforcement agencies are already searching for yesterday's shooters. And rest assured—they will be found.

❗It has been communicated to all TRSSC personnel that in the event of a threat to life, they should open fire to kill.

The jokes are over.


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Wanted it by the law? Everything will be by the law.

Economic mobilization
On August 21, strana.ua reported that fathers with many children are finding it impossible to leave the country. This is despite the fact that they are legally able to. Their requests to leave are being denied for vague reasons.

On August 29, Andrii Hnatush - an AFU officer and energy expert - proposed introducing a 10 hour working day. Along with the current 8 hours, 2 hours would be dedicated to the military industrial complex and rebuilding the energy system. According to Hnatush:

(Paywall with free trial.)

https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/ ... ot-to-kill

Frontline news:

Chinese drone catastrophe, speculation about the Pokrovsk mystery - Syrsky's cunning plan?

Events in Ukraine
Aug 29, 2024

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Madyar, a Ukrainian military officer with over 300,000 subscribers. The Drone Guy in the Ukrainian informational space:

The Aftertaste of This 'Ni Hao' Restriction from September 1st Will Come Gradually, Like the Stages of Cancer, Sorry."

‼️ Get Ready for a New Challenge for Everyone Involved in the Use of Drones. And it will be incomparable to the temporary shortages of ammunition. Those (ammunition, not drones) are occasionally supplied by our Partners. But it won’t be the same with drones. It will be expensive and scarce. And a few dozen new millionaires will appear, of various 'kinds.'

I have a feeling that the restriction described below will become one of the components pushing us to the negotiation table. And not on equal terms at all.

We're talking about the next wave of export restrictions from the Celestial Empire. A month ago, the Chinese government announced restrictions starting on September 1st on the export of a whole range of goods related to UAVs. The announcement of these restrictions went largely unnoticed, because 'raising the alarm' often borders on 'crying wolf' here, and there are no authoritative China analysts in Ukraine. So, in specialized chats, the topic was briefly discussed and then forgotten. Likely, local manufacturers (and assemblers are called that here too, though the designs are some of the best in the world, yet everything is assembled from imported Chinese components) have poured all their working capital into purchasing these spare parts, because they have obligations and/or see a solid premium on scarce, banned goods.

Stocks are not infinite, and the smuggling routes for delivering banned goods are, to put it mildly, different for us and the enemy.

Thus, yesterday and today, everyone involved received the following announcements from the largest carriers:

"Dear customers ….. ….. Please note the important changes in the list of goods that are prohibited for transport weighing up to 30 kg.

🚨 From September 1, 2024, exports from China will be subject to even stricter inspections. Banned goods will not be available for air or sea delivery.

Starting September 1, 2024, we will no longer be able to accept the following items for transport: Carbon frame for quadcopter Carbon beam for quadcopter Quadcopter Motor for quadcopter Set of parts for quadcopter Set of frames for quadcopters Navigation camera for quadcopter Flight controller for quadcopter Landing gear for quadcopter Propeller for quadcopter Frame for quadcopter Signal booster for quadcopter remote control Digital data transmission system for quadcopter Digital radio communication detector Radio system Radio station Portable radio Video signal transmission system via radio channel Electronic warfare systems…"

The situation is crap.

We will fight as long as we have the strength.

That's it…

MADYAR 🇺🇦 29.08.24


And a quite interesting, albeit speculative post by Evgeny Norin on August 28. Norin is a respected Russian military historian. His ruminations on the Pokrovsk mystery have been quite popular among Russian military bloggers, though of course not all agree:

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In summary, regarding the seemingly absurd concerns of the "armchair general staff":

I'm not much of a military analyst, but there are some things I'd like to discuss. Look, we have this situation on the front lines. Our forces are pressing on Selydove, pressing on Pokrovsk, and in some areas, the enemy is already openly abandoning some positions; the line is cracking. Meanwhile, it's well-known that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have several relatively intact, more or less fully equipped units in reserve, about five brigades. If they’re not throwing everything that moves into the battle near Pokrovsk, it means that a) they intend to deploy their reserves somewhere else, and b) they need to create some sort of devastating effect before the front in Donbas collapses completely. So, it suggests that we might see a repeat of something like the Sudzha operation. What could this be? For example, a second pincer movement in the Kursk region, which will be executed at the moment when we relax and decide that the offensive has been repelled and that it was all just a publicity stunt.

Why are we assuming that this was done purely for PR? Because they didn’t reach Kurchatov? But what if that was just a diversionary strike and the main blow will be delivered, for example, from Hlukhiv toward Rylsk to link up with the southern group? The distance from the border to Rylsk via highway is 30+ km—a quite manageable distance if they break through the first line, and as practice has shown, they can break through the first line. Take a package of several well-prepared brigades and rush into a maneuverable battle. What do we have in terms of reserves? Who knows. And if significant forces find themselves between this group and the southern one, well, that’s what’s called a cauldron. Also, by the way, they haven’t even used their aviation yet, including those F-16s.

In any case, if they’re not using their operational reserves in Donbas, it means they’re saving them for something else. And whether our side is ready for that something—I don’t know. In short, I want to shout “Goida!” (Let’s go!), but if the enemy is clearly not an idiot and is acting inexplicably strange, then there’s some kind of explanation—it’s just that they don’t want it to be obvious.


Resident, an anonymous Ukrainian telegram with over a million subscribers had a similar idea on August 29:

⚡️⚡️⚡️**#Insider Information**
Our source in the General Staff has reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Eastern Front are lacking heavy equipment and reserves needed for a flanking strike against advancing Russian units. Syrskyi not only deployed reserves but also pulled some brigades with equipment from Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk for the Kursk operation. Now, a quick decision is needed to transfer forces back to Donbas to prevent the front from collapsing.


There was a response on August 29 from ‘ZeRada’, an anonymous Ukrainian telegram with over 400,000 subscribers:

🔥 Counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Colleagues are speculating about a possible counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Pokrovsk direction.

To be honest, we've been scratching our heads for the past two days, trying to answer the question of what exactly is happening on this section of the front. The option of abandoning these territories as non-priority is not being considered because, as we’ve already written [link], the importance of this section of the front is hard to overestimate.

It’s also hard to believe that the distributed pressure being applied by the Russian Armed Forces across the entire front line has suddenly worked in one particular direction, since the "average" temperature across the rest of the front is roughly the same: Russian advances are very slow. But here, it's a complete disaster.

At the same time, the Russian Armed Forces are proceeding quite carefully and competently. We've mentioned that for a turn to the south, they really need Novohrodovka, ideally also Hrodovka and Selydove. These three points would serve as a backbone for the turn to the south. But they’ve already taken Novohrodovka, are practically in Hrodovka, and today there are battles in Selydove. Therefore, a frontal counteroffensive is out of the question.

A counteroffensive from below is also not feasible because an assault group needs to be trapped. So, in general, it’s not a serious option.

A strike from the north is the only acceptable option. The biggest problem is that there are no large settlements there where troops can be concentrated unnoticed.

There’s also the problem of losing New York. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces do begin to concentrate troops north of the Pokrovsk direction, west of Toretsk, for a strike to the south, they could always be flanked from New York.

But the most important factor is the concentration of Russian forces in this direction. A 150,000-strong group can always find reserves and deploy them to counter the counteroffensive. Therefore, it’s not fair to compare the kilometers the Ukrainian Armed Forces would need to cover to cut off the main supply artery running through Ocheretyne (where it's just 5 km) with the kilometers covered in the Kursk region, where there were only a few conscript units and the element of surprise. Here, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are dealing with the most powerful Russian group on the front.

There is also the problem of motivated reserves:

Some combat-capable brigades are rotating after the battles for Ocheretyne,

Some have already been withdrawn from Kursk with significant losses,

Some are still in Kursk.

Therefore, Syrskyi’s reserve is quite limited, and the Russians know it. This was one of the major problems of the Kursk operation, as the number of mobile reserves for the Ukrainian Armed Forces has significantly decreased, which frees the hands of the Russian Armed Forces.

Therefore, we don't particularly believe in a counteroffensive in this area.


https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/frontline-news

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‘Dialogue Works’ edition of 28 August 2024: Kursk and U.S. preparations for a first, decapitating nuclear strike against Russia

In today’s 40-minute chat with host Nima Alkhorshid, we reviewed many of the issues I raised in my latest analytical article entitled “For Russia, recovering Kursk is no walk in the rose garden.”



I was particularly appreciative of the possibility to explain the methodological errors I perceive in most of my peers in the “dissident movement” opposing the Washington narrative who are most visible on youtube these days. I said this not for purposes of self-promotion, but to restore reason and balance to what has become a highly emotional interpretation of what is going on in the Russia-Ukraine war.

At issue is the use by my peers of backroom channels in Russia from retired or active military officers, from political scientists to produce here in the West what looks like impressive “scoops” but may in fact be something quite different: by this I mean that colleagues are likely being played by their Russian contacts to disseminate misleading or inaccurate information which makes the Russian military operations look like the proverbial walk in the rose garden, which makes the Ukrainians look like a depleted, rag tag force. No, as one highly authoritative Russian military expert who is a member of the upper house of the bicameral Russian legislature explained on a Russian talk show two days ago, there is fierce fighting going on in Kursk, not just some ‘bombs away’ from Russian jets dropping glider bombs. “Fierce fighting” means there are heavy casualties on both sides, and the effort to expel the Ukrainians from Kursk will take some time.

All of the challenges for the Russians in Kursk are due to the role the United States has and is playing there. The USA is supplying real-time satellite reconnaissance and command and control assistance to the Ukrainians. Moreover, all of the equipment the Ukrainians are using was delivered by the USA precisely with this mission in mind. And the same Russian panelist on The Great Game says this preparation by the United States means that Russia’s enemy on the ground in Kursk is in better fighting form than the Russians.

And then there is the possible, maybe likely connection between the US-planned and driven invasion of Kursk and the positioning of two US aircraft carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean, where they can as easily launch a first nuclear strike against Russia as be used to intervene in an Israeli-Iran war, which is all we hear about in major Western media.

Nonetheless, the single biggest issue in this interview is where are the Russian experts in the West, who know the language and culture as well as I do? We do not hear from them. The work of commenting on the war has been left to folks who are highly skilled geopolitical and military experts but who lack the in-depth area knowledge and the language skills essential if they were to test what information they are being given by their sources before passing it along to their viewers and readers.

Yes, such Russian experts do exist. I am not alone in a vacuum. There are several hundred if not thousands of them in the United States. Nearly all are serving as professors or instructors in universities, where they will be fired at once if they open their mouths and say what I say in public At my age that is not a problem, since I no longer have to work for a living. Others of them have jobs in think tanks, like RAND, where the very notion of resistance to the Washington narrative is heresy.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2024

https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/08/28/ ... st-russia/

(Well Gilbert, how do you know you're not having smoke blown up your ass? You don't, and if you think talking heads don't lie you're not as sharp as you think you are.)

******

Venezuela Hands Over Colombian Mercenaries to Russia
August 30, 10:46

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Venezuela handed over to Russia two Colombian mercenaries who fought on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
They were stupid enough to fly through Venezuela, where they were captured and then handed over to Russia.

(Video at link.)

Thanks to the Chavistas for these pretzels. Maduro is not Durov.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9351713.html

Ukraine Loses First F-16
August 29, 22:20

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The US has confirmed the first loss of an F-16 in Ukraine.

According to the US, the aircraft crashed for technical reasons.
According to Russian sources, the aircraft was destroyed at the Ivano-Frankivsk airfield along with the pilot.
According to a number of Ukrainian sources, the aircraft was shot down by a Ukrainian air defense system while repelling a missile attack.

In any case, minus 1 F-16. However, no one will receive 15 million for the first one shot down due to unclear circumstances.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9351278.html

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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blindpig
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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sat Aug 31, 2024 12:11 pm

The deception of miracle weapons
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 08/31/2024

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On Wednesday, August 28, the mayor of the Ukrainian city of Lutsk announced on his official social media profile the death of a local hero. “Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Sergeevich Mes died on August 26, 2024 while performing a combat mission to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine,” wrote Ihor Polischuk, lamenting the loss. Not all names lead to the quick identification of the fallen, but this was the case on this occasion. Mes was a well-known pilot and Russian sources were quick to remind that it was public knowledge that he had participated in the Western training for handling the F-16 fighters that Ukraine has requested for months. The day before, the media had reported the first occasion in which kyiv had been able to use its Western-made aircraft against the Russian attack with drones and missiles. The coincidence in time made clear which mission the Ukrainian pilot had died on, although for more than a day, the Ukrainian and Western media preferred not to give any details on the matter.

On Thursday, American media filled in the gaps in the information that had already begun to spread through Russian channels. The Wall Street Journal was the first to announce that Ukraine had suffered the first loss of one of its few F-16s. Although the article explicitly mentioned that Kiev had not confirmed the reason for the crash of the fighter and added that the fate of the pilot was unknown, the facts were already clear. The ability to follow the war practically in real time makes it easy, on occasions like this, to put two and two together and deduce that Lieutenant Colonel Mes had died aboard his F-16, which would eventually crash. Shortly after the publication of the Wall Street Journal article , CNN specified that the accident had not been due to a Russian shootdown. All the media were already pointing to pilot error.

The episode is not representative for the loss of a single fighter – something that occurs with some regularity in a war in which both sides in conflict have powerful air defence systems – but for the way in which Ukraine is reacting and for the information it provides on the Ukrainian and Western discourse. To begin with, Kiev’s allies had only revealed that they had delivered “a small number” of F-16 fighters. Thanks to the article in The Wall Street Journal , we know that Ukraine only had six aircraft, a number that will undoubtedly increase, but which, for the moment, cannot be considered to cause a substantial change in the dynamics of the war. After receiving this small group of F-16s, the Ukrainian authorities did not hesitate to fly their brand new acquisition and show two of them flying over Odessa, an area far from the anti-aircraft systems that Russia has on the front, in an action that was aimed at public relations. It was not necessary to know the exact number of Western aircraft in Kiev to know that they would not be the turning point that Zelensky has repeatedly promised. “Russia will have nothing to do,” he declared. The reality of war is much more complex and miracle weapons not only do not exist but can lead to false hopes. That is, once again, one of the lessons of this episode, which confirms another obvious fact that had already been repeated even in the Western media since the moment when the Netherlands and Denmark announced that they would send several of their F-16 fighters to Ukraine: in the hostile environment of the war against Russia, their survival was not guaranteed. Even the most powerful aircraft are vulnerable to modern anti-aircraft systems and the conditions in which the F-16s have arrived and will continue to arrive in Ukraine are far from ideal.

From the very beginning, and especially since Ukraine admitted the loss of one of its six F-16s, both Kiev and its Western allies have wanted to rule out the possibility that the aircraft was shot down by the S-400 systems or Russian aircraft. The discourse of the Wunderwaffe depends on maintaining the aura of absolute superiority of Western weapons over Russian weapons, so it should not even be considered as a hypothetical scenario that one of the Western aircraft could be - now or in the future - shot down by Russian aircraft. There were thus three possible causes for the loss: pilot error, an accidental shoot-down or a failure of the aircraft itself. None of these is acceptable to Kiev, which has been praising the capabilities of the F-16s for over a year, although any of them is less damaging to its propaganda than a Russian shoot-down. Moreover, kyiv's first instinct was to blame the victim, Lieutenant Colonel Mes, a fallen hero to blame for what happened, in a way of seeking a lesser evil for the triumphalist discourse that Ukraine is currently trying to impose. To compensate for using the deceased pilot as a scapegoat, the Ukrainian media reported official statements in which it was claimed, in a completely implausible way, that, before crashing, Mes had shot down three Russian missiles with a single shot. The hero had made his penultimate contribution to the country, since the last would be precisely to bear the blame for the downing of the first F-16 of the war.

However, the shadow of doubt prevented this hypothesis from being confirmed, and it was quickly followed by speculation that the fighter could have been shot down not by Russian defences but by its own. Currently at odds with the country's political and military authorities, MP Mariana Bezuhla was the first to launch this version into the media space, which quickly provoked the anger of the most nationalist sectors and, above all, of the Ukrainian air force. “Can someone finally submit a report on Bezuhla to the State Investigation Service? How much longer will this mockery of the country and the army continue? Security Service of Ukraine, there is work for you here too!” wrote its spokesman Yuri Ignat. This possibility is particularly damaging for Kiev, as it would imply not only accepting the obvious vulnerability of aviation, but also the difficulties faced by air defence systems and, above all, the officers who have to operate them.

However, over time, the version of the pilot's failure seems to have given way to an error on the part of the aircraft itself or to the feared friendly fire to which the MP referred. "A Western official who has been informed of the preliminary investigation said there are indications that friendly fire from a Patriot battery may have been involved in the accident," The New York Times stated yesterday. For the moment, Bezuhla's hypothesis, which had caused statements appealing for her to be silenced, seems the most feasible. Reality once again reminds us that war is more complex than the discourse that pretends to analyse it and that there are no miracle weapons or weapons free of vulnerabilities. Despite Zelensky's discourse, which every time Kiev receives a new type of weapon, he exalts it as the tool that will mark a before and after in the conflict, Western aviation is going to suffer problems in the war similar to those suffered by Russian or Soviet aviation. Otherwise, the Ukrainian president would have already stopped demanding that the member countries of the former Warsaw Pact deliver MiG fighters, as he did again this week.

The day-to-day life of war tends to make clear the emptiness of propaganda discourse. Ukraine has wanted to rush the training and use of the F-16 in an environment that was always going to be tremendously complicated for its operation, without letting its personnel go through the necessary steps to guarantee the proper use of the material. kyiv has boasted in the past of having shortened training times to speed up the introduction of weapons such as the Patriot systems into the war. The Western press has collaborated by stating that the enormous value of Ukrainian soldiers made such long courses unnecessary, which could be reduced in the face of express training and return to the front. This phenomenon is especially relevant in the case of the F-16, aircraft superior to those Ukraine had at its service, but for which quality of training, a reasonable learning time and, above all, flight hours are necessary. Ukrainian pilots have not had the opportunity to receive the last two, so the failures, accidents and confusing episodes like that of that week may be repeated in the future. The fundamental reason why it is foreseeable that the Western aviation will not make a turning point is precisely the difficulty of training personnel and not the small number of F-16s that Kiev will have at its disposal. Much more problematic is the small number of pilots capable of handling these fighters with confidence, in which they have not done enough flight hours, a reality that kyiv prefers not to see. It is easier, as happened yesterday, to dismiss the commander of the Air Force and blame a single person than to understand the reality.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/08/31/la-de ... ilagrosas/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of 31 August 2024) Key points:

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 125 servicemen and two vehicles in the Liptsov and Vovchansk directions;

- The West group of forces improved its tactical position, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 460 servicemen in its area of ​​responsibility;

- The Dnepr group of forces of the Russian Armed Forces defeated four Ukrainian brigades;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 455 servicemen in the area of ​​responsibility of the Center group;

- The South group took up more advantageous positions, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 780 servicemen and the Uragan MLRS;

- Air defense systems shot down 4 ATACMS missiles, six Hammer aerial bombs, six Vampire shells, 48 ​​UAVs;

- The Russian Armed Forces destroyed a US-made M270 MLRS MLRS launcher, hit UAV assembly shops, and a missile and artillery weapons warehouse of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

- The "East" group of forces improved its position along the forward edge, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 125 servicemen.

▫️Units of the North group of forces, with the support of army aviation and artillery fire, repelled six attacks by enemy assault groups in the direction of the settlements of Borki, Bakhtinka, Komarovka, Malaya Loknya and Matveyevka.

▫️In addition, attempts by Ukrainian Armed Forces units to attack in the direction of Korenevo and Malaya Loknya were thwarted. The enemy lost up to 30 people killed and wounded, two combat armored vehicles and two cars were destroyed . One Ukrainian serviceman surrendered .

▫️ Reconnaissance and search operations to destroy enemy sabotage groups in forest areas continue .

▫️ Air strikes, artillery fire and troop actions inflicted damage on concentrations of manpower and equipment of the 21st, 22nd, 61st and 115th Mechanized, 82nd Airborne Assault Brigades and the 1004th Security and Logistics Brigade, which were identified during the day, in the areas of the populated areas of Apanasovka, Borki, Byakhovo, Vishnevka, Krasnooktyabrskoye, Kruglenkoye, Lyubimovka, Martynovka, Novoivanovka, Novaya Sorochina, Plekhovo, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Russkoye Porechnoye, Sverdlikovo and Snagost.

▫️ Operational-tactical aviation carried out strikes in Sumy Oblast on areas of concentration of personnel and military equipment of the reserves of the 21st, 22nd and 41st mechanized, 17th tank, 80th and 95th airborne assault brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the 1st National Guard Brigade, as well as the 101st, 103rd, 107th, 119th and 129th territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Belopolye, Glukhov, Kiyanitsa, Obody, Svessa, Sosnovka, Sumy, Shalimovka, Shalygino and Esman.

▫️ Over the course of a day, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 400 servicemen and 18 armored vehicles, including a tank, three armored personnel carriers , and 14 armored combat vehicles, as well as three artillery pieces , three mortars, an electronic warfare station , and seven vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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RED ARMY HONOUR, PRESIDENT PUTIN & THE START OF WORLD WAR III – THE DURAN PODCAST

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by John Helmer, Moscow @bears_with

“The Russian Army stands for a moral defence of the country which [Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev] could no longer accept, either from Gorbachev or from Yeltsin. He said in his suicide note ‘I have earned the right to step out of my life’. Now that is not possible except from a Russian Red Army officer…that is a special kind of political force now. Russian military honour, Akhromeyev’s honour, is a political force, and once you’ve got an invasion of Russian territory, like Kursk, then the military imperatives take priority, not the oligarch priorities and imperatives.”

“We must accept there are internal pressures, significant constituencies, and some of them talk very volubly to US friends and they want to be loved by Americans. There is the oligarch constituency. There are serious political pressures inside Moscow because Russia is not a one-man state. It is a polity in which there are fundamental economic interests in ending the war quickly. The war is bad for their long term.”

“I don’t see that we are on the verge of World War III, militarily speaking. But we are already, I’m sorry to say, in World War III in every other sense, economically. The world is now broken into two major economic, financial, trading blocs. We are not in World War III for shooting. We are in World War III already for everything else.”

Watch or listen to the podcast with Alexander Mercouris and Alex Christoforou. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lquZhs-UTQ

Eight hours after our discussion concluded on what the US can be expected to do next, including the F-16s, the Wall Street Journal reported that “a Ukrainian pilot was killed when his F-16 jet fighter crashed as he was helping to repel a massive Russian missile attack, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials. The crash occurred Monday, just weeks after the first American-made aircraft arrived in Ukraine. Officials identified the pilot as Oleksiy Mes, one of Kyiv’s first pilots to be trained on the F-16.”

The US government tipoff forced the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) into publishing its version of what had happened to Mes and his F-16. He had been manoeuvring in the air during the Russian missile and drone strike on August 26, the UAF claimed, and had shot down one drone and three incoming missiles before crashing himself.

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Source: https://x.com/

The four-day gap in time was too obvious to make the news flashes credible. Mes’s public funeral had already been held and an obituary from the mayor of his home town of Lutsk was published on August 26. “Lieutenant Colonel of the Air Force of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Alexei Mes was killed while performing a combat mission,” Mayor Igor Polischuk’s message read before it was deleted from the internet.

Another Ukrainian version picked up in Moscow indicates that Mes’s F-16 had been shot down by a Patriot missile fired by a Ukrainian battery and their US controllers.

The Russian military has kept operational silence, but there are hints from the Ukraine, as well as from Russian military bloggers, that Mes and his F-16 were struck either by an air-to-air missile fired by a Russian Air Force SU-57, or by a Russian missile attack on the Kolomyia airfield, 350 kilometres due south of the western Ukrainian city of Lutsk. “It’s not clear whether he was at the controls of the aircraft or simply at a command post,” a Rupert Murdoch-owned London newspaper admitted in its report hours before US officials began their story-telling. “It doesn’t appear as though Moonfish [Mes] was in the air when struck, according to early reports,” the Sun added. The Wall Street Journal, also owned by Murdoch, was running a cover-up.

https://johnhelmer.net/red-army-honour- ... more-90283

*****

Last of the Wunderwaffen? F-16 Blasted Out of Sky in First Mission

Simplicius
Aug 30, 2024

Well, the quintessential ‘game-changer’ of all game-changers was unceremoniously shot out of the sky on its maiden mission.

As I had stated from the get-go, F-16s were being utilized only in “safe” defensive roles in the far rear of the country to help shoot down Russian drones. Apparently even this task was too great for the poor F-16.

Official report from the Ukrainian General Staff:

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But the more shocking detail was revealed when Ukrainian Rada rep Mariana Bezuglaya claimed on her official account that the F-16 was kiboshed by none other than a friendly American-made Patriot missile system. Face palm.

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Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh confirmed the loss but refused to comment on whether it was indeed a Patriot that brought the plane down: (Video at link.)

Another top Ukrainian channel stated that the Ukrainian F-16s in fact received the most advanced of NATO’s electronic warfare packages which would have made the F-16 completely “invisible” to the inferior Russian radar technology:

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Well, either the Patriot is a superlative radar or the plane wasn’t quite as invisible as advertised.

The truth is, this incident shows several things:

1. IFF is harder than it looks. Either NATO IFF (Identity Friend Foe) systems do not work well, which is funny considering all the jeers at Russian IFF during the claimed friendly fire shoot downs of A-50s, etc.; or the US simply never bothered to give Ukraine IFF codes between the Patriot and F-16.

2. The pro-UA crowd likewise laughed at other Russian friendly fire shoot downs, particularly those that happened during extremely contested air defense missions when dozens of Ukrainian missiles and drones were in the sky. Now they have a taste of their own medicine as they can see that things get quite a bit frenetic and even the best of them can accidentally shoot down their own planes when the radar screens are filled with dozens of targets.

It’s also quite possible—and in fact probably more plausible than the official story—that the F-16 did not gloriously go down swinging, after heroically shooting down several Russian drones and missiles, but that it was infact destroyed on the ground just as the Russian MOD had stated. You’ll recall during the large-scale strikes days ago, the Russian MOD said two F-16s were potentially destroyed in their hangars.

How would the pilot have been killed, you ask?

I would think like so: when the initial missile launches were recorded, Ukrainian pilots were sent to begin scrambling the jets to the sky to keep them out of harm’s way, as is standard for both sides. They know the exact speed and trajectory of Russian cruise missiles and can calculate the precise time they have until the missiles potentially reach the airfield in the west of the country.

The problem is: they can’t calculate Kinzhals in the same way. While they were initiating scrambling procedures, Russia may have fired some Kinzhals which would have reached the airfield in as little as under 3 minutes. Such a hypersonic missile could have hit the hangars even as the Ukrainian pilots were prepping the jets.

All in all, it’s a testament to the fact that modern near-peer, high-intensity conflict is not about wunderwaffe and ‘game changer’ toys. There is no such thing as a golden bullet or unicorn weapon that can really move the needle in near-peer conflict. It’s all about the totality of what your nation as a whole can bring to the table, economically, militarily, productively, and in terms of willpower, political influence, morale, etc. Any single weapon system is meaningless in the grand scheme of things and can be destroyed easily by the plethora of available modern counter-systems.



Now, the central narrative has fully shifted to the question of “long range strikes” on Russia. It’s clearer than ever that this is the final strategic gimmick Zelensky has left in his bag to stoke a conflict between NATO and Russia.

Listen as CNN explains how top Ukrainian officials are en route to speak to Biden directly about opening up this final Pandora’s box:(Video at link.)

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There really is nothing left other than to launch massive provocations by whisking ATACMS and Storm Shadows as deep into Russia as possible.

But here’s the ultimate catch that the vast majority of observers do not understand: U.S.’ hesitancy is not about fear that Russia will lose and what “uncontrollable” chaos that would entail, as Ukrainian commentators keep telling us. No, rather it’s the opposite—the U.S. fears that Ukraine may provoke Russia to go “all out”, which would unfetter Putin from his “soft” approach to wage some kind of all out war that would result in Ukraine either being destroyed or totally subjugated.

You see, the smarter American policy advisors know that the only chance the West has to topple Russia, is to keep this conflict a slow boil such that Putin “sleep walks” into a trap, buying time for the regime to foment opposition against him. But Ukraine stands to accidentally unleash the full extent of the Russian war machine—which could encompass an official declaration of war, or simply the abrogation of all former “rules” against striking civilian objects, government buildings, leadership, Kiev in general, etc. This, Washington knows, would lead to Russia definitively occupying all of Ukraine, which would mean the end of the entire Ukrainian project 70 years in the making by the CIA and co.

In short: they want to bleed the bear slowly by poking it over and over such that the bear doesn’t even realize it’s bleeding out; what they don’t want is puncturing the bear so hard that he erupts into a frothy rage and beheads them with a grisly swipe of his claws.

Interestingly, a new Foreign Affairs piece—from the people of the Council on Foreign Relations—argues that it would be militarily futile to allow deep strikes into Russia:

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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ ... kes-russia

Career apparatchik Stephen Biddle argues that to have true strategic effect, Ukraine would have to combine such long range strikes with some massively successful maneuver warfare advances—which they simply don’t have the capability for at the moment:

From a strictly military perspective, restrictions never help. Giving Ukraine the means and permission to launch attacks deep into Russian-held territory would surely improve Ukrainian combat power. But the difference is unlikely to be decisive. To achieve a game-changing effect, Ukraine would need to combine these strikes with tightly coordinated ground maneuver on a scale that its forces have been unable to master so far in this war. Otherwise, the benefits Ukraine could draw from additional deep strike capability would probably not be enough to turn the tide.\

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To argue his point, he uses several historical precedents, including allied bombing of Germany in WWII which saw over 700,000 aircraft drop millions of bombs, only for German production to subsequently increase:

During World War II, the Allied powers used more than 710,000 aircraft to drop over two million tons of bombs on Germany over three and a half years—and German weapons production still rose between January 1942 and July 1944. Only in the war’s final months, after the German air force had been largely destroyed, did this enormous campaign incapacitate German ground forces. Even with the benefit of modern technology, no plausible transfer of Western weapons today would enable Ukraine to carry out a campaign that is remotely comparable in scope.

In his final paragraph he hints at my thesis, raising the question of whether it’s worth the escalatory risk for so little gain:

With that in mind, Kyiv’s partners should now ask whether the modest military benefits are worth the escalatory risk. The answer will turn on assessments of the likelihood of expanding the conflict and on the risk tolerance of Western governments and publics. The latter is ultimately a value judgment; military analysis alone cannot dictate where to draw the line. What it can do is forecast the battlefield consequences of policy decisions. If the West lifts its restraints on Ukrainian deep strike capability, the consequences are unlikely to include a decisive change in the trajectory of the war.


The Ukrainian frontline continues to collapse, and we’re starting to see cracks forming in other places, which—should they develop—would be a very bad sign for the AFU. Right now the collapse is still localized to one front, albeit the most significant front of the war. However, it still does imply that, while Russia gathered its most powerful fist in this direction, it may have done so at the expense of other fronts, whose groupings are too weak to move forward.

One Ukrainian source:

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An AFU volunteer writes about the lies and incompetence responsible for the ongoing Pokrovsk collapse:

The defense in the Pokrovsky direction is so disorganized that the Russians themselves do not believe in their advances.

Unfortunately, the higher command is still receiving reports about the "controlled situation", which is far from being controlled. Among the main problems in the direction:

- poor interaction between brigades and smaller adjacent units.

- shortage of people and their disproportionate distribution in defensive positions.

- our EW suppresses our drones better than enemy EW.

- disorganization of brigade rotations. One can leave before the other has entered. The enemy uses this and strikes right there.

- the OTU command does not actually manage the troops, has not established interaction and does not have information about our real positions. There are often cases of units being sent to positions that are already in the rear of the Russians, because the OTU thinks that they are behind us.

- lies, lies and lies again.


But my contention is that, if and when we start seeing multiple Ukrainian fronts collapsing at the same time, that will be the final siren song notifying us that the ‘snowball effect’ has truly begun and that Russian manpower is now overwhelmingly superior as a generality. That’s because as a last desperation move, Ukraine would be forced to pull forces from other fronts just to plug holes to keep from being entirely overrun and surrounded. The fact they’re not necessarily doing this yet likely means there are still some reserves available. When those reserves run out, it can create a cascading effect where reserves are pulled from other fronts, and then those fronts subsequently begin collapsing just as fast as the Pokrovsk one. Only then can we say that the AFU’s final stanza has begun.

At the moment, it’s not clear just yet, but there are some rumblings, as if the foundation is giving a little portentous shake or two. For instance, Russian forces have advanced in Urozhayne, Zaporozhye; in Kupyansk, they suddenly sprang forward and captured Sinkovka—or at least most of it—a town they’ve been contesting for something like a year or more:

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This is now confirmed, by the way; this town was prematurely declared ‘captured’ several times in the distant past, but this time we have the actual video of Russian troops planting a flag on the administration roof.

Then there were advances south of there, in Pischane. Followed by some gains in Chasov Yar, and the usual: in Toretsk, Pokrovsk direction, Selidove, etc. I don’t want to be premature, we still have to wait a little longer and see: but for now, it’s almost starting to feel like we’re at the moment where the water is seeping through the cracks in the wooden hull, signaling it could soon burst open, flooding the boat until it sinks.

Granted, the situation remains dangerous and tricky as Zelensky continues putting all his cards down on the Kursk direction, with rumors still going that a few remaining reserve brigades are being prepared for that final Zaporozhye gambit. Russia could still be caught with its pants down if the command staff is not fully vigilant at all times. But it does look like we’re getting closer and closer to the AFU’s breaking point. Granted—that could all change, there are still some emergency measures at Zelensky’s disposal, like mobilizing everyone from age 18 or even 16 and up; or, for all we know, Russian forces could still get exhausted from losses and grind to a halt—so don’t think it necessarily means the war is over. But things are definitely starting to break.

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One respectable analysis of how Russia’s next advances will go in the Kurakhove direction:

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In the Pokrovsk direction, Selidovo is being stormed. However, the dynamics of events are very rapid (Novogrodovka was taken in 3 days), today Russian troops are already breaking through to the central areas of the city. Therefore, there is a possibility that the city will not hold out for long. Let's simulate what might happen next.

If they take Selidovo, the Russians will probably begin the Kurakhovo operation. In fact, it is already partially advancing. Southeast of Mikhailovka (adjacent to Selidovo), enemy troops are advancing from captured Memrik to the outskirts of Ukrainsk and Galitsinovka. The Russians tried to enter the latter, but were repelled by the Defense Forces. Obviously, the assaults will continue, since the Russian Armed Forces intend to seize the heights in order to take fire control of the Karlovka-Kurakhovo road, along which the main supply of the Karlovka group goes.

After taking Selidovo and, accordingly, Mikhaylovka (it is almost entirely under Russian control), Russian forces will move to Ukrainsk . And after taking Ukrainsk and Galitsinovka, Ukrainian units in the area of ​​the Karlovskoye Reservoir will have to retreat in order to avoid being encircled. Ukrainian troops will be forced to retreat behind the Kurakhovskoye Reservoir to the main nodal center here - Kurakhovo. And the enemy will occupy the northern shore of this reservoir.

At the same time, the second stage of the Russian offensive here will probably be the bypass of the Kurakhovo Reservoir. Thus, the Russian army will enter Kurakhovo from the west . The Ukrainian army does not expect such a maneuver now and, accordingly, did not build defensive structures (probably, only a hastily equipped defense will be built). Therefore, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be forced to leave the city without serious fighting.

At the third stage, apparently, the Russian Armed Forces are planning the Ugledar operation. After the fall of Kurakhovo, the city will be in a semi-ring and in order not to end up in a cauldron, Ukrainian units there will probably be withdrawn.


In essence, this entire area is being turned into a big boiler:

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https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/las ... 16-blasted

(Much more at link.)

******

Poland Finally Maxed Out Its Military Support For Ukraine

Andrew Korybko
Aug 30, 2024

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Ukraine is now desperate to embroil Poland in a hot war with Russia.

Polish President Duda revealed on Monday that his country has already spent a whopping 3.3% of its GDP on providing military, humanitarian, and other forms of support to Ukraine over the past two and a half years, which works out to approximately $25 billion thus far. He then added that it also gave almost 400 tanks thus far too. This was followed the day after by Zelensky demanding even more and suggesting that Poland was still holding back from giving all that it really could.

In the Ukrainian leader’s words, “Today, the Polish side's attention to our defense capabilities has slightly decreased. I mean, Poland probably gave what it could, and there are probably some things that remain in Poland today. I am raising one question... There is a specific question: we really need your MiGs, your airplanes.” He then speculated that “Poland ... hesitates to be alone with [shooting Russian missiles]. It wants the support of other countries in NATO. I think this would lead to a positive decision by Romania.”

Polish Defense Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz responded to Zelensky by clarifying in comments to the publicly financed Polish Press Agency that “The Polish government, both our government and our predecessors, have donated billions of dollars in equipment to Ukraine. That’s all we were able to donate. But the security of the Polish state is always my highest priority and all decisions we make in this matter are made through the prism of the security of the Polish state.”

He then segued into responding to Zelensky’s appeal that Poland intercept Russian missiles over Ukraine by saying that “No country will make such decisions individually. I have not seen any supporters of making this decision in NATO. I am not surprised that President Zelensky will appeal for this because this is his role. But our role is to make decisions in line with the interests of the Polish state. And that is what we are making today.”

For background, it was explained in mid-July why “Ukraine Likely Feels Jaded After NATO Said That It Won’t Allow Poland To Intercept Russian Missiles”, namely because their new security pact – which readers can learn more about here and here – explicitly mentioned this scenario. While one solution to Ukraine’s arms woes would be for the EU to coordinate its military-industrial production, it was also cautioned that “The EU’s Planned Transformation Into A Military Union Is A Federalist Power Play”.

Several factors are therefore at play with regard to Zelensky’s latest demands. First, he’s trying to correct perceptions of their lopsided partnership via “megaphone diplomacy” in the hopes that the optics of demanding more arms despite the enormous amount thereof that Poland confirmed that it already gave Ukraine will come off as some sort of power flex. Second, the innuendo is that Poland should sacrifice more of its sovereignty by participating in the EU’s planned military union in order to boost production.

And finally, he obviously wants to pressure Poland to lobby NATO more on Ukraine’s behalf in order to reach an agreement for permitting it to intercept Russian missiles across the border. Nevertheless, Kosiniak-Kamysz’s response shows that Zelensky is surprisingly meeting some resistance from Tusk’s German-backed liberal-globalist government. His positive reference to the previous conservative-nationalist government and repeated reaffirmation of state interests sends a very powerful message.

It seems that there are still influential conservative-nationalists within Poland’s permanent military bureaucracy, which is a part of its “deep state”, who have some red lines in terms of how far they’ll go in support of Ukraine. The existence of these figures can be intuited by Kosiniak-Kamysz’s abovementioned words that contradicted the expected approach of Tusk’s team. They don’t want to sacrifice Poland’s minimum defense needs nor provoke a war with Russia and then risk being hung out to dry by NATO.

In other words, they’ve maxed out their military support for Ukraine, though that doesn’t mean that Poland will abandon it. Its “deep state” – both the liberal-globalist faction represented by Tusk and the (very imperfect) conservative-nationalist one represented by the former government – hate Russia more than they love Poland so they’ll remain embroiled in this proxy war till it’s finally over. Accordingly, they’ll probably still find some way to continue helping Ukraine, even if it’s less than before.

That said, the fact that Poland has already pretty much given Ukraine everything that it could and isn’t going to unilaterally risk sparking World War III by intercepting Russian missiles across the border bodes ill for Kiev at precisely the moment when it needs as much support as possible. Its invasion of Kursk failed to decelerate the pace of Russia’s advance in Donbass, which has actually accelerated since then, and the impending capture of Pokrovsk could reshape the conflict’s dynamics as explained here.

That’s precisely why Zelensky is so hellbent on Poland intercepting Russian missiles over Ukraine despite the risk of World War III breaking out since he expects that the resultant crisis would lead to Moscow engaging in a series of concessions for the sake of peace. NATO doesn’t share his views though no matter how much its propagandists mock Putin for his tepid response to every red line that Ukraine has crossed thus far otherwise they’d have already approved this and Zelensky wouldn’t have to beg for it.

The abovementioned insight regarding NATO’s continued reluctance to escalate tensions with Russia via direct involvement in their proxy war also suggests that it might not conventionally intervene if Ukraine provokes Belarus into carrying out cross-border attacks out of self-defense. That scenario was touched upon here when warning about Kiev’s possible plans to attack or cut off its northern neighbor’s southeastern city of Gomel, which might be partially predicated on prompting the intervention scenario.

NATO is unlikely to commence a conventional intervention unless Poland agrees to play a leading role, but its “deep state” still seems scared that their country might be hung out to dry judging by Zelensky and Kosiniak-Kamysz’s remarks about why it doesn’t want to intercept Russian missiles across the border. Poland therefore might not lobby for either scenario despite Ukraine’s demand, and it could also possibly refuse to play such a role even if NATO suggested it and offered Article 5 guarantees.

Of course, it can’t be ruled out that Poland’s “deep state” dynamics might change, thus resulting in the formulation of completely different policies. There’s no indication that this might soon happen with its military part, however, which is the most important one in this respect. After all, Kosiniak-Kamysz’s remarks came as a surprise precisely because they contradicted expectations. If its “deep state’s” military dynamics remain the same, then Ukraine shouldn’t count on Poland trying to “rescue” it from Russia.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/poland-f ... s-military

*****

Ukraine SitRep: Patriot Airdefense System Vs. Ukrainian F-16 - 1:0

Ukraine had received 6 F-16 fighter jets. On Monday, during a mass Russian missile and drone attack, 16.7% of them came down. A local administration was first to announce the death of its pilot.

The F-16 trained pilots, not the airplanes, are a resource that is missing most in Ukraine.

There were various theories how the plane was terminated. The Ukrainian Air Force Command made a hero out of its pilot. Stephen Bryen is quoting the Russian source Rybar:

The Ukrainian Air Force Command has released an official obituary for pilot Oleksii Mesia, who was flying an F-16 fighter jet.
According to the text, the fighter he was piloting was hunting Russian cruise missiles and kamikaze drones during the massive missile strike on August 26. It claims he shot down three cruise missiles and one UAV, but was killed himself. This wording suggests that the F-16 either was shot down by Ukraine's own air defenses, which were also engaging the missiles and drones, or crashed into one of the aerial targets, which has happened before.


However parliament member Mariana Bezuglaya, known for her previous criticism of General Zaluzny and other military staff, has claimed that the F-16 was shot down as a result of "friendly fire" (machine translation):

Bezuglaya wrote about this in her Telegram channel.
"According to my information, the F-16 of Ukrainian pilot Oleksiy "Moonfish" Mesya was shot down by a Patriot anti-aircraft missile system due to discoordination between units.

The reports noted that he "failed to manage". The event occurred during one of the most powerful air attacks of the Russians on August 26.

War is war, such episodes are possible. But the culture of lies in the Air Force Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as in other top military staffs, leads to the fact that the system of managing military decisions does not improve based on truthful, consistently collected analytics, but worsens and even collapses, as it happens in the West. Pokrovsky direction. And none of the generals are punished. General Oleschuk remains in office," Bezuglaya wrote.


Mariana Bezuglaya gets fed the details for such allegations from someone high up in the government or military.

The original assumption was that she was a tool of Andrei Yermak, the man who directs the presidential office and is who is brain behind Zelenski.

However, Strana writes today that someone else is likely handling her (machine translation):

Today, Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk commented on the criticism of MP Maryana Bezuglaya of the AFU command, as well as her dissemination of information about various failures of the Ukrainian military, and said that some people "chose" her "as a tool to discredit the top military leadership ." Oleshchuk also warned that " it will not be possible to hang all the dogs on the army."
What kind of people are these who use Bezuglaya as a tool to "hang all the dogs" on the military, Oleshchuk did not specify.

But in political circles, it has long been widely believed that Bezuglaya is the mouthpiece of the President's Office and voices about the military what Bankovaya [, the seat of the the Ukrainian government,] herself cannot say for various reasons.
...
And when Bezuglaya began to criticize the new commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Alexander Syrsky, many regarded this as a sign: Bankovaya was already dissatisfied with him.


That however turned out to be false. Syrski was recently promoted to become a full 4 star general.

Therefore, Bezuglaya's campaign (and not only her) against the current commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and his associates, unlike the times on the eve of Zaluzhny's dismissal, is more like an attempt by some forces to "shoot down" Syrsky in order to take his place.
In this regard, it is worth recalling that according to one of the versions that we have already written about, Bezuglaya focuses not on Yermak, but on another influential representative of Zelensky's inner circle - the head of the GUR Kirill Budanov.

It was Budanov who was considered as one of the main candidates for the post of Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the eve of Zaluzhny's resignation. However, in the end, he lost the" casting" to Syrsky, but it is likely that he did not give up his ambitions.

And it cannot be ruled out that Bezuglaya is still helping him to get closer to his cherished goal – to become the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army.


Budanov, the head of the military intelligence service, is the man who did not shy away from directing a terror campaign against prominent Russians like Darya Dugina.

He is ruthless.

His interventions via Mariana Bezuglaya are also somewhat successful:

DD Geopolitics @DD_Geopolitics - 17:09 UTC · Aug 30, 2024
🇺🇦 BREAKING! Zelensky has dismissed the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, Oleshchuk.

The corresponding decree was published on the website of the Ukrainian President's Office.

The F-16 saga keeps getting more and more interesting ...


Deconflicting the airspace between ground based air-defenses and ones own pilots when under attack is quite difficult and requires very detailed coordination. Ukraine has probably only a few men who were trained in it. It is thus highly likely that a Patriot or some other air defense system took the F-16 down.

It is a huge problem and lying about it makes it worse.

Posted by b on August 30, 2024 at 17:59 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/08/u ... .html#more

******

Ken Klippenstein: Pentagon’s “sensitive activities” detachment revealed
August 28, 2024
By Ken Klippenstein, Website, 8/19/24

As the Ukraine war enters its most perilous phase, with Kiev’s forces fighting inside Russia, the United States is operating a formal “sensitive activities” detachment that is active in providing direct military support to the beleaguered country. The detachment, never before disclosed, is run by U.S. special operations forces, and with its Ukrainian counterparts, provides on-the-battlefield support, including near-real time targeting intelligence, operators say.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, the Biden administration has issued firm reassurances that there are no U.S. boots on the ground in Ukraine. The statement has always been misleading because “boots” only refers to conventional forces and excludes CIA and military special operations personnel, which are considered unconventional and even covert.

The U.S. military defines1 sensitive activities as:

“Operations, actions, activities, or programs that are generally handled through special access, compartmented, or other sensitive control mechanisms because of the nature of the target, the area of operation, or other designated aspects. Sensitive activities also include operations, actions, activities, or programs conducted by any DOD Component that, if compromised, could have enduring adverse effects on U.S. foreign policy, DOD activities, or military operations; or cause significant embarrassment to the United States, its allies, or the DoD.”

Something that is “sensitive” is defined2 as:

“Requiring special protection from disclosure that could cause embarrassment, compromise, or threat to the security of the sponsoring power. May be applied to an agency, installation, person, position, document, material, or activity.”

The Government Accountability Office further clarifies that sensitive activities demand extraordinary secrecy and are “excluded from normal staff review and oversight because of restrictions on access to information.”

Given the Biden administration’s pledges not to be involved in the fighting against Russia, it’s not hard to see why public knowledge of special operators directly supporting the war might be embarrassing. Also, U.S. military aid packages for Ukraine have become an increasingly contentious issue, particularly among Republicans in Congress who have sought to block such aid. But is this a legitimate reason for secrecy? To prevent the American public from knowing something, especially at such a time when the war could even further escalate?

An operator formerly deployed to the Army’s 10th Special Forces Group assigned to a sensitive activities detachment told me their work included the creation of clandestine human networks for intelligence gathering, as well as identifying Russian military weaknesses for targeting. Part of the sensitive activities detachment, the operator was tasked with providing near-real time intelligence in support of Task Force Raven, which trains Ukrainian military personnel, predominantly in Poland.

A second operator also described having been tasked with providing near up-to-the-minute intelligence support to Ukrainian forces. Formerly deployed to a coalition planning cell in Germany, the operator worked with 20 partner nations, generating intelligence on vulnerabilities in Russian electronic warfare systems and air defenses.

To what extent is the “sensitive activities” detachment working on the ground in Ukraine? And how are U.S. green berets and other special operators providing support for Ukraine’s foray into Russia? These are questions that demand answers. Those answers would enhance U.S. foreign policy rather than undermine it, by better informing debate on the matter. At a time when the Pentagon is decrying adversary operations in the so-called “gray zone” — the murky continuum between peace and all-out war — shrouding their own such activities in unnecessary secrecy destabilizes more than stabilizes a very shaky world.

— Edited by William M. Arkin

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2024/08/ken ... -revealed/

*****

Deadly "Geranium"
August 31, 9:27 am

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Results of the flight of one "Geran".

1. Minus F-16
2. Minus deputy commander of the tactical aviation brigade of the Ukrainian Air Force.
2 3. Minus the commander of the Ukrainian Air Force.
4. The affected object in Ivano-Frankivsk.

The most effective "Geran" of the war.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9353534.html

Selidov's legacy
August 31, 10:38

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After the liberation of Selidovo, Russia will inherit two genuine masterpieces of Ukrainian art.

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I suggest exchanging for Scythian gold.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9353815.html

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Sun Sep 01, 2024 12:45 pm

A kind of cold war
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 01/09/2024

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Over the past year, due to the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the difficulties of the United States and the European Union to approve more funds to continue the war, the spectre of an armistice, a freeze on the conflict or even negotiation has been floating around the press. All these articles and proposals, even those made with the best intentions, have had something in common: they have always tried to find only a temporary solution to a conflict that would not be resolved and would become chronic until an indeterminate time when Ukraine could recover those territories that it would now temporarily leave in the hands of Russia. This tendency persists despite the recent Kursk adventure, which has revived demands for increased arms flows and the lifting of vetoes on their use against targets on Russian territory. The European Union, and its still High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, lead this bellicose faction. On the other hand, those who see the Kursk success as only a temporary effect, which is taking place at the cost of, for example, the loss of territory in Donbass, which until a month ago was the main front in this war.

The starting point of this trend is the growing certainty that the war is heading towards an inconclusive end in which neither side would be able to fully impose its conditions. The almost complete paralysis of Russian offensive capacity throughout the summer of 2022 was the first symptom of this. However, the two rapid Ukrainian victories in Kharkiv and Kherson made Ukraine and the political authorities - not necessarily the military ones - of its allied countries dream that such a total or practically total victory was possible. The counteroffensive of 2023, which did not achieve the political objective of bringing Russia to the negotiating table in a position of inferiority that would force it to accept Western terms, showed that the blockade persists even despite the Russian advances in Donetsk and the Ukrainians in Kursk.

The main risk currently lies on Ukraine's side, which over the past year has lost much of the initiative on the front, only to regain it on its own on a new front where the possibility of achieving strategic results is questionable. Added to this are the difficulties of its partners in obtaining the financing to maintain the state and the army and to send to Ukraine the enormous quantities of weapons and ammunition that this war requires. Despite Ukraine's attempt to restart military production in the country, Russia has, in this respect, the qualitative advantage of having one of the most powerful military industries in the world. For now, having the almost unconditional support of several of the powers has not been enough for Ukraine and its partners, which have not yet managed to mobilize their military industry to produce with the required speed the quantities that Kiev requires for this high-intensity war. Russia, for its part, has been able to maintain the necessary production to compensate for its used material and its losses on the front. Destroying this Russian military potential is one of Ukraine's objectives, which naively promises to remedy this imbalance with Western missiles.

The supply of artillery shells, the main weapon of this conventional land war, remains one of the headaches of the West. In an article published by Politico , Antti Häkkänen, Minister of Defence of Finland, a country that has wanted to show its commitment to NATO by increasing its economic contribution to Ukraine and, above all, its production of ammunition, openly referred to “a kind of new cold war”. The term does not refer, in this case, to an ideological dispute similar to that experienced in the last century, but to a similarity with the arms race that accompanied it. The need of the European Union and the United States to accelerate their production has been undermined by the economic and commercial interests of the industry itself, willing to meet current demand only if it has commitments to maintain the level of orders in the long term (mainly public contracts).

The common war against Russia has been declared as existential by the European Union, which will have to bear the extra cost that would be implied by a reduction in American assistance in the event of Donald Trump coming to power or another legislative blockage, so Brussels remains at the forefront of the most favourable tendencies to abandon the diplomatic path and concentrate on the military one. “Since the beginning of the invasion, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and other countries act as a coalition, and such an important actor as the European Union has something to say in this debate, and I call on the EU to play a role and make it clear that this is something that must be done now,” said Dmitro Kuleba this week, calling on Brussels to act practically as a Ukrainian lobby seeking permission from countries such as the United States and Germany to use Western missiles against military and industrial targets in the Russian Federation.

Although it was not necessarily so at the beginning, the war has also become an existential one for Russia, which is aware of what is at stake on the Ukrainian chessboard. And although Russia has not put its economy at the service of the war, certain aspects of military Keynesianism have been introduced, which have made it possible to maintain, and even increase, production. The effects have been diverse, with an increase in wages, a decrease in unemployment, but a lack of specialists and the risk of overheating the economy.

For almost a year, small Russian advances in Donbass and Kharkiv and even smaller ones by Ukraine in Zaporozhye showed a paralysis that reinforced the idea that there will be no complete military victory for either side. That perception has not changed for those who do not see in the Russian acceleration in Donetsk and the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk actions that will lead to the defeat of the opposing side. Although in war everything is possible and, as the recent Ukrainian incursion into Russia shows, changes can occur quickly if certain conditions are met, a military or political collapse of either side is not to be expected, even despite Ukraine's economic difficulties. The configuration of the front and the commitment of both sides to continue fighting in pursuit of their objectives implies that this kind of industrial cold war to which the Finnish minister refers will be accompanied by a situation in which it will coexist with the hot war , focused exclusively on the territory of Ukraine and the border regions of Russia, but in which a deep rupture towards either east or west is not to be expected. “It seems increasingly likely that the Ukrainians will not be able to expel the Russian invaders and that Moscow will not succeed in swallowing up more of Ukraine. What, besides unimaginable misery, comes next?” Bloomberg asked a few months ago . That is the starting point for those proposing the armistice option.

An article published by Foreign Policy perfectly illustrates the approach:

“The war raging in Ukraine today bears more than a passing resemblance to the Korean War. And for anyone wondering how it might end, the durability of the Korean armistice – and the high human cost of the delay in achieving it – merits close study. The parallels are clear. In Ukraine, as in Korea seven decades ago, a static front and irresolvable political differences demand a ceasefire that would stop the violence and leave the thorny political questions for another day. The Korean armistice “allowed South Korea to flourish under American security guarantees and protection,” historian Stephen Kotkin has noted. “If a similar armistice allowed Ukraine – or even just 80% of the country – to flourish in a similar way,” he argues, “that would be a victory in the war.”

Korea is an argument that runs through both sides of the European Cold War , for which some leaders are preparing. It has recently emerged that, by the indirect route of selling shells to the United States for Washington to send to Kiev, the Republic of Korea has surpassed all European countries combined in supplying artillery to Ukraine in 2023. And if the figures given by Western sources are to be believed, the People's Republic of Korea has doubled its southern neighbour's contribution with one million shells delivered to Russia. North Korea's military-industrial might has been used by Ukraine as an argument to claim that Western assistance is insufficient. From the simplistic and almost childish view of Ukrainian discourse, neither the West as a collective nor the United States or the Republic of Korea can afford to be outdone by Pyongyang.

As articles published in recent months by those who understand that an end to the fighting is necessary but do not necessarily seek an end to the conflict - which can only come about through negotiations - show, Korea is also a clear example of what to do . The division of the peninsula and the armistice that never became a peace agreement is a useful scenario for those who argue that Ukraine should focus on its economic recovery and leave the recovery of lost territory for later. Mentioning the Republic of Korea necessarily implies giving the impression that the industrial miracle that began in the 1960s and turned an impoverished country into an economic power can be repeated. However, this change required, for example, an investment of 800 billion dollars in ten years by Japan and that the European Union could hardly repeat, especially in the context of the deindustrialization of the continent.

Without the possibility of such an economic miracle, the intentions in this case are different. An armistice would protect Ukraine from the possibility of losing more territories and would not imply the acceptance of the loss of territories. The proposal, which initially came from Anders Fogh Rasmussen and his collaboration with Andriy Ermak, remains on the table even though, in the current triumphalism, President Zelensky has denounced it as a form of blackmail. Although the proposal of a temporary territorial commitment to guarantee immediate access to NATO is presented as the Korea option , it is really the FRG scenario , the division of Germany awaiting the annexation of the GDR. It is also clear that the cost for Kiev's allies of rebuilding Ukraine would be considerably lower if it were Russia that had to take charge of doing the same in the southern territories and, above all, in Donbass, the place where destruction is, in many areas, practically complete.

None of the proposals that present the option of separating the two Koreas as a model do so as a definitive solution, but rather as a more favourable option for kyiv, which would gain time to recover its economy and rebuild the country by developing beyond what the other side of the front would do. The approach means forgetting that Donbass has been, since the 19th century, one of the most developed areas of Ukrainian territory and that, in Crimea, Russia has already built more modern infrastructures than those available in Ukraine. This dream of great development that will make the lost territories demand to be part of Ukraine again is not new and has been present in Ukrainian discourse since 2014. For the moment, neither the development nor the desire of Donbass or Crimea to return under kyiv's control has occurred.

Only a small part of analysts believe that initiatives such as Kusk's can be the way to defeat Russia and give Ukraine everything it seeks: its territorial integrity and access to organisations such as NATO. Those who, from a pro-Ukrainian point of view and with the certainty that the Russian advance in Donbass will not be definitive either, seek to relieve the pressure and give Kiev time to rebuild its territory and recover its economy fall into a naivety that does not differ greatly from that shown by those who advocate the continuation and escalation of the war. Whatever the situation, whether it is Ukraine's strength or its economic or military weakness, any attempt to freeze the conflict will always come up against the rejection of kyiv, which showed in Minsk that no agreement without a clear political framework can be stable or lasting.

For weeks, rumours about the possibility of negotiations have been increasing in the Western media, which have practically announced the conditions under which the standstill at the front would take place. The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk temporarily silenced these voices, although the underlying situation has not changed. Voices advocating the search for a political solution to the conflict remain marginal, while the majority remains divided between a faction that defends an option of escalating an increasingly dangerous war that extends to the Russian Federation or those who aspire to present as a Korean scenario the attempt to strengthen Ukraine in order to resume Kiev's attempt to recover its lost territories in the future, a kind of cold war waiting for it to heat up again. Without crossing the only real red line of this war, diplomacy, any initiative, even if presented as a peace proposal, is in reality a war proposal.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/09/01/una-e ... erra-fria/

Google Translator

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From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Summary of the Russian Ministry of Defence on the progress of the special military operation (as of 1 September 2024) Key points:

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 30 servicemen in the Vovchansk and Liptsov directions in one day;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 100 servicemen and a tank in one day in the area of ​​responsibility of the East group of forces;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 510 soldiers in the area of ​​responsibility of the West group of forces

in one day; — Air defence assets destroyed 171 Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles in one day;

— The Russian Armed Forces destroyed an Israeli-made radar station, hit UAV assembly workshops and enemy manpower concentrations in 133 areas in one day;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 660 soldiers and 8 guns in the area of ​​responsibility of the South group of forces in one day.

▫️Units of the Dnepr group of forces inflicted losses on the formations of the 141st infantry, 31st mechanized brigades of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the 37th marine brigade and the 124th territorial defense brigade in the areas of the settlements of Malye Shcherbaky, Mala Tokmachka in the Zaporizhia region, Zmiyevka and Veseloye in the Kherson region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 60 servicemen, two vehicles and two 155-mm howitzers "FH-70" made in Great Britain.

▫️Operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces destroyed the Israeli-made RPS-42 air surveillance radar station , damaged workshops for assembling unmanned aerial vehicles and hangars for storing them in the Kharkiv region, as well as concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 133 districts.

▫️Air defense systems shot down three French-made Hammer guided aerial bombs , six US-made HIMAR S and Czech-made Vampire MLRS rockets , as well as 171 unmanned aerial vehicles .

▫️ In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed: 641 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 30,920 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,801 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,434 multiple launch rocket system combat vehicles, 13,898 field artillery pieces and mortars, 25,501 units of special military vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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b]Jack Rasmus: A Tale of Two Offensives: Endgames in the Ukraine War?[/b]
August 28, 22024
By Jack Rasmus, Website, 8/26/24

Dr. Jack Rasmus is author of The Scourge of Neoliberalism: US Economic Policy From Reagan to Trump, Clarity Press, 2020 and the forthcoming Twilight of American Imperialism, 2024, also Clarity Press. He blogs at http://jackrasmus.com, hosts the weekly radio show, Alternative Visions, and posts daily on ‘X’ at @drjackrasmus.

The Ukraine War is at a crossroads. It is entering a new phase. Military and political strategies on both sides are in flux. Both Ukraine and Russia have opened new fronts and offensives—Ukraine in the northern Kursk border region and Russia in the Kharkov and central Donbass area of Donetsk. Further new fronts are likely.

It is estimated that Russia’s total forces in Ukraine ranges today, late summer 2024, are between 600,000 (per Ukraine) and 700,000 (per Russia Ministry of Defense). Ukraine’s total available forces are around 350,000. Behind these numbers, however, both sides are mobilizing further additional forces not yet committed to the line of combat. Ukraine is hurriedly recruiting and training another 150,000 while Russia reportedly has another 400,000 in its total armed forces located elsewhere in Russia. Russia additionally plans to have an army of 1.4 million by year end which suggests additional combat reserves of perhaps 300,000 in addition to its 700,000 combat brigades now in Ukraine.

So Russia today has a roughly 2 to 1 numerical superiority in both combat troops in Ukraine as well as potential reserves. What a Russian force of 700,000 in Ukraine today—and even 1 million by year end—means is that Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) is simply not a sufficient force to conquer all of Ukraine. Nor was it ever intended to be when Russia in February 2022 entered Ukraine with an SMO combat force of less than 100,000.

With combat forces even at 1m by year end, short of an unlikely total collapse of Ukraine’s army, the SMO is not sufficient to take Kiev or Odessa; and it’s certainly not sufficient to invade NATO as some war hawks in the west like to argue in order to justify more direct NATO involvement in the war.

By way of historical comparison, it took the Soviet Union a 13 million man army to push the Nazis out of its territory; at least a third or 4 million of which were engaged in its southern Ukrainian front alone.

While Russia has a clear, albeit not overwhelming edge, in combat forces in Ukraine today, military success is not just a function of absolute numbers but of how well forces can be concentrated at a given front to enable a numerical advantage for a time over one’s adversary. Other factors play a tactical role as well—like the element of surprise, the quantity and quality of reserves that can be marshalled at critical points and times in the conflict, the mobility of one’s forces to be quickly deployed, and the ability to deceive one’s opponent as to where, when and how much force will be concentrated.

While important, and even at times decisive, these latter factors (reserves, surprise, mobility, etc.) are nonetheless secondary; concentration of force is always the primary military tactic. And so far we have seen both Ukraine and Russia concentrate their respective forces, albeit in different fronts separated by hundreds of kilometers. The question is which front is strategically the more important.

The Key Strategic Event of 2024

The key event of the war this summer 2024 is Russia’s concentration of numerically and qualitatively superior forces in the central Donbass area. Russia has enjoyed a numerical advantage in combat forces in the Donbass as well as in air superiority and missile-artillery forces for at least the past year since the collapse of Ukraine’s summer 2023 offensive. This Russian advantage and superiority in Donbass has been further increased this summer 2024 as result of Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbass this summer of some of its own best brigades. Ukraine sent these best brigades from the Donbass to the north Kursk border region to participate on August 6 in Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk territory. That shift of Ukraine forces left its Donbass front weakly defended. In contrast, Russia has not shifted any of its forces from Donbass to the Kursk front but has increased its forces in Donbass. This event is perhaps the single most important strategic shift in the war this summer 2024.

Which front and offensive—Ukraine’s Kursk or Russia’s Donbass—is more important for the eventual outcome of the war will likely be decided in the coming months, and definitely before year end 2024.

In the battles now underway in these two fronts—Kursk and Donbass— we may in effect be witnessing the beginning of the endgame of the war in Ukraine.

As result of Ukraine’s withdrawals of some of its best brigades from the Donbass, Russian forces are now having increasing success on that front taking village after village and driving west toward the key Ukraine strongholds of Pokrovsk in central Donbass, as well as toward Slavyansk in northern Donbass. Should Russia take Pokrovsk and Slavyansk, the war in eastern Ukraine will be effectively over—at least in those former provinces Lughansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhie and Kherson in eastern Ukraine. The line of combat will almost certainly then move quickly far to the west to the Dnipr river.

In contrast, it’s difficult to see what strategically Ukraine hopes to achieve by its penetration into Russia’s Kursk province. Will it turn the tide of the war in favor of Ukraine? That is highly unlikely given Russia’s continuing advantage in combat forces, weapons and air superiority. Which raises the question: what were Ukraine’s motives and objectives for its Kursk offensive and can it attain them?

Ukraine’s Kursk Summer Offensive

Launched on August 6, 2024 Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has had some initial success. Ukraine initially concentrated numerically superior forces at the Kursk border (as it had earlier in the summer at the Kharkov border southeast of Kursk).

In the run up to its August Kursk offensive, Ukraine publicly announced its troop concentrations opposite Kursk and north of Kharkov city were strictly defensive moves to prepare for expected Russia invasions from the north which were being rumored to be imminent throughout the spring 2024. In hindsight, however, Ukraine’s announcement that its forces at the Kharkov and Kursk borders were strictly defensive appears to have been a military deception. Ukraine’s military recently revealed that Ukraine had been preparing back in June for an offensive into Russia at Kursk.

The question then arises: what were Ukraine’s motives and objectives moving troops from the Donbass and other areas of Ukraine (also from the Belarus-Ukraine border) and concentrating them on its northern Kharkov and Kursk border? If it was not for defense against a new Russian offensive in the north but to launch an offensive of its own, what were (and are) Ukraine’s objectives?

In preparation for it Kursk offensive this August, Ukraine transferred combat brigades from all over Ukraine and concentrated them at the Kursk border in July—including many of its best brigades in Donbass as well as some of its 95,000 in defensive positions at the Kharkov border. Ukraine reportedly even moved troops from its Belarus border to Kursk, enabled apparently by an agreement with Belarus to reduce their respective forces from the Belarus-Ukraine border (an agreement that reportedly has been recently rescinded). Finally, Ukraine also rushed some of its new drafted recruits with minimal training to its Kursk region in preparation for the Kursk offensive as well.

In short, Ukraine moved up to a third of its total brigades to the Kursk region. That is probably around 150,000, perhaps half of which are actual combat brigades. A reduced force was left at Vovchansk and a seriously depleted force in the Donbass. In addition, some Ukraine brigades reportedly have returned to the Belarus border since the August offensive.

With an amassed combat force of around 70,000 Ukraine easily overwhelmed Russia’s thinly guarded Kursk border which was manned with border guards and other untested units—even though Ukraine invaded Kursk initially with 12,000 or so. Since August 6 it has brought up and concentrated at least another 60,000 or so.

This perhaps suggests Ukraine is not finished with crossing the border into Russia elsewhere along the northern border. Some analysts suggest Ukraine plans to open another offensive further northwest of Kursk in what’s called the Bryansk border region. Or alternatively just southwest of Kursk in the Belgorod border.

There is even some rumor of another offensive in the far southwest of Zaporozhie province by Ukraine, targeting the taking of the Zaporozhie nuclear power plant currently under Russian control. Where Ukraine might marshall such additional combat forces is debatable, however.

In response, Russia initially brought in special forces and marines to check Ukraine’s advance which has slowed significantly. And reportedly mechanized forces are en route to the Kursk front from other locations in Russia. The Kursk pocket has now become perhaps the most intense killing field of the war to date.
What the Kursk and other possible Ukraine offensives and fronts suggests is that Ukraine is desperate to get Russia to shift its superior and increasingly effective forces from the Donbass in order to slow Russia’s accelerating advances there. But so far it appears Russia has not done so.

Russia’s Kharkov-Vovchansk Offensive

There’s another parallel story here: Before Ukraine’s August offensive into Kursk, Russian forces in early May had entered Ukraine’s Kharkov province near the Ukrainian border city of Vovchansk located just 25miles north of Ukraine’s second largest city of Kharkov. That Russian offensive was launched with a small force of only 15-20,000 even though Russia knew Ukraine had concentrated 95,000 troops in a defensive line just south of the border. The result was predictable: the Russian offensive into Kharkov became quickly bogged down and a stalemate resulted there around the city of Vovchansk, at least until very recently.
A second parallel question therefore arises: why did Russia cross the border near Kharkov-Vovchansk with such an insufficient concentration of forces, facing off against what it knew were reportedly 95,000 Ukrainian troops dug in defensive positions? Clearly the objective could not have been to take Kharkov city. So then what was it?

Russia’s Donbass Offensive

The most important strategic military development this summer 2024 in the war is not Ukraine’s invasion at Kursk. It is that to enable its Kursk offensive Ukraine has left its Donbass front seriously weakened. So weak in fact that Russia’s offensive in the Donbass is intensifying almost daily with growing success.

There are three directions in which Russia is driving west in the Donbass. The most important is the central Donbass where Russia is virtually at the gates of the strategic hub Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk is a railway and road intersection that feeds Ukraine forces most of its weapons and supplies to central and southern Donbass. If it falls to Russia, supplies to most of its forces in central Donbass are at great risk. Equally important, west of Pokrovsk there are few lines and fortifications for Ukraine defense operations. The road is open to the Dnipr river to the far west, the next natural line of defense by Ukraine. But the Dnipr represents the loss of all of Donetsk province and its complete liberation by Russia.

Just further north of Pokrovsk lies a similarly strategic city of Slavyansk and its neighboring largest city of Kramatorsk. Slavyansk is the analog in terms of Ukraine logistical support for the northern Donbass. If it too falls so too does all of the remainder of northern Donetsk and Lughansk province. Russian advances have also begun in this region, through Siversk and Izyum.

In short, if Pokrovsk and Slavyansk fall to Russia it’s game over in the Donbass front to Ukraine. Russia advances suggest this is likely before the US November elections or soon after. The point is Ukraine’s withdrawal of some of its best forces from Donbass, to its Kursk front, as no doubt accelerated Russia’s gains now underway in the Donbass. And if Donbass falls, Ukraine has no choice but to exit its positions further south at the Zaporozhie border as well, or else be encircled there.

The events in recent months in Donbass thus raises yet a third strategic question: Has Ukraine effectively decided to sacrifice the Donbass in order to launch its Kursk offensive?

Military analysts on both sides seem uncertain as to why Ukraine and Russia have made the decisions they have at this critical juncture of the war in summer 2024—Russia last May in Kharkov, Ukraine this summer in Donbass and today Kursk, and Russia’s decision to hold firm to its offensive in Donbass.

So what are some of the possible explanations being bandied about by analysts trying to explain these objectives of these two offensives—Ukraine in Kursk and Russia in Kharkov-Donbass?

Some Unanswered Strategic Questions:

Let’s summarize these strategic questions and offer some possible answers.

Question 1. Why Did Ukraine Invade Kursk, what are its possible objectives, and can it attain those objectives:

Military analysts are all over the map with speculation as to why Ukraine invaded Kursk. Some say the objective was seize the Russian nuclear power plant located just south of the city of Kursk and less than 100 miles from the border. By seizing the plant Ukraine would then use it as a blackmail piece in negotiations with Russia.

Another objective raised is that Ukraine intends to use the territory captured as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Russia, which it appears several third party countries have been trying to arrange—albeit thus far without success.

In terms of military tactics, still another speculation goes, the Ukrainian invasion was intended to force Russia to transfer brigades from its Donbass front to Kursk, and thereby slow down Russia’s advances in the Donbass that appear to be accelerating.

Yet another speculation is Ukraine intended to create a buffer zone along the border before Russia launched its own offensive into Ukraine in the region. That suggests the Ukrainian invasion was to pre-empt Russia opening an offensive front of its own along the northern border.

Another view is that the true objective of Ukraine’s offensive has been to make Putin appear weak to Russian elites and public who are now demanding a more aggressive Russian response to the invasion. The Kursk offensive, according to this view, is to provoke Russia to a more extreme aggressive response that would enable Zelensky to receive more lethal military aid from NATO—like UK Storm Shadow and US ATACMS missiles and missile carrying F-16s—and NATO permission to use them to attack deep inside Russia.

It is possible that a little of all the above are motivations for Ukraine’s offensive: So far as seizing the Kursk nuclear plant is concerned, if that were the objective it has been neutralized and Ukraine has virtually no chance of reaching the Kursk plant any longer now that massive Russian defenses now block its path.

The explanation that the Kursk offensive’s objective is to force Russia to move military units from Donbass to Kursk has also apparently failed to date. Russia has sufficient reserves elsewhere in Russia proper and is moving those to the Kursk front.

The speculation that Zelensky authorized the Kursk offensive as a ‘land for land’ bargaining chip in future negotiations is also negated by recent events since August 6: Putin has publicly stated there will be no negotiations with Ukraine so long as its forces remain on Russian territory, whether in Kursk or Donbass.

The idea of Ukraine obtaining a buffer has never been convincing. Why would Ukraine deplete its military resources elsewhere and risk losing more territory (Donbass) in order to protect territory (North Border) it hadn’t even lost yet?

It seems therefore that the most likely objective of the Ukraine Kursk offensive was, and remains, political: to provoke Russia into an extreme response in order for Ukraine to restore fading western support for Ukraine to continue the war. Zelensky needs Russia to escalate to remain in power in Ukraine. Throughout NATO, support is waning for providing military arms and ammunition. The west further believes that funding Ukraine’s war and economy is settled, provided by the seized $300 billion of Russian assets. However, Western Media almost daily has become increasingly critical of the war, recognizing it cannot be won. Zelensky thus needs to show Ukraine still has the ability to fight and NATO needs to provide even more weaponry because Russia is escalating the war!

Zelensky realizes he needs more direct NATO troop involvement—not just weaponry. Currently NATO is participating in ground operations with technicians operating advanced NATO weapons, mercenaries, as well as senior NATO officers and war planners on the ground. It will need even more. It can’t impress NATO to provide more by losses in the Donbass. But it might convince NATO war hawks to do so by offensives into Russia like Kursk.

2. Has Ukraine effectively decided to sacrifice Donbass?

Evidence on the ground strongly suggests Ukraine may have decided to sacrifice territory in the Donbass and perhaps the entire region altogether. Its Donbass defense was beginning to crack well before the Kursk offensive, ever since loss of the strategic Donbass city of Avdeyevka earlier this year. Now losses there are accelerating after Ukraine pulled some of its best brigades from Donbass and moved them to Kursk.

For Ukraine, the northern Kursk front is strategically more important than Donbass. Its bargaining position in eventual future negotiations with Russia and western support in general was weakening so long as it was losing Donbass. Seizing Russian territory in the north might shore up that loss of support and strengthen its position. In short, protecting Kharkov city and Ukraine territory outside Russia’s four provinces in the east is strategically more important to Ukraine than holding on to the Donbass. Ukraine can’t hold onto the Donbass in the end and NATO and Ukraine both know it. Opinion in the west increasingly suggests Ukraine should agree to give up Donbass and the four provinces. But Ukraine cannot simply retreat in the Donbass and give it up without appearing weak or is about to lose the war. That would accelerate NATO withdrawal of support. Zelensky therefore needed another success elsewhere if Ukraine was inevitably about to lose Donbass. Thus the Kursk offensive.

3. Why did Russia invade Kharkov region with an insufficient force?

Russia crossed over the border early last May in the Kharkov region but not to capture the large Ukraine city of Kharkov. That would take perhaps a Russian offensive force of at least half a million. Russia obviously knew, moreover, that a large Ukrainian force of up to 95,000 per reports was concentrated between the border and Kharkov city itself barely 50 miles away to the south.

So why then did Russian open that front with only 15-20,000 troops? The only possible explanation is Russia entered Kharkov with an insufficient force to get Ukraine to withdraw forces from the Donbass to protect Kharkov, which it did. Otherwise the explanation for throwing a force of 15,000 at 90,000 was military folly. And there’s no evidence throughout the war Russia has been militarily foolish in its offensive force deployments.

4. Did Russia get caught by surprise by the Kursk invasion?

It has to be admitted Russia was clearly caught off guard by Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. It might have been misled by Ukraine’s deception that its amassing of forces on the Ukraine side of the Kursk border in the summer was strictly defensive, designed to confront Russia should it have itself invaded at that location. It is also possible Russia may have viewed US/NATO limitations to date on Ukraine’s use of ATACMS and cruise missiles to attack deep inside Russia as evidence Ukraine was not allowed by NATO/US to escalate attacks directly into Russia. Before August 6 Ukraine’s attacking inside Russia was limited to Ukrainian drones.

Russia may have interpreted these NATO limits meant Ukraine would not be given the ‘green light’ to cross the Russian border with large ground forces. This—combined with Russia misreading Ukraine’s concentration of forces on its side of the border as only defensive—may have led Russia to erroneously assume Ukraine would not mount an offensive into Kursk.

5. Are we witnessing the growing importance of reserves in the war?

As the war now has passed its two and a half year mark, it is clearly beginning to wear on both sides in terms of men and materiel. The availability of sufficient reserves is therefore beginning to play a relatively more important role as the war has continued. Not just reserves in the sense of the number of available combat troops but their combat experience, training, and availability of weapons and ammunition are becoming an increasingly critical factor in the conduct of the war. This is often the case in war as the conflict becomes protracted, except when one side has an overwhelming force advantage of the other. That may have been the case in US wars in Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia, Panama, and elsewhere. But it wasn’t in Viet Nam and it isn’t in Ukraine. Here Russia’s longer term advantage in reserves has begun to show.

It is true Russia in refusing to move reserves from Donbass has had to commit reserves from elsewhere in Russia but it has such reserves. Ukraine does not. The Kursk offensive shows Ukraine has probably committed most of its remaining reserves to that front. And it had to move brigades from Belarus, Kharkov and Donbass for the Kursk offensive—and to cut short training of new drafted recruits. Ukraine is approaching the end of its human reserves and cannot get an increase in weapons and ammunition from NATO that it requires if the war intensifies, as it is now, in both Kursk and Donbass. NATO has arrange continued funding for Ukraine throughout 2025 by seizing Russia’s $300B assets in G7 banks that were frozen at the outset of the war.

NATO’s provision of weapons is slowing, moreover, as NATO inventories are drying up; it can no longer accelerate the delivery of weapons to Ukraine as it did in 2022-23. Nor politically does NATO have the will to provide soldiers on the ground directly into Ukraine, although it is building the largest military and air base in NATO now in eastern Romania within tens of miles from Odessa where it already has stationed thousands of French and US airborne troops. If NATO does intervene ever on the ground it will mostly like be to prevent Russia seizure of the critical Ukraine seaport of Odessa, without which even a rump state of Ukraine in the west cannot be sustained.

6. What are Russia’s strategic options with regard to the Kursk invasion? Its Donbass Offensive?

Russian strategy will not change much in the Donbass. It will continue to advance, likely even more rapidly. Ukraine’s forces in Donbass may even collapse there before year end, with Ukraine retreating west to the Dnipr river and thus abandoning any hold on territory that comprises Russia’s four provinces. As for the Kursk front, Russia will most likely seal off the currently occupying Ukrainian force, bring up new Russian armored division, artillery and air forces and continue to batter those Ukrainian forces in the pocket until they weaken and retreat of their own accord. That will likely happen soon after the US November elections. Ukraine will try to hold on to Kursk to try to ensure further US support before Biden leaves office next January. The odds are significant, however, it will not be able to succeed in that.

Political Consequences of the Kursk-Donbass Offensives

Public opinion in Russia has strengthened Putin’s hand in the war as a consequence of the two offensives. His problem now is not ensuring Russian public opinion continues to support his government and the SMO but that growing segments of Russian opinion and Russian media are now demanding he take even more aggressive military action in response to the Kursk invasion.

Putin’s challenge now is to not fall for Ukraine’s Kursk provocation, abandon the SMO and escalate the conflict to an even more intensive and wider war that would require a much larger military force than the SMO and falling into the NATO war hawks trap to use a Russian escalation as an excuse to get NATO even more directly involved on the ground in the war than it already is.

Zelensky clearly wants to maneuver events into that direction—i.e. a more direct Russia-NATO conflict. That’s perhaps the major rationale behind the Kursk offensive. But Putin ultimately wants some kind of negotiated settlement, albeit on Russia’s two terms announced earlier this summer. He will therefore likely wait until the outcome of US elections to determine whether abandoning the SMO for a larger conflict is necessary. Zelensky and Ukraine leadership is desperate and reckless; Putin is calculating and typically factors in the bigger political picture.

For the moment, however, Putin’s conditions for beginning negotiations announced a couple months ago—i.e. Ukraine leave the four provinces and agree to neutrality—is off the table.

Scuttling the possibility of negotiations (that China was trying to arrange last July) may have also been part of the objective of Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Ukraine and Zelensky have a long track record of feigning interest in negotiations as a cover for an escalation planned. Ukraine diplomatic maneuvers in Beijing in July and in Qatar in August are evidence Ukraine has no intention of seriously negotiating anything. Quite the contrary. Although nothing is imminent, US and Russia may continue exploring the possibility of negotiations through back channels, as they have in recent months, but it’s clear there will be no negotiations of any kind until after the US elections at earliest and more likely not until the Biden administration ends next January 20, 2025.

Throughout the summer opinion has been growing among NATO elites and western media that Ukraine cannot hold onto the Donbass or even the four provinces annexed in 2022 by Russia. Russia’s continuing successes in the Donbass offensive further confirm that view, and solidify it should Russia take Pokrovsk next month. Conversely, NATO elite opinion may shift further toward allowing Ukraine to attack inside Russia using ATACMS, cruise missiles, and even F-16s to enable Ukraine to hold onto the Kursk territory as Ukraine losses the Donbass. The test of this NATO elites’ shift will be evident should US allow in coming weeks further shipments of UK storm shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine. Losing the Donbass logically means rolling the military dice even further in Kursk and the northern border.

US neocons and war hawks will attempt to create further escalation in the Ukraine war between now and January 2025 in order to make it extremely difficult for any new US president elected in November to reduce US/NATO commitments to Ukraine, let alone withdraw.

Should Harris win in November, the Biden administration policies toward the war will almost certainly continue. Harris will be malleable to the foreign policy/neocon establishment who have been running US foreign policy and wars since at least 2001 and perhaps even earlier since the late 1990s. Should Trump win—and the Deep State allow him to actually take office in January without a major US constitutional crisis (which is more likely than not)—it is unlikely that Trump will be able to end the Ukraine war in the short run after taking office January 20. Even with Trump in office, the war will therefore continue well into 2025. The only factor that may expedite an earlier end to the war is if Russia debilitates Ukraine military resources to such an extent that those forces effectively collapse in both the Donbass and Kursk fronts.

Russia has never intended to ‘conquer’ all of Ukraine, including Kiev. Putin’s SMO has always been to drive Ukrainian forces out of the Russian speaking provinces and then ensure some kind of neutrality by what’s left of a Ukrainian state.

But before that can happen Russia will need to conclusively drive Ukraine back across the border from Kursk and take the strategic Donbass cities of Pokrovsk and Slavyansk. Only then is Endgame apparent. Only then will Ukraine forces retreat back to whatever remains of Ukraine. Only then will US/NATO decide to cut losses and abandon the ‘Ukraine Project’ altogether.

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2024/08/jac ... raine-war/

.*****

Zelensky’s silence on F-16 crash raises eyebrows | WION Fineprint
August 30, 2024

Responding to requests for comment on breaking news from major broadcasters is fast becoming a 24/7 task. I do not complain, because preparing for each of these chats is stimulating and takes me into ever wider concentric rings of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

A couple of hours ago, I joined the Indian broadcaster WION for a discussion that lasted a few minutes but was heavy on content. The subject was the crash of an F-16 that had just entered service in Ukraine. The event took place three days ago but was announced by Kiev only now. It cost the life of Ukraine’s most experienced and celebrated pilot. And it raised many questions, foremost among them whether the plane had been downed by the Russians or by ‘friendly fire’ while it was chasing cruise missiles launched by Russia and heading towards targets in Ukraine.

A scandal erupted in Kiev over the past several hours when a Rada member went public with her allegation that the jet had been downed by an American supplied Patriot air-defense missile. This immediately brought a harsh response from the head of the Ukrainian air force who denounced the lady parliamentarian for besmirching the honor of his fighting units, saying she may be brought to justice for this. Meanwhile, the Russians have been silent, neither denying nor confirming their responsibility for the incident. And Ukrainian official sources say that the F-16 was not hit by enemy fire. Their investigation has given tentative findings which they as yet are not disclosing.

See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y3hOrEVuMh8

Transcript below by a reader

Mohammed Saleh, WION: 0:00
The Ukraine’s much-vaunted F-16 program has suffered a critical setback. The loss of both an advanced fighter jet and one of its few trained pilots deals a pretty significant blow to Kiev’s air defense capabilities, raising some serious questions about the future of its aerial warfare strategy using the F-16 fighter jets supplied by American allies to take on the Russian onslaught. And also, did Volodymyr Zelensky try to hide the tragic loss of the jet and the pilot? Our next report gives more details.

1:01
Russia on Monday launched a large-scale assault on Ukraine, firing over a hundred missiles and nearly as many drones. Half of Ukraine was under attack. Fending off the biggest Russian forces in an assault, Ukrainian air defense systems were stretched to their maximum. It now appears that the events took a stunning turn that day. A Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet crashed, killing its pilot during a mission to fend off the Russian missile barrage.

The tragic event marks the first reported destruction of an F-16 in Ukraine, a mere week after the country received its initial batch of advanced fighters. The timing couldn’t be more critical, as Ukraine had only recently integrated six of these American-made aircraft into its defense arsenal, with a limited number of pilots trained to operate them. Interestingly, on Tuesday, a day after the tragedy, President Zelensky publicly praised the Ukrainian Air Force for using the F-16s to destroy Russian missiles and drones, but did not mention the fatal crash.

Zelensky: 2:26
You said about F-16, very good result, very good. Nobody talked about it, but we destroyed already– in this huge attack of Russians, we destroyed already some missiles and drones using the F-16. I will not share how many, but we did it, thanks to partners that they gave us F-16s, provided to us.

WION Euroreport: 2:50
This omission has sparked speculation about whether Zelensky was withholding information to maintain morale or downplaying the loss of such a valuable asset. The F-16s delivered just weeks ago are crucial to Ukraine’s efforts to counter Russia’s superior air power. With only a handful of these jets and even fewer trained pilots, the loss of one so early in their deployment could be a significant blow to Ukraine’s strategic plans.

Zelenskyy claims that Kiev needs 120 to 130 F-16 tactical fighters or other advanced warplanes to take on the much superior Russian air force. The big question is: will the crash of the American-made jet make its western allies think twice before sending them to Ukraine? Euroreport, WION, World Is One.

WION (studio): 3:55
All right. Here to discuss more of this, we’re being joined by Dr. Gilbert Doctorow, an international affairs analyst, author and historian, who joins us live from Brussels.

Dr. Doctorow, thank you very much indeed for joining us here on WION. And let me start off by asking you this: the fact that an F-16 fighter jet, about which there’s been a huge amount of debate — Ukraine has been asking for it; the Western allies have been delaying it. Eventually, the Ukrainian pilots were trained. But now Ukraine has ended up losing one of these planes in some pretty controversial circumstances. It’s being said that it crashed on its own, but there are reports which also say that perhaps it could have been shot down as well. What’s your take on this?

Doctorow: 4:39
Well, the discussion, as I’ve seen, is that at present state, that a member of the Raja, the Parliament of Ukraine, Madame Gezugla, has made claims that the F-16 was shot down by a US Patriot anti-aircraft missile. And that was denounced by the head of the Ukrainian Air Force, Mr. Aleshchuk, who said that she might be brought to justice for making these claims that besmirch the honor of the Ukrainian Air Force. That is, to my knowledge, the latest state of play.

5:10
Of course, the interesting thing here is if indeed it was friendly fire– and I can say that the Ukrainians unanimously are denying that it was hostile fire that brought down the plane– if it was friendly fire, that is very perplexing, because to the information I’ve received, so much of the battlefield activity, operations, is being directed by the United States remotely and partly in place, and that the United States has a superior command and control infrastructure operating what is going on in Ukraine. Therefore, that a Patriot missile would intercept a Ukrainian F-16 shows, if it happens, a real breakdown in that system.

WION: 6:09
I think that’s an important point that you’ve brought up. And also the fact that the Russians are being very quiet about this, the fact that an F-16 fighter jet, the news of this came much later, almost three days since the incident happened, and it came via a report in the “Wall Street Journal”. Why do you think the Russians have been silent about an F-16 fighter jet going down?

Doctorow: 6:31
Well, by their silence, they allow one to suppose that they were responsible for bringing it down, which is very much in their interests, since Mr. Belousov, the Minister of Defense, and others in the Russian government have said that they would dispatch, they would eliminate, liquidate the F-16s within a few weeks. So if one went down within the first week of its operation, that’s already 17 percent of the Ukrainian F-16 air force that’s just been knocked out. And so the Russians can be coy, they can just sit back and let the Ukrainians bicker among themselves.

WION: 7:10
All right, and my final quick question to you is this: what do you think will happen to the strategy where Ukraine had been asking for F-16 fighter jets? Will the Western nations now be willing to send more F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine?

Doctorow:
Well, they probably will. The issue is not the F-16s as such. They’re very nice flying machines. The question is what they are equipped with. This plane, if it went down as described, was equipped in a way that the Russians could not take exception to. It was being used to bring down cruise missiles, and the Ukrainians said that it shot down, in fact, three Russian cruise missiles on Ukrainian territory, or the missiles approaching Ukrainian territory. The Russians have no objection to that.

7:56
The problem is how else these F-16s would be used. And the most likely way they’d be used is to equip them with Storm Shadow or the French Scalp medium- to long-range missiles, or most objectionable, to the Russians, if they are equipped with the American JASSM missles, which … stealth series that is they’re very difficult to detect, therefore very difficult to down. All of these missiles have the potential of 500 kilometers or more and could cause great damage to civilian and military infrastructure in Russia which is a casus belli that would–

WION: 8:41
Okay. all right, thank you very much indeed, Dr. Doctorow, for joining us and getting us all those details. Thank you very much.

Doctorow:
Now thanks for having me.

https://gilbertdoctorow.com/2024/08/30/ ... fineprint/

******

All Their Names Are Known...

... those which are not will be soon. The atrocities committed against civilians in Kursk are straight out of SS playbook of WW II. These "mercenaries", no matter nationality, will be hunted down for the rest of their lives and they will face justice one way or another.



Americans, British, Polish, German, Swedish, French, Colombian, Georgian et al. They will live their lives out in fear. I talk about it in my video today. Executing children... My Lai and Haditha... now in Russia.

http://smoothiex12.blogspot.com/2024/08 ... known.html
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Mon Sep 02, 2024 12:10 pm

Directions of attack
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 02/09/2024

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As speculated more than a week ago, a Ukrainian delegation led by Presidential Chief Andriy Ermak and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov has visited the United States with a very clear task: to present to the White House its plan for victory, which involves obtaining permission to “bring the war closer to Russian homes,” a phrase that Ukraine has recently repeated. Kiev already knows that it has the green light and explicit support for its ground operation in Kursk, and the veto on the use of heavy weapons and missiles against military targets in the border regions of the Russian Federation has long been lifted. Following the logic it has followed until now, Ukraine began to demand permission to attack at greater distances and with higher-capacity missiles as soon as it obtained approval to attack in areas such as Belgorod. The current plan is to exert sufficient media and political pressure to get the Biden administration to approve the list of military targets, presumably so that, once that objective is achieved, the scope, distances and perhaps even the type of target to attack will be expanded.

That has at least been Ukraine's modus operandi during the war years: demanding Western tanks as soon as the delivery of long-range artillery was announced, adding aviation to the wish list as soon as the supply of tanks was confirmed, adding targets in Russia after the delivery of the first ATACMS. According to several American media outlets, which simply confirm what had already been announced before the trip, Ukraine has given Joe Biden's team the list of targets it hopes to destroy within the Russian Federation. Joe Biden's refusal to run for re-election, which has revived his party's hopes for a victory that seemed within reach for the Republicans, means that Ukraine's preferred audience is now the Democratic one. Hence, if on previous occasions Ukraine wanted to address Donald Trump and his supporters by appearing on Fox News , the statements by Defense Minister Umerov have now been made on CNN . "We have explained what kind of capabilities we need to protect our citizens from Russian terror, which is caused by the Russians, so I hope that we have been heard," Umerov said in one of the channel's programmes.

Ukraine has long since decided that its path to a resolution of the war must be through negotiations in which it acts as the stronger party, with Russia between a rock and a hard place due to the military situation caused by defeats at the front, the economic chaos caused by sanctions, and international isolation and political pressure from the West. To achieve this, Kiev needs a sanctions regime that will cause serious damage to the Russian economy, something it is not achieving, nor has it achieved, thanks to the existence of a Global South with an increasing capacity to maintain its own international relations, the political isolation of Moscow. What remains firm is the pressure from the West, which is willing to finance the war and the Ukrainian state in the long term, and the desire to achieve military victories that endanger Russia's real red lines: the integrity of the state, nuclear security and, in territorial terms, Crimea. The option of jeopardizing control of the Black Sea peninsula failed in 2023, so instead of repeating the failed Zaporozhye offensive in the direction of Melitopol-Crimea, Ukraine has opted for the alternative option. Its Kursk offensive is in itself a threat to the integrity of the state and its nuclear security - the International Atomic Energy Agency has already warned about the danger of fighting in the vicinity of the Kursk nuclear power plant - although the results of the offensive indicate that Ukraine needs a much greater military victory to put itself in the position of strength in which it is willing to negotiate. To do so, Kiev no longer wants cruise missiles but a large number of ATACMS and permission to use them against Russian targets, which it presented to its American patrons this weekend. The difference between the two is fundamentally their speed, which makes ATACMS much more difficult to intercept than other types of missiles. In other words, Ukraine aims to inflict serious damage on the Russian rear in order to force Moscow to sit down at the negotiating table on the basis of Volodymyr Zelensky's peace plan , not the Istanbul document .

However, despite the fact that its entire discourse is based on the defense of sovereignty and independence, Ukraine depends entirely on its allies to aspire to implement each and every one of its plans. In this case, the concession of missiles and permission to use them against Russia, which would bring Moscow a little closer to understanding that it is being attacked, not by Kiev but by the countries that send this material and, as Olaf Scholz revealed, even operate it. “Despite repeated requests from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the United States is not currently expected to ease restrictions on Ukraine’s use of the Army Long-Range Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS),” CNN explained on Saturday , significantly downplaying the changes that Ukraine hopes to force with its visit and its lobbying activity to pressure the White House and Germany, the two countries whose missiles it hopes to use against Russia. “We have heard that the Ukrainians can use American security assistance to defend against cross-border attacks, i.e. counter-fire. But when it comes to long-range attacks, deep strikes against Russia, our policy has not changed,” the Pentagon press secretary had said days earlier. According to CNN , the opinion of the White House and the Pentagon remains the same. The United States is not yet ready to take a further step in the constant escalation of the war. The American media cites two main reasons for this: the relatively small number of missiles in the arsenals and the fact that some of the targets proposed by Kiev are outside the range of the ATACMS. The ambition of Ukraine, an increasingly demanding proxy, goes beyond the capabilities of its suppliers’ missiles.

“Ukraine has used its current supply of ATACMS to attack high-value Russian assets in occupied Crimea, including air defenses, ammunition depots and airfields. The entire Crimean peninsula is within range of the ATACMS, making it a prime area to use the US-made missile, the US official said,” CNN adds , making clear both the preferred tactic and the objectives of Washington, which expects Kiev to focus on Crimea, technically within the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine. The White House’s intention to maintain the status quo , possibly for electoral reasons, seems clear, so it is foreseeable that the pressure work by Kiev and its allies, led by the European Union, will have to continue for some time, during which Ukraine will use as an argument both its victories in Kursk and its defeats in Donbass.

While the Kursk front is stabilising in the same way that has been observed so far, with Russian troops ensuring that no deep advances are made, although they are unable to expel Ukrainian troops from a significant part of the border zone of the region, everything is accelerating in Donbass. “I have never seen such speed,” says one of the commanders fighting on the Krasnoarmeysk front, as quoted by The Telegraph . “It is very fast and our problem is the same: we do not have infantry, we do not have enough artillery or ammunition. We do not have enough drones,” adds the same source, who also insists on the increase in Russian electronic warfare and the critical situation in that sector of the front, clearly a priority only for the Russian Federation.

“The situation is difficult in the direction of the enemy’s main attack,” said Oleksander Syrysky, who, on his own initiative or by political order, has withdrawn part of the units fighting in Donbass to incorporate them into the more spectacular Kursk offensive. “All decisions are being taken without delay at all levels. Despite the fact that the enemy has an advantage in manpower and weapons, thanks to our soldiers, they are suffering significant losses,” he added, with the usual speech of someone who sees the front retreating, but needs to give his audience – both the local population and foreign leaders – reasons to believe that the objectives are being met. Denying reality is part of war propaganda and Zelensky has also done that this week, claiming that the Russian advance on the Pokrovsk front has slowed since the start of the Kursk offensive. There is no need to go to Russian sources to confirm that the acceleration of Russian progress on the front is recent and is partly due to the prioritization of the incursion into Russia over the front that had hitherto been the main one.

Image
Map showing the directions of Russian advances in Donetsk, showing, in the southernmost part, the encirclement that Russia hopes to close in order to expel Ukrainian troops and move the entire front line westwards, away from the city of Donetsk.

The reason why Russia has not opted for a rapid advance towards Krasnoarmeysk is due to the military logic of understanding that Ukraine is seeking a battle there similar to that of Artyomovsk, in which, in exchange for the almost complete destruction of the city, the Ukrainian army can inflict heavy casualties on the Russian ranks, something that Zelensky has explicitly stated. Russian troops continue to press towards Mirnograd and Krasnoarmeysk, although without exposing themselves to the possibility of a Ukrainian counterattack that would surround Russian troops that try to assault either of these two cities frontally. Hence, the emphasis is not on quickly starting the battle for Krasnoarmeysk-Pokrovsk, which will be decisive in sealing the fate of the western part of Donetsk, but on advancing south towards Marinka, Krasnogorovka and, finally, Ugledar.

“The most dangerous strategic situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is developing in the west, in the area of ​​Selidovo and Novogrodovka. From these localities, as we have already written above, a road opens to the south-west, covering the rear of the entire second line of defence of the Ukrainian Armed Forces west of Donetsk, which depends on Ukrainsk, Gornyak and Kurajovo,” wrote the Ukrainian media Strana yesterday . Yesterday, several sources suggested that Ukraine had begun withdrawing troops east of this line to avoid them being besieged. “After the sudden fall of Novogrodovka, it seems that the Ukrainian command became aware of the threat, so, according to various sources, reserves were transferred to the defence of Selidovo, so that the Russian forces were unable to take the city immediately. Heavy fighting has been going on for several days, with Russian troops managing to hold on to the outskirts of the city and now trying to break into the centre. However, according to Russian sources, unlike in Novogrodovka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are putting up serious resistance here,” Strana added.

Ukraine is fighting in Selidovo, where Russia already controls the dominant heights and a significant part of the town, to slow down the Russian advance. According to pro-Ukrainian sources, to do so, it has moved the 72nd Brigade to Selidovo from Ugledar, where it has been defending itself against Russian attacks for two years. The privileged position of the town had made it impossible for Russia to advance on the tactically important town, where it has suffered very high casualties over this time. Russian sources reported on Saturday evening an unusual increase in artillery and missile attacks on the town. Yesterday, Ukrainian media assumed that the assault on Ugledar had begun after Russian advances in nearby towns. While Ukraine is looking for missiles to raise the stakes and expand its attack capabilities, Russia is trying to push Ukraine away from the city of Donetsk and to destroy the last part of the 2014 front that still remains. Only then will it be time to really advance on Krasnoarmeysk, the loss of which would mean the end of the Ukrainian defence of Yuzhnodonetsk, the southern front of Donetsk.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/09/02/30489/

Google Translator

*****

From Cassad's Telegram account:

Colonelcassad
0:25
0:09
0:15
0:09
0:12
Massive attack on enemy targets in Kiev and the region

Tonight, a combined attack was carried out using cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as Geran-2 attack drones, on enemy targets in Kiev. Explosions were also heard in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions at night.

In Kiev, cruise missile strikes hit the territory of the State Joint-Stock Holding Company Artem (abbreviated as GAKHK Artem). The company is a manufacturer of air-to-air guided missiles, automated systems for the preparation and maintenance of air-guided weapons, anti-tank guided missiles, as well as instruments and equipment for aircraft. As a result of the strikes, one of the plant's workshops was destroyed and an administrative building was damaged. A fire broke out at the site of the strike on an area of ​​more than 1,500 square meters. It is important to note that the explosion, which sounded after the air raid alarm was cancelled in Kiev, was heard from the area of ​​the enterprise.

Another affected object was the territory of the Antonov Serial Plant (a state-owned enterprise of the aviation industry). According to available information, a warehouse and a workshop for the assembly and maintenance of unmanned aerial vehicles were destroyed as a result of the strike. A fire was recorded at the site.

The work of the Ukrainian air defense did not go without consequences: the building of the MAUP educational institution on Framentovska Street, 2 was damaged; falling fragments were recorded on Gymnasium No. 46 on Galaganovska Street, 4/2 and in its vicinity, which led to the fire of vehicles.

In the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, Russian troops hunted for enemy air defense systems last night.

According to available information, at about 21:15 in the area of ​​the settlement of Nizhny Byshkin (Kharkiv region), an Iskander-M OTRK with a cluster charge hit the positional area of ​​the S-300 complex. As a result of the strike, one launcher was destroyed, another launcher, a radar station, and a combat control post were seriously damaged. Seven people from the air defense crew were killed and another nine were injured to varying degrees of severity.

Also, at about 5:00, in the vicinity of the city of Sumy, a strike was carried out on another positional area of ​​the enemy's S-300V1 anti-aircraft missile system. As a result of the strike, a 9S32 multi-channel missile guidance station (MSNR), one radar, and two launchers were destroyed. The strikes were carried out using three Iskander-M OTRK missiles. In addition, in the vicinity of the settlement of Glibnoye (Sumy region), ballistic missile strikes damaged the positional area of ​​the enemy's mobile fire group

@don_partizan

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

Ukraine Weekly Update
30th August 2024

Dr. Rob Campbell
Aug 30, 2024

<snip>

August 23rd 1943 - Kursk Battle Ends

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According to the Two Majors:

The Battle of Kursk, one of the greatest military engagements in human history, ended on August 23, 1943 – 81 years ago. In total, the battle involved over 4 million people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and nearly 12,000 aircraft.

The battle had lasted 50 days. You can read more here.

Ukraine Independence Day - 24th August

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Ukraine achieved independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union and no doubt some Ukrainians are celebrating. However, many others have come to appreciate they have been used by the West, which could force them into poverty for the next 35 years.

Where Have All The People Gone?

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According to this report only 18-19 million people are left in Ukraine which had a population of 38 millions in 2022.

Squeaky Bum Time

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This is a phrase used by former Manchester United manager, Alex Ferguson, to describe the nervous end to a football season but I am using it in connection with the US/NATO’s decision to invade Kursk. Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Ryabkov has said that the consequences of the US’s decision to invade will be more severe than they have been hitherto and Sergei Lavrov has called any attacks by Stormshadow missiles deep into Russia as ‘playing with fire’. He also said that Russia’s doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons ‘is currently being clarified’.

There has been lots of coverage of Zelensky’s repeated requests to be allowed to use these missiles. Then we heard that Biden is considering these requests and may allow Ukraine to hit certain targets inside Russia. On the 27th August, the Pentagon confirmed that US policy remains the same: Ukraine cannot employ its weapons to strike deep into Russia. I think the mixed messages here are deliberate. To me, this appears to be part of a show designed to put the Russians off balance and tempt them into actions that would give NATO an excuse to get involved more deeply and would displease Russia’s supporters. The use of battlefield nukes would do that. An emergency meeting of NATO was granted at Z’s request for the 28th August - all part of the show.

But missiles flying against targets deep into Russia at the behest of the West is likely to fray the nerves of any Russian general, politician or civilian. It must be appreciated that F-16s - currently available to the Ukrainians - are capable of carrying a nuclear payload. So, the Russians have to ‘trust’ that the US will not launch a nuclear attack. I know this is unlikely but it will generate some nervousness in Russian circles. The Russian people will demand some sort of retaliation for Kursk and may not be satisfied with drone/missile attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure (though I don’t think that the air attack of the 26th August was a retaliation). Some have said that the Russians are in danger of not being taken seriously when they say things such as ‘playing with fire’ and nuclear doctrine ‘being clarified’ but don’t do anything. I have no idea how the Russians can retaliate other than by taking Pokrovsk, Toretsk and Kursk etc. while making sure that the Ukrainians are cold and dirty this winter. They could also supply weapons to Iran and the Houthis but in my humble view, anything else would be madness. An attack by Stormshadows into Russia will need to be tolerated in spite of the risks.

However, in this interview with Nima, Dr. Gilbert Doctorow offers a more pessimistic view of the current situation in Kursk. He believes that Ukraine’s offensive is much more of a threat than other commentators believe and was painstakingly planned and organised exclusively by NATO. It could also involve long range missiles being launched deep into Russia which will attack sites where military equipment/personnel are located as well as civilians. The game I referred to above could lead to this scenario and could involve Russian retaliatory attacks against Washington - yes - against Washington, according to Doctorow. Lavrov has said that the US can’t assume that because it is located on the other side of the Atlantic it will not suffer in the event of war - which fits with Doctorow’s view.

Doctorow also points out that the deployment of a US aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean, ostensibly for the purpose of supporting Israel in a war against Lebanon, Iran and the Houthis, could be used to make a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Russia with 100 planes. But Doctorow also suggests that the Russians will know this because they have the aircraft carrier on their radar. Moreover, they could be contemplating a pre-emptive nuclear strike of their own on the US and the West.

I should say that I haven’t come across any other commentators who share Doctorow’s rather gloomy prognosis. I am not convinced that the Mediterranean would be the best launching pad for a nuclear attack on Russia.

If this wasn’t bad enough, the Iranians are also causing some nervousness as we await their belated attack on Israel. And Washington is now planning for a joint nuclear strike against Russia, China and North Korea - according to Pravda. Meanwhile, back in Kursk, the IAEA inspector has warned that the Kursk NPP is at great risk of a nuclear accident - according to RT. Of course, it will not be at risk if the Ukrainians don’t target it but the inspector did not even concede that recent drone attacks on the plant have emanated from Ukraine.

Yes - it’s squeaky bum time!

<snip>

Biomaterial War Games

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Major General Kirillov

According to a report from IntelRepublic:

Igor Kirillov, Head of Protection of Russian Forces from Biological Weapons, alleges the U.S is actively using Moldova and Romania to transport biomaterials from Ukraine - publishing names of companies & individuals involved. There have been over 2,000 instances of biomaterial shipments to the U.S via Moldova between August 2022 and May 2024, involving U.S subsidiaries and firms controlled by Moldovan President Sandu. Ukrainian soldiers are also trained to use chemical ammunition, where Moldova and Romania are involved in developing pathogens targeting specific ethnic groups.

Those who are interested can read more here.

The Prophet Zelensky

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Ukrainians always return debts. And he who wishes our land disaster will get it at home. With interest. Whoever wants to sow evil on our land will reap its fruits on his territory. This is not prophecy, not gloating, not blind revenge, it is a pattern. Justice. A boomerang for evil. And to the one who brought evil to our land, everything returned back to his home.

Zelensky claims to have a new ‘Victory Plan’ that he will present to whoever wins the election in the United States in return for additional funding from the West. But I am not convinced that the once great Z, wanting to be great again, has any say at all in any ‘plan’. But maybe he has finally gone rogue and cut the strings with which the US makes him dance. I honestly have no idea.

The whole Kursk affair was so out of the blue and so irrational from many points of view that its is difficult to explain. A coke filled Zelensky, wanting to be great again, could have initiated it - but surely He would not act without US permission. If the US/NATO military thought this was a good idea then everything Martyanov, Ritter, Johnson et al have said about their incompetence is true.

In response to Zelensky’s ‘plan’, Sergei Lavrov has said that he is open to negotiations but not with Zelensky - according to Pravda.

Peace Talks Postponed
Zelensky’s plans to organise another peace conference in Switzerland with Russia also sat at the table have been postponed until 2025 according to a Ukrainian source. Apparently, countries from the Global South have refused to participate because of the Kursk ‘invasion’.

Podolyak

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Mykhailo Podolyak, Zelensky spokesman extraordinaire has delivered the most incomprehensible interview I have ever heard from someone who claims to be sane. According to this deranged verbiage, the Russians want to lose the war in order to get rid of Putin. Russians suffer from a ‘collective primitivism’, he said, that persuades them to elect primitive rulers such as Putin. He also said that Putin can survive only as long as the war continues and that when the war ends the people will come after him. He is also convinced that if Putin stays in power, Russia will cease to exist. Am I alone in thinking that he is actually describing Zelensky and Ukraine rather than Putin and Russia?? If you have a strong constitution, you can hear all his ‘projections’ here.

Kiev Tries to Boss Belarus

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Belarussian heavy equipment on the border with Ukraine

The Ukrainians are annoyed that Belarus has stationed troops close to its border with Ukraine and have demanded that it redeploy its troops at a safe distance greater than the firing range of it weapons. But this would conflict with the notion of border protection. The Ukrainians are particularly concerned, or so they say, that the Chernobyl NPP could be at risk. Now that’s a bit rich coming from a country that has attacked NPPs many times. The Belarussians will ignore the request, of course.

Dmitruk Flees

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Bye, bye.

Rada deputy, Artem Dmitruk, has fled to Moldova and then on to Italy with his family. The rats are leaving.

Cauld Winter Beckons in Ukraine

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A Ukrainian source, not supportive of the Zelensky regime, is reporting that the electricity grid in Ukraine is now operating at 50% capacity and that during the winter this will translate into 12 hour outage periods without electricity and water. During these periods, Ukrainians will not be able to communicate with each other or with the outside world, Business will not be able to function and refrigerated food will spoil or infect those who try to use it. The air defence systems promised by the July NATO summit have been delayed indefinitely which means that Ukrainians will not be able to prevent further damage to the grid. Many fear that the economy will finally collapse in consequence. One Ukrainian said:

We advise everyone to prepare for the worst-case scenario. Your life is in your hands. Remember this. For the Zelensky government, you are just a tool to continue the game.

Starlink Failure Spoiled Kursk Offensive

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Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Vadim Sukharevsky, has blamed Elon Musk for the failure of the Kursk operation. Apparently, Starlink stopped working 24 hours after the ‘invasion’ started resulting in a lack of communication and interaction between the attacking units. The fact that Starlink failed is clear but it is not certain that Musk is responsible - rather than the Russians who have blocked Starlink before now. However, Musk did block Starlink when the Ukrainians attacked Crimea - according to Slavyangrad.

<snip>

Abrams Trashed

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According to those at Military Watch Magazine, who know about such things, 20 out of the 31 Abrams M1A1 MBTs have been destroyed in the past six months.

Maneuver Warfare?

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Within the expert commentator ‘community’ some are more open than others to the possibility of a mobile form of warfare. Colonel McGregor is among those who believe that a ‘big arrow’ offensive is a possibility at least. I think it is more likely that the strategy of attrition will be pursued until the Ukrainian army collapses. But the Russians will also take advantage of situations as they develop: they are not inflexible, as some believe. If a ‘big arrow’ offensive can be conducted in a manner that does not risk significant losses in men and materiel, I don’t think the Russians would ‘turn their noses up at it’.1

But as Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge points out, the collapse of Pokrovsk (which could be fairly close) would provide the Russian forces with an opportunity to engage in mobile warfare because the area to the west (towards the Dnieper) has few villages and much open grassland. This is ideal for mobile warfare at the moment (before the autumn rains come). But before that happens, Durden suggests that the Ukrainians could turn this into another Bakhmut meatgrinder. I think that would be unlikely given Ukraine’s commitment to Kursk and another possible offensive in Zaporozhye. Insane as it may sound, reports are revealing what appears to be a huge build up of Ukrainian forces in the Orekhov area - pointed in the direction of Rabotino and Tokmak. This is where the Ukrainian summer offensive of 2023 floundered so tragically - this is where the folly that created ‘Bradley Square’ happened. Given the declining strength of Ukraine’s forces, their commitment to Kursk and the ascendency of the Russians, I would be very surprised if the Ukrainians embark on such a venture.

(Much more at link.)

https://robcampbell.substack.com/p/ukra ... update-440

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Frontline news:

Chinese drone catastrophe, speculation about the Pokrovsk mystery - Syrsky's cunning plan?

Events in Ukraine
Aug 29, 2024

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Madyar, a Ukrainian military officer with over 300,000 subscribers. The Drone Guy in the Ukrainian informational space:

The Aftertaste of This 'Ni Hao' Restriction from September 1st Will Come Gradually, Like the Stages of Cancer, Sorry."

‼️ Get Ready for a New Challenge for Everyone Involved in the Use of Drones. And it will be incomparable to the temporary shortages of ammunition. Those (ammunition, not drones) are occasionally supplied by our Partners. But it won’t be the same with drones. It will be expensive and scarce. And a few dozen new millionaires will appear, of various 'kinds.'

I have a feeling that the restriction described below will become one of the components pushing us to the negotiation table. And not on equal terms at all.

We're talking about the next wave of export restrictions from the Celestial Empire. A month ago, the Chinese government announced restrictions starting on September 1st on the export of a whole range of goods related to UAVs. The announcement of these restrictions went largely unnoticed, because 'raising the alarm' often borders on 'crying wolf' here, and there are no authoritative China analysts in Ukraine. So, in specialized chats, the topic was briefly discussed and then forgotten. Likely, local manufacturers (and assemblers are called that here too, though the designs are some of the best in the world, yet everything is assembled from imported Chinese components) have poured all their working capital into purchasing these spare parts, because they have obligations and/or see a solid premium on scarce, banned goods.

Stocks are not infinite, and the smuggling routes for delivering banned goods are, to put it mildly, different for us and the enemy.

Thus, yesterday and today, everyone involved received the following announcements from the largest carriers:

"Dear customers ….. ….. Please note the important changes in the list of goods that are prohibited for transport weighing up to 30 kg.

🚨 From September 1, 2024, exports from China will be subject to even stricter inspections. Banned goods will not be available for air or sea delivery.

Starting September 1, 2024, we will no longer be able to accept the following items for transport: Carbon frame for quadcopter Carbon beam for quadcopter Quadcopter Motor for quadcopter Set of parts for quadcopter Set of frames for quadcopters Navigation camera for quadcopter Flight controller for quadcopter Landing gear for quadcopter Propeller for quadcopter Frame for quadcopter Signal booster for quadcopter remote control Digital data transmission system for quadcopter Digital radio communication detector Radio system Radio station Portable radio Video signal transmission system via radio channel Electronic warfare systems…"

The situation is crap.

We will fight as long as we have the strength.

That's it…

MADYAR 🇺🇦 29.08.24


And a quite interesting, albeit speculative post by Evgeny Norin on August 28. Norin is a respected Russian military historian. His ruminations on the Pokrovsk mystery have been quite popular among Russian military bloggers, though of course not all agree:

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In summary, regarding the seemingly absurd concerns of the "armchair general staff":

I'm not much of a military analyst, but there are some things I'd like to discuss. Look, we have this situation on the front lines. Our forces are pressing on Selydove, pressing on Pokrovsk, and in some areas, the enemy is already openly abandoning some positions; the line is cracking. Meanwhile, it's well-known that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have several relatively intact, more or less fully equipped units in reserve, about five brigades. If they’re not throwing everything that moves into the battle near Pokrovsk, it means that a) they intend to deploy their reserves somewhere else, and b) they need to create some sort of devastating effect before the front in Donbas collapses completely. So, it suggests that we might see a repeat of something like the Sudzha operation. What could this be? For example, a second pincer movement in the Kursk region, which will be executed at the moment when we relax and decide that the offensive has been repelled and that it was all just a publicity stunt.

Why are we assuming that this was done purely for PR? Because they didn’t reach Kurchatov? But what if that was just a diversionary strike and the main blow will be delivered, for example, from Hlukhiv toward Rylsk to link up with the southern group? The distance from the border to Rylsk via highway is 30+ km—a quite manageable distance if they break through the first line, and as practice has shown, they can break through the first line. Take a package of several well-prepared brigades and rush into a maneuverable battle. What do we have in terms of reserves? Who knows. And if significant forces find themselves between this group and the southern one, well, that’s what’s called a cauldron. Also, by the way, they haven’t even used their aviation yet, including those F-16s.

In any case, if they’re not using their operational reserves in Donbas, it means they’re saving them for something else. And whether our side is ready for that something—I don’t know. In short, I want to shout “Goida!” (Let’s go!), but if the enemy is clearly not an idiot and is acting inexplicably strange, then there’s some kind of explanation—it’s just that they don’t want it to be obvious.


Resident, an anonymous Ukrainian telegram with over a million subscribers had a similar idea on August 29:

⚡️⚡️⚡️**#Insider Information**
Our source in the General Staff has reported that the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Eastern Front are lacking heavy equipment and reserves needed for a flanking strike against advancing Russian units. Syrskyi not only deployed reserves but also pulled some brigades with equipment from Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk for the Kursk operation. Now, a quick decision is needed to transfer forces back to Donbas to prevent the front from collapsing.


There was a response on August 29 from ‘ZeRada’, an anonymous Ukrainian telegram with over 400,000 subscribers:

🔥 Counteroffensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Colleagues are speculating about a possible counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Pokrovsk direction.

To be honest, we've been scratching our heads for the past two days, trying to answer the question of what exactly is happening on this section of the front. The option of abandoning these territories as non-priority is not being considered because, as we’ve already written [link], the importance of this section of the front is hard to overestimate.

It’s also hard to believe that the distributed pressure being applied by the Russian Armed Forces across the entire front line has suddenly worked in one particular direction, since the "average" temperature across the rest of the front is roughly the same: Russian advances are very slow. But here, it's a complete disaster.

At the same time, the Russian Armed Forces are proceeding quite carefully and competently. We've mentioned that for a turn to the south, they really need Novohrodovka, ideally also Hrodovka and Selydove. These three points would serve as a backbone for the turn to the south. But they’ve already taken Novohrodovka, are practically in Hrodovka, and today there are battles in Selydove. Therefore, a frontal counteroffensive is out of the question.

A counteroffensive from below is also not feasible because an assault group needs to be trapped. So, in general, it’s not a serious option.

A strike from the north is the only acceptable option. The biggest problem is that there are no large settlements there where troops can be concentrated unnoticed.

There’s also the problem of losing New York. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces do begin to concentrate troops north of the Pokrovsk direction, west of Toretsk, for a strike to the south, they could always be flanked from New York.

But the most important factor is the concentration of Russian forces in this direction. A 150,000-strong group can always find reserves and deploy them to counter the counteroffensive. Therefore, it’s not fair to compare the kilometers the Ukrainian Armed Forces would need to cover to cut off the main supply artery running through Ocheretyne (where it's just 5 km) with the kilometers covered in the Kursk region, where there were only a few conscript units and the element of surprise. Here, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are dealing with the most powerful Russian group on the front.

There is also the problem of motivated reserves:

Some combat-capable brigades are rotating after the battles for Ocheretyne,

Some have already been withdrawn from Kursk with significant losses,

Some are still in Kursk.

Therefore, Syrskyi’s reserve is quite limited, and the Russians know it. This was one of the major problems of the Kursk operation, as the number of mobile reserves for the Ukrainian Armed Forces has significantly decreased, which frees the hands of the Russian Armed Forces.

Therefore, we don't particularly believe in a counteroffensive in this area.


https://eventsinukraine.substack.com/p/frontline-news

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Malcom Kyeyune: Why Ukraine is being blamed for Nord Stream
August 31, 2024
By Malcom Kyeyune, UnHerd, 8/21/24

To understand the truth about the Nord Stream pipeline, one needs to master a certain form of “Kremlinology”. Everything about it is designed to obfuscate, every strand shrouded in prevarication and deceit.

From the start, the investigation was a textbook cover-up. The Swedish government rushed to secure evidence, citing their putative rights under international law, consciously boxing out any sort of independent, UN-backed inspection. Of course, after gathering all the evidence, the Swedish authorities studiously did exactly nothing, only to then belatedly admit that it actually had no legal right to monopolise the information in the first place.

The Germans, for their part, were also supremely uninterested in figuring out who pulled off the worst act of industrial sabotage in living memory against their country. In fact, over the course of a year-long non-investigation, we’ve mostly been treated to leaks and off-the-record statements indicating that nobody really wants to know who blew up the pipeline. The rationale here is bluntly obvious: it would be awfully inconvenient if Germany, and the West, learned the true answer.

Thus, the recent revelation that the true mastermind behind the ongoing deindustrialisation of Germany was none other than a Ukrainian by the name of “Volodymyr Z.” must have come as an unwelcome surprise. For not only is the idea that the authorities have suddenly cracked open the Nord Stream case not credible in the slightest, but the sloppy way in which the entire country of Ukraine is now being fingered is likely not an accident. Indeed, at the same time as the ghost of Nord Stream has risen from the grave, the German government announced its plans to halve its budget for Ukraine aid: whatever is already in the pipeline will be sent over, but no new grants of equipment are forthcoming. The German government is hunkering down for increased austerity, and so it is cutting Ukraine loose.

Germany, of course, is hardly alone. Even if there were enough money to go around, Europe is increasingly not just deindustrialising but demilitarising. Its stores of ammunition and vehicles are increasingly empty, and the idea of military rearmament — that is, creating entirely new military factories and supply chains — at a time when factories are closing down across the continent due to energy shortages and lack of funding is a non-starter. Neither France, the United Kingdom nor even the United States are in a position to maintain the flow of arms to Ukraine. This is a particular concern inside Washington DC, where planners are now trying to juggle the prospect of managing three theatres of war at the same time — in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Pacific — even though US military production is arguably insufficient to comfortably handle one.

And so, in an effort to save face in this impossible situation, Ukraine is now being held solely responsible for doing something it either did not do at all, or only did with the permission, knowledge, and/or support of the broader West. This speaks to the adolescent dynamic that now governs Western foreign policy in a multipolar world: when our impotence is revealed, find someone to blame.

The war in Ukraine, after all, was already supposed to be won, and Russia was supposed to be a rickety gas station incapable of matching the West either economically or militarily. Yet here we are: our own economies are deindustrialising, our military factories have proven completely incapable of handling the strain of a real conflict, and the Americans themselves are now openly admitting that the Russian military remains in a significantly stronger position. Meanwhile, Germany’s economic model is broken, and as its economy falls, it will drag many countries such as Sweden with it, given how dependent they are on exporting to German industrial firms.

10 years ago, during the 2014 Maidan protests, the realist John Mearsheimer caused a lot of controversy when he began warning that the collective West was leading Ukraine down the primrose path, and that our actions would lead to the destruction of the country. Well, here we are. At present, our only saving grace is the continuing offensive in Kursk — a bold offensive that will surely be remembered as a symptom of Ukraine’s increasing desperation.

Indeed, a far better guide of things to come can be found in the fingering of “Volodymyr Z.” as the true culprit behind the Nord Stream sabotage. Here, rather than accept responsibility for the fact that Ukraine was goaded into a war it could not win — mainly because the West vastly overestimated its own ability to fight a real war over the long haul — European geopolitical discourse will take a sharp turn towards a peculiar sort of victim-blaming. No doubt it will be “discovered” that parts of Ukraine’s military consisted of very unsavoury characters waving around Nazi Germany-style emblems, just as it will be “discovered” that journalists have been persecuted by oligarchs and criminals in Kyiv, or that money given by the West has been stolen, and that arms sent have been sold for profit to criminal cartels around the world.

All of these developments will duly be “discovered” by a Western political class that will completely refuse to accept any responsibility for them. Far easier, it seems, to calm one’s nerves with a distorting myth: it’s the Ukrainians’ fault that their country is destroyed; our choices had nothing to do with it; and besides, they were bad people who tricked us!

https://natyliesbaldwin.com/2024/08/mal ... rd-stream/

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The basketball players escaped
September 2, 13:00

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The coach and one of the players of the Ukrainian national basketball team escaped on the very first day of the foreign training camp. They used a legal way to leave the concentration camp and were gone.
The threat of lifelong disqualification in Ukraine does not stop them too much. The main thing is that they saved their lives. And they will be able to return home after the destruction of the Nazi regime.

Ukrainians, make the right choice - flee Ukraine. Do not become cannon fodder for the cocaine Fuhrer.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9357931.html

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Tue Sep 03, 2024 11:50 am

The danger of the extreme right
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 03/09/2024

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The power of the far right has been one of the most repeated themes in the last ten years since the war in Ukraine broke out. At that time, without being able to trust that the regular army would obey orders and besiege or attack cities and towns in the country, the process of militarization and integration of the most mobilized sector of society began: far-right militants who formed themselves into volunteer battalions, territorial defense or groups co-financed by official authorities and oligarchic groups, who supplied weapons and training for members of Azov, Praviy Sektor, C14, battalions such as Kyiv, Donbass or Santa Maria, which formed, together with the SBU, the first base of the attack against Donbass.

The denial, justification or apology for their presence as an integral part of the war effort and of the Ukrainian state itself have varied to suit each phase of the war. From initial denial, they moved on to justification: Yanukovich’s corruption had dismantled the regular army, so the use of far-right militants was justified to compensate for these shortcomings and respond to the Russian attack – in reality a local rebellion that Russia neither encouraged nor knew how to control and which it finally had to support to avoid being militarily defeated. During the Minsk years, the power of the far right, evident in the streets and in the way the state was reformatting itself in a nationalist key, was again ignored and denied. The proof was always the same: the poor electoral results of the various parties, while hiding the obvious infiltration that kyiv was consciously carrying out with militants and supporters of a part of society with which it shared a morbid hatred for Russia and everything Russian, including the population of Donbass.

The Russian invasion of 2022 brought back to Ukraine and its defenders the spirit of 2014, when everything was justified, including the inclusion of units with openly fascist ideologies in the regular army. The battle for Mariupol, after which the garrison took refuge in Azovstal, a Soviet industrial complex built to withstand a war, raised the Azov Brigade to prominence and made a hero of Denis Prokopenko, from the Borodach Division, the core of the movement built in 2014. The normalisation of the new Azov was carried out in part by claiming that the old Azov had been removed and that there was no trace of Andriy Biletsky in the Brigade. Months later, as a colonel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Andriy Biletsky commanded the Third Assault Brigade, another regular unit that has also been perfectly whitewashed despite its own cadres confirming that it maintains the same ideology and objectives as in its beginnings, ignoring, if not justifying, the constant appearance of fascist symbolism.

Azov, which has a presence in the National Guard, the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the special forces of Kirilo Budanov’s GUR, is only the strongest and best-known of the radical right-wing nationalist movements that have been gradually imposing their discourse in a state that has been receptive for a decade. In the past two years, Azov has been praised as a model of effective voluntary recruitment, has been welcomed by universities such as Stanford, has participated in events alongside such well-known figures as Francis Fukuyama, has toured Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom and has received explicit support, for example, from former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. A few days ago, Dmitro Kujarchuk, a member of the National Corps and commander of the second unit of the Third Assault Brigade commanded by Andriy Biletsky, posted on social media images of his propaganda event in Prague, which, unlike other stops on the planned tour, which were cancelled in the face of anti-fascist protests, was able to take place. “The word above the speakers is Dvizh , a colloquial term used by Russian and Ukrainian neo-Nazis to designate their movement,” explained Dmitry Ragozin. Peter Korotaev, author of the blog Events in Ukraine , specified that the word was Russian, not Ukrainian, which is logical given that “Azov comes from the post-Soviet Russophone world of football ultras.” “Everyone but Azov has to follow strict laws on language use,” he concluded.

Although not recognized and whitewashed as the various Azov units have been, other groups such as Bratstvo and C14 also have a prominence that should be surprising in a country that claims to be democratic. Last week, Bratstvo, which in the past has been known for its fundamentalism like the Christian Taliban , was recruiting on social media for its GUR unit, calling on potential soldiers to become “swords of God,” while drone operators from the Nightingale (or Nachtigall) battalion continue to answer to Yehven Karas, leader of C14.

The military presence of far-right battalions is not only obvious but consistent with the Ukrainian state's goals of complete social, economic and political rupture with Russia since the Maidan victory, but it exposes the country to the effects of granting power far beyond its social representation to heavily armed militants with experience in killing. Attempts to impose their will in the political and media spheres are not new and precede the invasion by many years, although it is now that every demand of groups like Azov must be taken into account, especially when their suggestions have become, not radical statements by marginal people, but the representation of a current that is gaining power at a national level regardless of its social approval.

Last week, for example, the Hero of Ukraine Denis Prokopenko criticised on social media both the method of recruitment and the training process, the lack of training and the attitude of commanders towards their soldiers. The last point of the Redis manifesto , in fact a complete amendment to the way practically all aspects of army management are organised, is also representative: “More importantly, in our society there is no categorical moral condemnation of evaders, objectors and deserters.” Prokopenko, who says he is in favour of voluntary recruitment in which future soldiers could choose the unit that best suits their abilities, calls for a tougher hand against those who do not want to risk their lives in war. Ukraine, which has banned men of military age from leaving the country, is trying to get neighbouring countries to return those who have crossed the border illegally, has placed razor wire to make it difficult to access the river through which thousands of people have tried to flee to Hungary and has even justified the fact that those who flee are shot in the back. None of this seems enough for the leader of the Azov unit of the National Guard.

Dmitro Kujarchuk expressed a similar view of the need to adapt political structures to the needs of war a few days ago. Summing up his appearance on a programme on the 1+1 television channel , Kujarchuk referred to the Ukraine that will be created after the war, which “today gives us an opportunity to minimise the manipulations of Ukrainian politicians and start working on the Ukrainian national idea”. The ideal Ukraine of the member of the National Corps, the political arm of the Azov movement, would be a society “militarised, because international risks will continue”, educated “because critical thinking allows us to understand the needs”, and spiritual “because our cynicism about the world around us will never allow us to unite. We have to recover what the Soviet system eradicated: God in Ukrainian homes”.

The comments of individuals and groups of the far right are not limited to opinions but extend to political demands with real consequences that put into practice the ideas that the commanders and political leaders of these groups distribute on their social networks and media appearances. A few weeks ago, Azov's denunciation was enough to cause personnel changes in the army, a dangerous precedent that will undoubtedly be repeated at times when events are not favorable at the front. However, the most recent case concerns not the military order, but the political one, in which Azov and other nationalist far-right groups aspire to set the pace. The last few weeks have provided a clear case of war within the war and a power struggle with the aim of positioning themselves in view of the day after the end of the military conflict, when the internal battle will begin to impose the new state model, its values ​​and, above all, relations with Russia and everything Russian, a category that now includes anyone who differs from the nationalist option. This is demonstrated by the recent nationalist harassment of a deputy, Artyom Dmitruk, who has suffered a media lynching encouraged by Maksym Zhoryn, Dmitro Korchinsky and other nationalist leaders, making the political representative fear for his safety and forcing him to leave the country.

Last July, Peter Korotaev, a well-known fascist-oriented Telegram profile – for the sake of appearances, in 2022 he changed his name to “Chronicles of the Fourth Empire” instead of “Chronicles of the Fourth Reich” – already pointed to Dmitruk as an example of what would happen if the war drags on. “On July 13, Chronicles published a post on Telegram in response to the appeal of popular Ukrainian bloggers for peace through negotiations and compromise in the wake of the Russian attacks on the capital. It also responded to MP Dmitruk, who has vigorously defended the bloggers.” The post in question stated that “if the war continues for another year, the population will bring the Dmitruks to power. At the moment, the Dmitruks are quite marginal. If it lasts two years, Medvedchuk will return here with the Russian flag. It’s that simple.” This idea should not be confused with pacifism, but rather it is a way of strictly adhering to what Zelensky repeats ad nauseam: more weapons are needed to toughen the war and shorten it by escalating it.

As the nationalist reaction to the bloggers' proposal and, above all, to the defence of a politician shows, war is the only political ideology currently allowed in Ukraine. Although Zelensky's path from peace candidate to war president was meteoric and his idea of ​​what to do is increasingly similar to that proposed by groups such as Azov, the extreme right continues to doubt the intentions of the president, whom, despite having helped in his electoral campaign by putting pressure on Poroshenko, they have always viewed with suspicion (perhaps because of his Jewish origin). And although the Zelensky government's desire for peace is non-existent, radical nationalism has wanted to see in every mention of peace or negotiations the feared betrayal. This is the case with the words of Dmitruk, who not only defended the bloggers' freedom of expression and their proposal for compromise, but also criticised the government's actions in banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church formerly affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate.

“Dmitro Kukharchuk of the Azov movement calls for the execution of those who consciously or unconsciously promote the enemy’s agenda. Several Azov figures have recently expressed their anger that the authorities in Ukraine have tentatively lifted the taboo on discussing peace negotiations and territorial concessions,” Leonid Ragozin said at the end of July. That week, Dmitruk had received explicit threats from both Dmitro Korchinsky and Maksym Zhoryn, who in a second, even clearer message, reminded him of the fate of Ilya Kiva. Coming from nationalist circles, a former member of Azov and of Arsen Avakov’s Interior Ministry, Kiva, a self-confessed follower of Mussolini, ended his political journey in Viktor Medvedchuk’s party and had to take refuge in Russia, where he was murdered, probably by the Ukrainian secret services.

The explicit threat of murder by a group capable of killing and with the means to do so has not caused the state to react, even when it comes to an elected political representative from the president’s party – quite the opposite. Last week, The Kyiv Independent reported that “controversial Ukrainian MP Artyom Dmitruk fled the country on August 25 after being charged with assaulting a soldier as well as a law enforcement officer in two separate incidents, the Prosecutor General’s Office has announced.” “My client, Ukrainian MP Artyom Dmitriuk, informs me that a group of armed men showed up at the home of his wife’s mother, allegedly to kill him,” his lawyer had written the day before. The departure from the country, apparently to Moldova, which, unlike Poland, does not have an agreement on the return of people who cross the border illegally, did not prevent the accusations, but rather amplified them. “Dmitruk is on the run. “Now Ukrainians have two questions for the authorities: will it be possible to arrest those who allowed him to escape and when will we hear their names?” wrote Dmitry Korchinsky, who believes that Dmitriuk has committed two grave sins: defending a form of Christianity that is not politically accurate to his own and opening the door to peace negotiations. Political deviations, however small, and mentioning the possibility of a resolution of the conflict are two serious crimes that, in today's Ukraine, are punished with criminal charges by the state and threats from armed groups that aspire to shape the future of the country.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/09/03/el-po ... ionalista/

Google Translator

(There is a mistake here, is Peter Korotaev the author of Events in Ukraine or of that 4th Reich horseshit? Because from what I've read 'Events' is certainly not fascist, leans socialist.)

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From Cassad's Telegram account:


Colonelcassad
Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation in Ukraine (as of September 2, 2024) Key points:

The Vostok group repelled two counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in one day, the enemy lost up to 110 servicemen;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 475 servicemen in one day in the area of ​​responsibility of the Center group;

— Facilities where aircraft and missile weapons were manufactured and repaired came under a group strike by the Russian Armed Forces at night;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 70 servicemen in the area of ​​responsibility of the Dnipro group;

— The Zapad group hit formations of eight Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades in one day, including Azov (banned in Russia); the enemy lost up to 430 servicemen;

— Russian air defence systems shot down 3 Hammer guided aerial bombs, 26 Vampire shells and 30 Ukrainian drones in one day;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 520 servicemen in one day in the area of ​​responsibility of the South group of forces;

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 85 servicemen in the area of ​​responsibility of the North group in one day.

▫️The units of the "East" group of forces occupied more advantageous lines and positions, defeated the formations of the 58th motorized infantry brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the 129th and 241st territorial defense brigades in the areas of the settlements of Vodyanoye, Ugledar, Prechistovka and Velyka Novosyolka of the Donetsk People's Republic. They repelled two counterattacks of the assault groups of the 72nd mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The enemy lost up to 110 servicemen, an M113 armored personnel carrier made in the USA and a 100-mm anti-tank gun "Rapira" .

▫️Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated concentrations of manpower and equipment of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the 37th Marine Brigade, the 123rd and 126th Territorial Defense Brigades in the areas of the settlements of Novodanilovka, Lobkovoe in the Zaporizhia region, Tokarevka, Berislav in the Kherson region and the city of Kherson.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 70 servicemen, three vehicles and an electronic warfare station .

▫️ Operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups have struck concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 143 areas.

▫️ Air defense systems shot down three French-made Hammer guided bombs, 26 Czech-made Vampire rockets and 30 unmanned aerial vehicles.

▫️ In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed : 641 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 30,950 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,805 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,434 multiple launch rocket system combat vehicles, 13,952 field artillery pieces and mortars, 25,520 units of special military vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

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Kursk Offensive: West Heralds 'Rebirth' of Maneuver Warfare
A rebirth, or more an aimless light-cavalry raid?

Simplicius
Sep 02, 2024

This is a premium article for paid subscribers that covers the recent trend of declaring the rebirth of ‘maneuver warfare’ as product of the perceived “success” of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk. In the piece I refute these conclusions by explaining how maneuver warfare is in fact a misunderstood, and deliberately misleading, concept which uses outdated combat stereotypes from WWII and beyond in a disingenuous attempt to paper over shifting modern paradigms.

We utilize several sources including the latest Institute for the Study of War piece, as well as an article on ‘positional deadlock’ from the latest issue of one of Russia’s premier military journals, Армейский сборник, or Army Collection.

This report is another whoppingly descriptive ~6,800 words, of which I’ve left a small portion open to the public as a teaser for people to decide whether the topic’s premise interests them and is worth subscribing for.

Since the start of the Ukrainian Kursk offensive on August 6th, 2024, there have been innumerable claims from the pro-Ukrainian West heralding the rebirth of “maneuver warfare”. Several high-profile figures and publications declared that offensive warfare is back on the menu, as if Ukraine had finally solved the riddle of the modern positional stalemate which has vexed both sides for nearly the past two years.

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Many top pro-UA accounts quickly jumped on the bandwagon of branding this as the second coming of Maneuver Warfare™, falling over themselves to proclaim how Russia was not ready for such “dynamic” styles of superior “NATO” operations.

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Adjacent to this was the triumphant claim that the dreaded “transparent battlefield” was again a thing of the past, as the groundbreaking AFU offensive was able to once again lower an opaque shroud over Russian ISR to create a tactical ‘surprise’, which was thought no longer possible under modern surveillance conditions.

Figures like Mick Ryan were quick to extol this achievement:

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Most prominent of all was ISW which released a lengthy report on maneuver warfare several weeks after the Kursk op:

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https://understandingwar.org/background ... porary-war

They claim that most of it was written prior to the initiation of the Kursk incursion, however, their accompanying social media truncations of the longer report credit the Kursk operation as emblematic of their points.

One of those larger points is that ISR is not impossible to overcome—which you can see they tied into the Kursk operation as evidence of their findings:

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The problem is, virtually the entire concerted information front about ‘maneuver warfare’s’ return has been a propaganda wave aimed at selling us Ukrainian victory and superiority as a morale boost.

Several other keen observers precisely understood it for what it was:

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In short: Ukraine choosing a lightly guarded, strategically trivial rural border area to send a shock fist of their most elite brigades through against a bunch of unarmed conscripts is not the highpoint of “maneuver warfare”, and in no conceivable way heralds its return. Anyone can send a couple light cavalry battalions to go romping through an undefended countryside to temporary effect—but that is not at the heart of maneuver warfare’s basest definition.

The primary importance behind maneuver warfare in operational art revolves around defeating enemy armies. When you’re maneuvering around a place where no army even exists, you’re not really accomplishing much. If Ukraine had truly revived the art then it would have been able to effect this discipline against Russian reserves which subsequently arrived to dig in. But what happened? Ukrainian forces hit a wall and became quickly stalled by the slightest resistance from actual professional troops.

Anyone can “maneuver” around a small token complement of conscripts when they’re outnumbered five to one. The reason maneuver warfare was deemed dead on the main contact lines was because there, both sides are of comparable strength and armament—albeit sometimes asymmetrically.

(Much more at link, paywall, which may be circumvented if ya got a 'smart phone'.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/kur ... ds-rebirth

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Ukraine - U.S. 'Experts' Throw The Towel

Michael Kofman and Rob Lee are U.S. experts who have visited the Ukrainian front-lines several times to then write positive hopeful pieces, in the sense of the West, about the conflict.

Their latest longer piece, published in Foreign Affairs, deviates from their older ones.

Ukraine’s Gamble
The Risks and Rewards of the Offensive Into Russia’s Kursk Region


They describe the Ukrainian incursion into the Russian Kursk oblast and the resulting lack of troops on the eastern Donbas front at some length.

They seem, like many others, not to be sure what it is all about. Neither Ukraine nor the countries that supports it seem to have any theory of victory.

Determining what this operation says about Ukraine’s overall strategy and the implications it has for the broader war effort is essential. In some ways, the offensive raises more questions than answers.
...
For much of 2024, the West has been supporting a Ukrainian strike campaign in Crimea without a good explanation for what was meant to follow. It was serviceable as an end onto itself, degrading Russian air defense and support infrastructure. But that campaign now seems disconnected from Ukraine’s efforts in Kursk and its broader drone strike campaign against economic infrastructure in Russia. A series of disparate efforts do not a strategy make.
...
Since 2023, Washington has been out of ideas for how to successfully end the war on terms favorable to Ukraine. Kyiv, meanwhile, has been focused on stabilizing the frontline, but equally worried about the prevailing gloomy narrative and the sense that Ukraine is losing the war. The Kursk operation helps address the latter at the risk of doing damage to the former. Whether or not Kursk succeeds, at least it is not an attempt to refight the failed 2023 offensive, a set piece battle in which Ukraine held no decisive advantages. That said, Kyiv’s present theory of success remains unclear.


Kofman and Lee are unhappy:

Holding Kursk as a bargaining chip, expanding strikes, and economic pressure on Russia could significantly strengthen Ukraine’s hand, assuming Ukraine can also hold the line, exhaust Russia’s offensive potential, and withstand Russia’s strike campaign this winter. However it ends, the Kursk offensive needs to provide the impetus for Ukraine and its partners to get on the same page—and shake off the current drift.

"Assuming Ukraine can also ..." carries a way too much weight in their closing words.

That becomes obvious when one sees news items like this:

The 152nd Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Ground Forces has been reorganized into a jager brigade, as announced on the brigade’s official social media channels.

A jager brigade is light infantry. It is specialized in fighting in woods and marshes. It has no armored means. It has no tanks, no infantry fighting vehicles and no heavy artillery. All of what the 152nd once had as a mechanized units has been wasted in the incursion of Kursk.

Ukraine can not sustain either of the three tasks Kofman and Lee are "assuming" it can.

The Donbas line is breaking, Russia's offensive potential is still much larger than anything we have yet seen and Ukraine has no means to defend against or prevent mass missiles strikes against its infrastructure and other military targets.

The Kursk incursion was a political theater piece designed to have a short term propaganda effect. It was paid for with the lives of Ukrainian soldiers. A way too height price for little effect. The mass of Ukrainian material that was destroyed in the campaign means that Ukraine has now thrown away any future attack potential its army still had.

Kofman and Lee know this. But they are still too timid to say so.

Still - its sounds like they have given up on it.

Posted by b on September 2, 2024 at 16:05 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/09/u ... l#comments

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Ukraine’s Kursk Raid and Its Imminent Loss of Metallurgy Industry in Donbass
August 31, 2024

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Compilation graphic showing photos of soldiers firing artillery over a backdrop of a map of the Russia-NATO conflict. Photo: Mahdi Rteil.

By Dmitri Kovalevich – Aug 28, 2024

Dmitri Kovalevich is the special correspondent in Ukraine for Al Mayadeen English. In this report, he examines the political and military situation in the country for August.

The situation in late August 2024 for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) remains critical in the key war front of the Donbass region (in former eastern Ukraine). The AFU is losing several towns and villages every day to the continued advances of the Russian army. Russia is now poised to cut off the key transportation and supply city of Pokrovsk (pre-war population of 60,000), which is located 60 km north and west of Donetsk city and 140 km east of the Dnieper River in Russia’s Donetsk People’s Republic.

Ukraine military incursion into Russia’s Kursk region
Despite its worsening military situation in Donbass, Kiev decided in early August to withdraw some of its troops from there to join a military incursion into Russia’s Kursk region. Within a few days of launching it on August 6, the Ukrainian army managed to advance several dozen kilometers into the wooded and agricultural area of the Kursk region along the Ukraine-Russia border. It captured some villages and the town of Suzdha before its modest advances were halted. Suzdha is the location of a natural gas transmission station on the one, remaining gas pipeline shipping Russian natural gas through Ukraine to western Europe.

The surprise incursion undoubtedly lifted Ukrainian spirits for a few weeks and upset many Russian people and soldiers. But the celebrations for Ukraine are short-lived. Ukraine will pay dearly for its Kursk adventure with a deteriorating military situation for it in Donbass.

As Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko told a Russian television interview on August 18, “They [the Ukrainian forces in Kursk] were gathered from the frontlines elsewhere. These were mostly Ukrainian soldiers with combat experience, reinforced by mercenaries, from Poland and elsewhere. Rather powerful forces were assembled to go into Kursk,” he explained.

U.S. foreign affairs scholar Andrew Latham wrote a harsh condemnation of Ukraine’s Kursk action in the online U.S. political journal The Hill on August 18. “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has proven himself a master of the political stage, a gifted orator capable of stirring emotions and garnering global support. However, his recent military incursion into Russia marks a departure from the realm of diplomacy and into the territory of strategic blunder. This reckless gambit, more akin to a desperate stunt worthy of a second-rate actor than a seasoned statesman, diverts critical resources from the primary battlefield while offering negligible strategic gain…”

Former Ukrainian MP Taras Chernovol writes that the Ukrainian Armed Forces re-positioned some of its most capable units from the Donbass front for the Kursk raid, while the Russian army has made no such repositioning of units. He also emphasizes that under the cover of the ‘fog of events’ in Kursk, the Russian military continues to advance on the city of Pokrovsk. He describes Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk as a case of “taking away the enemy’s territory for a few days or a few weeks while giving away your own territory forever.”

Stanislav Bunyatov, a Ukrainian military officer from the neo-Nazi battalion ‘Aidar’, writes that depleted AFU units defending Pokrovsk are outnumbered by the Russian military ten to one. According to him, the Russian forces advancing on the city do not stop even for a day, starting at four am in the morning and continuing until 9 pm in the evening.

Ukrainian political analyst Vadym Karasev is similarly puzzled why troops were shifted to Kursk when they are needed in Donetsk [Donbass region]. “On the Donetsk front, the situation is very critical, with Pokrovsk, Toretsk, and Chasov Yar all under great military pressure. If there was a calculation that Russia would withdraw reserves from there in order to transfer them urgently to Kursk, this assumption was mistaken.” Additionally, he is not sure that Kiev has enough reserves to hold the captured Kursk territories and organize the supply of its troops there.

Another former member of the Rada, the far-right, ultra-nationalist Ihor Mosiychuk, has warned in a video blog (as reported in Telegram by Politnavigator) that the loss of Pokrovsk will be costly for the Ukrainian economy, especially for the metallurgical enterprises in Donbass (which are largely owned by the oligarch Viktor Pinchuk). Metallurgy products and grain exports are the two, remaining, key pillars of the Ukrainian economy.

Mosiychuk writes, “The fall of Pokrovsk can turn into a catastrophe for our country. This is the only large mine [in Donbass] where coking coal is mined, which is essential for metallurgical production. The loss of Pokrovsk will mean the loss of its coking coal and the shutdown of ‘Metinvest’ [the large, metallurgical enterprise owned by oligarch Viktor Pinchuk].

“The second thing, which is even more terrible, is that the capture of Pokrovsk will allow Russian artillery and rocket fire to reach the railway junction of Pavlograd. This, in turn, will disrupt logistics within the Zaporozhye region and along the Dnieper River. This cannot be allowed, because it can turn into a real disaster.” [The city of Pavlograd, pre-war population of 10,000 is located 40 km west of Dnipro city, the fourth largest city in Ukraine which lies on the Dnieper River.]

Formally, the invasion of the Kursk region of Russia runs up against Ukraine law. Martial law in Ukraine only applies to its own territory. Law enforcement agencies can only act within those parameters. For them to act beyond the country’s borders requires a declaration of war. There is a de jure (‘according to law’) collision taking place, as salaries of Ukrainian police and armed forces can only be paid to those acting on the territory of Ukraine.

Pavlo Zhebrivskyy, the former head of the remaining, civil-military administration of Ukraine-controlled Donetsk oblast (province), writes about the disproportionate losses in the ranks of the AFU, which is barely hanging on in the Donbass region. “For a long time now, almost every week, I visit our soldiers in the Donetsk region. The ratio of losses of Russians to Ukrainians is about one to seven,” he writes.

Russia and its people are not intimidated
The Ukrainian military command presumably expected that its maneuver in Kursk would force Moscow to withdraw troops from Donbass and redeploy them to Kursk. But this has not happened if only because Russia has significant reserves to draw upon that are not involved in the current fighting in Ukraine or along the border.



The invasion of Russian territory has shaken Russian society, but more importantly, it has reinforced the support of the Russian people for the government’s and the country’s war aims. Many parallels are understandably being drawn in Russia to the titanic Battle of Kursk in 1943, the largest tank battle in military history in which the Soviet Red Army prevailed over Nazi German forces. The victory at Kursk was separated by only some months with the historic defeat of the Nazi German army by the Red Army at Stalingrad.

Of course, the scale of the Kursk incursion is minuscule by comparison to the events of 1943, but the symbolism of a Western-backed army, equipped with German weaponry, no less, invading Russian territory will only reinforce the Russian government’s message and the Russian peoples’ understanding that the very sovereignty of Russia is threatened by NATO’s continued, political and military intervention in Ukraine.

One result of the recent events in Kursk has been an increased flow of volunteers to Russian military recruitment centers. Russian blogger and journalist Mikhail Zvinchuk writes about the sharp increase in military volunteers taking place across Russia, even in Moscow, which has the highest standard of living in the Russian Federation. “I take my child to one of the schools in Moscow every morning and pass by a selection point for military recruits under contract. Before the Kursk events, I saw about 30-40 people every day. Not all of these are volunteers, some of them to see off friends or relatives. But equipped men are standing there, waiting, and this number has at least tripled since the beginning of the Kursk events,” writes Zvinchuk.

Demolitions of monuments to the WW2 victory over Nazi Germany
Adding to Ukraine’s troubles are the actions by Ukrainian nationalists-in-uniform that defame Russia and its Soviet history. One such defamation is the wearing of neo-Nazi insignia on their uniforms. Western military instructors have long chosen to look the other way, treating the practice as some kind of harmless game. But to the tens of millions of Russians with relatives who served in the Great Patriotic War, as World War Two is called in Russia, it’s no game and no joke. They read or hear about it every day in the media or from friends and relatives currently serving. (Vladimir Putin’s own father served in the war; he was severely wounded in 1942 but survived the war.)

Traditionally for Ukrainian and Eastern European nationalists and neo-Nazis, neo-Nazi manifestations are an extremely important part of their identification with ‘Western civilization’, as they see it. They reject Eastern Europe as a place populated by ‘inferior’ peoples.

The Ukrainian neo-Nazis also accept, in principle, a future status as ‘second-class’ Europeans, provided they are allowed to dominate over so-called ‘third-class’ people, as they consider the inhabitants of eastern Europe and Russia to be. In the Ukrainian neo-Nazi concept, the idea of equality itself is considered unacceptable because it leaves no chance for neo-Nazi adherents and their supporters to rise above others deemed to be inferior.

One of the first acts of the Ukrainian army upon entering the border town of Suzdha, Russia in August was to demolish a monument of Vladimir Lenin. This was a symbolic act of ‘revenge’ for the October Revolution which Lenin led in 1917 and for the future victories of the Soviet Red Army over Nazi Germany.

Vandalism and outright destruction of monuments to the 1917 Revolution, the Soviet Red Army, and the victories of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War have been widespread in Ukraine proper since the far-right coup of February 2014. In Donbass in 2014, initial confrontations that quickly led to outright warfare were sparked by attacks by Ukraine’s neo-Nazi, far-right paramilitaries against monuments to war heroes. The residents of Donbass rushed to defend the monuments from being attacked or threatened.

‘Light cavalry’ favored by Russian soldiers as battlefield response to drone warfare
As drones play an increasing role in modern warfare, the effectiveness of infantry operations has become more dependent on speed. Sometimes, there are only seconds or a minute to move and maneuver before an attacking drone arrives. Younger and more energetic men fare better in such warfare because they are able to constantly maneuver and run. But the soldiers of the AFU are increasingly older, due to the mass evasions of military conscription by younger men taking place across the country. Typical recruits today are older and less able to run, jump, and otherwise maneuver on the battlefield.

The Russian side began in August to use ‘light cavalry’, as it is called (motorcycles and four-wheeled vehicles), to conduct forays against AFU positions. The vehicles allow soldiers to strike and then withdraw quickly before drones or artillery may react and strike back.

Russian Senator Dmitry Rogozin, the former head of the Russian space agency Roskosmos, writing from the front lines, writes that modern warfare is all about the speed of the attackers and their ability to maneuver. Heavy and traditionally armored vehicles are increasingly vulnerable. That is why ‘unkillable’ motorcycles and four-wheeled, all-terrain vehicles are proving very popular among Russian soldiers. Assaults using such motorized equipment are proving successful, Rogozin writes.

Incursion into Kursk to improve a future negotiating position?
The Western powers and the Kyiv regime are uttering the mantra of ‘improving Ukraine’s negotiating positions’ to justify the Kursk incursion. But the effect is exactly the opposite: the Russian leadership has announced it is abandoning any prospect of negotiations as a result. It says that the ceasefire proposals it issued in June 2024 are no longer on the table. Russia’s new stance reverts to demanding that all Ukrainian troops be withdrawn from the territories of Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson (all former oblasts of Ukraine that have voted to join the Russian Federation); that the Ukraine government accept a neutral political status in world affairs; and that it completely renounces any aspirations to join the NATO military alliance.

Ukrainian political analyst Mykhaylo Chaplyga has forecast that Russia will not end hostilities until the issue of its security is resolved, and this strongly implies the complete demilitarization of Ukraine. “They are not going to end anything until shipping and territorial disputes in the Black Sea region are resolved until former eastern Ukraine is no longer under the political and ideological control of Kiev, and demilitarization extends to the 1939 borders of Soviet Ukraine [that is, to include all of present-day western Ukraine]. Until Russia achieves this, the Russian train will not slow down,” the analyst says.

Furthermore, according to him, the Russian Federation will not hold any talks or negotiations with the outgoing U.S. administration. Future talks with a new administration in Washington must include global security issues, not only issues arising directly over Ukraine. An adviser to Zelenskyy’s office, Mykhaylo Podolyak, admitted in an interview with the British newspaper The Independent that Kiev discussed beforehand the planned attack in Kursk with its Western backers. The latter meekly claim they were not aware of what was coming.

Deteriorating financial situation of Ukraine gov’t
Some analysts explain the raid on the Kursk as the need for Ukraine to obtain new loans from Western governments and financial institutions. The country is already in default to some of those. On August 14, the international rating agency Fitch downgraded Ukraine’s credit status to “restricted default” and affirmed its other bond rating sits at ‘C’ (default imminent). The rating was downgraded because the ten-day grace period expired for payments on a US$750 million Eurobond loan. Earlier, the international rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded Ukraine’s long-term credit rating to SD (selective default).

Analysts at the Ukrainian Policy Institute believe that the agreement reached in late July between the Ukrainian government and some Eurobond holders on the terms of debt restructuring, as well as the law recently adopted in Ukraine allowing suspension of payments on foreign debt, mark “the beginning of a default-like process.” As a rule, rating agencies downgrade the credit ratings of states in cases of direct default as well as in cases of debt restructuring where the given state is unable to make debt payments.

Russian political analyst Malek Dudakov believes that the default of the Ukrainian economy and the AFU raid on Kursk are linked. As the Financial Times recently reported, Kiev blames the U.S. government and the European Union for long delays in disbursing loan tranches. Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko said in a commentary for the Financial Times that slow arms deliveries, especially from the United States, led to an increase in direct military purchases by Kiev valued at US$12 billion. As a result, Ukraine has spent money on arms purchases that it would otherwise be used to pay the salaries of AFU soldiers.

“Ukraine’s budget deficit has reached a record US$44 billion equivalent. [Ukraine’s estimated GDP in 2023 was US$177 billion equivalent.] It is not for nothing that agencies have started to downgrade Ukraine’s credit rating to junk and pre-default levels. The actual partial default has already occurred,” Dudakov notes. In his opinion, the AFU incursion into the Kursk region may well be related to the desire to speed up the disbursement of tranches, as the situation with Kiev’s finances is rapidly deteriorating.

In the two and a half years of the Russian Special Military Operation, I have never seen such a flood of funeral processions and vehicles transporting dead servicemen in my home city and in neighboring towns. Sometimes public transportation sits in traffic jams to allow ambulances to pass through. No matter the day that one is in the street, you are bound to see a funeral procession. This is the price Ukrainian society is paying for the Napoleonic ambitions of its leadership and for the drive by the Western powers to somehow intimidate Russia into a subordinate status as they strive without success to maintain their imperialist hegemony.

https://orinocotribune.com/the-kursk-ra ... n-donbass/

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U.S. Contractors and Western Journalists Knew About the “Surprise” Invasion of Kursk
Posted by Internationalist 360° on September 1, 2024
Sonja van den Ende

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Aftermath of attack on Sudzha, Kursk region, 6 August 2024.

Western journalists waited for days at the Kursk border in Ukraine ready to cover the “surprise attack”.

In late June 2024, U.S. media reported that American military contractors would be sent to Ukraine, just weeks before the Kursk attack on August 6, 2024.

After the attack on the Kursk region of the pre-war Russian Federation, the U.S. and its NATO proxies claimed that the incursion was a surprise offensive by Ukraine alone.

The Forward Observation Group, the private U.S. paramilitary company that posted photos of its fighters involved in the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ offensive against the Kursk region, refused to comment on its involvement in the attack on August 6.

“The Biden administration is moving toward lifting a de facto ban on American military contractors deploying to Ukraine,” four U.S. officials familiar with the matter told CNN, “to help the country’s military maintain and repair U.S.-provided weapons systems.”

According to CNN, “The change would mark another significant shift in the Biden administration’s Ukraine policy, as the U.S. looks for ways to give Ukraine’s military an upper hand against Russia.”

CNN and other U.S. and European news outlets reported in late June about the possible deployment of this private military group. The U.S. has a long history of using mercenaries as cover for official American military troops. Think of Blackwater and the mercenaries in Syria and Iraq, the White Helmets (trained in Jordan), and I even go so far as to say that ISIS (Daesh in Arabic) is a private mercenary army, trained by the CIA and Mossad in Camp Bucca, Iraq.

The Foreign Observation Group (ironically, the acronym is FOG) is said to be a private group that claims to have traveled to Ukraine, Iraq and Syria to contact local fighters (jihadists) and take photos and videos of what they and the West call the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Syrian “civil war”.

All those conflicts are in reality proxy wars incited by the West, which is now resulting in a “hot war” between Russia and the U.S. and its criminal NATO partners.

Even before Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) began in February 2022, Western media published photos sourced from the likes of FOG from the Donbass region of then-eastern Ukraine. The images attracted limited criticism for interviewing (extolling) members of the NeoNazi Azov Battalion. The Nazi insignia of the Azov troops were blatantly displayed and their Nazi affiliation was irrefutable. Western media association with the NeoNazi paramilitaries raised questions at the time about whether they were so-called documentary journalists or a party to the conflict.

After the start of the SMO, the Western media whitewashed the NeoNazi image of the Azov Battalion and labeled them as the “good guys” fighting for the liberation of Ukraine.

The FOG group and other NATO private contractors are also active in obtaining medical supplies, equipment and money for Ukrainian fighters and foreign volunteers who have joined the International Legion for the Defense of Ukraine.

To be sure, we heard from the Kremlin that many red lines have been crossed. Think of the recent attack with American ATACMS missiles on the beach in Crimea. The day that the U.S. announced that it would give private contractors a free hand, there was the attack on Crimea. Coincidence? No, I don’t think so!

Since the attack on Kursk, the battlefield has an extra dimension and we can accurately talk about a tangible confrontation or war between America, its NATO proxies and Russia. One could even argue that the proxy war is over and there is a new phase of direct confrontation going on.

The U.S. government has so far gradually increased its military support to Ukraine. The purpose of this approach is to test the Russian red lines, to see how Moscow reacts to the deployment of each new weapons system or each new Western sanction and, most recently, of course, the donation of frozen Russian assets, mainly in Europe, to Ukraine.

The situation has come to a head, in my humble opinion. Regarding Kursk, there has actually been an attack on Russia; Russian people have been killed, and slaughtered whereby civilians have been taken from their homes in trucks and executed. There is even footage of Ukrainian soldiers with SS helmets and with the detachment of Adolf Hitler’s Leibstandarte Regiment on their sleeves, harassing an old man, who was later killed.

The West is trying to push Russia to the limit, knowing that the Second World War is an extremely sensitive subject for Russian society where every family is related to a victim, a fallen soldier, a grandfather, an uncle, a cousin, or aunt who was killed during the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany, in which more than 26 million people died. The recent action in the Kursk region, where most Russians perceive that the U.S. and its NATO accomplices are involved, is a brazen provocation. Indeed, more than a provocation, it has violated the Russian soul and there we have landed in a totally different dimension. Perhaps one might say, the “road of no return.”

The Americans and the West continue to play their dirty game knowing that a bloodbath has already taken place in Kursk.

The original Battle of Kursk was a major Eastern Front battle in World War II between the forces of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1943, resulting in a Soviet victory. It was the largest in the history of warfare. Perhaps in their deranged mindset, the NATO axis wants to reenact, or think they can, the Battle of Kursk from 81 years ago. They are so radicalized with Russophobia that this could very well be the case.

Not only are there mercenaries in the Kursk region but also Western journalists have illegally crossed the Russian border with mercenaries and/or Ukrainian battalions. We all know about the Italians from the state broadcaster RAI and American journalists. There is also a Belgian journalist, working for the Dutch and Belgian mainstream media newspapers, named Jan Hunin who claims to be one of the first journalists in what he writes as “Ukrainian Kursk”, as the headline says in the Rotterdam-Dutch newspaper Algemeen Dagblad. He claims in his article that Kursk is now Ukrainian territory and no longer Russian and is pleased about the destruction and toppling of statues such as that of Yuri Gagarin. We can therefore conclude from this that the invasion of the Kursk region was a planned action not only by Ukraine, but by the U.S. and its proxies NATO. Western journalists were ready on the other side of the border in Ukraine to accompany the invading forces, as Jan Hunin claims in a podcast on the Dutch radio NPO.

Journalists and politicians in the West knew that something was going to happen, otherwise, you wouldn’t send journalists to the Kursk border to cover the invasion. According to the regime in Kiev and the actor-president whose term has long expired, “Ukraine did not disclose preparations for an operation in Russia’s Kursk Oblast to Kiev’s allies, because the world might perceive it as crossing Russia’s “strictest of all red lines”.

This is belied by the fact that Western journalists waited for days at the Kursk border in Ukraine ready to cover the “surprise attack”. Evidently, they were well informed about the impending attack and took action when the green signal was given for the offensive so that they could enter illegally together with the mercenaries and the Ukrainian army.

Not a word is said about the fact that the Ukrainian soldiers and the foreign contractors aided by NATO soldiers or instructors captured Russian citizens and dragged Russian soldiers across the border into Ukraine. Russian citizens were killed, and their homes and possessions destroyed – all for the glory of Ukraine and the “Free West”.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2024/09/ ... -of-kursk/

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Lavrov Revealed That Russia Was On The Brink Of Reviving The Grain Deal This Spring

Andrew Korybko
Sep 02, 2024

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There’s no reason to doubt what he said since he’s Russia’s top diplomat so all that can be done is to try to make sense of this unexpected news.

Foreign Minister Lavrov revealed on Monday that Russia was on the brink of reviving the grain deal this spring as a result of Turkish mediation until Ukraine suddenly dropped out of the talks. This disclosure is surprising since that same deal was much-maligned by Russia’s supporters at home and abroad after Russia refused to extend it last summer. Here are Lavrov’s exact words on the matter as reported by TASS:

“This spring Turkey attempted to renew the agreement on the protection of food supplies in a modified format. We were ready. At the last minute, the Ukrainians said: 'Let’s write a clause - add to the obligations not to touch merchant ships the need to respect the safety of nuclear power plants.' It seems out of place, but we also said: 'Let’s do it.'

[Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan really convinced us that this would be a step forward, he was completely sincere and tried to be helpful. We agreed, but then the Ukrainians, who proposed it themselves, said they were not happy with it. Apparently, at that time they already had plans to bomb nuclear power plants.

There’s no reason to doubt what he said since he’s Russia’s top diplomat so all that can be done is to try to make sense of this unexpected news. The grain deal’s main criticism was that it was superficial after only around 3% of Ukrainian grain went to the Global South according to Putin himself. He also added that the West never implemented its part of the deal by removing obstacles to Russia’s own agricultural exports.

Russia’s worsening relations with Ukraine and the West since then suggest that neither of them had any intention of making good on their promises if the deal was revived. Moreover, while the nuclear power plant element might have sounded like a promising addition to the practically symbolic grain pact, there wouldn’t have been any guarantee that it too wouldn’t have been violated. Ukraine might have even used that to get Russia’s guard down ahead of a major preplanned drone attack against such facilities.

If that was the case, then it’s a blessing in disguise that this hybrid grain-nuclear deal fell through, but these observations still don’t answer the question of why Russia was even considering it. One possible explanation is that Putin sincerely thought that it could have advanced his diplomatic goal of laying the basis for resuming peace talks modeled off of their draft peace treaty from 2022. The reason why this can’t be ruled out is due to him bringing that up once again on Monday at a separate event.

He conditioned this upon the expulsion of Kiev’s forces from Kursk, but he also added that “The current authorities are clearly not ready for this, they have little chance of being re-elected. That is why they are not interested in ending the fighting, that is why they tried to carry out this provocation in Kursk Region, and before when they tried to carry out the same operation in Belgorod Region.” He might therefore have been hoping that the West would force Ukraine to do this after more so-called ‘goodwill gestures’.

Time and again, he seems to continue placing faith in the West becoming fatigued with this conflict the longer that it drags on for and the more that Russia continues gradually gaining ground in Donbass, which it’s continued to do since the start of the year and has recently picked up the pace. Putin still won’t radically respond to the spree of provocations against Russia over the past two and a half years out of fear that he’d inadvertently spark the Third World War that he’s thus far worked so hard to avoid.

Agreeing to another grain deal, a hybrid grain-nuclear one, or a reportedly Qatari-mediated partial ceasefire might thus be seen as a costless means to the end of politically resolving this conflict. So long as he remembers what he admitted regarding his naivete about the West and doesn’t let his guard down after more ‘goodwill gestures’, then perhaps this plan will succeed. Russia’s supporters should therefore brace themselves for this just in case so that they’re not disappointed if any such deals are agreed to.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/lavrov-r ... sia-was-on

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Changes on the front line in the SVO zone. 01-31.08.2024[/img]
September 2, 21:18

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Changes on the front line in the SVO zone. 01-31.08.2024

Changes on the map in the SVO zone for August:

♦️Kupyanskoye = 29.2 km
♦️Svatovskoye = 8.67 km (withdrew from 2.05 km)
♦️Limanskoye = 11.76 km (withdrew from 6.08 km)
♦️Seversky salient = 2.41 km
♦️Konstantinovskoye = 9.56 km
♦️Toretskoye = 50.57 km
♦️Pokrovskoye = 239.02 km
♦️Kurakhovskoye = 62.86 km (withdrew from 0.62 km)
♦️Vremyevskoye = 0.95 km
♦️Orekhovskoye = 9.67 km
♦️Kharkovske = 3.66 km (withdrew from 2.92 km)

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Total:
Occupied - 428.33 km
Withdrew - 11.67 km

@z_arhiv - zinc

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9358976.html

Google Translator
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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blindpig
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Re: Footnotes from the Ukrainian "Crisis"; New High-Points in Cynicism Part V

Post by blindpig » Wed Sep 04, 2024 11:45 am

Pokrovsk and Poltava
Posted by @nsanzo ⋅ 04/09/2024

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“Operation Kursk is fulfilling its purpose and is proceeding as planned,” Volodymyr Zelensky said on Monday at a press conference alongside Dick Schoof, the Dutch prime minister. Although the surprise effect of the first days has worn off and there has been no deep advance on Russian territory, the presence of Ukrainian troops in the Russian Federation is enough of an argument to present it as a great victory on which to demand more weapons from its partners. The speech can disguise the results and turn defeats into draws and small victories into great strategic successes, a necessity for weakened Ukraine, which continues to beg its allies for long-range missiles to attack any target in the Russian Federation. Judging by the information published in the press, specifically by the Reuters agency , “the United States is close to reaching an agreement to deliver to Ukraine long-range cruise missiles that could reach deep into Russia, but Kiev would have to wait several months while the United States resolves technical issues before any shipment, said American officials.”

The JASSMs (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles) are not the ATACMS ballistic missiles that Ukraine is requesting, although they do have a much longer range, meaning that Ukraine would be able to hit military bases and the war chain at a greater distance, increasing the economic costs of the war for Russia. According to Reuters , the decision will be made sometime in the autumn, perhaps for electoral reasons, and everything indicates that it will be perceived as an insufficient gesture by Kiev, which will undoubtedly continue to demand the ATACMS for which it has already presented a plan.

Far from Kursk, the war front on which Zelensky wants to focus attention, the situation of the Ukrainian troops continues to worsen in the face of Russian advances in several directions. The Krasnogorovka, Selidovo, Toretsk, Marinka and Ukrainsk advances, which are becoming more consolidated, have been joined by a new push to approach, from the east and west, the Ugledar fort, which the Russian troops are now trying to isolate in order to make its defence impossible. For the first time, even pro-Ukrainian accounts report a Russian advance from Pavlovka, something that on previous occasions had led to harsh failures with very high personnel and material losses. The reality is that Ukrainian resistance in this area is fading, and all trace of the 2014 front line has finally disappeared. Zelensky’s words last week, when he recalled that Ukraine seeks to fight battles in which it is able to inflict heavy casualties on Russian troops, coupled with strategic withdrawals that allow Russia to advance more quickly, indicate that Kiev is seeking to concentrate on points where it can defend itself reliably at least for a while. The Ukrainian president’s statements suggest a scenario similar to that of Artyomovsk or Chasov Yar – where the battle continues without Russia being able to defeat Ukrainian troops for the moment – ​​in the city of Krasnoarmeysk-Pokrovsk, where the population has been ordered to evacuate and which is too important for the logistics of the eastern front to be abandoned without a serious fight.

Pokrovsk-Krasnoarmeysk is both a danger and an illusion for Ukraine. Its loss would be decisive in sealing the fate of the western part of Donetsk. But the president seems confident in the Ukrainian troops' ability to hold out. "We believe that the Kursk operation can also affect the direction, where pressure can be reduced due to the reduction in the number of Russian troops," Zelensky said on Monday. The fact that hopes of success are dependent on the Kursk operation, which, according to Syrsky himself, has not succeeded in getting Russia to divert troops from the Krasnoarmeysk sector, suggests that this is either naivety or a way of diverting attention. "At the moment, we see that it is difficult there. In any case, however difficult it may be, there has been no progress in the Pokrovsk sector for two days,” the Ukrainian leader boasted, ignoring the fact that there have been significant advances in Selidovo, which is key to cutting off communication between the city and the southern part, and that Krasnoarmeysk is not, for the moment, the main direction of attack. As the sources dedicated to daily monitoring of the progress of the war correctly guessed, Russia is seeking to advance southwards to isolate or expel the garrisons protecting that sector of the front south of Krasnoarmeysk, in the direction of Ugledar. There, Russian successes are sustained and constant, although perhaps not to show triumphalism like that of President Vladimir Putin, who on Monday boasted about the speed of progress. Two and a half years after the Russian invasion, its troops are now advancing in Donbass as expected in 2022 and it does not seem possible that the situation in Kursk will change these circumstances.

The Ukrainian adventure in Russia has not changed the trend in Donbass nor will it bring the conflict closer to an end, as Zelensky and his entourage have repeatedly argued. The new circumstances have not only scuppered ongoing efforts to achieve a partial ceasefire to exclude electrical infrastructure from artillery and missile targets, but have further hardened the war. With no possibility of even getting to the start of indirect negotiations and with Ukraine threatening Russian territory from land and air, a harsh Russian response like the one that occurred yesterday was predictable. In the morning, AMK Mapping, a pro-Ukrainian account that tries to follow events and update control maps objectively, claimed that Russia had fired a ballistic missile at the city of Mirgorod in the Poltava region, “allegedly, the target is a troop concentration.”

In the afternoon, President Zelensky denounced an attack on “an educational institution” and added that it had taken place near a hospital. The president’s words concealed the fact that the educational institution was a well-known building built in Soviet times and to which Poroshenko gave an anti-communist name, although he did not change its use: the Military Institute of Communications. In the afternoon, Olena Zelenska, the Ukrainian president’s partner, announced the death of 41 people, a figure that rose to 51 by the end of the day. “The Russian scum will certainly be held accountable for this attack,” Zelensky had said, confirming, without mentioning the word military, that “a building of the Institute of Communications” had been destroyed. Reuters added in the afternoon that, according to Ukrainian bloggers, the victims were cadets or soldiers in training. In any case, neither President Zelensky nor the pro-Ukrainian media doubt that it was a military target. What is more, the controversy has not been caused by the objective, but by the result. Mariana Bezuhla, always quick to criticise the authorities, denounced the excessive concentration of troops who, according to her sources, were holding an awards ceremony, a circumstance that has already cost dozens of victims on both sides of the conflict on previous occasions. According to Yuri Butusov, “around 250 people gathered at the same time in a military institution in Poltava for some event”, an imprudence for which Ukraine has paid dearly.

Ukrainian authorities are investigating whether the alarm system worked as it should, as the first hypothesis is that the malfunction is due to the fact that, as Zelensky had claimed, the victims did not have time to take shelter before the missile arrived. The destruction shown in the images makes it likely that the number of dead and wounded soldiers will increase in the coming hours.

https://slavyangrad.es/2024/09/04/30503/

Google Translator

******

From Cassad's telegram account:

Colonelcassad
Summary of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation on the progress of the special military operation (as of September 4, 2024) Main points:

- The Russian Armed Forces launched a group strike, including with Kinzhal missiles and UAVs, on defence industry enterprises in Lviv, the targets were hit;

- Russian air defence systems shot down 11 HIMARS projectiles and 30 drones in 24 hours;

- The Zapad group repelled one counterattack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 24 hours, the enemy’s losses amounted to 480 servicemen;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 670 servicemen in 24 hours in the area of ​​responsibility of the South group of forces;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost over 480 servicemen and a MaxxPro armoured vehicle in the area of ​​responsibility of the Center group;

- The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 75 servicemen and an ammunition depot in 24 hours in the area of ​​responsibility of the North group of forces in the Kharkiv region.

▫️As a result of successful actions, units of the "East" group of forces liberated the settlement of Prechistovka of the Donetsk People's Republic. Formations of the 58th motorized infantry brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the 117th territorial defense brigade

were defeated in the areas of the settlements of Shakhtarskoye, Dobrovolye of the Donetsk People's Republic and Priyutnoye of the Zaporizhia region. A counterattack of the assault group of the 72nd mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was repelled .

The enemy lost up to 150 servicemen and five vehicles.

▫️Units of the Dnepr group of forces defeated formations of the 37th Marine Brigade and the 39th Coastal Defense Brigade in the areas of the settlements of Berislav, Tokarevka, Verovka in the Kherson region and Tamarino in the Mykolaiv region.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lost up to 80 servicemen and three vehicles. Two ammunition depots and an electronic warfare station were destroyed .

▫️ Operational-tactical aviation, unmanned aerial vehicles, missile forces and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces groups inflicted damage on concentrations of enemy manpower and military equipment in 129 areas.

▫️ Over the course of a day, air defense systems shot down 11 US-made HIMARS rockets and 30 unmanned aerial vehicles.

▫️ In total, since the beginning of the special military operation, the following have been destroyed : 642 aircraft, 283 helicopters, 31,017 unmanned aerial vehicles, 575 anti-aircraft missile systems, 17,814 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 1,435 multiple launch rocket systems, 14,039 field artillery pieces and mortars, 25,556 units of special military vehicles.

https://t.me/s/boris_rozhin

Google Translator

******

SITREP 9/2/24: Zermak on Escalation Begging Tour as Pokrovsk Clock Unwinds

Simplicius
Sep 03, 2024
Ukrainian Defense Minister Umerov and Head of the Presidential Office Andriy Yermak—or Zermak, as the two-headed monster of him and Zelensky is jointly called—just came off their Washington begging tour, where they were tasked with selling the escalation war against Russia in order to save Ukraine:

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https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/30/poli ... index.html

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The slovenly duo were seen hobnobbing around town.

Now that events have been clarified, Zelensky’s final overriding game plan is more obvious than ever. He intends to raise the stakes and costs for everyone involved by bombing targets deep within Russia in order to bring NATO and Russia to the brink of confrontation in the hopes that, through this trial by fire, NATO will somehow find the temerity within itself to get more directly involved in the war so that Zelensky’s dying regime can be saved.

Washington has utilized a slew of dodges and evasions to keep Ukraine from pulling it deeper into the conflict. From the excuse that Russia has already moved all their planes out of ATACMS range, to the new one that ATACMS missiles are running out. In fact, the latest is most dastardly of all, given that there appears to be hint of a threat that should Ukraine continue down this path, the US will stop supplying ATACMS altogether under the guise of their having run out:

CNN, citing a representative of the American administration, reports that Kyiv should not expect new large deliveries of ATACMS missiles.

As the TV channel notes, the number of these missiles in American warehouses is limited, and their production takes a long time.

The above CNN article reads:

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https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/30/poli ... index.html

And why could that be? Could it be Biden isn’t as stupid as he looks?

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I continue to remind people of the false equivalency fed to us: Ukraine sells it as a big ‘disadvantage’ that it is not allowed to strike Russia’s rear operational-strategic depth, yet recall that Ukraine’s own rear depth lies in NATO territory, in Poland, Germany, Romania, etc. Russia does not strike those either, so it really is a fair game not a disadvantage. If Ukraine wants to strike Russia’s rear logistics, then so should Russia be able to strike Reszow base where Ukraine stages its own supplies—to keep things fair and honest.

Now—lo and behold—not surprisingly Russia has again confirmed that it is working on modifying its nuclear doctrine. This time it was Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov:

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https://tass.com/politics/1836707

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"As has been repeatedly stated on our part, the work is at an advanced stage, and there is a clear directive to make adjustments, which are also conditioned by the study and analysis of the experience of conflict development in recent years, including, of course, everything related to the escalation course of our Western opponents in connection with the SVO," said Sergei Ryabkov.

He explained that the corresponding document is being finalized, but it is too early to talk about a specific timeframe for its completion.


It’s uncertain what to make of it quite yet, but in accordance with developments it was noted by some observers—without verification on my part—that a mysterious Russian radio station UVB-76 has ‘awakened’ for the first time in years:

It is reported that the Russian military radio station UVB-76 has "woken up". The last time it showed its activity was before the decree on mobilization and the Georgian war. Over the past 7 days, 8 messages have been broadcast. The station is called "zhzhuzhalka", no one can decode the signal, but it is distributed throughout the country.

UVB-76 🔥😱

Full logs of the military station : УВБ-76 (http://t.me/uvb76logs)

31.08.2024

The Russian military radio station UVB-76, which had been particularly active before the SMO, the decree on mobilization and the Georgian war, has “woke up”

Buzzer listeners recorded 8 messages in a week.

An important detail, this radio station operates in the shortwave frequency range. From 3 to 30 MHz. Wavelength from 10 to 100 meters. It is used for communication over thousands of kilometers, due to the reflection of electromagnetic waves from the ionosphere. In other words, this is a connection for transmitting messages over very long distances, our country is large. The bandwidth of this connection is small, you can’t watch YouTube or sit in Telegram. The maximum is to fax a piece of paper.

Some say it's the General Staff, the British wrote that it's one of the perimeter elements (dead hand). I also heard a version that these are ciphers for our agents in Europe.


(Video at link.)

No one knows what its true purpose is but the Wiki article on the station posits that it could be part of the infamous Russian Dead Hand nuclear alert system:

Another theory, described in a BBC article, states that the tower is connected to the Russian 'Perimeter' missile system, and emits a "dead hand" signal that will trigger a nuclear retaliatory response if the signal is interrupted as a result of a nuclear attack against Russia. This theory is also very unlikely, given that The Buzzer stops / breaks down regularly.

It’s easy to go overboard in speculation and fearmongering, but at the same time, it’s not exactly illogical that Russia would begin activating some legacy Soviet nuclear systems as precaution, given the recent developments.

Adjacent to this, it was reported that a top secret direct communications line between Kiev and Moscow, which has operated since 1998, has finally been severed by Ukraine:

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https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/30/7472730/

Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers has decided to terminate the Agreement between the Ukrainian and Russian governments on the organisation of a direct classified telephone line between Kyiv and Moscow dated 27 February 1998.

Source: the relevant resolution, submitted to the government by Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister for Innovation, Education, Science and Technology, was adopted on 30 August. The draft document has been seen by Ekonomichna Pravda


There’s also this report, but it is entirely uncorroborated and unsourced, so I’m only sharing it given the preponderance of other related developments:

The CIA from the United States reports on the appearance of a nuclear transport of the Russian Defense Ministry in the Crimea. Cars of the 12th directorate of the GUMO of the Russian Federation were seen near Kerch. They are indicated quite simply by the number 39 in the region number window. The 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry is engaged in the storage, operation and maintenance of nuclear weapons. It also includes a Special Control Service that monitors nuclear tests in other countries.

This is joined by Western reports, like the following from Reuters, that Russia is deploying its latest Burevestnik—dubbed Skyfall by NATO—nuclear-powered missile north of Moscow:

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https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us ... 024-09-02/.

According to Western intelligence, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces are preparing to deploy in the Vologda Region a positioning area for the Burevestnik strategic missile systems with a nuclear power plant based on 9M730 cruise missiles with an unlimited range and an ultra-low-altitude flight profile. If the information is true, then this step is a completely asymmetric response to the deployment in Germany of the LRHW "Dark Eagle" medium-range missile systems based on the Mach 17-5 hypersonic gliders "Glide Body Block 1", as well as the "Griphon" mobile missile systems based on the subsonic BGM-109E "Tomahawk Block IV" cruise missiles

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The Reuters article dismisses the missile, ironically, for the reason that it is redundant to what other Russian ICBMs like the Sarmat can already do. But they only show their own ignorance as the missile is a true game changer, given that it’s a cruise missile, not an intercontinental rocket. The Burevestnik flies very low and has “unlimited” range due to its nuclear power plant. Most people don’t understand the type of threat this poses.

Let’s say the US and Russia got into a confrontation, if Russia launched any kind of intercontinental missile, even if it was not a nuclear one, it would be detected from special space satellites and the US could be obliged to initiate a nuclear exchange because it would be assumed the ballistic missile is nuclear-armed.

However, the Burevestnik allows Russia to launch a cruise missile that can fly at very low altitude around the entire planet at extremely uncommon penetration angles where the US is not defended at all—for instance, from the south Pacific, given that the US anti-ballistic missile shield is mostly in the north in expectation of missiles coming over the arctic.

This would allow Russia to hit sensitive US factories that could instantly wipe out or cripple US’ entire weapons production. Given that US has only one main factory for most of its key weapon systems, disabling them could be an instantly crushing blow to US military power projection.

The Reuters article claims the missile does not have “unlimited” range but estimates perhaps 15,000 miles. This could be accurate given my own calculations: previous nuclear-powered aircraft propulsion tests that I’ve seen have shown 70-200 hours of flight time, though it’s possible to achieve more with modern tech, given that those tests were from the Cold War. A subsonic missile traveling at, let’s say, 400mph for 70 hours would give you 400 x 70 = 28,000 miles. Even the 15k miles Reuters claims is enough for the missile to loop all the way down from Russia into the south Pacific to avoid radar nets, then back up to hit US’ most sensitive weapons manufacturing sites in the southern US.

I.e. this route is almost exactly 15,000 miles:

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But there are a variety of ‘interesting’ routes it can take.

It’s just sour grapes that the US has nothing, and isn’t capable of making anything, like it.


Let’s move on to battlefield updates.

A few animated maps of Russia’s progress in the Pokrovsk direction: (Video at link.)

As can be seen, the advances in that direction continue. The more interesting updates are the breakouts in other directions.

Ugledar specifically is seeing a new pincer forming, and its days as a major Ukrainian stronghold appear to be numbered. One of the reasons, apparently, was disclosed by infamous rogue Rada MP Mariana Bezuglaya when she accused Syrsky of divesting Ugledar of its main defending brigade to send it elsewhere:

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Russian troops were seen capturing the area just northeast of Ugledar while under major attack: (Video at link.)

The Attack by Russian Troops on September 1, 2024 on the main site of the Yuzhno-Donbasskaya Mine No. 1. Despite heavy enemy fire and extreme maneuvers by the infantry fighting vehicles, the entire landing force managed to successfully land and occupy the mine's Administrative Building. The BMP also survived the fire unscathed.

Geolocation:

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Bild’s Julian Ropcke was again sent into convulsions:

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“The Ukrainian soldiers I speak to can hardly explain the catastrophe. Some areas are falling so quickly that they suspect an order to retreat.”

He goes on to say that Ukrainians will not give up but—they are already preparing “for the defense of Dnipro”.

As can be seen, the situation is being viewed as catastrophic at this point.

A well known Ukrainian military channel also showed panic:

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Russia's reserves in the Pokrovsky direction exceed the winter campaign in Bakhmut

▪️An officer of the 24th separate assault battalion "Aidar" made a statement about the current situation on the front. According to him, such reserves of Russian infantry are currently concentrated in the Pokrovsky direction that significantly exceed the forces that participated in the winter offensive on Bakhmut in 2023.

▪️ He stressed that one of the most serious mistakes was once again the neglect of the development of defensive fortifications. This omission could have serious consequences for the current situation at the front.

RVvoenkor


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The Telegraph’s latest article likewise spoke to an AFU commander who said: “I’ve never seen such speed of Russian advances…we don’t have troops, they outnumber us five to one….the Russians will be in Pokrovsk by mid-September.”

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If that wasn’t bad enough, the latest UK Times article agrees that Russia will “launch an offensive on the Dnipropetrovsk region in 2025”:

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https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-u ... -gkbkq5gpd

Firstly, British “military expert” Michael Clarke says the quiet part aloud in the article:

They have conducted special operations and artillery attacks along the whole border with Russia’s Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod regions, to spook flat-footed Russian commanders and frighten residents into panic measures.

He plainly admits that Ukrainian forces are using artillery attacks on the Kursk and Belgorod regions’ civilians simply to “frighten [them] into panic measures.” It only confirms things we already know, that, having failed in defeating the Russian Army, the AFU now instead attempts to “defeat” Russian civilians by terrorizing them to chip away at Putin’s consensus.

The article is actually egregious in its shameful attempt at downplaying Ukraine’s losses. It describes advancing Russian forces as being “easy” to take out in “large swathes” by the AFU, characterizing the Pokrovsk fight as a breeze. Then it absurdly goes on to call the forthcoming capture of the city as a “minor” victory, despite admitting it positions Russia to attack Dnipro region in spring of next year:

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Zelensky likewise downplayed events, claiming Kursk is a great success and that Russia is transferring huge amounts of troops from Donbass to there, which is a bald-faced lie: (Video at link.)
More:

According to the channel of the Ukrainian special forces unit "Extreme Tourism Company," the offensive in Kursk was driven by several factors, including Syrsky's desire to demonstrate a "victory". They also argue that redirecting these forces to Pokrovsk would only delay the inevitable, making the overall decision more advantageous.

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The above mentions control of gas, on that note, it was just revealed today that Russia has again supplanted the US to become Europe’s second largest gas supplier. In the below, Russian LNG, Yamal, Ukraine Gas-Transit, and Turk Stream are all sourced from Russia:

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By the way, as the AFU retreats from Pokrovsk region, they are reportedly flooding mines to ruin them for Russian control:

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(Much more at link.)

https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sit ... escalation

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Ukraine - Russian Missile Strike Hits Swedish Instructors

A Russian missile strike on the Ukrainian Military Institute of Communications in Poltava has at least killed 41 and wounded two hundreds. Other sources claim higher numbers.

Poltava is about 120 kilometer from the Russian border. The warning times after the missile launch was allegedly too short for everyone to reach the bunkers.

The Institute of Communications is training radio and radar operators. Its main multi-story building has been completely destroyed.

Britta Ellwanger, a (former?) Swedish volunteer with the Ukrainian army wrote that Swedish friends of hers, also volunteering with the Ukrainian army, were among those who died in the strike.

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Sweden had promised to gift two Swedish AWACS planes to Ukraine:

Sweden has announced sending its Saab 340B AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) aircraft to Kyiv, as per an announcement made by its defense ministry on May 29, 2024.

Given the nature of the Institute of Communications in Poltava it is likely that the Swedes were training Ukrainian operators for those.

One wonders why the training was not held elsewhere.

The Swedes should have remembered the history of that city:

The Battle of Poltava[e] (8 July 1709) was the decisive and largest battle of the Great Northern War. The Russian army under the command of Tsar Peter I defeated the Swedish army under the command of Carl Gustaf Rehnskiöld. The battle put an end to the status of the Swedish Empire as a European great power, as well as its eastbound expansion, and marked the beginning of Russian supremacy in eastern Europe.

Swedish and NATO attempts to change that status of Russia in eastern Europe more than 300 years after it had been achieved has ended in failure.

Posted by b on September 3, 2024 at 14:51 UTC | Permalink

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/09/u ... l#comments

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Ukrainian Tipping Points
by Gordonhahn
September 1, 2024
The NATO-Russia Ukrainian war is at a tipping point; one that leads to a Russian march to the Dniepr River and the relocation of what remains of pro-NATO Ukraine’s populace to right bank Ukraine and its Maidan government away from the western banks of the Diner and deeper into western Ukraine, likely Lvov. Not surprisingly, Kiev therefore is desperate and trying to escalate in ways that implicate or bring deeper, more direct NATO involvement, which has been deep and escalating on NATO’s part for years. For Kiev, ideal would be a full-scale NATO military intervention. The West’s previous strategy of gradual escalation – ‘boiling the frog’ by providing redlined air defense systems, then short-range missile/artillery systems, then tanks, then F-16s – hasd run its course. The only options now are permitting Kiev to use Western missiles to hit deep inside Russia and target Russian President Vladimir Putin and other top leaders. Until now neither Kiev nor the West has crossed any Russian or ‘Putin red lines’ because there have not been any Russian-declared ‘red lines’ but Western MSM-set red lines. One would-be hard-pressed to cite even one clearly expressed Putin ‘red line.’ I fear the Western escalation will continue up to crossing an actual ‘red line’ that Russians have indirectly hinted at – Ukraine’s use of long-range Western missiles such as American ATACMs and British Storm Shadows to strike deep into Russia – will be crossed one way or another, likely after the U.S. presidential election on November 5th.
The crossing of all previous red lines drawn largely by Western media produce a demonstration effect of supposed Russian weakness, which many play up in order to also facilitate a NATO decision to cross the long-range missile red line or to intervene overtly and officially on the ground in the war. The latter has been Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s goal since the war began and even before during the Minsk ‘ceasefire’. The repeated targeting of civilian areas in Donbass and now in Russia proper, bombing harvesting combines in Belgorod, and the now failed Kursk invasion itself is of the same genre. This desire, indeed desparate need to draw NATO ‘all in’ stands behind Zelenskiy’s fakes –Bucha, Russia attacked Zaporozhe Nuclear Power Plant Rus controls, a children’s hospital, schools, the Kramatorsk train station, etc., etc. This fakery is all part and parcel of the simulated reality that has been the Maidan and its resulting regime, built on legends of police brutality and mass shooting perpetrated by the Maidanists themselves.

Western propagandists use the alleged ‘failure of Putin to respond’ to Western-created ‘Putin red lines’ and to West-Ukraine provocations in order to give the impression that Russia is a paper bear and beatable, that Ukraine is winning and can win, and that the West and Ukraine should continue escalating and intensify its support and perhaps have NATO intervene full-scale. Zelensky himself – the premier propagandist and stage director in today’s West — has pointed to the mini invasion into Kursk as proof that Moscow’s ‘red lines’ are “illusory” and appealed to the leaders of Britain, France, Germay, and the US to allow the use of long-range missiles to strike air bases on Russian territory (www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-w ... -bdc893ztw). Even if the U.S. and all NATO refuse approval of the use of their missiles for strikes deep into Russia, Zelenskiy’s long-pursued goal of drawing NATO into the war suggests the Ukrainians might very well attempt to fire them on their own somehow.

At the same time, the West has played up ‘Putin’s nuclear threats’ – of whch there have been none. Russia has a clearly stated and codified nuclear use doctrine: nuclear weapons will be used only in the event od an existential threat to the survival of the Russian state. None exists yet, though this is a matter of interpretation and argumentation. The calculated rationale behind these false Western claims is to discredit the very rational Putin as some sort of mad man and anti-Christ. The more likely Russian escalation to come – and there are many options (symetrical and assymetrical alike) – to any missile strikes on Moscow or St. Petersburg will be a devastating blow to Kiev and other Ukrainian decisionmaking centers that will be designed to destroy in full central Kiev’s government buildings such as the Office of the President, the Verkhovna Rada, the government building, SBU, General Staff, and Defense Ministry buildings and such. This could precede or shortly follow a rapidly adopted declaration of war on Ukraine, ending the ‘special military operation’ and its relative restraint. In addition, the Russians will hunt to kill Zelenskiy and his colleagues.

So far, Washington has conducted a controlled but likely open-ended escalation until dominance is achieved; hence the relative U.S. restraint and its constraning of the UK, Poland, and others hitherto. But this restraint and constraint should not be overdrawn. The U.S. will escalate as far as is imaginable if it is safe to do so in order to deal a ‘strategic defeat’ to ‘Putin’s Russia.’ An inkling of what is to come can be seen with Washington’s recently announced plans to install nuclear cruise missiles in Germany, compounding the provocative miscue of placing ostensibly defensive, but potentially offensive missiles in Poland and Romania. The new ‘cold’ war is a “long war” as Washington has defined it.

Thus, the defeat of Kiev on the left bank augurs for a long standoff with Western support for continung attacks of various kinds across the Dniepr against Russian-controlled eastern Ukraine that will likely lead to a second phase of the war in right bank Ukraine. The only way to avoid this outcome is by way of a negotiated treaty involving at least Kiev and Moscow; the West is an unlikely partner in a peace endeavor, given the chaos now reigning in Washington. Washington will prefer a Russian quagmire in Ukraine as a way to intensify Russian agony and angst in an attempt to outlast the aging Putin, parlaying these into a Russian succession crisis, which could provide an opening for a re-start of outright war and Maidan’s retaking of eastern Ukraine. The attempt will revive the risk of a larger NATO-Russia war, perhaps extending far beyond Ukraine.

The threat of such developments is peaking now. Zelenskiy and the Ukrainians are desparate given the not-so-long-coming collapse of Ukraine’s defense across the entire front; hence the desparate throw of the dice that is the Kursk invasion—a last desparate attempt to turn the tables on Moscow. For nearly a year and a half, Russia has been on a gradually mounting counter-offensive, even as it defeated last summer’s Ukainian offensive in Kherson. Since Russia’s seizure oft he Donbass town of Bakhmut (Artemovsk) in May 2023, Russian forces have been taking villages and towns one after the other. In March of this year the powerful Ukrainian stringhold in the town of Avdiivka fell. Since then, Russia forces have been gradually increasing the pace of ist territorial advance and attrition of Ukrainian forces. Under what I have called Russia‘s ‘attrit and advance‘ operational strategy, Putin‘s forces have arrived at the gates of the strategic hub of Pokrovsk 50 miles west of Avdiivka. There is only one place where Ukrainian forces can set up a relatively strong defense line after Pokrovsk. That is at Pavlograd some 60 miles farther west. After that the road is open to the Dniepr River (30 miles to the west from Pavlograd) and the industrial stronghold of Dnepro (Dnepropetrovsk). So Russian forces have advanced some 50 miles in 5 months — 10 miles per month. At that pace, Russian forces would be at the Dneipr by next summer at the latest. But this will likely occur early next year, because Russian army is strengthening, while Ukraine’s is weakening. Russia’s advance has been accelerating over the last year because of this disparity, and the disparity itself is growing. Ukraine will soon be out of trained soldiers and wasted a large amoount – perhaps 17,000 – on the doomed Kursk incursion. The shortage of ammunition and weapons has been growing, and the recent Western refusal to send more weapons in anything close to a significant amount means the weapons gap is intensifying as well. The Ukrainian army is doomed.

Kursk may produce another few isolated tranches of Western assistance but that will do little to put off the arrival of Russian troops at the Dnepr River, even perhaps before the New Year. As I have argued for a year, the West no longer has sufficient weapons or means – aside from tactical nukes or a full-scale NATO invasion — to change the battlefield equation and help Ukraine hold the line. It was clear many months ago that Russia’s territorial advance and attrition of Ukrainian forces would gradually increase, as I then stated. Paid liars from Washington, Stanford, London and elsewhere have tried and likely will continue to try to tell you ‘Ukraine is winning’. It is not and cannot do so without a full-scale NATO intervention and a likely resulting World War III.

Western ‘experts’ and intel propagandists have failed Ukraine and their own peoples by their ignorance of Russia and their professional malfeasance. They have misunderstood and underestimated Russia for 35 years from her lack of self-identity to inevitable ‘transitions’ to American-style governance and from the ‘failed transition’ to a totaitarian caricature of Putin’s reborn, rather soft authoritarianism and neo-traditionalist culture. They underestimated how Russia would respond to NATO expansion and the broken promise it entailed, a Western-backed. They underestimated Russia’s reaction to the neofascist-led putsch in Kiev and the betrayal of another agreement that promised an end to the crisis the West nurtured, to the US- and Western-backed failure of Kiev to live up to its obligations under the 2015 Minsk peace accords, to the US and West’s training and equipping Ukr to de facto NATO member status from 2014-2022, and to the January 2022 declaration to Putin that the US was renegging on Biden’s December 2021 promise of no missiles in Ukraine. Now they will underestimate the risks of a new nuclear confrontation with Russia in Europe combined with a long war with Russia in Ukraine by way of NATO-supported guerrila and terrorist partisan warfare carried out by Ukraine’s most committed element—its ultranationalists and neofascists. It is they who will likely succeed the Zelenskiy-Maidan regime—the last phase of the hybrid oligarch-ultranationalist phase before the truly ‘nationalist’ revolution led by real extremists.

The grave failure of Western rusology, academia, and government, I suspect, is bringing the world back to schism and nuclear confrontation. This failure will bring another Western or Western-induced Ukrainian escalation in autumn leading in response to an escalation by Russia perhaps involving an official Russian declaration of war on Ukraine and/or the targeting Kiev’s ‘decision-making centers.’ The U.S. Democrat Party-state and the media-academic-military-industrial-congressional complex cannot allow prior to the presidential election neither an obvious Ukrainian collapse to materialize as an ‘October surprise’ nor a a major escalation that brings or clearly risks U.S. troops or the homeland.

But there should be no doubt; there are domestic options of an escalatory nature being examined in Western decisionmaking and research centers. When one of the next Western or Western-backed Ukrainian escalations is enacted – regardless if it is engineered under a Trump or Harris administration or the guise thereof – there will follow, as sure as night follows day, a Russian response targetting not just ruined, disappearing Ukraine but the West.

https://gordonhahn.com/2024/09/01/ukrai ... ng-points/

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Ukraine’s First Confirmed Loss Of A F-16 Is A Major Loss Of Face

Andrew Korybko
Sep 03, 2024

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This is an inauspicious start to Ukraine’s long-awaited F-16 deployment.

Ukraine confirmed last week that it lost its first F-16, which it claims simply crashed while on a mission, even though an MP alleged that it was shot down by a Patriot missile in a case of friendly fire. Others don’t believe either of these explanations and speculated that Russia bombed its hangar. Whatever the truth may be, this is a major loss of face for Ukraine after it hyped the F-16s up as a game-changer even though the US Air Force chief himself cautioned in spring 2023 not to have such expectations.

The reason why it still did so anyhow was for boosting morale at home and abroad, but this was doomed to backfire since there was never any credible basis for expecting the F-16s to make much of a difference. Popular expectations were that they’d be used to bomb Crimea or other parts of the territory that Ukraine claims as its own, yet Kiev’s official version of events is that it simply crashed during a mission shooting down Russian drones and missiles.

Few who eagerly waited for Ukraine to finally field the F-16s expected that they’d be put to use for air defense, let alone in a such dangerous conditions where projectiles are falling while Patriots are being fired into the sky to intercept them. It’s for this reason why the earlier mentioned alternative theory of it being hit by friendly fire is plausible since it’s extremely difficult to operate in such conditions. Ukraine is also known for its poor tactics so it’s believable that the pilot might have been ordered on this mission.

Considering how bad the official and alternative Ukrainian theories of this crash make Kiev look, it might have been better to claim it was bombed by Russia in its hangar even if that’s not what really happened, but that might have spooked the West into thinking the F-16s are sitting ducks. Ukraine might have thus thought that this would harm morale more than admitting to having made a lethal error of judgement in sending the pilot into those dangerous conditions just to shoot down a few missiles and drones.

To be clear, no conclusive evidence has yet to emerge indicating which of the three working hypotheses is the most accurate, but all of them are still embarrassing for Ukraine. In the order that they were presented, the pilot either made an error after being improperly trained per the shortened program they were in; the same might have occurred with regards to the Patriot operator; or Ukraine’s operational security for this program isn’t anywhere near as airtight as was thought and was penetrated by Russia.

No matter what happened, Russia benefits in the soft power sense, though it’s premature to predict whether this fiasco will adversely affect the Western elite’s plans to continue arming Kiev. The Wall Street Journal reported that the US won’t send contractors to service the F-16s since they’d be a high-value target, however, thus suggesting that they suspect that it might have been hit in its hangar. If this policy remains, then the F-16s won’t get as much action as expected, thus further reducing their impact.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/ukraines ... ed-loss-of

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The Poltava affair
September 3, 16:55

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As a result of the strike of two Iskander missiles on the Poltava School of Communications, the enemy lost at least 190 people killed and more than 400 wounded. One of the strikes hit the formation. It is very likely that this is the most effective strike of the war in terms of one-time losses, which will surpass the strikes on the mercenary barracks at the Yavoriv training ground and the barracks of the 79th brigade in Nikolaev.
Among the dead were Swedish instructors. The strike was most likely carried out by graduates of the Peter the Great Strategic Missile Forces Academy.

Photos and videos from the scene in Telegram https://t.me/boris_rozhin

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9360859.html

Google Translator

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These Russians who curse Peter for his Western influence seem to forget that Russia would be a Swedish colony without Peter's military modernization.
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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