South America

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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Wed Jul 16, 2025 1:34 pm

The Entrenchment of Dina Boluarte, the Most Hated Head of State in the World
July 13, 2025

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Dina Boluarte, de facto president of Peru. Photo: El Comercio.

By Anahí Durand Guevara – Jul 11, 2025

In recent months, Peru’s coup President Dina Boluarte has been in the news for seemingly contradictory reasons: having the lowest citizen approval rating in the world and, at the same time, receiving one of the highest salaries in Latin America, and nothing affecting her continuity in office.

In May, the polling organization IPSOS revealed that Dina Boluarte had 0% citizen approval. “In the whole world I do not know of such a poor record,” said Alfredo Torres, director of IPSOS, when asked about this situation. The director also emphasized that Boluarte’s approval represented a “historical record” because in the 30 years that the pollster has been conducting surveys it has never found such a high trend of disapproval, sustained for so many months.

Citizen rejection is also manifested in the streets. In December 2022, when the Congress removed Pedro Castillo and appointed Boluarte as president, she faced massive protests that paralyzed the country and were brutally repressed. If at the beginning the population rejected her for betraying her promise to resign if Castillo was removed from office, the rejection grew following multiple massacres, the accusations of corruption, the increase in crime, and her ostentatious incapacity and frivolity. Fearing popular rejection, Dina Boluarte rarely leaves the presidential palace and is always guarded by numerous police and military personnel. Even so, Boluarte has faced tense moments such as when the mother of one of the minors killed by the repression in Ayacucho pulled her hair while people shouted “usurper” and “murderer.”

Despite this overwhelming disapproval, at the beginning of July the official newspaper El Peruano published the decree formalizing Dina Boluarte’s salary increase to 35,500 soles per month (US$9,800). This 122% salary increase made Boluarte the second highest paid head of state in South America, after Uruguay. But for Boluarte it was not enough to earn the equivalent of thirty-four minimum monthly salaries (the minimum salary in Peru is 1,134 soles per month), and she got a Platinium card with no spending limit for food and clothing purchases.

With more than three years at the helm of the presidency, Boluarte faces seven public charges for crimes against humanity (50 killed and 1200 wounded during the protests), corruption for the Rolex Case (where she ratified regional budgets in exchange of high-end watches) and abandonment of office for being absent from her functions to undergo cosmetic surgery… And yet, paradoxically, Dina Boluarte remains stable in office. How can this contradiction be explained? How can such a nefarious character be sustained?



The immovable Dina Boluarte and the ruling coup coalition
To understand Boluarte’s stability despite such hatred from the people, political incompetence, and personal frivolity, it is necessary to take into account the coup coalition that swore her in as president. Those who put her in office give her stability and maintain her because she is totally functional to their interests.

Dina Boluarte’s main support has been and is the Congress. In a country where congress members frequently decide the removal of presidents, it is critical to have the support of the Parliament. Congress was the spearhead in the coup that ousted Pedro Castillo and it is the body that raised Boluarte to the presidency. There are no left-wing or right-wing blocs here, only parliamentarians interested in preserving their share of power and safeguarding corporate interests. That is why they massively voted against early elections and have blocked any possibility of presidential vacancy irrespective of the fact that the citizens also massively disapprove of the Congress (95%). Dina Boluarte is totally subordinated to the Parliament, has doubled its budget, and supports all its legislative initiatives.

At the same time, political parties with significant representation in Congress govern with Boluarte. The parties that lost the presidential election and whose parliamentary blocs boycotted Pedro Castillo, occupy places in key ministries: Alianza para el Progreso (APP) has the ministries of Health and Housing, Fujimorismo has Economy and Energy. Special mention should be made of Peru Libre of the Marxist-Leninist politician Vladimir Cerrón, a party that shares the Congressional board of directors with Fujimorism and the ultra-right.

Corporate elites also support Boluarte because she has consistently yielded to their policy demands, including new tax exemptions for agro-exporters, pension fund legislation, and incentives for mining investment. The armed forces and police have also fulfilled their role as guarantors of the regime. In fact, they were key to repress the protests with blood and fire. In return, they have been rewarded with increased military spending and an amnesty law for those implicated in crimes against humanity. And of course, let us not forget the United States, which is very proactive for the international support that this illegitimate and human rights violating government needs.

The Peruvian people remain excluded from this distribution of power and resources. With general elections just ten months away, Peruvians will choose their president and congressional representatives. While disaffection and disenchantment with a system that has ceased to respect citizens’ will may dominate, the elections could equally serve as an opportunity to expel this political class and forge a new path toward greater popular inclusion, resuming what was cut short on December 7, 2022..

https://orinocotribune.com/the-entrench ... the-world/

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Bolivia: Uncertainty, Internal Strife and Popular Fatigue
Posted by Internationalist 360° on July 13, 2025
Telma Luzzani

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The dispute between former president Evo Morales and current president Luis “Lucho” Arce is becoming more virulent every week. The extraordinary changes that the Plurinational State of Bolivia has achieved since 2006 are at risk of being lost. It is even feared that that right wing that had turned Bolivia into a country without dignity will return to power. After the 2019 coup d’état, Evo, outlawed, chose his former Minister of Economy, Arce, as presidential candidate for the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) for the 2020 elections. The Luis Arce-David Choquehuanca ,ticket obtained 55% of the votes and an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly. One year later, tensions began in the MAS.

“It is a decline without glory”, said former Vice President Álvaro García Linera, referring to this stage of reproaches, accusations and internal confrontations. The fight is so deep that, weeks before the presidential elections of August 17, it is not known who will be the leftist candidate. The uncertainty is total because, as explained by Ariel Basteiro, former Argentine ambassador in Bolivia, “by law, up to six days before the elections, changes can be made in the electoral formulas due to resignation or death of any of the candidates”.

Currently, there are three possible progressive candidates. Eduardo del Castillo (36), lawyer and current government minister. Andrónico Rodríguez (36), political scientist and prominent coca growers’ leader, and Mónica Eva Copa (38), former president of the Senate for MAS and current mayor of El Alto, one of the most combative Bolivian regions.

These young, progressive candidates, all graduates of Bolivian public universities, face the candidates of the neoliberal right. The three with the best chances -Samuel Doria Media (66); Tuto Quiroga (65) and Manfred Reyes (70)- have run unsuccessfully in other elections. Doria Medina, businessman and former minister; Reyes, former military trained in the terrorist School of the Americas and former mayor of Cochabamba; and Quiroga, successor of dictator Hugo Banzer; all are educated in Anglo-Saxon centers of study. They seek to impose neoliberalism in Bolivia.

Ariel Basteiro, author of the book Radiografía de una canallada (a rigorous investigation on the participation of Mauricio Macri and Patricia Bullrich in the 2019 coup against Evo), in an interview with El Destape, reflected on the complex economic, political and social situation Bolivia is going through.

– Is the confrontation between Evo and Arce ideological or is it a battle of “egos”?

– The main problem is clear and precise: it is a power dispute. Evo wants to be a presidential candidate at any cost and Lucho Arce, who was originally going to run for reelection, had to decline because the polls showed that he does not have popular support. Arce then looked for an alternative within his cabinet of ministers and chose Eduardo del Castillo. Both Evo and Lucho have clear and strong positions. Arce, in this last time, was very forceful in his support to Palestine; in strengthening the links with Latin America; in incorporating Bolivia to Mercosur and the BRICS. On the other hand, Del Castillo, Andrónico Rodríguez and even Eva Copa have not expressed definitions in this regard.

– But the dispute for the presidency continues.

– Today it is defined: Evo would not be a candidate for president and neither would Lucho.

– How does Bolivian society perceive this palace fight?

– The politicization of the Bolivian people no longer has the forcefulness it had from 2008 to 2013, the best moment of the MAS. Today there is some discomfort. In the street everyone is a little tired of the internal tensions and divisions, which are not only in the MAS but also among the 5 or 6 candidates of the right wing. This shows that the division is present at all levels and in all sectors. The ordinary citizen does not follow the political debate in Bolivia today. He complains because these internal conflicts create inconveniences in his daily life: there are road blockades, transportation stoppages, conflicts with the supply of food and fuel… and people are more attentive to how to solve the daily life than to the disputes of each sector.

– What is the economic context?

– Compared to Argentina, the economic context is not serious, but the reality is that for 14 years, during Evo’s government, a balance had been reached in the most important aspects of the economy, such as inflation, value of the currency, foreign currency income, foreign trade. Those were very profitable years and Bolivian society got used to that normality. Today there is a 20% inflation in food, a dollar that has doubled (the official one is at 7 pesos and the parallel one at double (14), among other things.

– Are the causes to be found in political quarrels?

– It is multi-causal. In part it has to do with political squabbles. Lucho’s government had neither the possibility nor the capacity to obtain soft loans with the IDB or with regional organizations due to political issues: Evo’s group did not give him the necessary votes in the Legislative Assembly for those agreements to go through. On the other hand, the drop in gas production was catastrophic. In the past, with purchases from Argentina and Brazil, more than 3,000 million dollars a month came into Bolivia. This generated a period of bonanza. Argentina now has its own production and Brazil, which was a great demander of Bolivian gas, could have continued buying what Argentina no longer demanded, but the wells dried up both for lack of exploration and for a geological problem. Today Bolivia has very little income from the sale of gas. It has some from mining, but nothing compared to what it was from the decade of 2006 to 2016. This has social repercussions. The salaries of state employees are paid in installments, public works were paralyzed, social benefits were reduced, and so on.

– Does the right wing have a chance of winning?

– Yes, today they are divided, but in a second round, if they are all behind the candidate who has made it to the second round, it is clear that they would pose a challenge to the MAS. Many people say that the MAS could win in the first round. If they are unified, the candidate that is elected could obtain 40 points and the conservative candidates only 30 points. Today, polls give the right 20 or 22 points. But if the left is divided….

– Bolivia’s experience with the United States is traumatic. Until the inauguration of Evo Morales (who had to expel Ambassador Phillips Goldberg for conspiring against his government), U.S. ambassadors openly intervened in Bolivian politics and economy. Even the intervention of the OAS, manipulated by Washington, in the coup against Evo in 2019 has been proven. How is that relationship today?

– The current government continues to maintain the same cold relationship with Washington as in Evo’s time. The Americans continue to influence and help opposition groups. In fact, the Bolivian right wing is clearly financed by a U.S. NGO. The most important fact is that the Chargé d’Affaires, Debra Hevia, currently the most senior person in the embassy, is a woman with a complex past. Where she has been, there has been destabilization, coups d’état and color revolutions. Now we will have to see how the electoral process develops. The US influences as always: officially it seems to do little activity, but they maneuver in the shadows as they do and have done in all countries.

– Do you dare to make any prediction?

– No. In Bolivia anything is possible.

https://libya360.wordpress.com/2025/07/ ... r-fatigue/

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VIDEO: ‘We are fighting second coup,’ Evo Morales tells The Grayzone

Oscar León·July 14, 2025

In an exclusive interview with The Grayzone’s Oscar Leon, former Bolivian President Evo Morales details a trove of leaked chats and documents which show how an electoral council member took money in exchange for disqualifying him from running for president again. As his country’s first indigenous president and the leader of powerful social movements, Evo remains popular among his base.

Here, Morales addresses the attacks he has weathered from the current Bolivian president, Luis Arce, who relied on him to get elected, but who now seeks to end his political career. Evo warns that the campaign to ban him will lead to a resurgence of right-wing forces which aim to sell his country’s vast mineral wealth off to US oligarchs.




https://thegrayzone.com/2025/07/14/evo- ... cond-coup/

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"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Thu Jul 24, 2025 2:54 pm

Marlon Vargas is the new president of Ecuador’s Indigenous movement CONAIE

After a close vote, Vargas defeated Leonidas Iza, former presidential candidate and current president of CONAIE, the country’s most powerful grassroots organization.

July 24, 2025 by Pablo Meriguet

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The election process for the new CONAIE Government Council for the period 2025 - 2028. Photo: CONAIE

On July 20, 2025, during the eighth congress of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), Marlon Richard Vargas Santi was elected president of Ecuador’s largest social and Indigenous organization for the 2025-2028 term. The inauguration will take place on July 28, 2025.

Vargas obtained 617 votes from Indigenous leaders, compared to 540 votes for Leonidas Iza, the current president of CONAIE, who was seeking re-election. Both candidates were proposed by the organization’s membership.

CONAIE is one of the most important grassroots organization in Ecuador, not only because of its complex system of democratic election of authorities, but also because of its powerful capacity for mass mobilization from the 1990s to the present day. In recent years, two anti-neoliberal mobilizations led by CONAIE (the first in 2019 and the second in 2022) challenged the governments of Lenin Moreno (2017-2021) and Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023).

CONAIE represents 15 nationalities and 18 Indigenous peoples and maintains close relations with various popular sectors. The organization defends collective rights and community power to govern their territories. The organization began in 1980 with the creation of CONACNIE (National Council for the Coordination of Indigenous Nationalities) to strengthen, organize, and defend the Indigenous peoples of Ecuador.

The Congress was held in the town of Conocoto, Quito, between July 18 and 20, 2025, at the Pichincha International Center for the Integration of Peoples (CIIP), where more than 1,600 delegates who are part of the movement gathered.

Vargas and Iza
Vargas, 49, was born in Capahuari, an Indigenous community in the Amazonian province of Pastaza, and is a member of the Achuar Indigenous group. He has held important positions in the Amazon region. In 2016 and 2020, Vargas was elected president of the Confederation of Nationalities of the Amazon of Ecuador (CONFENAIE) and previously served as vice president and communications director of the Achuar Nationality of Ecuador.

In addition, Vargas was one of the leaders of the October 2019 social mobilizations against former President Lenin Moreno, over the economic adjustments that the government had agreed to with the International Monetary Fund, including the elimination of gasoline subsidies. He also took part in the June 2022 mobilizations against the economic policies of former President Guillermo Lasso.

The outgoing president, Leonidas Iza, was the central figure in the national protests of 2019 and 2022, thus becoming one of the most important opposition figures to the governments of Lenin Moreno, Guillermo Lasso, and Daniel Noboa. He also participated in the last presidential elections, coming in third with 5.25% of the vote, which was a surprise given the high degree of polarization between the current government and the Citizen Revolution party of former President Rafael Correa (2007-2017).

At the end of the voting, Iza thanked the organization and congratulated Vargas, advising him not to be influenced by those on the right. Iza received words of gratitude and applause from members of the organization, as well as criticism from others. In addition, the current president of CONAIE, through X, congratulated Vargas again, highlighting his participation in the October 2019 and June 2022 mobilizations, and predicted success in his administration: “May dissent allow us to elevate the debate for a more just society, and may the mandate of the VIII Congress of the Indigenous Movement be the compass that guides the actions of the new Governing Council.”

A difficult mandate for Vargas
Many analysts remain skeptical about whether Vargas will maintain the same confrontational and oppositional stance that Iza has adopted toward the Noboa administration. However, the grassroots supporters approved a work agenda that Vargas will have to address if he wants to maintain the support of most of the leaders.

Approximately seven of the 65 mandates proclaimed during the congress focus on the protection of natural resources and the rejection of extractive activities in the areas of mining and oil, projects that are part of the controversial agenda of President Daniel Noboa: “[CONAIE] will not engage in dialogue with the government on extractive issues as long as the violation of collective rights and the criminalization of nature defenders continues,” states the collective document.

Another important development is that during the congress, it was decided that the six legislators from Pachakutik, the electoral arm of CONAIE who currently vote in line with Noboa’s government, will be expelled from the organization.

In his first statements as president of CONAIE, Vargas called for unity among the peoples and nationalities of Ecuador and declared that they will be open to dialogue both within and outside the Indigenous movement: “Dialogue will always be upfront, transparent, and serious, with results. It has to be a dignified dialogue because we cannot engage in dialogue without results while we have problems with health, the economy, production, and education in the territories of the three regions… We will be open to dialogue first among ourselves and then with the authorities. We will not be obedient when they come to try to impose an agenda on us. We will not give up the historic struggle of our peoples. We know how to dialogue, but we also know how to resist.”

Reactions to Vargas’ election
On behalf of the executive branch, Secretary of Government José de la Gasca stated during an interview on Radio Democracia that Vargas’ election as leader of CONAIE would open the door to dialogue in search of consensus and solutions: “The bridges are open; the lines of communication with those bases have existed. There is no reason to be surprised if tomorrow we sit down at the table, if suddenly you see him sitting with the president (Daniel Noboa) in Carondelet.” La Gasca also mentioned that these elections represent a defeat for Iza and Correísmo.

For its part, the Communist Party of Ecuador welcomed Vargas’ election: “We are familiar with [Vargas’] history of struggle and we know that rapacious external interests are seeking to divert and undermine CONAIE’s struggle. But we are confident that Marlon will be able to remove the elements that are traitorous to the political project, such as the expelled Pachakutik assembly members.”

In addition, the PCE recognized the leadership of Leonidas Iza and his political legacy: “Iza is and will continue to be a key figure for the Ecuadorian left, because he represents one of the most powerful syntheses between the Indigenous movement, critical thinking, and revolutionary commitment.”

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/07/24/ ... nt-conaie/

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Protest Crackdowns Intensify in Argentina as Milei Implements Austerity

A new human rights report shows a marked increase in police violence against protesters in Argentina, with more people injured and detained in six months than in all of 2024.


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Protesters face tear gas and arrests in Buenos Aires during growing anti-austerity mobilizations under President Javier Milei. Photo: @CPMemoria


July 24, 2025 Hour: 3:23 am

en en
More protesters were injured or detained in Argentina during the first half of 2025 than in all of 2024, according to a new report by the Provincial Commission for Memory (CPM), which links the spike in repression to President Javier Milei’s austerity policies.

In the first six months of 2025, the CPM documented 1,251 cases of injuries or detentions during demonstrations in Buenos Aires—surpassing the total of 1,216 recorded in all of 2024. The organization attributes this rise to a deliberate state strategy to suppress dissent amid the government’s sweeping economic adjustment program.

The report was released at the headquarters of Argentina’s State Workers’ Association (ATE) on July 23, with the presence of prominent human rights and labor leaders. It concludes that the security forces—both federal and from Buenos Aires City—have adopted “systematic practices” aimed at limiting the right to protest, particularly among unions, social movements, political groups, and pensioners.

Presentación del 2° informe espacial sobre la represión a la protesta social

En el primer semestre de 2025, más de la mitad de las manifestaciones fueron reprimidas. En sólo seis meses ya hubo más personas heridas y detenidas que en todo el 2024. pic.twitter.com/GeuADqKEmX

— Comisión Provincial por la Memoria (@CPMemoria) July 22, 2025


One of the most violent episodes occurred on March 12, when a mass mobilization near the National Congress turned into what the CPM called “the most brutal repression” under Milei’s government. Originally led by pensioners protesting benefit cuts, the demonstration quickly grew to include workers, political parties, grassroots organizations, and football fans.

That day, 672 people were injured and more than 100 arrested. Among the most serious cases was that of photojournalist Pablo Grillo, who was struck in the head by a tear gas grenade launched by a Gendarmerie officer. Grillo suffered a traumatic brain injury, spent 83 days in intensive care, and remains in neurological rehabilitation. The CPM identified Héctor Jesús Guerrero as the alleged perpetrator based on audiovisual footage, and filed a formal complaint with Federal Court No. 1, presided by Judge María Romilda Servini de Cubría.

There are demands for Argentina’s hardline security minister to resign after police shot a photojournalist in the head during a violent crackdown on protests in the capital. Pablo Grillo required emergency brain surgery. pic.twitter.com/BYGiQWoW3G

— Al Jazeera English (@AJEnglish) March 14, 2025
The CPM also documented a significant rise in arbitrary arrests, with 130 detentions in just six months, compared to 93 in all of 2024. The report describes an increasingly militarized public space, where the number of security personnel deployed at demonstrations has doubled or tripled in some cases.

State repression now occurs in half of all protests, up from three in ten the previous year. While the increase in total injuries may seem marginal, the severity of violence and lack of accountability mark a new phase. The Ministry of Security closed the internal investigation into the Grillo case without sanctioning those involved—what the CPM says indicates political decisions made “at the highest levels.”

The report was compiled with assistance from on-site medical and legal support teams, including the Emergency and First Aid Corps (CEPA) and the health team of the Left Unity Front. In cases where direct monitoring was not possible, data was sourced from partner organizations and verified media outlets.

#Ahora en el auditorio de @ateprensa presentamos los datos del monitoreo de las fuerzas de seguridad en las manifestaciones durante el primer semestre de 2025, con la presencia de nuestro presidente @PrensaPEsquivel junto a @CNPTArgentina y @mlptcaba https://t.co/NsBq7Imi4I

— Comisión Provincial por la Memoria (@CPMemoria) July 22, 2025
Speaking at the report launch, ATE national secretary Rodolfo Aguiar called for institutional resistance to state repression:

“This report must strengthen our struggle. A government that deploys security forces to silence those who oppose its adjustment and looting policies must be answered with institutional and democratic tools. Against repression, we respond with strikes and mobilization.”

Such levels of violence during peaceful demonstrations mirror trends seen in other Global South contexts, where austerity and authoritarianism often go hand in hand.
As Argentina’s economic reforms deepen, so does the state’s reliance on force—raising urgent questions about the future of democratic dissent in the country.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/protest- ... austerity/

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Panama’s Top Union Leader Goes Into Exile in Bolivia
July 23, 2025

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Saúl Méndez with SUNTRACS workers. Photo: SUNTRACS.

According to SUNTRACS, the country ‘s largest union, its general secretary, Saúl Méndez, had to flee Panama due to the political persecution by Mulino’s right-wing government.

On July 19, 2025, Saúl Méndez, the top leader of the Single National Union of Workers in the Construction and Similar Industries (SUNTRACS), fled from Panama to Bolivia. The Panamanian secretary of state declared that Méndez obtained a “safe-conduct” (a formal document guaranteeing safe passage) at the request of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

Since May 21, 2025, the union leader had been in asylum in the Bolivian embassy to protect himself from possible arrest, after denouncing the political persecution that protesters and union leaders were facing in Panama by the government of President José Raúl Mulino.

Upon leaving the Bolivian diplomatic institution, Méndez shouted, “Let’s go and then we’ll be back. Long live the Panamanian people!” Police and a group of supporters then escorted him to the airport. Méndez has served as secretary general of SUNTRACS since 2010, one of the most powerful unions in the country.

Since April 2025, unions of teachers, workers, agricultural workers, students, and others, began a national strike in rejection of Mulino’s neoliberal policies, including:

A pension system reform (Law 462) that reduces pensions and opens the way for the privatization of social security.
The military agreements between Washington and Panama, signed in April 2025, that propose the installation of US military bases in Panamanian territory.
The plan to reopen a copper mine that the Supreme Court of Justice ordered closed in 2023, following massive protests.
In May 2025, amid widespread protests, Panama issued an arrest warrant against several union leaders, including Méndez. The Public Prosecutor’s Office, through the Second Prosecutor’s Office against Organized Crime, charged the union leaders with alleged crimes of “aggravated fraud, money laundering, illicit association, falsification of documents and prevarication”, citing a complaint filed in 2022 by former members of SUNTRACS. The complaint had been dormant and “practically closed” by the prosecutor in the Bocas del Toro province assigned to the case because “there were no crimes” found, Antonio Vargas, a lawyer for SUNTRACS, told La Prensa. Yet, the complaint was revived in May amid the national strike.

Méndez and other union members have denied the charges, stating that the union’s primary source of funding is member dues and accusing the government of political persecution.



Méndez breaks silence
Méndez has kept a low profile while at the Bolivian Embassy in Panama. But once he arrived in the Andean country, Méndez made several statements denouncing the situation in Panama.

The union leader appeared in a video addressed to the “united, honest and hard-working Panamanian people”, in which he denounced the political repression of the government. “[These are] moments in which the dictator has violated the constitution and the laws,” Méndez said, listing various examples: “Political prisoners have been tortured, murdered, persecuted, and massacred, such as the case of Jaime Caballero, Genaro López, the case of comrade Erasmus Cerrut, the case of the illegal dismissal of teachers, the yellow trials, and the attempt to dissolve SUNTRACS.”

“Power comes from the people. We can never again vote for these corrupt people; we have to be clear that we have to raise our alternatives from below, from the humble, honest, and working Panamanian people,” said the secretary general of SUNTRACS.

Méndez also stated that he will continue to fight from a “new trench” and encouraged SUNTRACS to remain firm and united to confront the Mulino government: “The people, their organizations, their leaders, teachers, unions, indigenous communities, peasants, students, parents, we must all fight for what is ours, that our conquests are respected and that democracy truly represents the interests of all. We continue in struggle, without struggle there is no victory”.

Miguel Angel Rodriguez, another of the union’s lawyers, pointed out that the asylum is political, without conditions, and that Méndez’s return will depend on having minimum guarantees from the Panamanian Public Prosecutor’s Office about their intentions.

In addition to Méndez, union leader Erasmo Cerrud is in asylum in the Nicaraguan embassy awaiting a safe-conduct that will allow him to flee from the persecution of the Panamanian government. For his part, 70-year-old unionist Genaro López, who led SUNTRACS for two decades, remains under arrest after appearing before the Prosecutor’s Office in May 2025. He has also described the process against him as a “political persecution”.

“The government seeks to destroy SUNTRACS”
In addition, days before Méndez’s exile, the Panamanian government filed a lawsuit before the country’s labor court to dissolve SUNTRACS and ordered the closure of the cooperative that the union used to store its members’ funds. The secretary of labor, Jackeline Muñoz, said: “We filed a lawsuit before the specific courts requesting the dissolution of the union. This is an abbreviated process that is carried out in the Judicial Organ … The Labor Code establishes that when a social organization constantly departs from the purposes for which it was created, it is a cause to request its dissolution.”

For their part, the union organizations, grouped in the National Council of Organized Workers (CONATO), warned that the move marks the beginning of an offensive against union freedom and the fundamental rights of workers.

Antonio Vargas, who is also a member of SUNTRACS, said that he will fight against the government’s decision which, according to them, seeks to destroy a revolutionary workers’ organization. “We have always defended the workers,” he affirmed. “The Constitution, the law and the Labor Code establish that a union cannot be dissolved administratively, they have to present the evidence before a sectional Labor Court and prove their claims.”

https://orinocotribune.com/panamas-top- ... n-bolivia/

Erick Prince Visits Peru: Blackwater’s Shadow Extends Across Latin America
July 23, 2025

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Before arriving in Lima, Prince spent two days in Ecuador, evaluating an agreement with Daniel Noboa's government to train security forces. Photo: EFE Archive.

Blackwater could operate with opaque contracts, without clear regulation and without being accountable to Peruvian judicial authorities.

The arrival of Erik Prince, founder of the controversial firm Blackwater (now Academi) and former Navy SEAL, to Lima to offer “training” to police forces, the military, and civilian groups reveals the continuation of an intervention strategy that US imperialism has been deploying with the use of private contractors from Iraq to Haiti.

Invited by economist Hernando de Soto, Prince has presented his arrival as a simple export of “solutions that have worked elsewhere.” But his “success stories”—Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, and Port-au-Prince—conceal systematic human rights violations and the delegitimization of civilian control over the state monopoly on violence.

In an interview with a local media outlet, Prince acknowledged that there is no “magic formula,” yet he promised to “empower” a Peru plagued by poverty, exclusion, illegal mining and drug trafficking.

Together with De Soto, he met with informal miners to hear their demands for land titling and legal certainty. However, Prince’s rhetoric merely proposed forceful strategies that—like in the past—ended up escalating social conflicts while failing to address the roots of exclusion and most notably the absence of due process.

Academi’s project in Peru is part of a regional conflict: before setting foot in Lima, Prince visited Quito to design an agreement to combat drug trafficking and illegal fishing. The establishment of a US military base in Ecuador was even considered.

This is the same logic that led Washington to tolerate the massacres of civilians in Baghdad (2007) and to sustain coups disguised as “peacekeeping missions.” Now, it seeks to install an army of private companies in the heart of the Andes, operating outside of transparency and parliamentary oversight.

Peruvian human rights organizations and academics have warned that the hiring of Academi erodes national sovereignty and blurs the subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian power. Without a clear legal framework, these mercenaries could operate under opaque contracts, unaccountable to local judges, reproducing the pattern of impunity experienced by Blackwater in Iraq.

The militarization of rural areas, where thousands of unlicensed informal miners are concentrated, risks turning into a repressive siege, involving the use of human shields, night raids, and the use of extreme lethality. Instead of strengthening the social fabric and ensuring productive formalization, the so-called-deal offers “support” that, in practice, dismantles democratic institutions and opens spaces for the accumulation of power by private actors.

Peru, facing a governance crisis aggravated by a lack of investment in social infrastructure and rural poverty, does not need armies from foreign security companies. What is urgently needed is a comprehensive rural development policy, the simplification of land titling procedures, and the reinforcement of the National Police and the Prosecutor’s Office through transparent technical cooperation under clear human rights standards.

Erik Prince asserts that he will not replace the State, but rather “will support it with tools and intelligence.” But experience shows that wherever mercenaries arrive, political and legal responsibility is displaced: the State delegates its obligation to protect citizens, while private companies secure contracts paid with public funds and diplomatic support.

The Dina Boluarte government and its police commanders face a crossroads: deepen their reliance on war tactics or seek multilateral alliances that strengthen institutions, guarantee accountability and address the root causes of the challenges of illegal mining, drug trafficking and social exclusion.

https://orinocotribune.com/erick-prince ... n-america/
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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Fri Aug 01, 2025 2:00 pm

Paramilitarism, Drug Trafficking, and Death: Uribe’s True Record
July 30, 2025

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Former Colombian president, Álvaro Uribe. Photo: Biel Aliño/EFE/file photo.

By Misión Verdad – July 30, 2025

The recent verdict against Álvaro Uribe for procedural fraud and bribery in criminal proceedings, after 475 days of trial and with the individualized sentence still pending, should not serve as a smokescreen. While the spotlight remains on the judicial novelty, a more serious background is fading: ties to paramilitaries, accusations of drug trafficking and the memory of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during his ruling.

On July 29, Judge Sandra Heredia found Uribe guilty of procedural fraud and witness bribery connected to the manipulation of statements in a case dating back to 2012. The defense maintains his innocence and may appeal. The individualized sentence is expected to be announced this Friday; based on his age and circumstances, house arrest is allowed.

But reducing “the Uribe case” to the conviction for witness tampering diminishes the picture. It ignores the victims or the power structure that shaped Colombia between 2002 and 2010, when alliances with paramilitaries were consolidated, incentives that led to extrajudicial killings—”false positives”—expanded, and the intelligence apparatus went on a rampage.

Paramilitarism: political project and territorial capture
The Ralito Pact (2001), an agreement to “refound the country” between leaders of the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) and elite public officials, revealed the political nature of paramilitarism. This so-called parapolitics led to dozens of congressmen being investigated and convicted for collusion with the AUC; many belonged to forces that supported Uribe’s administration.

In the city, Operation Orion (Medellín, October 2002) epitomized the convergence of law enforcement and paramilitary structures. There were mass arrests and disappearances; later, the Oficina de Envigado and its allies—a mafia network born as a collection arm of the Medellín cartel that, after the fall of Pablo Escobar, reconfigured to coordinate neighborhood gangs and regulate illegal economies in the Aburrá Valley—consolidated social control of the territory.

Uribe denies alliances with paramilitaries and has not been convicted of that crime; however, sentences and court testimony from former AUC leaders reveal patterns of regional co-optation. What is relevant today is to emphasize that those events were part of a project with structural effects that shaped the architecture of power and the political economy in large regions of the country.

Drug trafficking: how the criminal connection works
To understand the Uribe regime’s trajectory, it must be placed within the real ecosystem that governs war and regional politics: drug trafficking is the financial engine that connects armed groups, local authorities, and power structures. In this light, existing documentation records operational links and shared benefits between drug networks and the political project led by Álvaro Uribe.

On the documentary front, in 2020, the National Security Archive published a dossier of declassified official US records that, since the 1990s, point to Álvaro Uribe’s ties to paramilitaries and drug trafficking. A 1991 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report placed him among the “top drug traffickers” and close to Pablo Escobar; a 2004 Pentagon memo warned Donald Rumsfeld that Uribe “almost certainly” had dealings with the AUC when he was governor; and diplomatic cables from 1992–1997 recorded contributions attributed to the Ochoas, contacts with Escobar’s entourage and the “web” between the governor, Convivir, ranchers, and the AUC—that is, a narco-paramilitary and local elite network.

At the institutional level, the Truth Commission describes, through extensive testimony and documents, how during Álvaro Uribe’s administration (1995–1997), the expansion of the Convivir groups in Antioquia was intertwined with paramilitary structures financed by drug trafficking, which operated under legal cover and with departmental political validation. The report situates this narco-influence as a structural feature of the territorial control apparatus of the time and compares it with judicialized testimony and declassified official records that document how this network operated.

In court, paramilitary leaders such as Salvatore Mancuso and Ever Veloza (“HH”) have testified under oath regarding networks, local pacts, territorial protection, and coordination with authorities to consolidate paramilitary control in regions such as Antioquia, Córdoba, and the Caribbean Coast. In these confessions, they directly mention Álvaro Uribe in the context of political-territorial relations that facilitated this armed dominance, although drug trafficking economies fueled many of these operations.

War crimes and crimes against humanity: “false positives”
Between 2002 and 2008, under the Uribe ruling, the Colombian Army systematically executed thousands of innocent civilians, passing them off as guerrillas killed in combat. According to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), these unlawful executions, known as “false positives,” left at least 6,402 victims, with Antioquia accounting for a quarter of the cases. The peaks occurred between 2006 and 2008, when military units faced the greatest pressure to show “results” under the Democratic Security policy.

The court records reveal a recurring pattern: death quotas; incentives such as promotions or vacations; recruiting unemployed youth with false job offers; transporting them to conflict zones; summary executions; manipulating the scene; planting weapons; and subsequently presenting them to the press as combat casualties. The JEP concluded that these crimes were part of an institutional policy promoted by senior military commanders and rewarded by civilian authorities.

Among the statements brought before the court in truth and reparation proceedings, retired Major General Henry Torres admitted before the JEP that he acted on orders from General Mario Montoya and under direct pressure from President Uribe. This is compounded by testimony of a senior DAS official in Casanare, who stated that institutional intelligence policy “depended on and followed direct orders from the president of the Republic.”



Uribe’s own words reinforce this line of responsibility. At a community council held in 2007 in Aracataca, he said bluntly: “General Padilla, criticize whatever you criticize, but under my political responsibility, put an end to what remains of the FARC.”

Beyond the verdict
The conviction for procedural fraud and bribery may set a precedent, but it falls far short of reflecting the magnitude of the damage Álvaro Uribe represents as a political figure. His career has been linked to a model of power sustained by assassinations, extrajudicial executions, alliances with paramilitaries, and state structures permeated by drug trafficking economies. This machinery not only shaped an architecture of violence in Colombia but also projected its effects to other countries, including Venezuela, where he has operated as a promoter of destabilization strategies.

From this side of the border, the key is to keep in mind that his legacy—far from over—is a criminal, violent, and transnational project that remains a threat to Colombia and the region.

https://orinocotribune.com/paramilitari ... ue-record/

Javier Milei Appears in NY Complaint About $LIBRA Cryptocurrency Fraud
July 31, 2025

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Argentine President Javier Milei. Photo: X/ @PeladoStream.

At this stage, however, Milei is not among the defendants, as he enjoys immunity in his capacity as Argentine president.

A court filing by the plaintiffs in a class-action lawsuit in New York accuses Argentine President Javier Milei of carrying out a “highly misleading” and “strategically timed” promotion to give $LIBRA a false appearance of legitimacy and government affiliation at the time of the token’s launch.

The document states that “tens of thousands of reasonable consumers were misled” and that the “investment project” Milei referenced in his Feb. 14 post on X linking to the cryptocurrency “was false.”

The civil filing being handled by Judge Jennifer Rochon’s court names Hayden Davis, founder of $LIBRA, and his company Kelsier Ventures; Julian Peh and his firm Kip Protocol, which collaborated on the creation of the $LIBRA project; and Benjamin Chow, former CEO of Meteora, the platform used in the cryptocurrency fraud. At this stage, Milei is not among the defendants, as he enjoys immunity in his capacity as Argentine president.

However, the court declaration is part of a request by attorneys from Burwick Law and Hoppin Grinsell to maintain the freeze on 57,654,371 USDC (a dollar-pegged cryptocurrency), along with any other $LIBRA proceeds held in two specifically identified crypto wallets, named LIBRA Wallet 1 and LIBRA Wallet 2.

The plaintiffs are specifically seeking a preliminary injunction to block access to those assets until the conclusion of the trial, in order to secure the recovery of what they claim to have lost.

“When tens of thousands of investors lost more than US$280 million in a coordinated cryptocurrency fraud, they turned to this Court to preserve the proceeds of that fraud,” Pagina 12 reported.

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“The defendants now ask this Court to look the other way and treat digital assets—which can be moved with the click of a button through anonymous networks—as if they were cash safely stored in a bank vault,” it added.

https://orinocotribune.com/javier-milei ... ncy-fraud/

******

El Salvador Removes Presidential Term Limits, Enabling Bukele to Seek Re-Election


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(FILE) Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele. Photo: EFE.


August 1, 2025 Hour: 1:47 am

El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly, dominated by President Nayib Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas (NI) political party, ratified on Thursday a fast-track constitutional reform allowing indefinite presidential reelection. The ratification received three votes against—the only votes held by the opposition—and no deputies spoke before or after the vote.

This ratification modifies articles 75, 80, 133, 152, and 154 of the Salvadoran Constitution. It also eliminates the second round of presidential elections and extends the presidential term to six years.

The amendment had already been approved earlier that same Thursday night during the weekly legislative session and was sent to be published in the Official Gazette by the head of state. Once publication was confirmed, the ruling party presented the ratification request in a new session, which passed within minutes with 57 out of 60 deputies voting in favor.

“It is appropriate to ratify the constitutional reform agreement,” reads the approved decree, which includes a “transitory provision to enable the reforms.” This provision shortens the current presidential term to end in 2027 instead of 2029, aligning presidential, legislative, and municipal elections.

In Article 80, the new wording removes the suspension of civil rights for those who promote reelection, while Article 152 deletes the clause stating that a person cannot be a presidential candidate if they “have held the Presidency of the Republic for more than six months, whether consecutively or not, during the immediately preceding term, or within the six months prior to the beginning of the new presidential term.”

During the session in which the reform was approved, opposition deputy Marcela Villatoro of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena) criticized the move, saying the legislators “have made a public confession of killing democracy under the guise of legality” and that “they have killed the Constitution.”


The text reads: “Today, democracy has died in El Salvador; it is a disgrace. In an afternoon without consultations and in the most crude and cynical way. The masks have already been removed, they are cynical, they have made a public confession of killing democracy, disguised as legality.” Attributed to [@Villabull] regarding reforms.

Bukele began his second consecutive term on June 1, 2024, despite several constitutional articles prohibiting it, following a reinterpretation by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court—whose judges were appointed in a controversial process by the first NI-dominated legislature in 2021.

On the day of the presidential elections in February of that year, Bukele was asked whether he believed a constitutional reform allowing indefinite reelection was necessary. He replied: “I don’t think a constitutional reform is necessary.”

https://www.telesurenglish.net/el-salva ... -election/

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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Sat Aug 09, 2025 3:00 pm

Less Than Four Months After Joint IMF-World Bank Bailout and Lifting of Currency Controls, Argentina Is Back in Crisis Mode
Posted on August 5, 2025 by Nick Corbishley

“The IMF’s maximum credit to Argentina… is projected to reach 1,352% of the country’s quota in 2026. This would be the Fund’s largest exposure in absolute terms in its history.”

Before we get to the meat of this story, let’s begin with a wee refresher. On April 11, as readers may recall, Argentina’s faux libertarian President Javier Milei gave a televised address to the nation. Flanked by his senior cabinet members, Milei told the Argentine people that his government had finally lifted the currency controls that had plagued the economy since 2011 so that people can once again buy dollars unhindered.

Economic stability, he said, had finally returned to the country — all thanks to another, ahem, IMF bailout, Argentina’s 23rd since becoming a member of the fund in 1956.

The latest $42 billion injection — $20 billion from the IMF, $12 billion from the World Bank and $10 billion from the Interamerican Development Bank — was intended to artificially prop up the peso in the months leading up to mid-term elections in October. But the peso is already in freefall, and the elections are just two months away.

As I noted at the time, this was the first time, to my knowledge that an Argentine government, or indeed any national government, had responded to a bailout from the IMF — an institution that Milei had described as “perverse” before his election as president — with jubilant celebration:

Normally, an IMF bailout is the last resort for a government that has run out of options as well as a source of great shame, not the beginning of a new golden age or the source of great pride, as the Milei government is trying to present it.

The fact that the Milei government is filled with pseudo-libertarians to whom the IMF should be anathema makes it all the more surreal. Argentina’s Finance Minister Luis Caputo, a serial debtor and former JP Morgan Chase banker who already burdened Argentina with a $57 billion IMF loan in 2018, even thanked his wife and children for their support during the negotiations, as if he were winning a lifetime award.

At the same time, some senior IMF staffers were so opposed to the deal that they were willing to walk away from their jobs.

Milei’s faster-than-expected lifting of currency controls was initially celebrated on Wall Street. Milei “is moving full speed ahead toward cleaning up Argentina’s decades-old macroeconomic mess,” investment bank UBS wrote. “The elimination of capital controls, and the strengthening of the fiscal anchor, have all surpassed even the rosiest analyst expectations.”

Time to “Take a Breather”: JP Morgan Chase

Despite all the talk of removing currency controls, there are clear exchange rate bounds for the dollar (between $1,000 and $1,450). Initially, the peso performed reasonably well, given that citizens and businesses were finally able to buy unlimited sums of dollars — albeit only digitally (the controls on cash are, if anything, tighter than before) — and send them overseas.

Pressures, however, have gradually risen, as the peso has moved closer and closer to the $1,450 upper bound. Meanwhile, increasing doubts have set in among international investors, reports Buenos Aires Herald:

´[A] JP Morgan report, titled “Argentina: Taking a breather,” suggested taking profits in long [Argentine bonds, or] LECAPs. Although the financial institution remained “constructive on Argentina’s medium-term prospects given disinflation and fiscal progress,” it warned about potential issues — namely, the fact that “peak agricultural inflows” have past, likely continued tourism outflows, potential election noise, and the Argentine peso’s underperformance, which prompted the Central Bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market via derivatives.

“With positive seasonality close to an end and elections looming, we prefer to take a step back and wait for better entry levels to re-engage in bullish local markets trades,” the report said.

In April, the firm had recommended that investors participate in short-term carry trades in Argentina after the administration lifted several capital restrictions for individuals and companies. However, in last week’s report, they said that “recent developments warrant a more cautious approach in the near term.”

The lifting of the currency controls at the behest of the IMF has enabled investors to get the money out of the country, just as happened in the 2018 bailout. In April and May, the first two months following this year’s bailout, USD 5.247 billion left the country, reports Perfil. That is equivalent to 44% of the first instalment of $12 billion issued by the IMF. This is a feature, not a bug, of IMF bailouts.

“The level of outflows in May exceeded the monthly averages of all the years of the exchange balance series prepared by the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina — that is, from 2003 to date,” warns the Center for Research and Training of the Argentine Republic in a recent study. “It is even higher than the monthly average of 2018 and 2019, when the valuation of financial assets collapsed during the Macri government.”

If you combine the figures from April and May with the estimates from June, around $10 billion has left the country in just three months, notes the economist and former president of Banco Nación, Carlos Melconian. To put that in perspective, Argentina’s entire annual energy trade surplus is around $12 billion.

As hot money leaves the country, the pressures are building on the Argentine peso. In June, the official dollar exchange rate rose sharply. In July, the rise went almost vertical: 14% in just one month.

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Last Thursday, as Bloomberg reported, the peso dropped more than 4.4% in just one day, making it the worst performer in emerging markets and rounding off a woeful month for the Argentine currency:

It has tanked by more than 12% in July, the worst monthly decline since Milei devalued it after taking office in December 2023.

The government has been building up international reserves in July, pushing pesos into the economy, amid pressure to meet goals of its program with the International Monetary Fund. The market has also seen increased demand from the private sector as businesses seek cover in the greenback ahead of October mid-term elections.

A central bank report shows dollar purchases rising in June by more than $800 million to total around $4 billion, with the number of Argentines buying foreign currency almost doubling the amount of those selling it.

“Grab the Pesos and Buy US Dollars”

The irony is that this comes just weeks after Economy Ministry Luis Caputo disparaged analysts for daring to suggest that the government has been artificially propping up the peso in a bid to contain inflation, which is exactly what it’s been doing since December 2023. The two main drivers behind Milei’s success in bringing down inflation are: a) his government’s austerity-on-angel dust program; and b) the artificial cheapening of the dollar.

This latter approach has not only made Argentina the most expensive country in Latin America in dollar terms while destroying the competitiveness of the country’s manufacturers; it has also burnt through tens of billions of dollars of central bank reserves while generating easy profits for financial speculators. It is also wholly unsustainable, as we warned in December. As Philip Pinkerton notes, the moment the economy started to grow again import demand began surging and the peso came under renewed pressure.

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Now, back to Economy Minister (and former JP Morgan Chase banker) Luis Caputo.

“To anyone who thinks [the dollar] is that cheap, grab the pesos and buy [U.S. dollars],” Caputo said sarcastically a few weeks ago. “Don’t miss out on it, champ. If you have pesos, the exchange rate is free-floating, and you know for a fact it is very cheap, go ahead and buy”.

And that is what many have done. From that moment, the exchange rate has surged by AR$135, almost 11%. As the FT reports, the sinking peso presents Milei with a thorny dilemma:

The potent peso is policy. Milei is betting it will help him achieve the goal on which he has staked his political reputation: killing inflation. Argentina holds midterm elections in October and although last month’s inflation was the lowest in five years, prices are still up 43 per cent year on year.

Faced with a dilemma between reducing inflation, boosting growth or building reserves and stabilising the exchange rate, “the government prioritised inflation, which is politically the most profitable, at the expense of the others,” said Eduardo Levy Yeyati, an economist and professor at Torcuato di Tella university in Buenos Aires. “Now the other areas are screaming for attention.”

With the peso about 40 per cent stronger against the dollar in real terms, imports have surged, small businesses are struggling and unemployment has jumped to a four-year high. Despite Milei’s oft-professed desire to transform statist Argentina into a beacon of free markets, chief executives are not opening their wallets.

As the dollar rises, the risk of a sharp resurgence in inflation rises. Prices are already surging at the checkout, reports Perfil. Milei’s response has been to double down on his chainsaw austerity.

If necessary, more IMF dollars will have to be auctioned by the Treasury in an increasingly futile attempt to keep the rising dollar at bay. Meanwhile, public sector wages and pensions will remain frozen for the foreseeable. The economic pain will have to intensify until the economy stabilises — in a country where around 50% of the population are already having difficulty making ends meet as prices continue to rise while wages stagnate, according to a survey by Moiguer.

With consumer demand already anaemic, even large corporations are beginning to complain, reports Página 12:

They say that five large companies came knocking on the Minister Caputo’s door. “We are unable to sell, with these high prices. In the long run, we’re going to have to fire people. In fact, some are already doing it,” executives from two large food companies and envoys from the automakers Toyota and Ford told him. “The President is not interested in these issues,” the minister replied, with some embarrassment.

Caputo must have said something similar, and in the same terms, to a senior leader of the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) of a province in the interior. This week, its head, Martín Rappallini, used official numbers to say that the country’s factories are losing 1500 jobs per month due to the drop in activity.

The Geopolitical Dimensions of Argentina’s Debt Crisis

In a recent speech in Colombia, the US economist Joseph Stiglitz warned that history is once again repeating in Argentina. Stiglitz recounted that in 2018 then-President Mauricio Macri had applied for bailout funds in excess of $44 billion, which the Fund duly approved. It was the Fund’s largest ever bailout, which has now been beefed up by a further $20 billion.

Just as now, the rescue package was awarded during the lead-up to key elections, which Macri ended up losing. Just as now, currency controls were temporarily lifted, allowing investors, domestic and foreign, to get their money out of the country before things got ugly, which is exactly what happened.

As Stiglitz notes, Argentina “could not pay the 44 billion dollar loan (from 2018), yet now the IMF is lending them an additional $20 billion that they will also be unable to pay. This is presumably the reason why some senior IMF staffers were so opposed to the deal that they were willing to literally walk away from their jobs, as La Política Online (LPO) reported (machine translated):

The opposition this situation generated among the organisation’s staff led to the firing/resignation of several senior managers. First was the Chilean economist Rodrigo Valdés, who as director of the Western Hemisphere was naturally in charge of the Argentine case. Valdés is a consistent critic of Argentina’s hyper-indebtedness favoured by the Fund.

And now it has emerged that Turkey’s Ceyla Pazarbasiogluel, the director of the IMF’s Strategy, Policy and Review Department (SPR), refused to sign off on the new loan. In her place, two minor officials intervened to trigger the loan. “Totally outside the manual,” the Fund itself acknowledged to LPO.

The SPR is known as the “alpha male” of the IMF’s departments, or the IMF’s “politburo” — metaphors that illustrate its enormous power behind the scenes, since no major report can be published without its approval, as a former member of that committee revealed in an article in the Financial Times.

Yet resistance was overcome, presumably because Washington wanted it this way.

As readers may recall, just three days after the joint IMF-World Bank-Interamerican Development Bank bailout was announced, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent visited Argentina. As we reported at the time, the most likely motive for the visit was to impress upon the Milei government the importance of reducing Argentina’s economic dependence on China, currently its second largest trade partner.

Just weeks before Bessent’s visit, the US State Department's head of Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone, was in Argentina, where he cited the ending of Argentina’s swap line with China as a key condition for an explicit endorsement of the Trump administration for the IMF bailout.

“We want to make sure that no agreement with the Monetary Fund ends up prolonging that line of credit or that swap they have with China,” said Claver-Carone. “If we do that, we are shooting ourselves in the foot.”

This is a reminder of just how important a role the IMF often plays in geopolitics — a role that is only likely to grow in the coming years as the US seeks to reinsert control over its own back yard. In 2020, Claver-Carone, in the same role for the first Trump Administration, openly admitted that the US’s decision to grant the $57 billion loan (of which only $44 billion was ultimately used) requested by Mauricio Macri’s government in 2018 was largely based on geopolitical considerations.

Back to today, Argentina has an additional economic sword of Damocles hanging over its head. In late June, US District Court Judge Loretta Preska ordered the Argentine State to turn over its 51% stake in the oil and gas company YPF to partially satisfy a $16.1 billion court judgment brought by litigation funder Burford Capital. As Reuters relates, the case centres on Argentina’s 2012 forced nationalisation of Spain’s Repsol’s 51% stake in YPF without placing a tender offer to minority shareholders Petersen Energia Inversora and Eton Park Capital Management.

YPF is one of Argentina’s main sources of foreign currency, and the Milei government has appealed the decision, warning that the stakes could not be higher. If Judge Preska’s ruling is upheld, it says, it would irreparably harm its sovereignty, destabilize the Argentine economy and cause the irrevocable loss of a controlling stake in the country’s largest energy company. For the moment, the US government has sided with Argentina’s efforts to put the court order on temporary hold but the sword continues to hang.

In the meantime, the IMF’s exposure to Argentina’s almost constantly ailing economy continues to grow. The Fund’s maximum credit to the country is projected to reach 1,352% of the country’s quota in 2026, making it the Fund’s largest exposure in absolute terms in its 81 year history. What happens the next (and 24th) time Argentina defaults on its obligations, time may soon tell.

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2025/08 ... -mode.html

*****

Argentina: Milagro Sala and the Dress Rehearsal of Lawfare in Jujuy
August 8, 2025

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Protesters hold a placard with Argentinian social activist Milagro Sala's face and the words "Free Milagro" at a demonstration in Buenos Aires. Photo: Julieta Ferrario/Zuma Press/file photo.

By Charo Solís – Aug 5, 2025

Milagro Sala is one of the first political prisoners of the current Argentinian democracy. The founder of the Tupac Amaru Neighborhood Organization, she led an unprecedented program of social development by the people in Jujuy province: thousands of homes, schools, health centers, and cultural spaces built by workers’ cooperatives. She was a threat to the entrenched system of political and economic power.

Since her imprisonment in 2016, her case became a symbol of the criminalization of protest and a new type of political persecution that would later be replicated at the national level. With the publication of the book Jujuy: the Laboratory of Repression by Eli Gómez Alcorta and Valeria Vegh Weis, this process can be viewed in its complexity: a systematic machinery that combines the judiciary, media, and the government to crush popular power.

Milagro Sala: a city for the poor
Milagro Sala is an indigenous leader and founder of the Tupac Amaru Neighborhood Organization (OBTA), which emerged in the late 1990s in the province of Jujuy. Her first organizational experience was the creation of milk cups (afternoon snack and playtime sessions for children) in neighborhoods without basic services, such as Alto Comedero. From there, Tupac Amaru launched an unprecedented project: thousands of social housing units, swimming pools, health centers, schools, factories, and even a water park.

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Water park in Jujuy. Photo: Prensa Tupac Amaru.

At one point the organization had more than 100,000 members nationwide, and Milagro Sala was elected provincial deputy in 2013 and Mercosur parliamentarian in 2015. Her figure combined the unexpected: woman, indigenous, poor, with territorial leadership and institutional aspirations. Her popularity grew in sync with the progress of the works, and that unsettled the traditional powers of Jujuy, both political and business.

As Paula Quiroga points out in her research on the coverage about Milagro Sala by the right-wing newspaper La Nación, Sala’s media figure was shaped by stereotypes of gender, class, and race. She was portrayed as “violent,” “lawless,” and even “masculinized,” to question her legitimacy as a political and social figure.

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Tupac Amaru’s neighborhood construction in Jujuy. Photo: Prensa Tupac Amaru.

The history of Tupac Amaru was not only captured in books. It was also portrayed in the film Amasando Futuro by Marta Valle, where one can observe a record of the impact of the collective work carried out in Jujuy: housing, schools, health and cultural centers in places where there was once only mud and snakes.



The cases and international repudiation
The criminalization of Sala began with a minor complaint in 2009 for her protest against Gerardo Morales, former governor of Jujuy, later a senator and then president of the right-wing party Radical Civic Union. In the following years, cases against her accumulated for threats, instigation to riot, and finally, illicit association and fraud against public administration.

On January 16, 2016, just a month after Morales took office as governor, Milagro Sala was arrested for leading a camp in front of the Government House. Although a judge granted her release for that case, she was immediately charged in another complaint initiated by the provincial state prosecutor. From that moment on, she remained detained without conviction for years.

International organizations denounced irregularities from the beginning. In October 2016, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention described her arrest as “arbitrary” and called for her release. This was followed by statements from the OAS, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which suggested the adoption of precautionary measures in 2017, considering that Sala was being deprived of her human rights.

In 2017, the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina ruled that Sala be granted house arrest in accordance with the ruling of the Inter-American Court. But the Jujuy judicial system repeatedly failed to comply with that order. It was only in 2018 that house arrest was implemented, and since then it has been modified and revoked at various stages.

On July 25, 2023, the Supreme Court dismissed Sala’s final appeal and upheld the sentence of 15 years in prison and permanent disqualification from holding public positions.

https://orinocotribune.com/argentina-mi ... -in-jujuy/
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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Fri Aug 15, 2025 3:00 pm

Pink Tide Reversed: The South American Oligarchy Never Rests
Roger Boyd
Aug 15, 2025

This weekend it looks like the Bolivian oligarchy will complete the slow death of the indigenous rebellion lead by Morales that lasted for thirteen years. In October, Milei will look to consolidate his power in Argentina with the legislative elections, and the Chilean right looks to return to power after four years of the Boric bourgeois progressivism. The Correa revolution in Ecuador has been dead since 2017, and a progressive change in Peru was snuffed out before it was even started. In 2026, the leftist Petro of Colombia will also be gone after four years of obstruction by the legislature - replaced probably by a right winger. In Brazil, the twice oligarch re-educated Lula hands out some crumbs while not altering the oligarch-dominated and corrupt nature of the country. Apart from a Venezuela which is still hanging on under immense pressure from the West, the South American vassal oligarchs can be proud of their successful reversal of the post-2000 pink tide. Back to the Future it is.

With the turn of the century a wave of new progressive leaders took over from the neoliberal US vassal leaders that in many cases had destroyed the economy through extensive looting, corruption and cooperation with drug cartels. The new leaders did not understand that the domestic oligarchies, together with their friends in the US and the West in general, would patiently wait for weakness to return the countries to neoliberalism and oligarch dominance; reversing whatever gains had been made for the majority. In more recent years other progressive leaders have come forward, only to be swiftly blocked and/or overthrown.

Castro understood this reality and cast out the oligarchy, and embedded socialist rule within the economy and society; including an active and politically educated workers’ movement. Just as the Soviets had found in 1917, they would have to be ready to fight the forces of the right allied with foreign powers. As with China in 1949, as with North Korea, as with Vietnam. The most important thing was to gain control of the core institutions of power including the army, security services, and courts. This is why the US has waged an unrelenting war against Cuba for more than six and a half decades. It is why the West refused to provide aid to North Korea during its time of troubles after the fall of the Soviet Union; a period still used to misrepresent North Korea as a starving country. It is why the West economically cordoned off China until the 1970s when they opened up to China in order to weaken the Soviet Union (“my enemy’s enemy is my friend”) in the 1970s. It is why the West is now so alarmed at the ability of China to equal and surpass it in so many areas.

Hugo Chavez of Venezuela understood the need to control the army, the security services and the justice system, and to build a committed workers movement, but still left in place the economic and financial power of an oligarchy that is tightly allied with the West. He also thought that repeatedly holding free and fair bourgeois elections would provide him with legitimacy within the West; it did not. He had to survive a coup in 2002, and an attempt to cripple the oil industry form 2002 to 2003. Aided by rapidly rising oil prices he raised the living standards of the majority before he died in 2013. Hi successor, Maduro took office just before oil prices crashed in 2014, and the US saw another chance to take down the progressive forces. In 2015, Obama launched sanctions against the country which were greatly deepened by the Trump administration. Venezuelan foreign assets were also stolen by the US and UK and an alternative oligarch sponsored “president” endorsed by the US. In addition, even an assassination by drone attempt in 2018.



Maduro has survived all of this, due to the control of the military, security services and courts, but Maduro has still not jailed the oligarchs who are continuously plotting against the Venezuelan state and has not re-oriented the economy the way that Castro did. A reorientation that allowed Cuba to survive and adapt to the loss of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. The Venezuelan and US oligarchs will not rest until they once again control the Venezuelan state.

Argentina: 2003 to 2015
I have written much about the Argentinian situation here and here, so I do not need to reprise the history of the post 1998 to 2002 Great Depression rule by the Kirchner husband and wife team from 2003 to 2015; rescuing the economy and the population from the devastation rent by the utterly corrupt Menem during the 1990s. The Argentinian citizenry made the huge error of electing the oligarch tool Macri in 2015, with 51.43% of the vote, who immediately set about funding colossal capital flight with a massive IMF loan after removing capital controls and keeping a fixed exchange rate. He was thrown out in 2019 but the new president, Fernandez, refused to default on the huge and illegal IMF loan - instead muddling through and creating the conditions for Milei in 2023; the reincarnation of Menem.

There are legislative election in Argentina on October 26th which Menem needs to win to be able to fully implement more extreme radical right wing and neoliberal policies; serving the agricultural, extractive, media and financial oligarchy of the nation as well as his US bosses. Fully turning the nation into a low value added commodities exporter, completing the destruction of the post-WW2 drive for industrialization. The IMF are doing their best to facilitate an October victory by looking the other way and making new loans that are against their own rules, as they always do for such US vassal governments.

Brazil: 2003 - 2016
In 2003, Lula de Silva was at last allowed by the Brazilian oligarchy to become president after he had greatly reduced his left wing radicalism through the 1990s. As I have covered before his policies were really “green neoliberalism with crumbs” as his liberalization and deregulation of the economy was offset somewhat by relatively small increases in social spending - known as the “bolsa familia”; placing him more along the lines of a Tony Blair. When even these crumbs were deemed too much by the oligarchy after the end of the 2000s commodities boom, his chosen successor Rousseff was removed by lawfare aided by the US in 2016 and then Lula himself was jailed on trumped up charges. This was part of an overall operation to undermine both the Brazilian economy and Brazilian politics.



The right wing vice president Temer took over from Rousseff and immediately started reversing the policies of Lula and Rousseff. In the 2018 election, in which Lula was not allowed to take part, the right wing Bolsonaro was elected amid widespread campaigning irregularities and the stabbing of Bolsonaro. After four years of misrule, corruption and neoliberal policies, Bolsonaro was replaced by a Lula who had undergone a second oligarch re-education (the first one being in the 1990) via imprisonment and was hemmed in by a right wing legislative majority; elected by only 50.89% against a Bolsonaro who committed a number of irregularities during the election campaign and on election day. Lula has managed to reinstate some of the crumbs.

The next Brazilian presidential election is scheduled for October 2026. The Trump administration’s tariff blackmail attempt to get the charges against Bolsonaro dropped may have been aimed at allowing him to run in that election. Instead, it has bolstered Lula whose popularity had been waning badly recently. His main opponent seems to be a Tarcísio Gomes de Freitas who is ex-military and served in Bolsonaro’s government. As I have covered, evangelical Christian nationalism that pushes the oligarch-friendly Prosperity Bible and right wing cultural values has spread quickly in Brazil, aided by US evangelical churches, and is pulling the electorate rightwards against their own interests; 30% of Brazilians are now evangelical Christians.



Bolivia: 2006 to 2019
In 2006, driven by a wave of popular movements against such things as water privatization, Evo Morales was elected as the first indigenous president (the Bolivian indigenous population are the majority, but the white settler population has previously dominated political power). He greatly increased the state’s share of fossil fuel (gas) exports and increased the living standards of the majority, winning election after election. But during his 13 years in power he did not wrestle control of the armed forces and security services away from the oligarch class. It was they that carried out a coup in 2019, on the grounds of utterly spurious claims of election fraud driven by the US-tool Organization of American States (OAS) and the US government. He had to flee the country, while a popular uprising against the coup gained strength against a murderous oligarch controlled state:

The November coup was led by a white and mestizo elite with a history of racism, seeking to revert state power to the people who had monopolised it before Morales’ election in 2005. The racist nature of the state violence is emphasised in the HLS/UNHR report, including eyewitness accounts of security forces using “racist and anti-indigenous language” as they attacked protesters; it is also clear from the fact that all of the victims of the two biggest massacres committed by state forces after the coup were indigenous.

The oligarchy were forced to back down and hold a new election in October 2025, but this was instead of reinstating Morales as the lawful president; with Morales barred from being a candidate. Luis Arce was elected as the candidate for MAS (Morales’ party) in an election carried out under the remit of the coup plotters. In can be assumed that some back room deals may have been made by Arce, which probably included not allowing Morales to rule again. After the election, the coup installed president (Anez) was jailed but the armed and security forces were not purged of the coup plotters. The Bolivian state has been heavily dependent upon gas export revenues, and the current account was in surplus from 2003 until 2014, ran large deficits from 2015 to 2019 (3-6% of GDP), went back into surplus in 2021 and 2022 but then went back into large deficits (2.5% to 4.5% of GDP) from 2023 to the present.

Oil production is falling, increasing oil imports, and natural gas exports are also falling due to lower production and increases in Argentinian gas production that have removed it as an export market and also replaced Bolivian gas exports to Brazil. Also, the recent El Nino reduced the agricultural export crop production. The exchange rate peg to the dollar needed to be removed, as it forces the state to squander foreign exchange reserves on its protection. It has not, and Bolivia is now suffering from a shortage of the dollars required to import essential supplies such as fuel. Arce was unwilling to let Morales return as the head of the MAS, triggering a feud that has split the party and involved Arce using lawfare against Morales; which has included politicized charges of statutory rape against Morales (for fathering a child with a fifteen year old) and his barring from standing in the presidential election. There was also an assassination attempt made upon Morales with the car he was in being riddled with bullets.

The presidential election is set for August 17th, with Arce declining to stand for re-election in May and Morales banned from standing and now facing arrest on the statutory rape charges. The oligarchy has seen its chance and formed an alliance, “Unity” of right wing parties. Latest polls show the Unity candidate, Medina, and another right wing candidate, Quiroga, jostling for the lead in the first round with the MAS candidate far behind. It looks as if Bolivia will be returned to the path of neoliberalism and once again become a US vassal in South America.

Ecuador: 2007 to 2017
In 2007 Rafael Correa was elected president of Ecuador, ending a 10 year chaotic period that had followed a debt crisis that had ruined the economy. During his term, he gained a much greater share of the country’s fossil fuel (oil) export revenues for the state and greatly improved the economy and living standards of the majority. He also paid off all IMF debts early on and ceased all relations with the IMF. Unable to run for further office, he put forward his Vice President Lenin Moreno for election and Moreno became president in 2017.

Moreno immediately carried out a 180 degree policy turn toward neoliberalism, took a large IMF loan that the nation did not need, attempted to jail Correa who had to flee the country, and launched a major austerity drive that weakened the state. His political ratings crashed and he only served one term, but he greatly served the oligarchs as a traitor to Correa, to his party, and to the majority of Ecuadorians. He was followed by the neoliberal authoritarian Lasso, who lasted only two years as the legislature was in the process of impeaching him in 2023. From 2017 to 2023 the nation had been transformed from a peaceful and progressive one into a highly dangerous narco state, as the oligarchs got in bed with the drug dealers.

In 2023, in a highly contentious election in which an opposition leader was seemingly assassinated by state actors just two weeks before the first round vote and the issue of narco politics and increasing violence was centre stage, the son of the richest man in the country was elected president (Noboa); gaining 51.83% of the vote vs 48.17% for the candidate of the party of Correa (Luisa Gonzalez) with accusations of fraud in favour of Noboa. In the last two weeks of the first round election, after the assassination, Noboa went from being a fringe candidate to coming second and gaining a place in the runoff round; pushing a “tough on crime” stance that was much supported by the media. Without the assassination would Noboa have even made it to the second round? In his first term, which was the balance of the previous president’s term, Noboa established an authoritarian state with widespread human rights violations. In the 2025 election, during which Noboa declared a state of emergency and widespread fraud is alleged, Noboa again beat Gonzalez by 55.63% to 44.37%. Noboa was born in Florida, and has degrees from New York University (2010), Northwestern University (2020) and George Washington University (2020), a perfect training for a US vassal oligarch. The Noboa riches are founded upon dominance of the banana industry, and the family has been linked to the smuggling of cocaine; Noboa is part of the very problem that he campaigned against.

Peru: 2021 to 2022
Peru has long been a narco-state with the oligarchy fully in bed with the drug traffickers and vastly corrupt and human rights violating presidents such as Fujimori. In July 2021, the people of Peru had the temerity to elect a president that came from and represented the poorer majority: Pedro Castillo who narrowly beat the oligarch candidate and daughter of Fujimori, Keiko.

The oligarch-dominated legislature immediately set to work making it impossible for him to govern, including two impeachment attempts. A third was on the way when Castillo attempted to legally dissolve the legislature so that the will of the people could be implemented. The oligarch controlled army, security services and courts immediately reacted and overthrew him, with the traitorous vice president Boularte taking his place and putting down widespread demonstration against this coup through measures that included the massacring of protestors.



Boularte has aligned herself with the right wing and the military, and has a 2% approval rating. Castillo has been jailed and will not be allowed to run in the next presidential election scheduled for April 2026. Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko, has stated that she will be running for president in 2026. Promising a return to the corruption and authoritarianism of her father’s time, when she served as First Lady. We will see if a free and fair vote will be allowed.



Colombia: 2022 - 2026?
In 2022 after widespread street protests the left-wing Gustavo Petro was elected president of the country that has long been ruled by an oligarchy utterly in bed with the drug cartels and the US. Earlier in life he was a member of the left-wing guerrilla group M-19. One per cent of farms own 80% of the fertile land in Colombia, underlining the dominance of agricultural and extractive oligarchs who fund their own para-military organizations. The military is also tightly aligned with the oligarchs, and the US military.

He rules with a minority in the legislature so is limited in what policies he can implement. He has been hamstrung by that legislature, which has blocked one reform policy after another - repeating some of the experience of Castillo in Peru. He was even forced to issue a presidential decree to get his budget passed. The media and judiciary have also been active in undermining Petro. The next presidential election is in May 2026, with the constitution banning Petro from running again.

Chile: Still Waiting
In 1973 the US, together with the Chilean oligarchy, engineered a coup that overthrew the Allende left-wing government and installed the dictator Pinochet who ruled until 1990. He fundamentally transformed the country along neoliberal and right wing lines.



From 2006 to 2010 and 2014 to 2018, Michelle Bachelet was president. She is the daughter of a minister that served in Allende’s government; her father was tortured and murdered and she herself was tortured. She made only limited progressive changes, and the right wing billionaire Pinera served between 2010 and 2014 and from 2018 to 2022. Little of the economic and power-relations legacy put in place by Pinochet had really changed.

In 2022 it at last seemed that some real change may occur with the election of the left-wing activist Boric, and the rewriting of the Pinochet-era constitution. Unfortunately, the young Boric turned out to be a classic upper middle class anti-communist “critical theory” bourgeois progressive cosplaying as a leftist. The rewriting of the constitution was utterly botched by progressives who dominated the revising group and showed their disconnection from the realities of a still deeply socially conservative nation. It was rejected by the electorate, and a second right-wing driven effort was rejected a year later; leaving Chile with the Pinochet-era constitution.

The next presidential election is in November 2025, and the left-wing forces have elected an actual communist, but she will be hamstrung by the negative legacy of Boric; the right wing currently look to be the winners in October.

https://rogerboyd.substack.com/p/pink-t ... dium=email

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In Latin America, the US Is Showing What the Future World-Order Might Look Like
Posted on August 14, 2025 by Curro Jimenez

Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s president, has called for an emergency meeting of Latin American countries to respond to a “threat” by the United States. He is referring to the executive order supposedly signed by Trump and reported by The New York Times, which asks the Pentagon to ready the army for military interventions against drug cartels in the region.

This order was reported the day after Pam Bondi announced a reward of $50 million for information leading to the arrest of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro. She accused him of being “one of the largest drug traffickers in the world and a threat to U.S. national security” and the leader of the supposed “Cartel de los Soles” with ties to the Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel.

This makes Maduro a legitimate target for the army, since Trump had previously labeled these drug cartels as terrorist organizations. Both Petro and Maduro had accused Marco Rubio of plotting “terrorist attacks” against Venezuela. Of course, it could be argued that both were trying to deflect attention from internal problems and that the U.S. is an easy target.

It is no secret that the United States has aimed at regime change in Venezuela since at least Hugo Chávez came to power, who survived a coup in 2002. After the 2018 election, the U.S. tried to push Juan Guaidó as president, while after the 2024 election it tried to push the frontman of Corina Machado, Edmundo González. Marco Rubio confirmed that the Trump administration’s designation of the Cartel de los Soles, which it claims is led by Maduro, as a terrorist organization would legitimize U.S. military operations in Venezuela

If the U.S. wanted to intervene militarily in Venezuela, it has already built up the case. However, as Nick has elaborated in this post, Venezuela might not be the country to which Trump’s order is directed—at least not in the short term—but rather Mexico. Nick argues that full-blown military action against Mexico is not probable, but that the threat of a U.S. unilateral military action against drug cartels is growing and perhaps “imminent”.

A full military action against Venezuela or Mexico is not expected in the short term, but perhaps that is not the purpose of Trump’s order. The combination of labeling drug cartels as terrorist organizations and ordering the army to be ready for a possible intervention against them could be used, in due course, against most countries in Latin America. That’s why Petro is calling for a regional meeting to respond to what he says is a threat to all.

This meeting will probably not happen, and if it does, it will only be attended by Petro’s ideological allies, which are growing thin in the continent as the U.S., under Trump, redirects its attention to the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine in the region. It is not that it has ever abandoned it, but the need for it and the justification is changing. An example of this is the recently released U.S. State Department Human Rights report.

In the report, the Trump administration asked to soften the critique of partners in the region, such as El Salvador, about which the report says that there are “no credible reports of significant human rights abuses.” On the other hand, it has ramped up criticism of Brazil, with whom the U.S. is currently involved in an escalating spiral of diplomatic conflict.

Trump wants Brazil to drop the charge against ex-President Bolsonaro, who is accused of leading a coup conspiracy after losing elections. Lula has defied the U.S. and vowed not to submit to Trump’s designs, which has led the U.S. president to impose 50% tariffs (with notable exceptions) and to apply sanctions on members of the judiciary. But the case is larger than Brazil.

The Trump administration is seeking to ward off Chinese and Russian influence in the region and is doing so by lending full support to allies such as El Salvador, Argentina and Ecuador—where U.S. military bases might stage a comeback—and going strong against countries that do not bow to its will, such as Petro’s Colombia, Venezuela, or Brazil.

Brazil is a founding member of BRICS, and Lula has openly called for de-dollarization. For the U.S., making Brazil fall in line would serve as an example to others against defying U.S. hegemony in a region that it considers its sphere of influence.

In asserting its influence, Trump is taking a different approach than previous administrations. Instead of using human rights and democratic measurements to justify its interventionism, he is returning to threats to national security from drug cartels and immigration. It is also readopting the policy of backing up authoritarian governments in the region—such as El Salvador or Ecuador—as long as they are servile to U.S. interests.

Both policies have had terrible results in the past. As Nick points out, “further militarizing the war on drugs is unlikely to hamper the flow of drugs; it just creates yet more cycles of violence. We have already seen this play out in Colombia and Mexico, and is currently playing out in Ecuador.” And many of the past U.S.-backed dictatorial regimes in Latin America, such as Chile, Argentina or Brazil, were particularly brutal.

This focus and change of attitude towards the region is driven by what Foreign Affairs magazine titled “The Return of Sphere of Influence” and argues that the concept of “sphere of influence” has been gaining traction since 1999, but especially after the economic crisis of 2008–09 and the Ukraine war, which could be argued marks the end of U.S. hegemony.

The authors define “spheres of influence” as larger countries “using their advantages in military force, economic leverage, and diplomacy to secure spheres of influence—that is, geographic areas over which a state exerts economic, military, and political control without necessarily exercising formal sovereignty.”

The subtitle of this article—“Will Negotiations Over Ukraine Be a New Yalta Conference That Carves Up the World?”—becomes even more relevant with the upcoming Trump–Putin meeting in Alaska. The result of this meeting could herald what geopolitical analyst Alfredo Jalife calls the new “tripolar order”. The “tripolar order” is a G3 composed of China, Russia and the U.S. each with a “sphere of influence”.

Although there are other analysts, such as Andrew Korybko, who argue that Russia is trying to beat China to what he calls a “New Détente” with the U.S., which would normalise their relationships, would lessen Russia’s dependence on China and would allow the U.S. to “pivot back to Asia” to contain China.

Regardless of the outcome, what seems to be emerging is that the end of the “rules-based order”, which is digging its own grave in Gaza, will be followed by a return to one based on different powers exerting influence over their regions. China, Russia and the U.S. are the obvious ones, but others, such as Turkey, Israel, India or Ethiopia are following suit.

This development in international relations is, I suppose, expected after a hegemonic power loses grip. The power vacuum is filled by other actors. What remains to be seen is if these actors will behave in their “spheres of influence” similarly to how the U.S. does. I, personally, hold some hope that there will be some differences as China’s way, for example, is less confrontational and more diplomatic, for now.

However, I don’t discard the possibility that this return to a world governed by regional powers, now aided by surveillance technology and control tools never experienced before, is not the previous stage before a further concentration and consolidation of power in fewer global actors. The U.S. has already signed agreements with Chile, Ecuador and Colombia to share biometric data.

PS: Since writing this article, I have come across a few interesting developments. The GOP Ohio Senator endorsed by Trump has changed his discourse, stating that “Maduro’s reign of terror is over” and claiming that he will be out by the end of the year. At the same time, Edmundo González has returned to the spotlight, claiming Venezuela’s presidency from Spain, and Ecuador’s President Noboa, following the U.S.’s lead, has declared the alleged “Clan de los Soles” a terrorist organization. I still don’t think a full-fledged U.S. military operation against Venezuela is likely, but a new attempt at regime change might be on the horizon.

Another interesting development in the region—unrelated to Venezuela but involving the U.S.—is that Vectus Global, Erik Prince’s security company, has signed a deal with Haiti’s economic elite to take over security in the country and collect taxes. I believe this deserves a separate article.


https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2025/08 ... -like.html

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Colombia’s Petro backs Maduro, labels unapproved U.S. military ops ‘aggression’ in Latin America
August 12, 2025 Orinoco Tribune

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Colombian President Gustavo Petro, left, with Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro being saluted by the Presidential Honor Guard at Miraflores Palace, Caracas, in October 2022.

Through a message posted Sunday, August 10, on social media, Colombian President Gustavo Petro reaffirmed his strong support for Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. This followed recent threats from the Trump administration against the Venezuelan government, which is trying to link Maduro with drug trafficking, and the discovery by Bolivarian authorities of arsenals of weapons belonging to terrorist groups linked to the extreme right.

Petro emphatically declared that “Colombia and Venezuela are the same people, the same flag, the same history.” He emphasized that “any military operation that is not approved by our sister countries is an aggression against Latin America and the Caribbean.” This came after it was leaked to the US press that US President Donald Trump had authorized the use of armed forces against Latin American nations he believed were linked to cartels.

Some analysts worry Petro’s message might imply knowledge of US destabilization plans in the making. For that reason, Venezuelan security agencies have raised alert levels, especially after The New York Times report about an alleged “covered” US anti-narcotic operation in Latin America.


Evoking the legacy of the independence war, the Colombian president made a resounding call: “‘Freedom or death,’ shouted [Simon] Bolívar, and the people rose up,” highlighting the defense of Venezuelan sovereignty and self-determination.

The Colombian head of state also shared a message of the Venezuelan president’s Presidential Honor Guard. In it, General Javier José Marcano Tabata, commander of the Presidential Honor Guard (GHP) and director general of military counterintelligence (DGCIM), declared loyalty to the government of Nicolás Maduro as the constitutional president of the nation. He affirmed that his forces are ready to defend the people of Venezuela when the president orders it.

President Petro also showed support for his Venezuelan counterpart regarding persecution by US authorities. He categorically denied accusations by US Attorney General Pam Bondi against Nicolás Maduro, in a repeat of a dirty trick that Donald Trump already attempted in 2020, during his previous term, against the Venezuelan constitutional president.

According to the Colombian president, the solution to Venezuela’s political problems should not lie in violence nor in the persecution of its leaders, but rather in open dialogue that guarantees free and peaceful elections.

Along these lines, Petro called for a multinational and coordinated fight against drug trafficking involving the governments of the US and Venezuela, but always without undermining national sovereignty.

The Colombian president publicly acknowledged the valuable support of Venezuela and President Maduro in the fight against this scourge, stating that “it has helped us decisively defeat drug trafficking along the border.”

Other Latin American leaders and governments have expressed support for the Venezuelan president. The governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, and Iran also expressed their rejection of a possible US unilateral military operation, interpreting it as a form of political pressure rather than a genuine effort against organized crime.

https://www.struggle-la-lucha.org/2025/ ... n-america/

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Bolivian President Arce Replaces Military High Command Three Days Before Elections

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Bolivian President Luis Arce (L), Aug. 14, 2025. Photo: EFE

August 15, 2025 Hour: 9:22 am

On Sunday, Bolivians will elect president and lawmakers for the next five years amid a severe economic crisis.
President Luis Arce replaced the top military leadership of the Bolivian Armed Forces on Thursday, three days before Sunday’s general elections.

Arce swore in Gustavo Anibarro as interim commander of the Armed Forces; Sherman Sempertegui as chief of the Armed Forces General Staff; Roberto Delgadillo as commander of the Army; Marco Antonio Choquehuanca as commander of the Air Force; and Freddy Pozo as commander of the Navy.

“You have a mission, in addition to your constitutional mandate, to maintain the peace and governability of the state and, fundamentally, to guarantee the stability of all legally and democratically constituted governments,” the Bolivian president said.

Arce acknowledged that his country faces economic problems and urged the new military leaders to oversee the Armed Forces “in an adaptation to new times.” He called on Bolivians to go to the polls so that “a government transition can take place after a long time in a peaceful and democratic manner.”


“May those of us who entered through the front door of this Casa Grande also leave through the front door and leave a democratic legacy for the Bolivian people,” Arce stated and pledged that he “will never take up arms against the people” and that “differences must be resolved at the ballot box, peacefully and democratically.”

For his part, Commander Anibarro committed to leading the Bolivian Armed Forces “in strict adherence to the Political Constitution of the State, preserving peace, national unity and the institutions.”

In 2024, Arce appointed new military commanders on three occasions, one of them after an attempted coup in June, when former military officer Juan Zuñiga stormed the government palace in an effort to remove Arce from the presidency — something former President Evo Morales described as a “self-coup.”

On Sunday, Bolivians will elect a president, vice president and lawmakers for the next five years amid a severe economic crisis marked by a shortage of dollars, fuel scarcity, and the worst inflation in decades.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/bolivian ... elections/

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Tensions rise in Ecuador as President Noboa protests against the Constitutional Court

The Ecuadorian president has decided to confront the Constitutional Court, which has partially blocked his controversial laws, in the streets and at the polls.

August 14, 2025 by Peoples Dispatch

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Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa leading a mobilization on August 12, 2025. Photo: Daniel Noboa / X

Tensions between Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa and the Constitutional Court (CC) are increasing with each passing day. On August 12, the right-wing leader led a mobilization, alongside his ministers and assembly members, to criticize the recent actions of the CC, which he has described as an “obstacle” to achieving peace.

The CC has recently annulled several articles of the latest laws passed by the ruling party. According to the highest body responsible for ensuring the correct application of the Constitution of the Republic, these articles violate fundamental principles and rights enshrined in the Constitution and have therefore been suspended, although the rest of the laws remain in force.

The articles suspended by the CC
Among the suspended articles are those of the Organic Law on Intelligence, which allowed the executive branch to interrupt citizens’ right to privacy without a court order, as well as the acquisition of false identities by security agents.

In addition, the article that allowed the executive branch to grant “early pardons” to police and military personnel prosecuted for crimes in the so-called “internal armed conflict”, which was declared in 2024 by Noboa himself, was also suspended. Another article that was rejected by the CC was the one that allowed any “structured group of three or more people with an organized power structure that exercises prolonged violence against the state, the population, and civilian property” to be declared an organized armed group.

In addition, all savings and credit cooperatives in the country were prohibited from acquiring the structure of a bank (i.e., a private sector corporation), which could destroy all forms of popular and solidarity-based economy that are precisely safeguarded in the constitution.

A controversial mobilization
Thousands of protesters arrived in buses early in the morning in Quito to join the rally called a few days earlier by Noboa, who, after arriving late to the mobilization, marched alongside his supporters to the CC.

Several media outlets reported that many of the protesters were public officials who were forced to take to the streets, while others claimed that those who attended the demonstration were being paid 20 USD. A video even shows a protest organizer with a wad of cash talking to several people, something that has caused outrage in various sectors of public opinion.

Many were surprised that large banners displaying the faces and names of the CC judges were installed along the march route, which many have claimed is a clear form of “moral lynching” and intimidation for not having aligned themselves behind the executive branch’s political, economic, and security agenda.

In this regard, Leonidas Iza posted on X: “In other societies, to combat crime, images of the most dangerous criminals and mafia leaders are publicized, but in Ecuador, Daniel Noboa’s plutocratic government, with fascist practices like the worst regimes, displays the faces of Constitutional Court judges on large billboards, simply because they have blocked laws that contradict the Constitution and international treaties, perverse laws that violate the basic rights of Ecuadorians.”

When they arrived at the CC, Noboa gave a very brief speech that lasted less than three minutes, and almost all his supporters were unable to hear it due to the terrible sound system.

However, several media outlets managed to record the president’s words, who said in his brief speech: “Thousands of people here are demanding justice, demanding support for our law enforcement agencies. These are the people who want peace, who are the majority … who want strong law enforcement. We will not allow them to stop us! We will not allow change to be stalled by nine [CC judges] … who seek to hide their names and faces from society.”

Reactions to the mobilization
There have been numerous reactions to the mobilization. One of the most significant criticisms came from the United Nations. Volker Türk, High Commissioner for Human Rights, said: “Attacks against Ecuador’s Constitutional Court are unacceptable. The authorities must guarantee the Court’s independence and the safety of judges and personnel.”

For its part, the CC said in a statement that it respected the right of citizens to freedom of movement. However, in the context of the August 12 march, “the security, independence, and autonomy of constitutional justice” were not respected.

“The perimeter fence normally installed outside the Constitutional Court was removed without notice on the afternoon of Monday, August 11. The perimeter of the institution has been completely militarized, with an unusual deployment of Armed Forces, with hundreds of troops … During the march, billboards with the faces of judges of the Constitutional Court were placed along the route, which constitutes stigmatization that increases the risk to their safety and personal integrity and directly affects the independence of this body,” added the CC.

For his part, Interior Minister John Reimberg defended the mobilization: “The people are the principal, and the people demand security. That is what we have done and what we will continue to do in this fight for the security of all Ecuadorians. The president has been very clear with us. We have to achieve peace at any cost.”

Contrary to this view, journalist María Sol Borja stated that what really bothers Noboa’s government is precisely the democratic system: “This visual and discursive strategy sought to personify the supposed obstacle to security, publicly identifying the magistrates of the Constitutional Court by misrepresenting a decision that is part of their jurisdiction – temporarily suspending the articles in question – in order to position them as directly responsible for the violence plaguing the country.”

A referendum to control the CC?
Noboa decided to respond to the CC not only with a demonstration, but also by announcing that in the next referendum. With the referendum, the executive branch hopes to reinstate military bases for foreign forces, reopen casinos, and approve hourly work for tourism businesses, among other things – CC judges could be politically impeached, meaning that the National Assembly could censure them and, consequently, remove them from office.

This plan to subordinate the CC judges to the ruling political power – a move that, ironically, must be approved by the CC itself to be included in the referendum – has been questioned by almost the entire left, but also by several sectors of the right, who see it as a very clear threat to democracy, the separation of powers, and the very structure of the state.

Henry Cucalón, former minister in the right-wing government of Guillermo Lasso (2021-2023) and former presidential candidate, said: “They know what they want: total control. [The executive branch] still does not know how to do it … The goal is to co-opt the constitutional judges … and that is not good for democracy in Ecuador.”

A lot of people were surprised by former President Rafael Correa’s (2007-2027) support for Noboa’s government’s move to politically control the judges of the CC, an institution that also caused several “headaches” for his administration. When mentioning how to vote on each of the possible questions in the referendum, Correa said that people should vote “Yes” on the question regarding the CC: “YES. Making the Constitutional Court untouchable is characteristic of more mature democracies. Since the CC was illegally replaced during the Trujillo regime, this body has been susceptible to manipulation. It is the lesser evil, although I repeat: there will be no virtuous institutions without virtuous individuals.”

On the other hand, Indigenous leader and former presidential candidate Leonidas Iza wrote: “We are facing a totalitarian and abusive regime that seeks to violate all norms to do what suits the economic group of family and friends who applaud the abuses and destruction of the constitutional rule of law in order to move to a dictatorial regime, believing that Ecuador is a banana plantation. What a historic disgrace!”

Noboa bets on mobilization
This is the first time Noboa has carried out a mobilization of this nature. As the government is well aware, there have been regular demonstrations against the neoliberal decisions of the executive and legislative branches for several days now.

In response, Noboa has decided to confront his opponents in the streets as well, which could spell even greater political instability for the country.

In any case, Noboa’s administration seems unwilling to back down from its political agenda, even if it means confronting the very structure of the constitution, which must be reconfigured by a new state structure “whatever the cost,” as the Minister of the Interior said.

https://peoplesdispatch.org/2025/08/14/ ... nal-court/
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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Tue Aug 26, 2025 2:02 pm

Confidence in Milei’s Government Falls to Record Low, Survey Finds

Argentina’s Government Confidence Index fell 13.6 percent in August, marking the sharpest decline of Javier Milei’s presidency and the lowest level since he took office.

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A University of Di Tella survey shows confidence in Milei’s government has reached its lowest point since his inauguration. Photo: @dofipaz


August 26, 2025 Hour: 5:04 am

Public confidence in Argentina’s government has dropped sharply, falling 13.6 percent in August to the lowest level since President Javier Milei took office in December 2023, according to a survey by the University Torcuato Di Tella.

The Government Confidence Index (ICG), compiled monthly by the university’s School of Government, rated Milei’s administration at 2.12 points on a scale from 0 to 5. The score is down from 2.45 in July and represents a 16.5 percent decline compared to August 2024, when the index stood at 2.54.

“The confidence in the Government reaches its lowest value since the beginning of Javier Milei’s mandate, interrupting the relative stability observed in the previous four months,” the report stated.


The survey, conducted between August 1 and 14 by Poliarquía Consultores, was completed before recent corruption allegations against government officials surfaced. The accusations involve leaked audio recordings pointing to bribe-taking at the National Disability Agency (Andis).

The August results showed declines across all five components of the index: honesty of officials (2.54 points, -9.9%); ability to address national problems (2.46, -14.6%); efficiency in managing public spending (2.10, -13.2%); overall evaluation of the government (1.78, -12.8%); and concern for the public interest (1.73, -18.2%).

Confidence fell most among women and younger respondents aged 18 to 29. Regionally, the sharpest declines were registered in Buenos Aires city (-28.2%) and Buenos Aires province (-23.3%), compared with a more moderate drop of 7.4 percent in the country’s interior. The provincial results are viewed as significant ahead of legislative elections scheduled for September 7 in Buenos Aires province.

Since Milei took office, the ICG has averaged 2.48 points. This figure is slightly lower than the 2.58 average recorded during the first 20 months of Mauricio Macri’s administration (2015–2019) but above the 2.17 average under Alberto Fernández (2019–2023).

Published monthly since November 2001, the ICG has shown a consistent correlation with electoral outcomes. The August survey covered 1,000 adults across 41 localities with more than 10,000 residents.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/confiden ... vey-finds/

******

Even Libertarians and Austrian-School Economists Are Pillorying Javier Milei’s Economic Program
Posted on August 26, 2025 by Nick Corbishley

It makes a nice change to read scathing critiques of Milei’s disastrous economic program from the right as well as the left.

Argentina is scheduled to hold mid-term elections in a few weeks’ time, and Javier Milei’s government is once again in the spotlight for all the wrong reasons. As we reported a few weeks ago, the economy is back in crisis mode just months after receiving the first instalments of a $42 billion bailout package from the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank — a bailout over which high-ranking IMF officials resigned or were fired for refusing to greenlight.

In July, the Argentine peso posted its worst month since Milei devalued it in December 2023. In recent days, JP Morgan Chase has cut its 2025 growth forecast for the Argentine economy for 2025 from 5.3% to 4.7%. That came on the heels of a slowdown in the second quarter of this year. The latest reports suggest that economic activity shrank in July (on a month-by month basis) for the fifth consecutive month.

Another Looming Default?

Ten days ago, the government tried to roll over bonds by offering investors what should have been a mouth watering 69% interest rate, yet only succeeded in rolling over 61% of them. As the Palestinian-Jordanian libertarian economist and prominent Bitcoin advocate Saifedean Ammous notes, the fact that “even a 69% annual interest rate isn’t enough to tempt investors to risk lending to the Milei ponzi… means they either expect a default very soon, or they expect price inflation to exceed 69% over the next year.”

If the peso continues to plunge, inflation could once against surge (it’s still at 36% annually). Meanwhile, unemployment is at a four-year high. Car sales continue to slide while industrial production shows no sign of recovering from Milei’s chainsaw austerity, with output levels at their lowest since 2007.

A new study by the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires suggests Argentina has “lost its lure” among multinational companies and foreign investors. For all the promises of foreign money pouring into the country, the reality has been quite the opposite. Now that the government has lifted capital controls, at the IMF’s insistence, the money is flowing the other way.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, distrust in the government is on the rise, reports Perfíl. According to one survey, almost seven out of 10 (67%) Argentines say they do not believe that the government’s official inflation figures reflect their true cost of living.

Ripping Off the Disabled

That distrust is almost certain to have grown in recent days with the eruption of yet another sordid scandal involving senior Milei officials. Last week, audio recordings leaked to local media purporting to show Diego Spagnuolo, President Milei’s personal lawyer and the head of the country’s disability agency, describing a kickback scheme tied to government health contracts for the disabled that funnelled money to top officials, including Milei’s own sister, Karina.

Other alleged participants in the scheme include Eduardo and Martín Menem, two nephews of the former President Carlos Menem who both hold senior roles in Milei’s government. As readers may recall, Carlos Menem was the man whose neo-liberalisation of the Argentine economy and hairbrained one-to-one peg of the Argentine peso to the dollar helped pave the way for Argentina’s 2001 default and resulting IMF bailout.

That, in turn, set the stage for bank runs, the subsequent harsh restrictions placed on bank account withdrawals (in dollars) — the so-called “corralito” — and the inevitable devaluation that ended up wiping out the savings of millions of Argentines. Of course, before the restrictions came into effect, foreign investors, political insiders and Argentina’s business elite were tipped off, allowing them to get their money out of dodge.

It is not hard to see the same happening in the coming months, probably shortly after the mid-term elections. All the pieces are certainly in place. Once again, an IMF bailout will be used to subsidise capital flight so that Argentina’s wealthiest businesses and citizens can yank their money out of the country before the currency collapses — all on the government’s tab.

Readers may also recall that one of Milei’s campaign pledges was that he would do away with Argentina’s political caste, just as Trump pledged to drain the swamp in Washington. It would be the elite, Milei said, not ordinary working people, who would bear the brunt of the structural adjustments needed to transform Argentina into a viable, flourishing economy.

It was a lie, of course. Many of Argentina’s political elite ended up filling senior government roles in Milei’s government, including Luis Caputo, the former JP Morgan Chase banker who helped create the conditions for Argentina’s 2018 default.

As always, it is the poor and middle classes, particularly those of pension age, that have borne the brunt of the economic pain, all of it applauded by the IMF and Western media. It is the poor and middle classes who have seen their incomes frozen, their benefits squeezed, and their energy, transport and medical subsidies scrapped while inflation has continued to rage, albeit somewhat more quietly.

Making Out Like Bandits

Argentina’s financial elite and international financiers, by contrast, have made out like bandits. A year ago, Milei told a meeting of industrial lobbyists: “we shrank the state in order to fill your pockets”. Yet Argentina’s industry is also shrinking as a result of Milei’s austerity program, the real beneficiaries of which are the financial speculators who made bank on the peso-dollar carry trade facilitated by the policies of Economy Minister (and former JPM banker) Luis Caputo.

As happened in 2001 and 2018, the speculators are once again moving their money overseas before the trade collapses, all made possible, once again, by the IMF. Meanwhile, Milei’s sister — whom he refers to as “La Jefa” (The Boss) given she essentially manages his agenda and his finances — is allegedly feathering her nest with kickbacks alongside Menem’s nephews.

The company that is allegedly paying the kickbacks, Suizo Argentina, saw its contracts with the Milei government balloon by 2678% between 2024 and 2025 alone.

To make matters even more unsavoury, the recording was leaked just weeks after Milei vetoed three bills that would have increased pension and disability benefits. In other words, the government is robbing from the disabled while at the same time vetoing a law that would give the disabled extra funds at a time of endlessly surging prices.

Of course, this is not the first time Milei’s inner circle has been accused of taking bribes and kickbacks. Just five months ago, Milei promoted an unknown shit-coin called $LIBRA that rocketed in value after his endorsement and then quickly cratered. In both cases, Karina Milei appears to have played the role of bagwoman.

The difference this time round is that it is much easier for voters to understand the nature of the crime. Also, the victims are not crypto-freaks and Milei fanboys but hundreds of thousands of recipients of disability benefits. From Associated Press:

This latest firestorm saw Milei’s government dismiss Spagnuolo from his post Thursday over the released recordings in which he can be heard complaining about how pharmaceutical companies pay bribes to Karina Milei, the president’s chief of staff and top adviser, to secure government drug purchases for disabled people.

The date and location of the audio, recorded in secret, remain unclear. Only Spagnuolo’s voice can be heard over the low clatter of cutlery and coffee cups, suggesting the conversation was captured in a cafe or some other public place. The other interlocutors cannot be identified.

The government has not confirmed nor denied the authenticity of the recordings.

In the audio, Spagnuolo can be heard calling out the major pharmaceutical company Suizo Argentina as offering bribes to Karina Milei through her close confidant, Eduardo “Lule” Menem.

“They’re embezzling my agency. They’ve assigned a guy who handles everything related to my coffers,” the alleged voice of Spagnuolo says. “They’re going to ask people for money, the providers.”

At one point he appears to explain that the highest rungs of Argentina’s government have demanded 8% kickbacks from pharmaceutical companies.

“I estimate that Karina gets 3%,” Spagnuolo can be heard saying. “One percent goes to operations, another 1% goes to me. … Probably something like that and they’re screwing you big time.”

“No Crying in the Casino”

At the same time as this scandal grows, the Milei siblings also face the threat of lawsuits in three countries, Argentina, the United States and Spain, over the LIBRA meme-coin scandal. As Ammous notes, when the shitcoin he had promoted collapsed, “Milei had the audacity to go on TV and abdicate all responsibility for the losses” his followers had suffered, and “effectively told his countrymen: NO CRYING IN THE CASINO!”

In other words, they took their risks; now they have to face their losses. But there will be far more than tears when Milei’s economic experiment comes crashing down, Ammous warns:

When the ponzi collapses, as it always does, Argentines will have lost their cash savings, and most suckers who invest in bonds will have been ruined, but the fiat cartel banks will walk away well-fed, as they always do. Milei will discredit Austrian and libertarian ideas for decades to come by associating them with their diametrical opposites: inflation, indebtedness, bond market pump-and-dumps, and genocide. It is only his constant invocation of the Austrians that makes me take time from my busy schedule to discuss this con artist and his unfortunate country.

Despite — or perhaps more accurately, because of — his libertarian principles, Ammous has been a fierce critic of Milei’s economic policies ever since the moment the faux libertarian took office and reneged on his campaign pledge to shut down Argentina’s central bank. Instead, Ammous says, Milei went about attempting to save the central bank by piling its debt onto the government’s:

[Milei] reneged on his promise to fight inflation by doubling or tripling money supply measures; reneged on his promise to not raise taxes; sought an IMF bail-out; and hired the same JP Morgan bankers who had entrapped Argentina into tens of billions of dollars of debt to head the most important positions in his administration and central bank. Old habits die hard, and all of the free market bluster on the campaign trail gave way to the same old fiat banksterism.

It makes a nice change to read such a scathing critique of Milei’s disastrous economic program from the right as well as the left. But Ammous is not the only Austrian economist to have denounced Argentina’s self-ascribed libertarian president as a fugazi.

Milei’s “Love Affair With All the Institutions Responsible for Evil in the World”

In July, three members of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Ludwig von Mises Institute Germany resigned their seats after the Institute announced on its website that a “Memorial Prize in honour of Ludwig von Mises” would be created in October of this year and awarded to Milei.

One of the three economists, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, is a German paleolibertarian and anarcho-capitalist philosopher who teaches at the University of Nevada. In his earlier years he was a close collaborator of Murray Rothbard as well as a major inspiration for Milei’s economic ideas — until Hoppe began criticising Milei’s policies as well as his unquestioning subservience to Washington and Israel. On one occasion, Hoppe said:

“There is a kind of love affair between Milei and all the institutions responsible for evil in the world. He loves the US government, which is the most imperialist, and he aligns himself with it.”

He also said:

“Libertarianism suddenly means being a fan of Netanyahu, a fan of the clown Zelenskyy, and a fan of Trump… That is not libertarianism, we oppose all of them.”

Following the resignation of Hoppe and his two colleagues, only two of the original five members remain on the Board. The three professors explained their decision to leave the board in a seething text that was published by the Mises Institute a few days ago. Here are the key parts (emphasis my own):

Neither the creation of the prize (which, incidentally, is the only prize ever awarded by MIG) nor the selection of the laureate were discussed in advance with the Institute’s Scientific Advisory Board. Not only is this bad style, it also gives the public the impression that these decisions have the backing of the Board. This is not the case…

It is true that [Milei] has made the names of Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard and other thinkers of the Austrian School known to a wider public. But his knowledge of their ideas and theories is superficial and flawed, and his praise is therefore double-edged. In any case, we can only advise the public not to regard Milei’s statements on economic philosophy as authoritative…

For one thing, Milei is at the beginning of his political career. The future success of his policies to date is highly questionable, and he may still take many wrong turns in the course of his term in office. No one knows how freedom-oriented they will ultimately prove to be. The assessment of his actions must be differentiated and open-ended. This simply cannot be done after twenty months in office…

[W]hatever successes his policies may have had so far have been largely achieved through the usual means of inflationary government financing, i.e. by inflating the money supply and government debt. It remains to be seen whether this strategy will succeed under Milei, given that it has repeatedly and for good reasons failed in Argentina and other countries in the past.

In addition, all the achievements of his political record to date are already offset by major liabilities: the political centralisation of the country, the expansion of the police state, the failure to implement the announced abolition of the central bank (one of the most popular points in his election programme), the haggling with the country’s traditional political elites, who also dominate his cabinet, and a foreign policy that is not geared towards international peace and is therefore not a libertarian policy.

Today, Javier Milei stands not only for inflation-financed radical economic policies with an uncertain outcome. He also stands for uncritical and downright enthusiastic solidarity with the current governments of the United States and Israel.

In our opinion, awarding Javier Milei a ‘Memorial Prize in Honour of Ludwig von Mises’ therefore has the potential to cause lasting and irreparable damage to the Ludwig von Mises Institute Germany, as well as to the Austrian School as a whole.

We cannot and will not take responsibility for this. We therefore declare our resignation from the Scientific Advisory Board of the Ludwig von Mises Institute Germany.

While hopefully more and more libertarians speak out against Milei’s policies, the reality on the ground is that public support for Milei, while lower than six months ago, remains stubbornly above the 40% mark. This, I believe, is largely a reflection of the public’s lingering dissatisfaction with Argentina’s traditional parties, which is fully merited.

But it also means that despite all the scandals, the worsening economic malaise, the IMF bailout, the crypto scam aimed squarely at Milei’s own followers, and the spectre of rising authoritarianism (Milei’s constant use of decrees and presidential vetoes, his escalating crackdowns on protests, his prohibition of medical marijuana, his plans to build Bukele-like mega-prisons and set up a pre-crime unit), a hard-core of Argentines will continue voting for Milei’s thinly veiled neoliberal project whatever he says or does.

At the same time, Milei’s party, La Libertad Advanca (Freedom Advances), is haemorrhaging support and allies in Congress, making it much more difficult for him to govern by decree and veto. And that is a small silver lining.

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2025/08 ... milei.html
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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Thu Sep 04, 2025 2:41 pm

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Donald Trump greets Jair Bolsonaro, March 2020 (via Wikimedia).

The Restoration of the Monroe Doctrine and Trump’s Imperialist Offensive in Latin America
By Tiago Nogara (Posted Sep 03, 2025)

1. The Revival of the Big Stick and the Monroe Doctrine
Since Donald Trump’s reelection as president of the United States, the world has watched in shock as US foreign policy has grown increasingly unilateral and aggressive, raising deep concerns about the future of international politics. These concerns stem not only from the record of his previous term but also from the growing resurgence of interventionist and unilateral policies that have gradually regained prominence in recent years—developments that have accelerated during the early days of Trump’s new administration.

Given the campaign promises made under the familiar slogan Make America Great Again (MAGA), such concerns were far from unfounded. And they were only amplified by the administration’s early actions. Within days of taking office, the United States had already announced its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the World Health Organization (WHO), and even the global tax deal of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In a threatening tone, Trump suggested turning Canada into the fifty-first US state, expressed interest in annexing Greenland, and made illegal and immoral proposals such as relocating Palestinians from Gaza to other areas in order to “cleanse” the region. He fully aligned with Israeli interests in the Middle East, giving carte blanche to the genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza and even bombing Iranian territory in defense of his favored ally.

It is especially in Latin America, however, that Trump’s threats and directives have taken on an even more aggressive tone. During his previous administration, he had already pursued a policy of encirclement and annihilation against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by recognizing the puppet, self-proclaimed government of Juan Guaidó and imposing a wide array of political and economic sanctions on Venezuela’s legitimate government. In the same vein, he reversed the thaw initiated by Obama in relations with Cuba; added Nicaragua to the list of countries subject to illegal and unilateral US sanctions; backed the coup d’état against Evo Morales in Bolivia; and encouraged the Colombian far-right’s attacks on the peace agreements with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). He also pursued an open confrontation against China’s economic presence in Latin America, promoted the rise of neofascist movements in various countries, and intensified discriminatory immigration policies—most notably through the construction of a wall along the Mexican border.

Less than a month into the new administration, Trump’s Latin America policy already clearly signaled a path of radicalized hegemony and interventionism long embedded in US diplomacy. It is no coincidence that Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first official trip was a tour of Central American and Caribbean countries. Not since Philander Chase Knox’s 1912 visit to Panama, during the construction of the Panama Canal, had Latin America been the destination of a US Secretary of State’s inaugural trip.[1]

From the outset, the president declared that the Panama Canal—managed directly by Panama since 1999—should be returned to Washington’s control in order to curb China’s growing regional influence. He loudly asserted that the United States “doesn’t need Latin America,” announced plans to rename the Gulf of Mexico as the “Gulf of America,” threatened heavy tariffs on Brazilian goods, and signed a decree classifying several Latin American cartels and criminal organizations as terrorist groups—thus opening the door for direct US military intervention in the region.[2]

Pledging to carry out the largest deportation campaign in history, the Trump administration issued several executive orders to that end. These included measures to end birthright citizenship for children born on US soil to undocumented immigrants, resume border wall construction, suspend asylum application processes, declare a state of emergency at the border, and deploy army troops to assist in operations against irregular immigration. In parallel, a mass deportation process was initiated, with military planes transporting hundreds of Latin American immigrants back to their countries of origin.

The way the US carried out these deportations sparked serious diplomatic incidents. In Brazil, deportees arrived in handcuffs—a practice deemed unacceptable and outrageous by Brazilian authorities, prompting official protests from the Lula government. In Colombia, the situation escalated even further. The Colombian government initially refused to allow US aircraft to land, demanding that its citizens be treated with dignity. In retaliation, Trump announced 25 percent tariffs on Colombian goods entering the US market—possibly increasing to 50 percent within a week—and declared that US visas would be revoked and travel banned for Colombian officials and their supporters. Colombian President Gustavo Petro responded by imposing reciprocal 25 percent tariffs on US goods, but soon backed down, agreeing to receive deportees unconditionally in order to prevent further escalation.

The diplomatic clash with Colombia illustrates key features of the strategy Trump’s new administration has adopted for Latin America. The US and Colombia have maintained a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) since 2012, and Trump’s proposed measures would directly violate it. Moreover, Colombia is the only South American country that still considers the US its top export destination, holds extra-NATO ally status, and hosts at least seven active US military bases. These early moves made clear that Trump intended to use tariffs and sanctions to coerce regional governments into aligning with US diplomatic interests—extending such tactics far beyond the usual targets of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Indeed, Trump’s initial threats were directed at the governments of Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia, suggesting that his offensive would not be limited by ideological boundaries—as also evidenced by the confrontations with Canada and Denmark.

In Central America and the Caribbean—historically the most targeted regions of the “Big Stick” policy—the outlines of a renewed political and economic reconfiguration became quickly apparent. Pressure on Panama, including threats of forcibly retaking the Canal Zone, led the country to announce its withdrawal from the Belt and Road Initiative and to transfer management of two canal ports from Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison to the US-based BlackRock. In Costa Rica, Marco Rubio endorsed the government’s criticism of Huawei’s 5G rollout. In an official statement, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Arnoldo André celebrated alignment with the US, stating: “Costa Rica was recognized, praised, and congratulated by Senator Rubio for addressing these issues in accordance with the interests of the new US administration,” echoing rhetoric aligned with the framework of a so-called “New Cold War.”[3] In Guatemala, backed by radical US sectors, President Bernardo Arévalo maintained his country’s subservient diplomatic stance, even continuing to recognize Taiwan diplomatically.

In this same context, the US has made clear efforts to discipline its regional ally Nayib Bukele, President of El Salvador, who—despite his right-wing orientation and personal ties to Trump—has sought to deepen El Salvador’s relations with China. In April, an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal criticized the US government’s complacency toward Salvadoran-Chinese ties.[4] Meanwhile, the tightening of sanctions on Cuba and Nicaragua has reinforced the goal of consolidating a “sanitary cordon” around those nations—and, of course, around Venezuela.

Further south, pressure on Brazil intensified in the lead-up to President Xi Jinping’s visit, with multiple US officials voicing opposition to Brazil’s potential accession to the Belt and Road Initiative. Though Brazil has not formally joined the initiative, the Lula administration has emphasized synergies between its national programs—the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), the New Industry Brazil plan, and the South American Integration Corridors—and the Belt and Road Initiative. Brazil–China relations have continued to deepen, with discussions underway on a bi-oceanic railway corridor between Brazil and Peru, backed by Chinese expertise and companies.

The US–Colombia diplomatic crisis in January occurred amid mounting strategic tensions between the two nations, particularly regarding China–Colombia relations. Traditionally a close US ally and the only “global partner” of NATO in the region, Colombia under Gustavo Petro has taken an alternative path in foreign policy—challenging US hegemony and drawing closer to China. In 2023, Petro established a Strategic Partnership with Beijing and spent over a year preparing Colombia’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative—officially announced during the Fourth China–CELAC Forum.

Unsurprisingly, when Trump announced tariffs on products from multiple countries, Argentina received the lowest rates—an outcome publicly celebrated by Javier Milei. As the foremost representative of the Trump-inspired far right in Latin America, Milei has shown a clear willingness to sacrifice the interests of his people—and even of Argentina’s business class, as seen in his efforts to sabotage lucrative ties with China—in exchange for displays of unconditional loyalty to Washington. Under his leadership, Argentina withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative, abandoned the BRICS+ accession process, and skipped the China–CELAC Forum held in Beijing.

Two other ideological allies of Trumpism in the region—Daniel Noboa’s government in Ecuador and Nayib Bukele’s in El Salvador—have shown less alignment with anti-China efforts, reflecting the growing tension between the worldview of the US right and the real interests of parts of the Latin American elite. Though they share an anti-progressive agenda and maintain close ties with conservative US sectors, these leaders also represent fractions of national economic elites whose fortunes are increasingly tied to strong relations with China. Even so, it is undeniable that the United States wields far more control over Noboa and Bukele than over their main challengers—the Revolución Ciudadana in Ecuador and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador. For that reason, US diplomatic and intelligence services did not hesitate to back the irregular and questionable measures that defined the elections which returned Noboa to the presidency, despite the opposition’s strong allegations of fraud.

Finally, the heavy and ongoing US sanctions against Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela were further intensified at the start of Trump’s new term, with the aim of fracturing their governments and empowering reactionary political and social forces committed to the success of regime-change tactics.

2. The Reasons behind Latin America’s Centrality
This reconfiguration of US foreign policy is no coincidence. Contrary to Trump’s claims that the United States “doesn’t need Latin America,” the region is, as the Argentine political scientist Atilio Borón consistently argues, the most important in the world for the United States.[5] It was not by chance that the Monroe Doctrine was articulated as early as 1823. Long before Woodrow Wilson outlined the pillars of a new global multilateralism in his Fourteen Points, the US was already seeking to establish a regionally led multilateralism through the Pan-American Conferences, which began in 1889. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) later consolidated a decision-making environment in the Americas operating outside of global multilateralism and under the close watch of the United States. Even before McCarthyism was exported or the political conditionalities of the Marshall Plan helped suppress communist parties in Europe, Latin American oligarchies were consistently encouraged by the United States to persecute key leaders of local workers’ and peasants’ movements.

Those who interpret such actions as mere expressions of American “disregard” for what they consider their “backyard” are mistaken. In reality, Trump’s diplomatic maneuvers reflect a determined effort to reorganize the balance of political and economic forces in the region. This objective is directly tied to three interrelated issues: global competition with China, containment of left-wing governments in Latin America, and control over strategic natural resources.

Latin America holds vast reserves of critical minerals essential to the global energy transition and the development of sustainable technologies, including lithium, copper, and nickel. Specifically regarding lithium, the region accounts for around 60 percent of global reserves—most of them concentrated in the Lithium Triangle of Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia.[6] Latin America also produces roughly 40 percent of the world’s copper, thanks to large reserves and mining capacity in countries like Chile, Peru, and Mexico.[7] It also hosts significant reserves of silver and tin, nearly one-third of the planet’s freshwater, and immense biodiversity. In addition, the region holds about one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas reserves, including the world’s largest proven oil reserve, located in Venezuela.[8] Crucially, Latin America is the world’s largest net food exporter and controls almost a third of the planet’s arable land—most of it in Brazil.[9]

The United States’ insatiable appetite for control over these resources has never been a secret. History is filled with examples of how Washington deployed a wide array of tools to eliminate Latin American political and social forces that opposed this agenda. One need not revisit the early days of the Monroe Doctrine, the violent seizure of nearly half of Mexico’s territory, the incursions of filibusters into Central America and the Caribbean, or the CIA-backed coups and dirty wars of the Cold War. It would be enough to observe the more recent cycle of the rise and destabilization of left-wing governments in the early twenty-first century.

Indeed, the marks of Yankee imperialism are deeply etched in the brutal campaign to topple the progressive governments of Latin America’s so-called pink tide—those that buried the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) proposal at the 2005 Mar del Plata Summit, challenged the Washington Consensus, and sought to build regional multilateralism outside the frameworks of the OAS and TIAR. When needed, the empire resorted to its usual brand of violence, as seen in the repeated unilateral, illegal, and criminal political and economic sanctions against Cuba, Venezuela, and more recently, Nicaragua. This same logic underpinned explicit US support for successive coup attempts in Venezuela and Bolivia, including the kidnapping of Hugo Chávez in 2002, the secessionist push in Bolivia’s Media Luna region in 2008, the violent Venezuelan guarimbas, and the bloody 2019 coup against Evo Morales.[10]

Yet Washington’s reactionary offensive has not relied solely on open violence. It has also refined its tactics of “soft coups,” particularly through lawfare.[11] By fueling Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato), the US managed to dismantle Brazilian construction firms that competed in Latin America, severely undermine Petrobras’s operations—paving the way for foreign companies to access Brazil’s pre-salt oil reserves—and in the process, destabilize and oust Dilma Rousseff’s government and imprison Lula.[12] Even earlier, lawfare had already struck the Workers’ Party (PT), with the “Mensalão” scandal temporarily removing key figures like José Dirceu and José Genoíno from political life. Similar tactics led to the removal of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay; the resignation of Vice President Raúl Sendic in Uruguay; the convictions of Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, and Rafael Correa and Jorge Glas in Ecuador; and the ousting and imprisonment of Pedro Castillo in Peru. It is no surprise, then, that Mexico’s Fourth Transformation governments have consistently emphasized the urgent need to democratize their country’s oligarchic judiciary—a system that mirrors that of many others in the region.

While these tools succeeded in destabilizing and even overthrowing numerous governments, they failed to eliminate the social contradictions that continue to drive Latin American peoples to fight for better living conditions. Despite the immense challenges—hundreds of debilitating sanctions among them—the governments of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua remain standing. After the 2019 coup, Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism (MAS) returned to power with Luis Arce. Even in Brazil, where the far right once appeared to dominate the political landscape, Lula was re-elected—albeit at the head of a far more conservative coalition than in his previous terms. And not even Colombia—once a cornerstone of US influence in the region—proved immune to the shift, as the election of former guerrilla Gustavo Petro marked a dramatic turn in national politics. The high approval ratings of Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, in Mexico, also speak volumes.

One might argue that the more radical governments have been weakened and the moderates pose little threat to US interests. But this is precisely where many analysts go wrong. In the current historical moment, even moderate solutions seem insufficient to sustain US hegemony in the region or globally. And this is not merely due to the back-and-forth of confrontations with the Latin American left—it is above all due to the structural factor of China’s growing cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean.

Since China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) just over two decades ago, its economic presence in Latin America has steadily grown. Today, China is the main trading partner of nearly all South American countries. Chinese direct investment has also increased, financing infrastructure projects with significant regional impact—such as the newly inaugurated port of Chancay in Peru. More than twenty countries in the region have joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and fewer and fewer maintain diplomatic ties with the Taiwanese province, choosing instead to recognize the one legitimate government of China, headquartered in Beijing.[13]

Furthermore, China’s guiding principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries has been well received by leaders across the ideological spectrum. This combination of expanding economic synergy and respect for sovereignty has created a major dilemma for US diplomacy. In the Cold War era, counterinsurgency tactics in partnership with Latin American oligarchies were used to contain communism and Soviet influence. But those same tactics are now inadequate to contain China. Today, it is not only left-wing or nationalist-popular governments that seek closer ties with Beijing. Even Peru’s conservative government under Dina Boluarte has shown no signs of jeopardizing its relationship with China. And even puppet far-right governments, such as those of Jair Bolsonaro and Javier Milei, have faced enormous difficulties in executing anti-China policies, because large segments of their national elites rely on strong economic relations with Beijing.

This explains the recent surge in public statements by high-level US officials criticizing growing China–Latin America cooperation. In July 2024, during the Aspen Security Forum, US Southern Command Chief Laura Richardson criticized Latin American engagement with China, saying: “They don’t see what the United States is bringing to the countries. All they see are the Chinese cranes, the development, and the Belt and Road Initiative projects.”[14] She suggested launching a new “Marshall Plan” for the region as a counterweight to Chinese initiatives. Speaking about Chinese infrastructure investments, Richardson claimed these projects were allegedly designed for “dual use,” implying potential military as well as civilian applications. Later, at the opening of the South American Defense Conference (SOUTHDEC) in Santiago, Chile, in August, she declared that a contradiction existed between what she called “Team Democracy” and the interests of “authoritarian and communist governments trying to take as much as they can here in the Western Hemisphere—operating with no regard for national or international law.”[15]

Subsequently, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai warned Brazil to be cautious about joining the Belt and Road Initiative. Echoing Laura Richardson’s tone, she stated, “Sovereignty is fundamental, and that is a decision for the Brazilian government. But I would encourage my friends in Brazil to view the proposal through the lens of objectivity, through the lens of risk management.”[16] Finally, in an April 10 interview with Fox News, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth accused the Obama administration of neglecting China’s growing influence in Latin America and declared that, under the Trump administration, the US would reclaim its “backyard.” He added that efforts were already underway to “take back the Panama Canal from communist Chinese influence.”[17] In sharp contrast, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi responded on April 14 that Latin American countries are “no one’s backyard” and that “the people of Latin America want to build their own home.”[18]

It is within this broader context that the now-familiar anti-China narratives have emerged and proliferated. Updating Cold War–era anticommunist metaphors, these discourses recycle baseless accusations of “totalitarianism,” “Chinese imperialism,” and “debt traps.”[19] Most reflect the worldview of the hardline anti-China camp—those who openly oppose any manifestation of the People’s Republic of China’s success and who hold considerable sway over influential circles of power in the North Atlantic world, as illustrated by recent statements from top officials in Donald Trump’s administration.

Thus, when Trump accuses Brazil of wishing “harm” upon the United States, he does so not because Lula’s government is overtly anti-imperialist, but because it refuses to participate in the dirty game of containing China and suffocating defiant neighboring governments. Alongside his early pressure on the Petro and Sheinbaum administrations over migration, Trump has also paved the way for interventionist measures by classifying various Latin American cartels as terrorist groups. It is no coincidence that these developments coincide with calls from former Colombian presidents Álvaro Uribe and Iván Duque for international military intervention in Venezuela. Meanwhile, the conservative media accuses Petro of leniency toward the ELN and insists on portraying the insurgent group as a mere criminal faction and political tool of Nicolás Maduro’s government.

All of these moves are part of a broader strategy: to weaken China’s presence in Latin America and to fully restore US hemispheric hegemony—a goal that ultimately depends on the ability to defeat progressive Latin American governments and social movements.

3. No Room for Moderation: The Assault on Brazil as a Test Run for What Comes Next
It is this broader context that has led the United States to intensify its unilateralism and the violent imposition of its will in the region. Moderate and compromise-based solutions are no longer sufficient to meet the empire’s interests. More than ever, what the United States now seeks are puppet governments willing to sacrifice not only the interests of their own peoples but also those of significant portions of their national elites. After all, the decline of US hegemony on the global stage is becoming increasingly evident, as demonstrated by its recurring defeats in the technological race against China—most recently exemplified by the staggering $1 trillion loss suffered by US Big Tech following the release of DeepSeek, a Chinese artificial intelligence model.[20]

It is no coincidence that Elon Musk—who held quasi-ministerial status during the beginning of Trump’s administration—is an open supporter of far-right activity in Latin America. He publicly defended the 2019 coup in Bolivia, maintains close ties with Nayib Bukele and Javier Milei, and recently clashed directly with the Lula government in Brazil.[21] Musk has a vested interest in competing with China in several technological sectors, which explains his increasing involvement across the Lithium Triangle and his efforts to politically destabilize Brazil, a country poised to become a hub for Chinese electric vehicle production. The Trump phenomenon and the proposed overhaul of relations with Latin America are not the result of megalomania, but rather the materialization of the interests of American billionaires intent on defending their astronomical profits.

As has historically been the case with US foreign policy, maintaining unrestricted control over Latin America remains a prerequisite for boosting the country’s global projection. The US would hardly dare to engage in large-scale conflict in the Middle East or East Asia without first securing at least partial control over Venezuela’s vast oil reserves. Nor can it hope to export its anti-China directives to extra-hemispheric allies without first succeeding in Latin America.

Thus, the effort to reshape the region’s political landscape is directly tied to the outcome of this year’s and next year’s elections, with decisive chapters in countries like Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Colombia, and Brazil—where the US will focus on defeating a broad range of progressive governments. Bolivia has long been a target of US interventions, most notably illustrated by Elon Musk’s public remarks on the 2019 coup against Evo Morales. Today, President Luis Arce faces difficulties stemming from internal divisions within the MAS between his own supporters and those of Evo. In this context, the right’s hopes of returning to power through elections—after more than two decades—are visibly reinforced by Washington’s strategic interests.

In recent years, Honduras has taken a markedly different path from its past, establishing diplomatic ties with China in 2023 under President Xiomara Castro. She now seeks to ensure that her successor upholds a progressive political orientation and deepens the country’s relationship with China. In contrast, the likely candidate of the Liberal Party, Salvador Nasralla, has publicly opposed a potential free trade agreement with China and criticized the diplomatic break with Taiwan.

In Chile, the right-wing opposition to President Gabriel Boric includes several prominent conservative figures, notably Johannes Kaiser, who espouses a libertarian, far-right discourse reminiscent of Javier Milei. Meanwhile, in Colombia, the United States has made clear efforts to redirect the country fully toward its strategic and commercial interests. Colombia serves not only as a key trading partner, but also as a central player in Washington’s attempts to isolate Venezuela and curb China’s influence in South America.

Brazil will likely be the stage for the region’s most important electoral battle. President Lula will seek re-election against a yet-to-be-defined candidate who will nonetheless have the backing of Jair Bolsonaro, who is currently ineligible to run. It is worth recalling that under Bolsonaro’s last administration, Brazil officially withdrew from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), actively dismantled the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and undermined other regional integration bodies that had gained prominence in the previous decade. Bolsonaro’s supporters are unequivocally aligned with Trumpism, frequently seen waving US and Israeli flags at demonstrations in Brazil.

As a dress rehearsal for US-backed destabilization of the Lula administration, President Trump has dramatically escalated the unilateral and aggressive posture of US foreign policy, orchestrating a series of joint attacks on Brazil and its efforts to build a new multipolar world order. In the wake of the successful BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro—which delivered a powerful declaration defending multilateralism and South–South cooperation—Trump threatened a 10 percent tariff on products from countries aligning with what he called the “anti-American policies of BRICS.”[22] He then launched a new phase of his global trade war, this time explicitly targeting Brazil under the pretext of alleged commercial irregularities and, more pointedly, to interfere in Brazil’s domestic political process in favor of his ideological ally, Jair Bolsonaro. Meanwhile, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned that Brazil, India, and China could face secondary sanctions due to their ongoing diplomatic and economic ties with Russia.

Contrary to dire forecasts from Western think tanks and media outlets, the BRICS Summit in Rio defied predictions of fragmentation and stagnation. During its seventeenth high-level meeting, BRICS leaders approved over 120 joint commitments spanning global governance, finance, health, artificial intelligence, climate change, and sustainable development. The Rio Declaration raised urgent concerns about global military spending at the expense of development in the Global South. In contrast with prevailing militaristic rhetoric, the bloc reaffirmed its commitment to multilateralism, poverty eradication, and climate action. Among the adopted initiatives were the BRICS Leaders’ Framework Declaration on Climate Finance, the Declaration on Global Governance of AI, and the BRICS Partnership for the Elimination of Socially Determined Diseases. Far from being irrelevant, BRICS emerged as a principal vanguard for a peaceful, multipolar world order.

Additionally, during bilateral meetings held alongside the summit, Brazil and China made progress in discussions and technical studies for the construction of a bi-oceanic railway in South America. The project would cross Brazilian and Peruvian territory, providing a direct land connection to the port of Chancay on the Pacific coast, reducing dependence on the Panama Canal and helping to shorten and enhance trade between Latin America and Asia.

In light of the dire situation of his Brazilian ally—former President Jair Bolsonaro, ruled ineligible for the 2026 election and facing growing legal jeopardy, including involvement in coup plots and even assassination schemes against President Lula—Trump decided to openly intervene in Brazil’s internal affairs. Bolsonaro’s son, Federal Deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro, simply abandoned his seat in Brasília and moved to the United States, where he is actively working with Trump’s team to reverse his father’s political ban and reignite the far right in Brazil. The trade offensive thus goes beyond economics—it is a calculated political assault designed to fracture the coalition that defeated the reactionary and surrenderist forces in 2022.

In President Trump’s and the Bolsonaristas’ view, hitting Brazilian exports to the US—critical to the profits of many industrial sectors—would sever the alliance between Lula and parts of the national economic elite. They believed this would forge a united front of elites advocating for Bolsonaro’s release and eligibility to run for office, in exchange for restored Brazil–US trade relations.

But this logic completely misfired. Instead, the subservience of Brazilian extremists—who went to Washington seeking sanctions on their own country—aroused a robust wave of national pride and pushback. Brazilian social movements and popular organizations mobilized on Avenida Paulista, in São Paulo, occupying more than three blocks to defend national sovereignty and demand progress on social justice issues, including Lula’s recent proposal to increase taxes on multimillionaires. Simultaneously, broad sectors of the conservative opposition lowered their weapons and aligned themselves with the president to form a national unity front against imperialist aggression, condemning the cowardly and submissive stance of the far right.

In response, the government invoked the Economic Reciprocity Law, announcing the imposition of symmetrical trade sanctions to protect national industry. This move was endorsed by Congress, business federations, and even influential private media. Estadão, a traditional conservative outlet, published an editorial condemning Bolsonarista submission to foreign powers, and Jornal Nacional—linked to the right-leaning Rede Globo, Brazil’s main private media oligopoly—gave Lula a prime-time platform to speak directly to television viewers.[23] In Parliament, far-right lawmakers found themselves increasingly marginalized, while conservative sectors shifted in support of the government. Finally, Lula issued a public statement to the country, invoking the unity of broad forces in defense of national sovereignty, economic development, and social justice, while denouncing the subservience of those he called traitors to the nation.

Lula’s leadership redrew the political center, uniting social movements, democratic leftists, middle-class factions, and segments of the industrial bourgeoisie. Recent polling shows a strong surge in government approval and steep declines for Bolsonaro’s supporters. Lula has reemerged as the beacon of a national project centered on sovereignty and social justice.

What simply isn’t understood by Trump and his strategists is how global power dynamics have shifted. While key Brazilian industries still rely on the US market, China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009. Brazil’s pragmatic, universalist foreign policy enables strategic diversification through agreements across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already initiated efforts to redirect exports.

Even Brazil’s most conservative elites remain unaligned with Washington’s anti-China campaign and firmly reject interference in national affairs. Under these circumstances, Lula’s reaffirmed leadership has gained renewed legitimacy under the banner of national sovereignty and social justice.

By brandishing his threatening “big stick” against Brazil, President Trump has inadvertently strengthened the very unity he sought to fracture. His approach mirrors the flaws of US global policy: unable to prevent China’s rise, the consolidation of BRICS, or the popular resurgence in Latin America. In attempting to push Brazil—and the world—backward, he only accelerates history in the opposite direction. With Lula at the helm, Brazil’s democratic-popular alliance, the revitalization of BRICS, and the resurgence of South–South solidarity ensure that Brazil will not bow to blackmail—and that the wheel of history will keep turning forward.

4. There Will Be No Victory without Struggle
In light of all the aforementioned developments, the peoples of Latin America must be fully aware of the central role that their lands and destinies play in the current global realignment of power. It is undeniable that two elements—the growing diplomatic pressure on Latin American governments and efforts to reshape the balance of forces by supporting reactionary elements—form the core of the Trump administration’s strategy for the region. The primary goals are to weaken Latin America’s ties with China and to contain the renewed rise of progressive governments.

Recent events, however, have revealed key vulnerabilities in this strategy. The unilateralism, tariff threats, and blackmail deployed by the United States have generated mistrust and discord even among some of its closest partners. Trump allies such as Daniel Noboa and Nayib Bukele have shown hesitation in fully endorsing the anti-China offensive, while other conservative governments—like that of Dina Boluarte in Peru—appear unwilling to embrace the rhetoric of a “New Cold War.” The US offensive has even led some progressive governments to radicalize their positions in response to Washington’s hegemonism, as illustrated by President Petro’s tone when announcing Colombia’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative. In Brazil’s case, it is undeniable that attacks and threats against the Lula government have, perhaps unintentionally, strengthened it—while solidifying the public image of the Bolsonarist far right as national traitors, for going so far as to request sanctions against their own country at the White House.

Even so, these developments do not mark the final outcome of the conflict. As the case of Panama clearly shows, US pressure has also yielded results favorable to its interests. Although Brazil continues to deepen its relationship with China, it is evident that American pressure played a significant role in preventing the country from formally announcing its accession to the Belt and Road Initiative—a gesture that would have greatly enhanced the symbolic weight of bilateral rapprochement. The United States’ aggressive stance in favor of regime change and the destabilization of progressive governments goes hand in hand with its unwavering support for far-right reactionary forces. US tacit backing of the fraudulent re-election of Noboa in Ecuador, preparations for a coup d’état in Colombia, and the ongoing attempt to destabilize the Lula government are clear indicators that a period of heightened political and electoral challenges for progressive forces lies ahead in the region.[24]

That said, it is equally clear that the world is rapidly undergoing structural transformations that are expanding the political and economic room for maneuver available to developing countries. In this context, the relationship between Latin America and China has become increasingly indispensable, as evidenced by the outcomes of the Fourth China–CELAC Forum, which emphasized a shared vision of development, multilateralism, and South–South cooperation. Strengthening these ties is not merely a matter of diplomatic protocol—it is a vital necessity for securing the region’s autonomy and future.

However, it must also be acknowledged that the definitive defeat of imperialism in Latin America will not come solely through the international actions of national governments—crucial as these may be. It will also depend on the ability of progressive and popular forces to resist, within each country, the historical alliance between surrenderist oligarchic elites and Washington’s hawks, who continue working to keep the ghost of the Monroe Doctrine alive.

(Notes at link.)

https://mronline.org/2025/09/03/the-res ... n-america/

*****

Of Peace, of War, and Other Demons

The principles born in the Global South, from spaces of unity and cooperation such as the Bandung Conference or the Tricontinental Conference of Havana call on us to strongly defend a peace anchored on solid foundations of national sovereignty, sustainable development, and social justice.

27 August 2025

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Marisol Escobar (Venezuela-US), The Generals, 1962.

Greetings from the Nuestra América Office of Tricontinental Institute for Social Research,

In a letter addressed to various leaders and authorities around the world on June 23, 2025, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro called for a “Summit for Peace and against War” in response to the military offensive by the United States and Israel in West Asia. The South American leader specifically urged organizations of the Global South, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African Union, BRICS, and CELAC, with the crucial support of China and Russia, to take the lead in promoting, under the framework of international law, an immediate and complete ceasefire throughout the region.

Warning about the danger of a nuclear escalation, Maduro also urged the creation of a “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in West Asia,” which the United Nations Security Council would have to guarantee by ensuring the denuclearization of Israel. The request is preceded by the resolution first presented in 1974 by Iran with the support of Egypt for the “establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region,” which was approved and has since been a recurring topic of work in the multilateral body.

As a show of support for this initiative, nearly 600 delegates from 80 countries met in Caracas on July 25, showing that peace diplomacy must be on the agenda of the peoples of the Global South and not only of the United Nations, whose total budget is a thousand times less than global military spending. The Political Coordination of ALBA Movements was present in Caracas and identified the urgency of acknowledging that the underlying dispute is “a conflict between the ideas of liberation and the ideas of domination.” In May 2026, on the centenary of the birth of Comandante Fidel Castro, the IV Continental Assembly of ALBA Movements will be held with the goal of consolidating a common agenda to fight against the challenges of imperialism and its warmongering agenda, starting from a “climate of hope and revolutionary mystique.”

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Candido Portinari (Brazil), Paz (Peace), 1952-1956. Oil panel/plywood, 1400 x 953 cm.

Peace
The clamor for peace in Our America was born in response to the fiercest episode of violence ever recorded in history. In Open Veins of Latin America, Eduardo Galeano, citing the Brazilian sociologist Darcy Ribeiro, notes that of the 70 million original inhabitants in the American continent at the time of the first contact with European invaders, only about 3.5 million survived a century and a half later. In addition, the United Nations notes that for more than 400 years, 15 million people were victims of the transatlantic slave trade. This is why Simón Bolívar, who led the national liberation process against Spanish colonialism, denounced in his Jamaica Letter, “atrocities [rejected] as mythical, because they appear to be beyond the human capacity for evil. Modern critics would never credit them were it not for the many and frequent documents testifying to these horrible truths.” The same could be written today about Palestine (see Red Alert No. 19), where the magnitude of the violence transcends the capacity of imagination and reason.

June 2026 will mark 200 years since the Amphictyonic Congress of Panama, an early effort for continental unity and multilateralism convened by Bolívar, aspiring to a space of legal equality among states where “none would be weak with respect to another: none would be stronger” and “a perfect balance would be established in this order of things.” The Treaty of Union, League, and Perpetual Confederation between the Republics of Colombia, Central America, Peru, and the United Mexican States of July 15, 1826, considered “to commonly sustain, defensively and offensively, if necessary, the sovereignty and independence of each and every one of the confederated powers in America against all foreign domination and to secure now and forever the joys and an unalterable peace.”

Peace, in the Bolivarian concept, must be comprehensive and sustainable over time. For this reason, it is a peace that, in light of our times, cannot be built with our backs turned to the people. It is a peace that must be accompanied by social justice and guarantees so that the motives for war cannot reappear. As Ytalo Américo Silva describes, “this is the ‘Unalterable Peace of the Liberator Simón Bolívar,’ the one capable of ‘destroying forever the motives of hatred, discord, and dissolution’; which he thought about as many times as he tried to materialize Colombia.” For this reason, President Maduro’s letter insists that peace in West Asia must definitively resolve the conflict over Palestine, with the full recognition of its state with its capital in East Jerusalem and the right of refugees to return.

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Candido Portinari (Brasil), Guerra (War), 1952-1956. Oil panel/plywood 1400 x 1058 cm.

War
The year 2025 marks 80 years since the most significant military victory over fascism, but this does not mean that the fascist ideology has disappeared. The War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression fought by China and the Great Patriotic War fought by the Red Army remain living testimonies that confronting fascism entails enormous sacrifices and that the military defeat it suffered in the 20th century is no guarantee that our peoples cannot again be threatened by extremist ideologies that combine capitalist predation with its violent ideological project. At the Tricontinental Institute (see Dossier No. 79), we have reflected on the advance of the neofascist project and its challenges for our region.

The “new Cold War” with which hyper-imperialism today threatens China, the impossibility so far of reaching a peace agreement in Ukraine, and the worsening of the genocide in Gaza demonstrate the limitations of multilateralism, which is increasingly threatened by Washington’s attempt to impose a supposed “rules-based order” that seeks to change the principles of the United Nations Charter for norms dictated and imposed for the convenience of the interests of a project that aims to monopolize the use of military force and technological development, fragment popular struggles, plunder the common goods of nature, and keep humanity on the brink of a nuclear war.

The principles born in the Global South, from spaces of unity and cooperation such as the Bandung Conference (see Dossier No. 87) or the First Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Tricontinental Conference of Havana), call on us to strongly defend, from the popular camp, a peace anchored on solid foundations of national sovereignty, sustainable development, and social justice. The encounters between the peoples of Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa must be resumed with greater force to build a new international order where there is room for an unalterable peace.

The work of spaces like the Group of Friends in Defense of the United Nations Charter, faithful to the founding principles of the UN and opposed to the arbitrariness of unilateralism, reminds us that we must look at ourselves in the mirror of the painful history of the 20th century and gather from the fruits of the victory against fascism the elements that allow us to overcome a tragic re-edition of the Cold War.

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Beatriz González (Colombia), Señor presidente, qué honor estar con usted en este momento histórico (‘Mr President, What an Honour to Be with You in This Historic Moment’), 1987.

The other demons
On the same day that the People’s Summit for Peace and Against War was held in Caracas, the United States Treasury Department declared President Nicolás Maduro as the head of a supposed drug cartel known as the Cartel de los Soles, which was also declared a terrorist organization. The Department of Justice raised its reward for the capture of the Venezuelan president to US$ 50 million, and a New York Times article on August 8, 2025, states that President Donald Trump has signed a directive aimed at the Pentagon to use military force against certain Latin American drug cartels considered terrorists.

This is how the Bolivarian call for peace in West Asia was met with a new offensive in the misnamed War on Drugs, which since the Nixon administration has been progressively implemented as a justification for imperialist interventionism against Nuestra América. The War on Drugs, in practice, has been a military and legal instrument used to advance the ends of U.S. foreign policy and even to eliminate obstacles.

In July, the Venezuelan government had also announced that, together with the Colombian government, a Binational Economic Zone would be created for commercial integration, agricultural development, social development, and cooperation between the two countries, which would include sectors such as industry, gas, oil, electricity, tourism, and transportation. In terms of security, this advance strengthens cooperation between Colombia and Venezuela to combat drug trafficking without the need for U.S. mediation. Petro expressed on his social media: “I have received the support of Maduro and General Padrino to defeat the drug trafficking groups on the border of that country.” Likewise, Claudia Sheinbaum, the president of Mexico, a country that has been repeatedly threatened by Trump with military interventions against drug trafficking, dismissed the attempts to link President Maduro with Mexican drug trafficking: “if they have any evidence, let them present it, but we have no evidence related to those links.”

So far in 2025, Venezuela has seized more than 50,000 kilograms of drugs, and local authorities have indicated that seizures after the expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are now significantly greater. Political motivation, and not drug trafficking, once again seems to be the main impulse behind this escalation of persecution against the Venezuelan government.

Recently, along with the Observatorio Lawfare, we published the second notebook in the series Addicted to Imperialism, which seeks to show the role that the drug problem has played in U.S. foreign policy and the political, social, and economic impact of Plan Colombia. The peace that is sought to be imposed in this war is the peace of exploitation, oppression, the appropriation of natural resources, and displacement from territories. It is an apparent peace that will only end up reproducing the engines of war, exploitation, and death.

Peace is associated with every element of the material reproduction of life. War, consequently, is associated with every threat against it. It is no coincidence that the Pentagon is the main polluter of the planet. In a planet of environmental crisis, a climate catastrophe such as a flood or a prolonged drought also puts peace at risk. The peoples of Nuestra América and the entire Global South have the right to build the peace necessary to save the life of the planet. The way to exercise that right is through popular organization.

In the midst of the escalation, Venezuela held its seventh national election in a year, and on July 27, 37,000 communal projects were presented, driven by the country’s youth. In the protagonism of the youth and their organizational capacity lie the keys for new generations of the Global South to build a future that surpasses the logic of capitalism and reaffirms humanist values to transform society. It will not be through war, but through a peace that can be sustained in justice and solidarity, that we can guarantee the future.

In El despertar de la historia (The Awakening of History), the singer Alí Primera asked us the question and gave us the solution:

What is the struggle of men to achieve peace?
And what peace? If they want to leave the world as it is.
Help it, help it, so that humanity may be human.

Greetings to all,

Carlos Ron, Carmen Navas and Guillermo Barreto

https://thetricontinental.org/newslette ... er-demons/

*****

Leaked Audio Recordings and an Alleged Corruption Network: Milei’s Latest Nightmare
September 3, 2025

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A suitcase is held in front of Argentine President Javier Milei as protesters throw bottles and rocks at the vehicle. Photo: Reddit.

The Argentine president is facing provincial elections at the most critical moment for his popularity.

Javier Milei’s far-right government is experiencing one of its most critical moments since he took office as president of Argentina in 2023. According to a poll by Torcuato di Tella University, the executive branch’s popularity and trust ratings have plummeted in recent weeks.

On August 27, the president and other senior officials, who were campaigning for the September 7 provincial elections, had to be evacuated from a public appearance after being insulted by several protesters.

Some even threw objects at the president, forcing the vehicle they were in to flee from the crowd. Milei accused Kirchnerism, a left and pro-sovereignty political trend in Argentina led by former presidents Néstor and Cristina de Kirchner, of being behind the attack.

The decline in popularity of the libertarian leader follows several leaked audio recordings. These recordings allegedly reveal a corruption network benefiting several government officials, including Karina Milei, secretary of the presidency and sister of the president.

An alleged corruption network: “Karina takes 3%”
On August 29, journalist Mauro Federico’s outlet Data Clave broadcast two alleged audio recordings of Karina Milei. In the first recording, according to the media outlet, Karina Milei states, “We can’t get into a fight with each other. We must be united.”

In the second audio recording, the Secretary of the Presidency apparently says: “So, not even here. In truth, they don’t have to be here 24 hours a day. I come in at 8 in the morning and leave at 11 at night from the Casa Rosada.”

Although the audio recordings do not reveal anything truly compromising, except for an apparent division within the executive branch, they do show a clear security breach within Javier Milei’s inner circle, as these are not the first recordings to be leaked.

These audio recordings are in addition to those that were leaked in previous days, in which Diego Spagnuolo, then director of the National Disability Agency, can be heard talking about an alleged corruption scheme involving laboratories and service providers linked to public health care for people with disabilities.

According to Spagnuolo, the kickbacks were paid through the Suizo Argentina drugstore, which pressured certain suppliers to apply surcharges and secure contracts in favor of the state.

In addition, Spagnuolo accuses Karina Milei and Eduardo Menem, a former senator, of benefiting from the scheme in the audio recordings. Menem allegedly took 1% of the profits, and “Karina takes 3%,” said Spagnulo.

Following the leak of the audio recordings, Spagnuolo was dismissed, but not before announcing that he had already informed the president of the corruption scheme. Days later, the lawyer for former president Cristina Fernández, Gregorio Dalbón, filed a complaint about the alleged corruption plot.

The government’s reaction: denial and prosecution
Despite his sister’s silence, President Javier Milei has categorically denied the accusations and blames the opposition for initiating them. “Everything [Spagnuolo] says is a lie; we are going to take him to court and prove that he lied … They are coming for the freedom of all Argentines,” said the president in response to the scandals plaguing his government.

For its part, the executive branch said that the dissemination of Karina’s audio recordings is historic, as recordings of conversations that took place in the Casa Rosada had never been released before: “If this is a real audio recording, it was obtained illegally inside the National Government House, creating an unprecedented event in national history.”

In addition, presidential spokesperson Manuel Adorni said he would file a complaint with the courts over what had happened: “The government has reported to the federal courts an illegal intelligence operation aimed at destabilizing the country in the midst of an election campaign. Private conversations between Karina Milei and other officials were recorded, manipulated, and disseminated to influence the executive branch. This was not a leak. It was an illegal, planned, and direct attack.”

Russia behind the leak? Argentine courts ban the dissemination of Milei’s audio recordings
For now, the government’s move to stop further dissemination of the audio recordings has worked. The Argentine courts have banned the continued dissemination of the audio recordings in which Karina Milei can be heard, on the grounds that it would be an attack on the “privacy and honor” of the official, as well as putting Argentina’s “institutional security” at risk.

In its complaint, the far-right government said that this was an “illegal intelligence operation” that sought to destabilize democracy. But what is most surprising is that, according to the government, those who leaked the audio recordings are “people linked to Russian intelligence services with influence in Venezuela.”

Several experts have criticized the court’s decision, considering it an attack on freedom of expression. According to them, the honor of the Secretary of Government has not been endangered, and that the decision is rather aimed at censoring new recordings. However, he states that a court order of this type cannot be issued before the content of the undisclosed audio recordings is known.

For now, the government is seeking to resolve the problem it finds itself in, which has paralyzed its control of the public agenda. Amid rumors of more audio recordings allegedly featuring government officials, Argentine public opinion is eagerly awaiting developments. Milei’s government will face a real test in the September 7 elections, from which it could emerge stronger or deeply wounded, even compromising its possible reelection.

(Peoples Dispatch)

https://orinocotribune.com/leaked-audio ... nightmare/
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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Fri Sep 05, 2025 2:10 pm

The Mileis are under a noose around their necks: Deputies summon Karina in the LIBRA case

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The cryptocurrency scandal involving $LIBRA originated in February 2025. Photo: Honorable Chamber of Deputies of the Nation.

September 3, 2025 Hour: 11:19 pm

The investigative commission of the LIBRA case in the opposition-dominated Chamber of Deputies determined, as one of the resolutions of the investigation, to summon Karina Milei, Secretary General of the Presidency and sister of the president, to testify about her role in the crypto scam.

Furthermore, the deputies determined that if the officer refuses to attend, they will appeal to Judge Romilda Servini to compel her to do so. According to the regulations approved by the opposition majority, if a subpoenaed public official refuses to testify, the commission may request the competent judge to assist law enforcement to ensure their personal appearance.

The deputies will activate this provision if necessary, as Karina Milei previously refused to attend a meeting on June 25.

On the other hand, the commission did not limit itself to the President's sister. He also summoned other key officials such as Chief of Staff Guillermo Francos and presidential spokesperson Manuel Adorni, who could also be forcibly removed if they do not appear.

The list of invitees is extensive and includes crypto businessmen such as Mauricio Novelli, Manuel Terrones Godoy, and Sergio Morales, who have been identified as links between the creators of $LIBRA and the Argentine president.

In addition, figures such as Roberto Silva (head of the National Securities Commission), Paul Stark (Financial Information Unit), Alejandro Melik (Anti-Corruption Office), and María Florencia Zicavo (head of the Investigative Task Unit, UTI, which was created to investigate Milei's tweet) were summoned.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/the-mile ... ibra-case/

******

History sets the price for being unconditional to the US (I)

Eder Peña

Sep 3, 2025 , 1:11 pm .

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Argentine President Javier Milei was the first foreign leader to meet with Trump since his election victory in November 2024 (Photo: BBC)

"Latin American leaders spend millions to influence Trump's White House" is the title of an article published by The Guardian last May, which highlights how some presidents in the region have chosen to deepen their alignment with the government led by the American magnate.

The "efforts" undertaken by at least 10 Latin American and Caribbean countries range from registering high-ranking officials and envoys as "foreign agents" under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) to the Bukele administration's spending of $1.5 million on lobbying , which led to its collaboration in the confinement of Venezuelan deportees in the Cecot mega-prison. This includes Daniel Noboa's increased arms purchases and Javier Milei's long-awaited trade agreement .

The text mentions fundraisers who hoard millions of dollars, such as retired Cuban-American ambassador Carlos Trujillo and Argentine-American Damián Merlo , who promoted Bukele's lobbying efforts alongside the " shadow cabinet " of Venezuelans linked to the Venezuelan party Voluntad Popular. Also mentioned is Mauricio Claver-Carone, the White House special envoy for Latin America who was dismissed from US-Venezuela relations.

The aforementioned presidents, and other governments such as those of Paraguay, Panama, Colombia, Honduras, Haiti, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic, appear as clients of Trujillo's Continental Strategy LLC. The article states that they pay $5 million to dine at Mar-a-Lago, Trump's private residence. It claims they do so to play "Trump's unique transactional game of covering up controversial policies, positioning himself electorally, and currying favor with key lawmakers and officials who will execute the next four years of policy toward their often-ignored countries."

" Being an enemy of the United States is dangerous, but being a friend is fatal."
The phrase attributed to former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is a historic statement. An unwritten law of the system of power that has dominated the world since the mid-20th century. It has been applied with chilling precision in dozens of countries, from Asia to Latin America, through Africa and Europe. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy for those who believed that submission guaranteed survival.

This maxim should be an essential guideline for any nation that aspires to maintain its sovereignty. Because behind the rhetoric of alliance, cooperation, and collective security lies a repetitive pattern: the United States uses its allies as geopolitical instruments, strengthening them while they are useful, and abandoning—or even destroying—them when they no longer serve a purpose or become a hindrance.

This phenomenon is the central axis of American colonialism: maintaining control without the need for formal colonies. The United States does not seek to rule directly, but rather to ensure " almost total economic subordination " under the guise of political independence. The result is a modern system of vassalage, where allies are, in the words of intellectual Noam Chomsky, interchangeable pieces on an imperial chessboard.

There is no better proof of this than the fate of those leaders and countries who, blindly trusting Washington, surrendered their autonomy in exchange for military, financial, or diplomatic support.

Some were discarded, while others, like Joseph-Désiré Mobutu (a Congolese man who called himself Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga) or Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), ruled for decades as puppets, only to be abandoned when the winds changed. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (Dominican Republic) and Manuel Antonio Noriega (Panama) discovered too late that their loyalty had been a trap.

The rise and fall of disposable allies in Asia and Africa
In the vast and dynamic Third World during the Cold War, Washington sought not democracy or social justice but barriers to communism. To build them, it did not hesitate to support some of the most bloodthirsty regimes of the 20th century.

One of the most emblematic cases is that of Haji Muhammad Suharto, the Indonesian dictator who, following the 1965 coup d'état, massacred more than 500,000 people—mostly communists, trade unionists, and peasants—in the name of the "anti-communist order." According to declassified documents, the United States supported him and provided hit lists to Indonesian forces. The CIA provided the names of thousands of members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), facilitating their extermination. Washington celebrated the coup as a "victory against communism," and Suharto was rewarded with decades of military and economic support.

But in 1998, the United States withdrew its support when his geopolitical usefulness waned and his regime became a liability due to corruption and the social protests unleashed by the Asian financial crisis. Washington failed to intervene, Suharto fell, and with him, the myth of the eternal ally. His destiny was clear: useful while he contained the left, expendable when he was no longer useful.

Another paradigmatic case is Hosni Mubarak, the "Western-friendly pharaoh" who ruled Egypt for 30 years. Since 1981, he was one of the pillars of the pro-US order in the Middle East. He received more than $30 billion in military aid and became the second-largest recipient of US aid after Israel. His authoritarian and corrupt regime was tolerated because it guaranteed peace with Israel and stability in the Suez Canal.

But in 2011, during the Arab Spring, the United States abandoned him. When massive protests shook Cairo, the White House didn't defend its ally but instead pressured for his departure. Global media outlets began to be "critical" of the dictator, noting that "Mubarak was the symbol of stability, but also of authoritarianism." When that stability became unsustainable, the United States preferred to sacrifice him rather than risk its democratic image. Mubarak was tried, humiliated, and imprisoned. His fall was not a triumph of the people, but a liquidation ordered by the "Pharaoh's" patrons.

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Ousted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak sits in a cage in a courtroom during his verdict hearing in Cairo on June 2, 2012 (Photo: AFP)

Mobutu Sésé Seko, the dictator of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), was Washington's man in Central Africa for more than three decades. Supported by the CIA since he orchestrated the 1965 coup and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, he ensured that the African country—rich in cobalt, copper, uranium, and coltan—would not fall into the hands of progressive or socialist governments. In return, he plundered his country, amassed a personal fortune of billions, and ruled with an iron fist.

But in 1997, when the rebellion led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila threatened his power, the United States did not defend him but instead declared that "Mobutu's reign was over." They let him fall, and his exile in Morocco was the final scene of a discarded puppet. After his fall, the Congo sank into a series of wars that have caused more than 6 million deaths, fueled by foreign powers that continue to exploit its resources.

The United States and the United Kingdom maintain allied governments in Rwanda and Uganda that have been directly complicit in this plunder. They enjoy the approval of the "international community" while financing both sides and preferring a devastated Congo to a sovereign country. Mobutu's loyalty, like that of so many others, was not rewarded but punished with oblivion.

Being a disposable leader in Latin America
In Africa and Asia, the pattern is clear, but in Latin America it's even more evident. The region has been considered the United States' backyard since the 19th century, and its history is littered with leaders—all betrayed—who believed that aligning with Washington would guarantee them eternal power.

One of the first was Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic known as "El Jefe," who ruled with brutality for 31 years, supported by the United States for his anti-communism and subservience. But when his regime began to generate diplomatic tensions and his image became uncomfortable, the CIA gave the green light for his elimination. Declassified documents confirm that "the plan to eliminate Trujillo was presented to Washington on December 29, 1960." They didn't arrest him, but rather allowed it, and when he died, the United States feigned surprise.

Another case is that of Noriega, the Panamanian general who worked for years as a CIA agent. He was trained by the United States, used its intelligence services to infiltrate revolutionary movements in Central America, and collaborated in arms trafficking for the Nicaraguan Contras. But when he began to act independently , negotiate with Cuba, and launder drug money, he became a problem. In 1989, the United States accused him of drug trafficking and launched Operation Just Cause: a military invasion that killed thousands of civilians and landed him in a US prison. He was described as " the man who knew too much ," and his loyalty was rewarded with betrayal.

In recent times, the case of Juan Orlando Hernández has emerged as a modern cautionary tale. The former president of Honduras governed from 2014 to 2022 and was one of the United States' most loyal allies in Central America. He supported Trump's immigration policy, violently suppressed protests, was part of the Lima group during the "maximum pressure" campaign against the Venezuelan government, and received millions in military aid. But he also, according to evidence presented in New York, became a drug kingpin, protecting cartels in exchange for money. Insight Crime , a criminalization tool against governments not aligned with Washington, revealed that "the United States had overwhelming evidence against him for years."

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The former Honduran president was deported to the United States on charges of conspiring to manufacture and export drugs to the United States. He was also accused of using and carrying firearms and instigating the use of them by criminal groups (Photo: Reuters)

In 2024, he was extradited and sentenced to 45 years in prison. His daughters denounced in a video that "he was betrayed by those he called friends," but the betrayal was not personal but structural. Hernández was useful while he contained migration and repressed the left, but when his corruption became unsustainable, he was sacrificed to maintain the facade of fighting drug trafficking.

He was ruled out like Noriega, Trujillo, and Mobutu, but also like Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, Alfonso Portillo of Guatemala, Alejandro Toledo of Peru, and Ricardo Martinelli of Panama. The latter was the one who appointed María Corina Machado as his country's ambassador to the OAS to speak out against the Venezuelan government.

Europe and vassalage disguised as alliance
If the countries of the Global South have been direct victims of US imperialism, Europe has been their willing accomplice. The European Union, especially since the Cold War, has acted as the political and economic arm of the United States. But this submission has not brought prosperity but rather dependence, deindustrialization, and loss of sovereignty.

Today, Europe depends on the United States for its security (through NATO), its energy (especially after the war in Ukraine), and its foreign policy.

Analysts claim that "energy vassalage" has cost Europe more than $750 billion in purchases of inflated U.S. liquefied gas after the Nord Stream pipeline was blown up. It seems increasingly clear that the sabotage of this pipeline was the work of Anglo-American interests , and while European industries close due to high energy costs, U.S. oil companies are enriching themselves.

Furthermore, the EU has blindly pursued the policy of sanctions against Russia and China, without assessing its own interests. This policy has accelerated the "deindustrialization of Europe," a region that is subservient to the United States while the latter protects its market with massive subsidies such as the Inflation Reduction Act.

On the military front, subordination is total. NATO acts as a unified military bloc in which strategic decisions are made not in Brussels, but in Washington. And when the United States decides to attack, as in Gaza or Ukraine, Europe simply applauds.

Furthermore, the so-called "US-led military bloc," which also includes Japan, Australia, Israel, New Zealand, three countries in the Global South, and the few European countries that are not members of NATO, is a network of clients of the US Military Industrial Complex that depends on its technology and controls different regions of the world based on the hegemonic interests derived from this de facto power.

The result is an increasingly irrelevant Europe, scorned even by its own allies. The recent NATO summit demonstrated how even close allies are treated as subordinates, never as equals. This will be the subject of the second issue of this investigation.

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EU leaders lined up like schoolchildren on August 18 as "Daddy" Trump lectures them from his desk (Photo: X)

In the end, history is full of warnings for Bukele, Milei, Noboa, and other Latin Americans aligned with Washington. Kissinger, with his characteristic cynicism, summed them up in a single sentence, but the facts bear them out. Unconditional loyalty to the United States guarantees not protection but servitude. There is no isolation, but destruction when the empire decides a politician is no longer useful.

Today, the fate of these three presidents is unpredictable, as is that of others whose alignment is more muted. Milei, for example, is a staunch defender of free trade and open markets. He differs ideologically from Trump due to his protectionist approach, renegotiation of treaties, and the application of tariffs to protect US domestic industry. But they share a common struggle against political and economic enemies, such as socialism and the advance of globalism.

Even more importantly, for Trump, supporting Milei means strengthening the United States' position in Latin America, a strategic area for countering the influence of China and Russia, as long as the tsunami of scandals and financial chasms the Argentine president is creating allows.

The world-system conceived by the American elites doesn't condone autonomy, but it doesn't reward submission either, because its true goal isn't to have friends, but vassals. These don't have rights, but obligations, and when they fail, they are discarded.

https://misionverdad.com/investigacione ... nal-eeuu-i

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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Mon Sep 08, 2025 1:37 pm

Argentines Told Milei That He Cannot Hit the Retirees: Kiciloff

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Buenos Aires Governor Alex Kiciloff. Photo: teleSUR

September 8, 2025 Hour: 8:39 am

Buenos Aires governor hails election results as a ‘popular celebration.’
On Sunday, Buenos Aires Province Gov. Axel Kicillof called the victory in the provincial legislative elections a “popular celebration” after Peronism handed a crushing defeat to President Javier Milei’s alliance.

The leftist coalition Fuerza Patria secured 47.23% of the vote, far surpassing the far-right alliance between the Freedom Advances Party and the Republican Proposal Party, which obtained 33.73%.

“They’re going to have to change course. The ballots told President Milei that he cannot stop public works. The ballots explained that he cannot hit retirees. The ballots, with a 13-point difference, explained that he cannot abandon people with disabilities,” Kicillof said.

During his speech, the Buenos Aires governor thanked his cabinet and the mayors who “stood firm” and “resisted” adversity. He also said he hopes Milei will call him. “Have the courage to meet, to work and to come to an agreement,” Kicillof said.

🇦🇷El gobernador de Buenos Aires, Axel Kiciloff afirmó que Las urnas le dijeron al presidente Milei que no se puede frenar la obra pública, ni pegar a los jubilados pic.twitter.com/VYJVH2WDdI

— teleSUR TV (@teleSURtv) September 8, 2025


The text reads, “Buenos Aires Governor Axel Kiciloff stated that the polls told President Milei that public works cannot be halted, nor can retirees be hit.”

“We won without cheating anyone. Milei, the people gave you an order: You cannot govern for foreigners and for those who have the most. Govern for the people! That’s what the ballots told you, and that’s what we are asking of you,” he added, reiterating his commitment to defending public services and works.

“The ballots shouted, Milei, that you cannot defund health care, education, universities, science or culture in Argentina,” Kicillof stressed, while recalling the severe economic situation facing Argentine families.

“The ballots said that you cannot continue governing with hate, mistreatment and insults. The ballots told Milei that the national government must intervene and cannot act with indifference in the face of layoffs and business closures.”

“At the beginning of our administration in Buenos Aires Province, we said that our government would serve as both a shield and a safety net to defend and protect our people to the best of our ability,” Kicillof stated.

This Sunday, September 7, legislative elections will be held in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Thirteen million citizens will vote for 23 provincial senators and 15 alternates, 46 provincial deputies and 28 alternates, councilors, and school board members in the various… pic.twitter.com/bePiP7fL3w

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) September 7, 2025


https://www.telesurenglish.net/argentin ... -kiciloff/

Milei Loses Key Buenos Aires Provincial Elections: Overwhelming Peronist Victory

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People gather to wait for the results of the legislative elections of the province of Buenos Aires in front of the house of former president Cristina Fernández, this Sunday, in Buenos Aires (Argentina). Photo: EFE/ Adan González

September 7, 2025 Hour: 8:21 pm

Fuerza Patria, an alliance of different sectors of the Peronist opposition to the government of Javier Milei, crushed the president’s party, La Libertad Avanza, this Sunday in the legislative elections in the province of Buenos Aires, the country’s largest electoral district and key to the national elections next October.

With more than 80% of the votes counted, Fuerza Patria obtained almost 47% while La Libertad Avanza was in almost 34%. Fuerza Patria, the opposition coalition led by Governor Axcel Kicillof, won with 46.93% of the vote.

Second, with a difference of more than 13 percentage points the right-wing alliance between Libertad Avanza and PRO was placed, which obtained 33.86%. The third place was taken by the coalition Somos Buenos Aires, with 5.41%; while in fourth place was placed the Left-Unity Front with 4.38%.

In this context, Carlos Bianco, Minister of Government of the Province of Buenos Aires reported that Fuerza Patria “is winning in 6 of the 8 electoral sections” and “in 99 municipalities of the 135 municipalities of the Province of Buenos Aires. He also emphasized that “The results have been really strong in favor of our political force.”

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Bonaerense electoral authorities reported that voter turnout reached 64% of the electoral roll, several points below the district’s historical average of around 75%.

The province of Buenos Aires is the most important nationwide, in terms of production, economy, and demographics. With 14.3 million citizens eligible to vote, the district represents more than 37% of the national electorate, making these elections a crucial bellwether for Javier Milei’s government ahead of the national legislative elections on October 26.

During the day, 23 provincial senators (full) and 15 alternates, 46 provincial deputies (full) and 28 alternates were elected, with the aim of renewing half of the legislators in each of the two legislative chambers. In addition, municipal authorities such as councilors and school board members were elected in 135 municipalities in Buenos Aires.

The elections were held in a tense atmosphere due to a corruption scandal involving Karina Milei, the president’s sister, for alleged fines at the National Disability Agency.

The results represent a setback for the aspirations of Javier Milei, whose management has been criticized for cuts in social benefits, rising prices in public services and declining incomes. In addition, for the first time in 42 years, legislative elections in the province of Buenos Aires were held independently of national elections.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/milei-lo ... elections/
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Re: South America

Post by blindpig » Sun Sep 14, 2025 2:27 pm

Anniversary of the coup in Chile
September 11, 14:49

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The anniversary of the September 11, 1973 coup in Chile, the day of the military coup and the death of President Salvador Allende, remains a day of deep and insurmountable national division in Chile. The chameleon-colored left-center governments that came to power after the dictatorship often spoke of reconciliation, but the executioners continue to die without a shadow of remorse, taking with them to hell the secret of the fates of thousands of “disappeared persons,” whom their loved ones stubbornly and tirelessly continue to search for.

September 11 is the date of death of the once popular provincial myth in the country about itself as a Latin American Switzerland, where, due to a particularly strong democratic tradition, all political opponents will always come to a peaceful agreement and a Chilean will never shoot a Chilean. I remember that at the beginning of the armed conflicts on the territory of the recently collapsed Soviet Union, the Ukrainians said about themselves approximately the same thing.

This day is one of many examples of how the international mafia led by the US government, at any slightest threat to its interests, instantly forgets about democracy and immediately unleashes its main defender - fascism.

This is not just a day of remembrance - it is a moment of meeting with the fallen and reporting to them. The time when life and death are allowed to come very close to each other, almost point-blank, in order to together discern the features of tomorrow on the Andes tsunami frozen over Santiago.

(c) Oleg Yasinsky

https://t.me/olegyasynsky - zinc

As the example of Ukraine and Europe shows, fascism is still in the running arsenal of the "democratic world". Which is not surprising, since fascism is a product of capitalism.
All conceivable and inconceivable crimes of modern fascism can be easily overlooked if it is profitable. Therefore, in the same Chile, many war criminals who once served the United States calmly lived to a ripe old age and escaped responsibility for their crimes.

https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/10064976.html

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Argentina: What Do Parliamentary Elections Mean for Milei?
September 13, 2025

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Milei’s popularity has dropped from 60% to 39% in 7 months. Photo: Resumen.

By Francisco Delgado Rodríguez – Sep 10, 2025

The results of the parliamentary elections in the province of Buenos Aires could mark a turning point in Argentine politics, to the detriment ofLa Libertad Avanza, the party structure of Argentine President Javier Milei.

Fuerza Patria, the Peronists, won comfortably with 47.07% vs. 33.82% for La Libertad Avanza; this gives them a provincial parliamentary majority, with 13 senators and 21 deputies. And this is not happening just anywhere, but in a territory that accounts for almost 40% of the country’s voters.

Certainly, Peronism, in the case of Fuerza Patria, has always controlled this territory in the past, including the provincial government and most of the municipalities, but it now appears to have made further gains, notably winning the so-called fourth electoral section, after 20 years of failure, where there are 19 municipalities in the northern part of the province.

This convincing victory was preceded by positive results for the Peronist opposition in provincial parliamentary elections in Córdoba and in the election of delegates to reform the provincial constitution of Santa Fe.

Regardless of the purposes of these electoral contests, Peronism won in these provinces where it had lost in the 2023 presidential elections, as well as in important places such as the provincial capital of Santa Fe. Both territories account for around 16% of the national electorate. In other words, together with Buenos Aires, the Peronists reap territorial support where approximately 56% of Argentines vote.

The issue is not limited to these provincial processes. In the balance of votes in Congress at the national or federal level, there is also a noticeable sustained loss for Mileism, which is often joined by the right-wing PRO, led by former president Mauricio Macri, and factions of the historic Radical Civic Union.

Several dynamics interact in the Argentine Congress, where sometimes the results of what is agreed upon have little or nothing to do with the issue under debate, and more to do with the exchange of favors between the federal government and provincial governors, who decide behind the scenes what legislators, selected and supported from each province of origin, will do. Under this logic, Milei had managed to impose decisions, despite not having his own caucus capable of agreeing on anything.

But this also seems to have come to an end. Just a few days before the vote in Buenos Aires, the Senate rejected the presidential veto on legislation that imposed support resources for people with disabilities. Previously, legislators had rejected five presidential decrees on other occasions and, to make matters worse, due to its symbolic weight, they reactivated the investigative commission on the $Libra cryptocurrency case.

Democracy Under Siege: The Case of Cristina Kirchner and the Return of Proscription


And speaking of that cryptocurrency, the issue serves to understand the sinister side of La Libertad Avanza, which owes part of its popularity to Milei’s inflammatory rhetoric against the “caste,” understood as the corrupt politicians who have bled the country dry; that is, precisely what Milei and company are.


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Pensioners and workers continue to be in the streets of Argentina.

The president, the visible head of that “caste,” has been involved in corruption scandals such as this million-dollar $Libra scam, which is even being tried in courts abroad, or the latest and most dazzling one involving the president’s sister and secretary general, Karina Milei, and other crooks close to the president, who organized a scheme to embezzle money from none other than the National Disability Agency (ANDIS), the very agency whose resources Congress is trying to save.

The “caste,” the real one, is also made up of and led by a stale and unscrupulous oligarchy, which built up a figure like Javier Milei to try to dismantle the kind of welfare state promoted over the last 20 years by Kirchnerism, reducing the state to the management of a repressive force that guarantees its dismantling.

This oligarchy or “royal caste” is made up of a select and concentrated group of millionaire businessmen who hope to control even more sectors such as energy, steel, infrastructure and airports, technology, finance, pharmaceuticals, and the main media, among others. Most of them are closely associated with US and European transnational corporations, and some are even listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

What happened in Buenos Aires may be a prelude to what is expected on Sunday, October 26, when national legislative elections will be held, which are key to defining the balance of power in Congress. Milei hopes, of course, to win a majority, which he did not obtain in the presidential elections, when part of that legislature was also elected and which, as can be seen, is behaving in an increasingly elusive manner.

Milei is also going downhill in terms of popularity, falling from more than 60% in January 2025 to around 39% in August, a drop that can even be seen in the parallel universe of social media, where the occupant of the Casa Rosada spends most of his presidential time and had a significant accumulation in his favor.

And it was to be expected, Milei is the president who in the shortest time imposed widely unpopular measures, not only in their content, which would be enough, but also in the way he communicated them with hyper-aggressive rhetoric, routinely and crudely disparaging his opponents, an example of when discourtesy shows a lack of courage.

The foreign policy of the current Argentine government deserves a separate analysis because it has less weight in the electoral will of Argentines. But it is useful to establish its shamefully subordinate nature to the US, which includes support for the Zionist genocide in Gaza or the worst causes in Our America.

In any case, what happened in Buenos Aires on September 7 is one more step in what many hope will happen in Argentina: the political cornering or weakening of one of that country’s worst leaders, paving the way for his departure from office, either through the ballot box or a popular uprising, as happened with Fernando De La Rúa 24 years ago.

Predicting what will happen in this southern country, so close to Cuba, is a very complicated task. It is well known that it is not enough for Milei to work towards his own defeat; those calling for this outcome must know how to defeat him. But that part of the story will have to be asked of the good people of Argentina, those who believe that only unity can move mountains.

(Resumen Latinoamericano – English)

https://orinocotribune.com/argentina-wh ... for-milei/

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3 Key Laws Vetoed in Argentina Political Crisis: A Nation Divided

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Massive protests spread nationwide as social groups reject President Milei’s vetoes, marking a deepening Argentina political crisis.


September 13, 2025 Hour: 1:11 pm

Argentina´s political crisis deepens as President Milei vetoes 3 key laws amid protests and fractured governance ahead of October elections.

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Argentina political crisis deepens after President Milei vetoes 3 key laws

Argentina political crisis escalated sharply as President Javier Milei recently vetoed three critical laws passed by Congress, intensifying political instability following his electoral defeat in Buenos Aires. These laws, concerned with provincial fund allocation, university financing, and pediatric emergency response, will be re-discussed by Congress on September 17 amid growing social and political mobilization supporting the legislation.

Milei invoked his constitutional veto power to block laws that enjoyed broad parliamentary consensus. The first vetoed law was the National Treasury Contributions Act, designed to distribute financial resources among the provinces. The second rejected measure targeted Pediatric Emergency, proposing salary increases and updated budgets for specialized hospitals including the prominent Garrahan Hospital. Lastly, Milei vetoed the University Financing law approved on August 22, which sought salary adjustments for teaching and non-teaching staff, inflation-linked operational funding, scholarships, infrastructure upgrades, and a progressive financing plan ranging from 1% to 1.5% of GDP between 2026 and 2031.

The president’s rationale centered on achieving a “zero deficit” and claiming the laws lacked clear financing sources. Concerning the Pediatric Emergency law, Milei raised concerns about salary distortions and fiscal risks to national stability.

Political fragmentation worsens amid Argentina political crisis
The political response was swift. Chief of Cabinet Guillermo Franks called a meeting with provincial governors, revealing the ruling coalition’s isolation: out of 30 governors, only three attended, all aligned with the president’s party and eyeing October elections. This underscored the deepening fragmentation and weakened consensus-building of the administration.

Simultaneously, opposition parties in both congressional chambers—the House and Senate—have begun coordinating to overturn the presidential vetoes. This sets the stage for a new legislative confrontation layered atop ongoing social and union protests, portending a turbulent electoral month.

Argentine Congress official site
United Nations on public financing policies
Reuters coverage of Argentina political unrest

Rising social protests fuel tension in Argentina political crisis

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University movements and health workers spearheaded protests. On Friday, September 12 in Buenos Aires, large demonstrations gathered teachers, students, and union representatives from groups like ATE and APyT. The University of Buenos Aires, led by its union AGD-UBA, organized a national noise protest (“ruidazo nacional”) opposing the vetoes on University Financing and Pediatric Emergency laws. These protests are planned to spread nationwide on September 17, coinciding with Congress’s resumption of debate on these bills.

Political analysts argue the vetoes form part of Milei’s confrontational strategy to regain political relevance and set the agenda ahead of the general election. However, experts warn this approach risks backfiring, further undermining the president’s ability to push his policies and deepening political polarization in Argentina.

Images shared by news agencies such as Sputnik and Xinhua document the marches led by students, educators, and health workers connected to the Garrahan Hospital, highlighting the broad social rejection of Milei’s policies.

Geopolitical context
The current political crisis in Argentina is symptomatic of deeper, more widespread issues confronting many nations across Latin America. These challenges often manifest as a confluence of economic difficulties, persistent social inequality, and a fragmentation of effective governance, all of which contribute to significant political instability in the region. Argentina’s present dispute, particularly concerning the direction of fiscal policies and the allocation of social spending, is occurring against a backdrop of heightened electoral tensions, thereby amplifying the potential risks. These internal divisions not only threaten the nation’s domestic stability and overall social cohesion, but also present considerable challenges for broader regional economic integration initiatives and collaborative efforts aimed at fostering mutual growth and development.

The manner in which Argentina navigates these internal conflicts, especially during what is proving to be a pivotal election year, will be crucial in shaping both domestic and international perceptions. Successful resolution of these issues will likely play a significant role in influencing investor confidence, either attracting or deterring foreign investment, and will undoubtedly impact the country’s diplomatic relations within the Mercosur trade bloc and in its wider relationships with countries beyond the immediate region. The stability and prosperity of Argentina are thus inextricably linked to its ability to address these fundamental challenges and maintain constructive engagement both internally and externally.

https://www.telesurenglish.net/argentin ... al-crisis/
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."

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