India

[blindpig]

Digitalisation in India: The class agenda [Part IV]
Originally published: RUPE (Research Unit for Political Economy) India on May 23, 2024 by RUPE India (more by RUPE (Research Unit for Political Economy) India) (Posted May 28, 2024)

Examining India’s digital sector in relation to the world economy, we observe the following: (1) the international division of labour in the digital economy, whereby cheap labour power in India is used to raise the rate of profit of imperialist countries’ firms; (2) the domination of India’s market for digital goods and services by firms of the imperialist countries; (3) the capture and control of data, as a raw material, by these firms; (4) the use of foreign investment to capture economic territory in India; and (5) the use of political influence by U.S. imperialism to shut out rivals.

Part IV. Imperialism and the Digitalisation of India
The digital production process
Indian propagandists talk of India’s “emerging status as a technological powerhouse”, and the heads of the world’s largest technology corporations have started to refer to India as a global technology/software “superpower”, at least in their interactions with Indian media outlets.1 Undeniably, India has a large pool of technologically skilled workers (albeit small as a percentage of the country’s workforce) as well as globally competitive firms in specific sectors of software and related technology. But India’s technology sector is not a ‘superpower’, or even an emerging one. It does not disturb, let alone upturn, the existing hierarchy of world powers, even in the sphere of the digital economy. Rather, India plays an important but subordinate role in the international division of labour under imperialism.

That division of labour, as Christian Fuchs describes it,2 includes the contingent of workers who mine the minerals required for the digital sector; these minerals are then processed by various other contingents of workers, over many stages, into physical components of information and communication technology (ICT); another contingent of workers assembles these components into various finished physical goods. These stages generally span many countries, from, say, the Congo to China or Vietnam.

These physical goods are then used by workers in non-material production (among whom there is a hierarchy of tasks involved) to construct information technology. In turn, the products of their labour are used by other workers to create digital content of various types. Fuchs notes: “Today most of these digital relations of production are shaped by wage labor, slave labor, unpaid labor, precarious labor, and freelance labor, making the international division of digital labor a vast and complex network of interconnected, global processes of exploitation.” To take just one example, an army of ‘invisible’ workers around the world is employed in training artificial intelligence systems by identifying, say, a tree on a video, or correcting a translation. Amazon, Google, and other tech giants run on vast amounts of such ‘ghost work’, by workers paid less than minimum wages, without health benefits, and with no job security.3 Facebook is reported to engage at least 100,000 ‘content moderators’, and perhaps many more than that, “spread across a range of call centers, boutique firms, and ‘micro-labor’ sites around the world”,4 and similar is the case for other social media sites.

The surpluses extracted at each stage of this vast, multi-layered production process are concentrated in the hands of giant corporations which control each step. At least 6 of the world’s 10 richest persons (from the Forbes list of 2024) made their fortunes in the tech sector (Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Ellison, Bill Gates, Steve Ballmer, Larry Page).5 Worldwide, the six largest public corporations by market capitalisation are Microsoft, Apple, Nvidia, Alphabet (Google), Amazon, and Meta (Facebook), with a combined market capitalisation of $7.3 trillion as of March 31, 2024.6

Indian IT workers in the international division of labour
Workers in India’s tech sector are located within this global division of labour. Giant multinational corporations employ them in order to reduce their own wage costs and increase their profits. Thus India’s software services exports rose from $3 billion in 1999-2000 to $100 billion in 2016-17 to almost $200 billion in 2023-24.7 Software exports are the major part of services exports, which are estimated at $340 billion for the calendar year 2023.

Value of Export of Software Services from India, by Country of Destination
| Report on Services Export Reporting Form for 2022 23 Ministry of Commerce | MR Online
Report on Services Export Reporting Form for 2022-23, Ministry of Commerce.

Another, and increasingly important, part of India’s services exports is that of ‘global capability centres’ (GCCs) set up in India by multinational corporations. India’s nearly 1,600 such units account for half the world’s GCCs, and employ about 1.6 million, or about 1,000 each.8 ‘GCC’ is a broad term, spanning low-skill back-office work, IT work, and research and development (R&D). Specific GCCs may do one or the other task, or combine more than one type of work.

There has been a dramatic rise in R&D work in GCCs in India, engaging over 0.5 million staff.9 According to the Financial Times, R&D capital expenditure by foreign firms in India rose more than 400 per cent in a single year, from $2.5 billion in 2021 to $12.9 billion in 2022. In that year, India supplanted the U.S., the number one for the past decade, as the top R&D foreign direct investment (FDI) destination; there are indications that this trend will continue.10 The incentive is lower labour cost: a software engineer’s salary in India is between $12,000 and $18,000 per annum, compared to the U.S. equivalent engineer’s salary of between $75,000 and $100,000.11 A Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) survey finds the number one reason for MNCs to invest in R&D in India is “availability of R&D talent pool at low cost”.12

However, the R&D carried out in the GCCs is largely unrelated to India, and does not provide impetus to Indian R&D capabilities. An observer notes that “GCCs continue to be linked directly to corporate headquarters or the headquarters of the strategic business unit. They have weak links to the MNC’s business in India.”13 A 2012 study of MNC R&D centres in India found that they had little connection with Indian institutions, and their R&D activities in India did not “reflect much importance of their Indian set-ups, or their interest in high-end R&D initiatives”. Indeed, their patents from activities in India accounted for just 0.5 per cent of their patents worldwide. The MNC R&D units maintain links with India’s university system, but not for the purpose of scientific or technological research inputs; rather, they do so in order to re-shape university education to generate more human resources of the type they require.14

As in the case of software exports, the main customer is the U.S., and U.S.-origin GCCs (global capability centres) account for 70 per cent of GCCs in India. U.S. firms feel comfortable with the environment in India: “India does not have Huawei-type companies that can challenge the pole position of global corporations in important new technologies. So, it is unlikely that we will face the kind of dispute we see on emerging telecom technologies between China and the U.S.”15 Nevertheless, foreign firms are anxious to protect their data from the Indian authorities, and hence “many GCCs have moved to a policy of storing all data on servers in the U.S. (or their parent country). In at least one GCC, computers located in the GCC have no data storage, and act more like ‘dumb terminals’ connected to the remote server.”16

What enters into the consumption of the IT worker
There is a wide range of skill levels and wages within the services exports sector. The GCCs include a large contingent of low-wage workers (earning as low as Rs 12,000 per month 17), and staff turnover is high, perhaps double of international levels.18 However, the wages of the better-paid workers in India’s digital sector are by Indian standards handsome (though a fraction of U.S. levels). The reason these wages are attractive to educated Indians is that many goods and most services are available in India at low prices, when expressed in U.S. dollar terms at the market exchange rate, i.e., $1 = Rs 83. That is, Rs 83 can buy more in India than $1 can buy in the U.S. Thus what is called the ‘Purchasing Power Parity’ (PPP) value of the rupee is higher than its market exchange rate value. Behind this seemingly benign phenomenon lies the fact that vast numbers of people in India, particularly in the informal sector, work for very low wages or returns, and therefore the things they make are cheaper. (The unpaid toil of women too hugely helps keep down the reproduction costs of the working class family.19)

So the Indian tech worker’s ability to enjoy a comfortable standard of living at a relatively low U.S. dollar wage (and therefore the foreign employer’s ability to hire him/her at that low dollar wage) depends on, in effect, a subsidy provided by India’s sweated informal sector and women’s labour.20 Without the vast reserve army of labour, as manifested in India’s low employment rate 21 and its vast informal sector, the wages of IT workers too would have to be higher, and the profits of firms outsourcing to India would be lower. In that sense, the continued growth of India’s IT industry depends precisely on its remaining an enclave, drawing on a large periphery. It is important to realise that the demand-suppressing policies by the Indian State, in the name of controlling the fiscal deficit and checking inflation, serve to maintain the reserve army of labour and keep down wage levels. In this fashion, the distorted pattern of development in India reproduces itself under imperialist domination.

Imperialist domination in the digital sphere
The dominant media have long associated certain ideological conceptions with the internet, such as freedom of individual expression and freedom of choice. One such conception is that the internet has put individuals worldwide on an equal footing; in the words of an American propagandist, “the world is flat”—an epiphany he claims to have had in India.22 The reality is that the digital world is marked by imperialist domination; and India is a prime example of this.

While several writers have talked of ‘imperialism’ or ‘colonialism/colonisation’ in the digital sphere, the meanings they have attached to these terms are very diverse, and, in some cases, divorced from a broader political-economic analysis of the world economy and politics. We take, as our frame, the relationship between the monopoly capital of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful countries and the mass of humanity in underdeveloped Asia, Africa and Latin America, a relationship which shapes the world’s material and financial flows, its physical environment, its cultural life and its political developments.

Over 100 years ago, Lenin, in his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917), described the process of concentration of capital in the later 19th century, which rendered the ‘free market’ a thing of the past. Giant monopolist associations emerged, backed by, or merged with, big finance. For their survival and growth, these monopolists were driven to seize the sources (and even potential sources) of raw materials and conquer foreign markets as well. All this was done with the help of State power. Foreign investment was an important instrument of extending monopoly hold. In this process, monopolists secured profitable deals, concessions, monopoly profits, and so on—“economic territory in general”.

“In [the] backward countries”, said Lenin, “profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap.” Even more important than the benefit the monopolists obtained by getting control of raw materials and markets was the benefit they obtained by denying their rivals access to the same. So they constantly strove to gain political influence, colonising countries, creating “spheres of influence”, and so on. Lenin remarked: “There are already over 100 such international cartels, which command the entire world market and divide it ‘amicably’ among themselves—until war re divides it.” Employing a historical-materialist method of analysis, he brought out the intertwining of economic and geopolitical aspects in the entire process.

The forms of imperialism may have undergone some change in the century since Lenin’s work, but there are striking continuities in its content. When we apply this perspective to India’s digital economy, we observe:

1. the creation of an international division of labour in the digital economy, whereby cheap labour power in India is used to raise the rate of profit of imperialist countries’ firms;

2. the domination of India’s market for digital goods and services by firms of the imperialist countries;

3. the capture and control of data, as a raw material, by these firms;

4. the use of foreign investment to capture economic territory in India;

5. the use of political influence to shut out rivals, if necessary even by war.

We have already discussed point 1 above. Let us look at points 2-5 below.

Hardware dependence
The hardware industry of computers, electronics, and optical products contributes to only 0.1 per cent of India’s gross value added (GVA).23 As Dhar and Joseph note, “While the ITES [Information Technology Enabled Services] segment of the Information Technology (IT) sector has performed exceptionally well, the other component of the industry, the Indian computer electronics industry, has not been able to establish itself as a distinct entity, despite its emergence in the 1960s.”24 This despite the glimpses of India’s technological potential in the performance of two institutions set up in the 1980s: the Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DoT), which was responsible for the initial spread of telephony in India till the 1990s, and the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC). Sudip Chaudhuri observes,

In the pre-reforms period, domestic manufacturing of telecom equipment was essentially sustained through public procurement and import substitution policies…. Mandatory purchase requirement did not make C-DoT less efficient. In fact C-DoT showed that it is possible not only to develop technologies as per international standards. The products can be cheaper and more suited to Indian conditions.25

Meanwhile, in the face of the denial of supercomputer technology by the U.S. and Japan, the C-DAC produced the Param supercomputer in 1991; “From its very first generation,”, Dhar and Joseph observe, the “Param supercomputer was ranked among the best machines in the world”.26 While these instances were not part of a comprehensive programme of building independent manufacturing capacity, they did provide glimpses of what is possible if one wants to promote indigenous capabilities.

The period of liberalisation and globalisation, however, saw India turn to near-complete dependence on imports of telecom gear and computer electronics.27 The ‘Make in India’ programme announced by the Prime Minister in 2014 claimed it would make India into a global manufacturing hub, including the domestic manufacture of mobile phones. Superficially, there was a sizeable increase in such ‘manufacture’; but in fact, import dependence only deepened, as a 2020 study by Sunil Mani brought out:

Domestic production has been dependent on parts that were imported from abroad, and these imports have been growing [imports of parts of mobile phones rose from $2.67 billion in 2014 to $11.56 billion in 2018]. Given the fact that production is largely based on imported inputs, the ratio of gross value added (GVA) to gross value of output (GVO) has been declining sharply, ­especially during the period when domestic output has been increasing [GVA/GVO declined from 17 per cent in 2013-14 to 13 per cent in 2017-18]…. As such, no domestic production or innovation capability has been created or is in the offing in the foreseeable future. This dependent development has led to India’s technology trade deficit increasing on account of increased royalty and licence fee payments, besides dividends and profits being repatriated abroad.28

Indeed, an RBI study of India’s digital economy noted indications of increasing in import dependence between 2014 and 2019 in computers, electronics, and optical products.29

In 2020-21, during the Covid lockdown, the Indian government announced a ‘Production-Linked Incentive’ (PLI) scheme, the stated aim of which was, once more, to promote manufacturing in India. There appeared to be a dramatic improvement in India’s net exports (i.e., exports minus imports) of mobile phones, from -$3.3 billion in 2017-18 to a $9.8 billion in 2022-23—a turnaround of $13.1 billion. The turnaround started in 2018-19, when import tariffs on mobile phones were raised, and accelerated in 2020-21, after the PLI scheme was announced.

However, an analysis by Raghuram Rajan, Rohit Lamba and Rahul Chauhan of mobile phone manufacturing in India reveals that, in the same period, the import of inputs for mobile phones (semiconductors, printed circuit board assemblies [PCBAs], displays, cameras and batteries) rose steeply. The combined net exports of mobile phones + inputs in fact sharply worsened, from -$12.7 billion in 2016-17 to -$21.3 billion in 2022-23; thus “it is entirely possible that we have become more dependent on imports during the PLI scheme!” Even after providing for various other possibilities, the net figure of exports remains negative. Moreover, Rajan et al. point out that the PLI subsidies are expressed in terms of the final value of the phone, not on the value added in India. The manufacturing cost of an Apple iPhone 12Max is only one-third the value of the phone, value added at the stage of assembly is only 4 per cent of the manufacturing costs; that is, assembly would amount to only 1.33 per cent of the final value of the phone. Whereas PLI subsidies are initially 6 per cent of the value of the phone, falling by the end of five years to 4 per cent, of the value of the phone. Since only assembly appears to be taking place in India, the subsidies may well be larger than the value added.30 Moreover, state governments add to the PLI subsidies by providing tax incentives, power and subsidised land.

As we shall see later in this article, the western imperialist countries used their political influence to shut out rivals from the Indian telecom market, bearing out Lenin’s political-economic analysis.

Capture of the digital market
In October 2015, the Indian Prime Minister visited Silicon Valley in the U.S., home to Big Tech, where he received a rousing reception. As former Infosys chief financial officer, T.V. Mohandas Pai, rapturously explained:

Why was there this great interest in Mr. Modi in the Valley? Well, Americans, Indians, and techies saw in him a tech-savvy leader who was pro-business, decisive, articulate, charismatic and who exuded strength. They recognised that India was the last great, unconquered digital market after China and Prime Minister Modi’s Digital India project could empower 1.25 billion people in India digitally…. They all wanted a piece of the action. So, Microsoft, Facebook, Google and Apple, who want to own the whole world digitally, saw in Mr. Modi the answer to their dreams.31

India’s digital market is overwhelmingly captured, or, to adopt the term Michael Kwet uses in the context of South Africa,32 “colonised” by a handful of U.S. multinationals. Table 1 presents the shares of different U.S. firms in India’s digital market:

(much, much more at link. Table don't c&p worth a damn.)

https://mronline.org/2024/05/28/digital ... a-part-iv/

*******

Modi’s latest campaign message to supporters: ‘God has sent me’
By Rhea Mogul, CNN
Updated 1:46 AM EDT, Tue May 28, 2024


India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi addresses his supporters during an election campaign rally in Pushkar on April 6, 2024, ahead of the country's upcoming general elections. (Photo by HIMANSHU SHARMA / AFP) (Photo by HIMANSHU SHARMA/AFP via Getty Images)
Popular but polarizing: Hear what Indians say about Modi
04:20 - Source: CNN
—
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a new message for supporters on the campaign trail: God has chosen him.

“I’m convinced that God has sent me for a purpose, and when that purpose is finished, my work will be done,” he told local news channel NDTV in an interview last week. “This is why I have dedicated myself to God.”

Modi continued: “God doesn’t reveal his cards. He just keeps making me do things.”

Since assuming power in 2014, Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have promoted a strident brand of Hindu nationalism in a country where about 80% of the population are followers of the polytheistic faith.

And while he has used such language in the past, his message of being a leader chosen by God has become much more apparent as attempts to win a third consecutive five-year term in power.

Throughout India’s mammoth weeks-long national election, which declares results on June 4, Modi has given multiple media interviews and speeches that echo the comments made to NDTV.

He has taken on the persona of an openly devout Hindu, said Subir Sinha, Director of the South Asia Institute at SOAS University of London. This, he added has “rallied his base who feel pride in such religiosity.”

India is a deeply religious country. But historically its post-Independence leaders have remained publicly secular, in part to avoid being seen to pander to any one side in a nation with a long history of inter-religious violence.

“(He is) the first prime minister, they say, to be unashamed about this faith,” Sinha said.

When he first contested elections a decade ago, Modi chose India’s spiritual capital Varanasi as his constituency, making the ancient city the perfect backdrop to meld his religious and political ambitions.

“Mother Ganga has called me to Varanasi,” Modi said at the time, referring to the holy Ganges River, considered to be the body of the Hindu deity Ganga by many followers of the faith.

Standing on its banks earlier this month, Modi made another reference to his perceived divinity.

“Until my mother was alive, I had believed that perhaps my birth was a biological one,” Modi told CNN affiliate CNN News-18. “But after her death, when I look at my life experiences, I’m convinced that God has sent me here.”

God has, Modi said, made him “nothing but an instrument.”

Modi’s grandest display of divinity was on display in January this year, when he consecrated the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, a controversial Hindu temple that was built on the site of a destroyed mosque.

Billboards celebrating the temple’s opening featured an image of Hindu deity Ram alongside Modi’s face, with the leader of his BJP even dubbing the prime minister “The King of Gods.”

Modi fasted for 11 days in a purification ritual before the event and visited temples across the country, performing customs sacramental to India’s majority faith. He publicly called himself “an instrument” of Lord Ram, picked by the divine to “represent all the people of India.”

At the consecration, Modi presided over the “Pran Pratishtha” – the unveiling of the much-anticipated Ram idol – taking on a role typically reserved for priests.

During the election Modi has also sparked a row over hate speech when he accused Muslims – who have been part of India for centuries – of being “infiltrators,” and echoing a false conspiracy voiced by some Hindu nationalists that Muslims are displacing the country’s Hindu population by deliberately having large families.

It ignited widespread anger among Muslim leaders and opposition politicians and calls for election authorities to investigate. BJP party spokespeople subsequently said Modi was talking about undocumented migrants. The election commission has asked the BJP to respond to the allegations.

https://us.cnn.com/2024/05/28/india/ind ... index.html

Easy to see that the West, through it's media, is punishing the Indian government for not joining the anti Russo-Chinese alliance wholeheartedly. It's shooting fish in a barrel but you never heard this stuff until they got mad at Modi.
(amusing that a 'Mogul' would pen an anti-Modi piece.)

[blindpig]

How BJP masked its class agenda with false religious narrative
By Prabhat Patnaik (Posted Jun 03, 2024)

Originally published: NewsClick.in on June 2, 2024 (more by NewsClick.in) |

An object lesson in how fascistic outfits operate is provided by the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) attitude toward an inheritance tax. The fact that there has been an immense increase in income and wealth inequality in the country during the neoliberal era is well-known. Indeed, this is not a phenomenon confined to India alone; it is an international phenomenon which has been much discussed even in high-bourgeois circles for quite some time. At the World Economic Forum, for instance, the need for taking some countervailing measures has been repeatedly mentioned.

Even the world’s richest, in other words, recognise that unrestrained growth in wealth and income inequality poses a threat to the future of capitalism. It is this recognition that prompted several American billionaires some time ago to issue a statement suggesting that greater taxation should be imposed on themselves and on other wealthy people.

The Indian wealthy segment, at least in the contemporary epoch, however, is singularly devoid of any such foresight. It believes that supporting a fascistic outfit which can win elections by playing the religious-communal card, and then use extreme authoritarian measures to suppress any challenge to its dominance, will be enough to allow its share of wealth and income to increase ad infinitum.

There was a time when leading elements of the Indian bourgeoisie, like G D Birla, used to advise capitalists in the country not to flaunt their wealth; but that was a period when the fear of a popular backlash had haunted the bourgeoisie. That is no longer the case.

The leaders of the bourgeoisie today are no longer so haunted; they are confident that their alliance with the Hindutva elements will thwart any challenge to their dominance arising because of their inordinately large wealth-share. And the manner in which the Hindutva elements have dealt with the inheritance tax proposal, gives an inkling of why they are so confident.

The most obvious way in which an attack can be launched on wealth inequality is through a progressive wealth tax for financing expenditures that benefit the poor, via instituting a set of universal economic rights.

We estimated some time ago that it was eminently feasible to raise the resources needed for five such rights through a 2% wealth tax and a one-third inheritance tax on the top 1% of the population of India. Thomas Piketty and his associates, who have been writing for some time on the dangers of growing inequality, have also recently suggested a 2% wealth tax and a one-third inheritance tax, on all net wealth in India exceeding Rs 10 crore. The inclusion of an inheritance tax along with the wealth tax is significant: indeed, if a wealth tax is to have any impact by way of reducing wealth inequality, then it must be supplemented by an inheritance tax to prevent wealth from escaping the tax net.

This can be defended even on bourgeois theoretical grounds: inherited wealth cannot be claimed in anyway to have been “earned”, even by those who justify wealth on the grounds that it represents the fruits of “earning”. If the father’s wealth is justified on the grounds that he “earned” it, the son’s owning this wealth cannot possibly be justified on the same grounds.

Inherited wealth, in other words, is a pure windfall that accrues to a person by the sheer accident of his birth, and cannot be justified even by bourgeois theory. This is why most advanced capitalist countries have substantial inheritance taxes in the form of death duties. Japan, for instance, has an inheritance tax that goes up to 55%. But the shocking fact is that India has no inheritance tax whatsoever.

The absurdity of this situation was realised even by persons who are by no means Leftists or opposed to the neoliberal agenda. In fact, it is a non-resident techno-savvy Congressman, Sam Pitroda, who recently mooted the idea of having an inheritance tax; and the BJP leadership came down on him like a tonne of bricks.

The Indian super-rich obviously get frightened by this idea; and the BJP, as the defender of the super-rich, was expected to come to their rescue by attacking the idea. But it did so not on any of the several expected grounds, namely, that such a tax would be difficult to implement, or that it would destroy capitalists’ incentives, or that it would create an atmosphere where global finance will get frightened and be reluctant to come to India, making our balance of payments situation precarious. It attacked the idea on the entirely spurious and utterly communal-fascistic grounds that such a tax would take money away from the Hindus and hand it to the Muslims! It added, for good measure, in order to impart a dash of sentimentality to its nasty construction, that such a tax would take away the mangalsutras of Hindu women for benefiting the “infiltrators”!

A misinformation campaign on this scale must be quite unprecedented. An inheritance tax is obviously not imposed on the basis of religion; it is imposed on the magnitude of wealth that is inherited. The BJP’s suggestion that it will be imposed on religious grounds is astounding. But in case an impression got around that the BJP had just made a mistake and had decided to remain quiet about it afterward, it took steps to dispel any such impression. The Uttar Pradesh chief minister Adityanath, recently remarked that an inheritance tax would be akin to the jazia imposed by Aurangzeb, which was obviously a tax imposed on religious grounds.

Neither Prime Minister Narendra Modi nor Adityanath can be excused on the grounds that they are ignorant about what an inheritance tax means. Their sticking to this theme of Hindu wealth being taxed to benefit Muslims is a deliberate propagation of falsehood. And it shows quite clearly how the super-rich are being protected through a false religious narrative, that simultaneously fans hatred against a religious minority and against an opposition political party for allegedly appeasing this minority.

For the BJP, therefore, the tirade against an inheritance tax kills three birds with one stone: it promotes further hatred against this minority; it trashes the opposition political party; and it kills the idea of an inheritance tax and thereby protects the super-rich who are its main patron. And this feat is achieved by resorting to a nasty falsehood of the kind that communal-fascistic outfits habitually resort to.

This, however, raises another question. The premise underlying any democratic arrangement is that the people are capable of comprehending all issues in the public domain and taking informed and wise positions on each one of them. But, of course, in an exploitative society, where the people are deliberately kept ignorant, it becomes important that issues are discussed in public and explained to them.

The Marxist tradition explicitly theorises about it and assigns an important role to declassed intellectuals for bringing theory to the working people. But even many bourgeois writers recognise the importance, not of declassed intellectuals (for they do not cognise society in class terms), but of an educated and conscientious intelligentsia, for explicating issues before the people and thereby making democracy work.

The bourgeois economist John Maynard Keynes, for instance, had talked of the importance of the “educated bourgeoisie” for the functioning of a democracy. The task of the “educated bourgeoisie”, according to the Keynesian conception, would have been precisely to explain to people that an inheritance tax is not a tax imposed on the basis of religion.

The ascendancy of fascistic elements in the polity with their deliberately false narratives, therefore, is indicative according to this conception of a marginalisation of, or an abdication of responsibility by, the “educated bourgeoisie”.

No matter what reservations one may have about Keynes’ conception, the empirical phenomenon of a weakening or disappearance of the “educated bourgeoisie” is undeniable. The very fact that the BJP bigwigs can get away with presenting an inheritance tax as a religion-based tax, without the media making a noise about it, is indicative of this disappearance; indeed, the so-called “godi” media (or lap media) is a symptom of this disappearance.

The question is: why does this happen? The “educated bourgeoisie” is after all a segment of the bourgeoisie. It can play the role that Keynes thought it had to, only when it is clear in its own mind about the direction that a bourgeois society with a democratic polity should take. Its weakening as a democratic pillar, and hence its acquiescence in the fascistic project, is an indication of the severity of the dead-end that neoliberal capitalism has reached, a dead-end that Keynes could not have imagined and that presages major class struggles that Keynes had wanted capitalism to avoid.

https://mronline.org/2024/06/03/how-bjp ... narrative/#

[blindpig]

JUNE 7, 2024 BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
US engages a chastened Modi in office


Prime Minister Narendra Modi displays a letter from President Draupadi Murmu inviting him to form the next government, June 7, 2024
The US president Joe Biden has deputed his trouble shooter National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to travel to New Delhi no sooner than Prime Minister Narendra Modi forms his new government.

The White House said in a readout that Sullivan plans “to engage the new [Indian] government on shared U.S.-India priorities, including the trusted, strategic technology partnership.”

Of course, “strategic technology partnership” is a code word. Simply put, with the elections over and another term under Modi’s leadership assured, the integration of India into the Biden administration’s Asia-Pacific strategy will be accelerated where much has changed in the US’ favour in terms of the alignment of forces during the past six-month period with the Biden administration making significant inroads into the ASEAN and a new ecosystem of network and alliances overlapping and supplementing each other is being put in place to prepare for the unavoidable confrontation with China that lies ahead in which New Delhi under Modi’s leadership is an indispensable — and in many ways an irreplaceable — partner.

That said, it is predictable that Sullivan will keenly explore the positioning of New Delhi in the tumultuous developments lately in the confrontation between the US and Russia. He will take the pulse of the Indian ruling elite and estimate how much their fiery nationalist rhetoric is real, delusional or make-believe.

The stakes couldn’t be any higher. Only this week, Biden made an explosive remark ruling out a US missile attack on Moscow and the Kremlin and Russian President Vladimir Putin retorted that Russia too has an option to arm the actors elsewhere who are locked in mortal combat with the US and its allies.

Strongman politics has no place

Specifically, India has become a mainstay of the Russian economy due to its massive purchase of Russian oil. That is not in the US interests — although it helps keep oil prices “low”. India’s Bank of Baroda reported that the country’s imports of Russian oil soared tenfold in 2023. Russia has successfully weathered the EU embargo on Russian seaborne oil and the West’s price cap by rerouting most of its energy exports to Asia – particularly to India and China. According to the Russian Finance Ministry, income from energy exports between January and April soared by 50% compared to the same period in 2023.

Reuters reported that last month, India’s largest private corporation Reliance Industries and the Russian company Rosneft signed a one-year contract for monthly supplies of up to three million barrels of oil that will be paid for in rubles.

Sullivan will take a close look at this deal since cross-border settlements in local currency undercuts the West’s attempts to cut off Russia’s access to its financial system while promoting “de-dollarisation.” The US aims to use India as a “braking mechanism” within BRICS.

The recent parliamentary election has been a big setback for the ruling BJP and Modi personally. However, across the board, there is a sense of elation in the western commentaries, which estimate that the election has diminished Modi’s “stature as an elected strongman with a mission from God.”

An expert opinion at the influential Council for Foreign Relations in New York noted that Modi will be leading a “fragile coalition” and will be facing daunting economic and social issues that have no easy solution. Make no mistake, Sullivan will thoroughly explore how a weakened Modi can still serve US interests. It is not a mission that state secretary Antony Blinken can preform.

The Cfr commentary concluded that “Another challenge relates to India’s foreign relations. Modi and the BJP have massively traded on his reputation of popularity and his credentials as a devout Hindu nationalist with a new vision for India. Both of these have now received a setback… there is little doubt that Modi’s stature of invincibility as a leader of a rising power and a community of Global South nations with a large mandate has been diminished abroad.”

To be sure, Sullivan will look for all emergent opportunities to navigate US interests from a position of strength. The US traditionally abhors “strongman” politics, especially in the Global South. From such a perspective, Sullivan can be trusted to assess the advantages that may now be opening up for smart diplomacy.

Without doubt, India’s Russia ties will be listed somewhere at the top of his talking points. But there are other pressure points too, which the Biden administration had developed during the past several months, especially the Modi government’s alleged assassination plots in North America.

Even as the election results were heading the news cycle in India, Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, comprising members with top security clearances, unveiled a report alleging that “India has become the second-most significant foreign interference threat to Canada’s democratic institutions and processes, replacing Russia… These efforts include intervention in Canadian democratic systems and institutions, including targeting Canadian politicians, ethnic media, and the Indo-Canadian ethnocultural communities.”

Sullivan is just what the doctor would prescribe to correct abhorrent erratic behaviour by the US’ partners. There is no question that the US expects the Modi government to have a national security apparatus that is accessible, cooperative and transparent.

Return of the natural ally

Herein lies a paradox. For, at the end of the day, the election result may hold the potential to do good for the US-Indian working relationship. Consider the following.

The election is living proof that India remains a vibrant democracy and, therefore, has much in common with the liberal democratic world — something that the western media is unwilling to acknowledge. As an opinion piece in the Hill newspaper put it,

“The result of India’s latest elections is in some ways a reminder of how democracies can successfully apply self-correction mechanisms. In addition to concerns about over implementing BJP’s Hindutva ideology, which equates Indianness with Hinduism, some observers were worried about the prospect of authoritarianism in India.”

Secondly, in a curious way, the human rights situation in India may improve, democratic norms such as free press may revive and, most important, the anti-Muslim state policies may get mothballed under a coalition government that reverts to consensual politics for sheer survival and also faces a strong opposition in the parliament.

Indeed, despite Modi’s best efforts to debunk Rahul Gandhi, the latter is now a serious contender for power waiting in the wings — and Modi would know he is well-liked in the West as an erudite mind with a cosmopolitan outlook suffused with humanism and compassion for the dispossessed and marginalised millions of Indians.

All this restores the political balance in New Delhi after a decade, with the Congress in a position to insistently question the government’s policies and the ruling BJP obliged to be accountable. The BJP’s hubris has no place in the scheme of things ahead.

Equally, the reassertion of regional parties highlights India’s ethnic diversity. Thus, the rhetoric of ethno-nationalism though the past decade, which pitched India’s Hindu majority against the country’s Muslim minority and helped the BJP in the previous two general elections, cannot have a free run anymore with tacit state support.

Indeed, people’s primary concerns are about economic distress, and the limits of religious identity as a basis for voters’ choices have been reached. India cannot and will not be a Hindu Rashtra.

Suffice to say, a major concern of the western world — that India was lurching toward ethno-nationalism and falling victim to its attendant dangers of militancy and extremism and authoritarianism — is dissipating. This will help the US-Indian discourses to regain their elan.

In the final analysis, Biden’s decision to rush his hatchet man to New Delhi right at the birth of the new government only goes to show how much the US wants India to get back on track as its natural ally. As the saying goes, the early bird gets the worm.

For the Biden administration, Modi has been the most “pro-American” leader that India ever had and it has been a dream team on Raisina hill with the External Affairs portfolio held by S. Jaishankar who is trusted by the Americans and whose heart is in the right place when it comes to India’s strategic alignment to the US, all his grandstanding as the role model of an unvarnished nationalist notwithstanding.

To be sure, the US will do all that is possible and necessary to shore up the stability of another “Modi government.” It has been a decisive influencer in Indian politics and it will not hesitate to be proactive. And, above all, it has excellent rapport with the Sangh Parivar circles in the US, who are wired into the powers that be in India.

Biden’s hands-on role

Make no mistake that Biden will take a hands-on role in the relaunch of the US-Indian odyssey once his preoccupations over his own re-election bid gets over. Nikkei Asia, FT’s sister publication, has reported quoting Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House National Security Council, that Biden plans to attend the summit of the QUAD in New Delhi after the US presidential election in November.

“The preparatory work for … the [QUAD] leaders’ summit is well underway… And we are very confident that we will have really substantial deliverables that continue to build upon the QUAD’s mission,” she revealed.

In every respect, the signal that Sullivan’s visit will convey — not only to the Indian audience but also to the US’ adversaries in the epochal struggle looming ahead for the world order and the international system — is unmistakably that the Biden administration attaches the highest importance to forging a strong and enduring alliance with India.

To that end, Washington is willing to strengthen Modi’s hands in steering through choppy waters what seems a shaky coalition government setting out on an uncertain voyage — provided, of course, the Indian side also keeps its side of the bargain.

https://www.indianpunchline.com/us-enga ... in-office/

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‘Made in India’ Bomb Used in Nuseirat Massacre Lays Bare New Delhi’s Stance on Palestine
JUNE 7, 2024


Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu, left, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India. Photo: AFP.

A “Made in India” label was discovered on the remains of a bomb dropped by Israeli warplanes on a UN shelter in the besieged Gaza Strip.

It brought to light the involvement of Indian-made military equipment in the bombardment of Gaza.

A video that has gone viral depicts the aftermath of the attack. It shows the destruction of the building in Nuseirat earlier on Thursday.


Israeli aircraft conducted airstrikes on the UNRWA’s Sardi school in the Nuseirat refugee camp. The target was being used as a shelter for at least 6,000 displaced Palestinians.

The involvement of Indian arms manufacturers in Israel’s savage campaign raises significant concerns, providing additional evidence of India’s participation in human rights violations and war crimes in Gaza.

Official records in May showed India’s Munitions India Ltd. (MIL), a public sector enterprise under the Ministry of Defense, was granted permission to export weapons to Israel.

Similarly, Premier Explosives Ltd. (PEL), a private company based in the southern Indian state of Telangana, has been granted permission to export explosives and associated accessories to Israel on two separate occasions.

Collaboration between India’s business tycoon Gautam Adani’s Adani Defense and Aerospace and Israel’s Elbit Systems has delivered more than 20 Hermes 900 UAVs to Israel for military purposes from 2019 to 2023.

Additionally, India has maintained its position as the leading purchaser of Israeli arms, acquiring weaponry valued at $2.9 billion from the regime in the past ten years, coinciding with the ascent of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party to power.

Ever since Modi came to power in 2014, New Delhi and Tel Aviv have seen unprecedented highs in their relations.

https://orinocotribune.com/made-in-indi ... palestine/

[blindpig]

Indian Voters Restrain Narendra Modi
June 11, 2024

The ruling BJP has returned, writes Ullekh NP. But its survival hinges on parties that don’t share its enthusiasm for Hindu nationalism.


PM offers prayers at Sri Venkateswara Swamy Temple in Tirumala, Andhra Pradesh in November 2023. (Prime Minister’s Office of India, Wikiimedia Commons, GODL-India)

By Ullekh NP
Special to Consortium News

At the height of the mammoth, seven-phased general elections in India spread across six weeks, I came across many rural Indians who liberally used the word tanashaahi, Hindi for dictatorship.

They resented any prospect of an authoritarian rule, democracy in retreat, and indicated that they would vote against any formation seeking to establish an oppressive regime headed by someone excessively power-hungry, a man Plato would call the “beast” of human nature.

It was interesting to hear this concern coming from the common folk of the countryside, often from people who had voted for the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) five years earlier.

They saw its absolute rule as a cyanide pill to the country’s democratic health, proof that the rural Indian had an ear to the ground and had no sympathy in the long run for politicians sowing social divisions and curtailing democratic freedoms.

Their words contrasted with the announcements of learned pollsters on mass media who predicted a massive landslide for Narendra Modi and a near decimation of the opposition in the polls which saw more than 640 million voters cast their ballots, making it the world’s biggest democratic exercise.

A majority of the so-called exit poll projections, done on the last day of polling on June 1, turned out to be way off the mark. In sharp contrast to those forecasts, the BJP failed to get an absolute majority and requires the backing of its coalition partners to stay in power.

Modi’s BJP and the alliance it leads, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), had raised the rallying cry for 400-plus seats out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, or the lower House of Parliament, to which the elections were held. “Abki Baar 400 Paar” (“This time 400 plus”) was their favorite slogan.

The only time a single party won more than 400 seats was in 1984 in a sympathy wave following the assassination of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The ruling dispensation has been in a perpetual election mode since Modi came to power in 2014. Notwithstanding token anointments of a few people from disadvantaged groups, it has unabashedly followed a Hindu-first policy for the past decade.

This includes an apparent backing for mobs that targeted those who ate beef, crushing of dissent in universities, destruction of the autonomy of institutes and institutions, and online and offline witch-hunts against Leftist and liberal scholars.

Many BJP politicians also promoted Islamophobia and violence against minorities, passed policies discriminatory towards non-Hindus, and acted against those lowest in India’s caste hierarchy.


On the grounds of India’s Taj-ul-Masjid Mosque, 2018. (Abkshivhare, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0)

The outcome at the polls was so stark that it threw the BJP into jitters and embarrassed the pliant mainstream media.

Unlike the 2014 and 2019 elections when the BJP enjoyed an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha, meaning it could stay in power on its own, this time around it ran 32 seats short of the 272-mark to gain majority control of the House.

Smarting under an implicit defeat guised as victory, Modi regardless poked fun at the combined opposition on the evening of the announcement of the results on June 4, asserting that together they had fewer seats than the BJP.

But the message was clear to everyone: his party had vastly trailed exit poll results and his expectations of absolute power.

This result came about following a fiercely fought election that saw Modi himself making Islamophobic rants and accusing the Muslims of India of being “infiltrators” and those who “produce more children.”

Although he denied making those specific references later, fact-checkers called him out for such a semantic evasion. He also accused the main opposition Indian National Congress Party — commonly known as Congress — of bringing out a poll manifesto that he said resembled that of the Muslim League (ML).


Congress Party 2024 campaigning kicking off in January in Thoubal, Manipur, India. (Wikimedia Congress, Public Domain)

ML is one of the parties in the opposition I.N.D.I.A bloc, a rainbow coalition that includes Congress and various other parties that came together to fight the BJP’s authoritarian ways.

These parties forged such an alliance against an existential threat after the BJP began engineering splits in various opposition parties and unleashing central agencies against rival politicians to conduct raids on them. They also singled out opposition politicians for criminal investigations and had many of them arrested.

This was why, although the BJP is the single-largest party in Parliament and heads a coalition that has a majority, many have termed this election a loss for Modi but a win for democracy.

Political analyst Yogendra Yadav writes,

“This (2024 election) was the least free and fair national election in the history of independent India, where everything was stacked against the Opposition. Money, media, administrative machine, and what have you — the ruling party enjoyed an infinite advantage over the Opposition.

The Election Commission was blatantly partisan. And yet the people inflicted severe reversals on the ruling establishment. This is reminiscent of the popular mandate against the Congress in 1977, though even then Indira Gandhi had triumphed in the South.”


India’s Chief Election Commissioner Shri Rajiv Kumar during an event in New Delhi to announce the election schedule on March 16, 2024. (Election Commission of India, Wikimedia Commons, GODL-India)

The BJP’s strategy for the past many years has been to focus more on issues that fetched them instant gains in polls and quick acceptance in a polarised electorate rather than on setting things in order.

For instance, while the ruling party has never let go of an opportunity to drive a wedge along religious lines with its statements and actions, it has come under attack for not doing enough to address issues such as unemployment and higher cost of living.

A Lokniti-CSDS survey had shown that unemployment was the primary concern of 27 percent of 10,000 voters across 19 of India’s 28 states. Inflation was second at 23 percent, according to reports.

India’s wholesale price index-based inflation increased by 1.26 percent, year-on-year in April, as against 0.20 percent in February, according to data from the Office of the Economic Advisor, India.

Similarly, official numbers show that the unemployment rate in the country rose to 5.4 percent in 2022-23 from 4.9 percent in 2013-14. Reports quoting official data suggest that as many as 16 percent of urban youth in the age group of 15-29 years remained unemployed in 2022-23 owing to multiple reasons, ranging from poor skills to a lack of quality jobs.

Economists of the stature of Jean Dreze and others had warned about the stagnation of growth in real wages over the past nine years.

But Modi chose to place greater emphasis on temple construction, display of Hindutva credentials and relentless propaganda. His party, which prides itself in mastering the art of winning elections, hastened to project the polls as a presidential-style contest in which Modi was seen as unbeatable.

The Congress Party, which had won only 42 seats in 2014 and 52 in 2019 appeared weak in comparison with the BJP, which had won 282 and 303 respectively.

Placing temple-building at the center of governance gave rise to fears that any such Hindutva revivalism would strengthen India’s age-old and dreaded caste hierarchy.

Perhaps the BJP could learn a lesson or two from the reverses it incurred in parliamentary seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Scheduled Tribes (STs): of the 92 seats it lost this time compared with 2019, 29 were reserved for SCs and STs, a fall in support from these communities compared with the previous two general elections.

In the crucial state of Uttar Pradesh, which sends 80 members to the Lok Sabha, the BJP had anticipated winning almost all the seats. But it suffered a rout, shrinking to 33 seats this time, from 62 in 2019. Samajwadi Party (SP), the regional party that is vehemently anti-Hindutva, won 37 seats while the Congress Party won six of its 100 nationwide seats from Uttar Pradesh.


A Samajwadi Party supporter carries a bicycle – the symbol which adorns the socialist party’s flag, April 2009. (Al Jazeera English, Flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0)

The most embarrassing defeat for the BJP in Uttar Pradesh was in the seat of Faizabad, which represents the holy city of Ayodhya.

Modi had, earlier this year, played the role of the chief priest in the widely publicized consecration of a new temple dedicated to Lord Ram. The temple has been built on the site of a medieval-era mosque, which was demolished in 1992 by Hindu nationalists.

The incumbent BJP candidate from that constituency, Lallu Singh, had appealed to people during a poll campaign to give the BJP a two-thirds majority in Parliament so that they could write a new Constitution for India.

Not only did this suggest that the secular nature of the country would be amended, it was also perceived as a slight on one of the key architects of the Indian constitution, Dr. BR Ambedkar, who was a Dalit, previously known as “untouchable.”

Modi himself trailed his victory margins of 2014 and 2019 in Varanasi, considered by Hindus as the holiest of holy cities. His vote share fell by more than 9 percent, winning by a margin of 152,513 votes compared with 479,505 five years ago.

The election results, therefore, came as a rude shock to BJP, and as a check to Modi’s vaulting ambitions.

Worse, he is now reliant on allies, especially N Chandra Babu Naidu of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Nitish Kumar of Janata Dal (United). Both are veteran political players who can easily wear out anyone as unused to the pressures of coalition politics.

As of now, Modi’s days of unilateral decisions appear to be over.

https://consortiumnews.com/2024/06/11/i ... ndra-modi/

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Why Modi’s India is suddenly getting Washington’s cold shoulder

Finian Cunningham

June 15, 2024

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could be forgiven for thinking the United States has a schizoid view of his government and the world’s most populous country.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi could be forgiven for thinking the United States has a schizoid view of his government and the world’s most populous country.

Modi’s narrow re-election this month was greeted in the U.S. media with petulant satisfaction that Indian voters had “woken up”, as an oped piece in the New York Times put it.

The Washington Post’s editorial board rebuked Modi with the headline: “In India, the voters have spoken. They do not want autocracy.”

The Post editors went on to say that Modi “will lack a free hand for further repression of civil society, imprisonment of the opposition, infiltration and takeover of democratic institutions, and persecution of Muslims.”

That is quite a withering rap sheet for a political leader who not so long ago was given the VIP treatment in Washington.

Other U.S. media outlets also sounded smug that India’s legislative elections had returned a diminished majority for Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The “shock setback” for India’s strongman would mean that his Hindu nationalist politics would be restrained and he would have to govern during his third term with more moderation and compromise.

The American media’s contempt for the 73-year-old Indian leader is a dramatic turnaround from how he was lionized by the same media only a year ago.

Back in June 2023, Modi was feted by U.S. President Joe Biden with a privileged state dinner in the White House. The Indian premier was invited to address the Congress and the media were rhapsodic in their praise for his leadership.

Back then, the Washington Post’s editors recommended “toasting” Modi’s India, which Biden duly did at the White House reception. Raising a glass, Biden said: “We believe in the dignity of every citizen, and it is in America’s DNA, and I believe in India’s DNA that the whole world – the whole world has a stake in our success, both of us, and maintaining our democracies.” With trademark stumbling words, Biden added: “[This] makes us appealing partners and enables us to expand democratic institutions across, around the world.”

Modi may well wonder what happened over the past year. The Indian leader has gone from receiving the red carpet treatment to having the rug pulled from under his feet.

The difference is explained by the changing geopolitical calculation for Washington, which is not to its liking.

It is not that the Indian government under Modi has suddenly become a bad strongman who has taken to trashing democratic institutions and repressing minorities. Arguably, those tendencies have been associated with Modi since he first came to power in 2014.

The United States had long been critical of Modi’s Hindu nationalism. For more than a decade, Modi was persona non-grata in Washington. At one stage, he was even banned from entering the country owing to allegations that he was fanning sectarian violence against Muslims and Christians in India.

Washington’s view of Modi, however, began to warm up under the Trump administration because India was seen as a useful partner for the U.S. to counter China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific, a region which Washington renamed as the Indo-Pacific in part to inveigle India into its fold. To that end, the U.S. revived the Quad security alliance in 2017 with India, Japan and Australia.

The Biden administration continued the courting of India and Modi who was re-elected in 2019 for his second term.

Biden’s fawning over India culminated in the White House extravaganza for Modi last June when the U.S. media championed the “new heights” of U.S.-India relations. There were at the time residual complaints about India’s deteriorating democratic conditions under Modi, but such concerns were brushed aside by the sweep of media eulogizing, epitomized by Biden’s grandiloquent toasting of the U.S. and India as supposedly world-conquering democratic partners.

It was discernible though that all the American charm and indulgence was setting India up for an ulterior purpose.

In between the lines of effusive praise and celebration, the expected pay-off from India was that it would be a “bulwark” for U.S. interests against China and Russia.

As a piece in CNN at the time of Modi’s visit last year in Washington asked: “Will India deliver after lavish U.S. attention?”

The article noted with some prescience: “India and the U.S. may have different ambitions and visions for their ever-tightening relationship, and the possibility that Biden could end up being disappointed in the returns for his attention on Modi.”

The Indian leader certainly did receive some major sweeteners while in the U.S. Several significant military manufacturing deals were signed such as General Electric sharing top-secret technology for fighter jet engines.

Still, despite the zealous courting of New Delhi, over the following months, the Modi government appeared not to change its foreign policy dramatically to suit Washington’s bidding.

India has had long-held strained relations with China over border disputes and regional rivalry. Nevertheless, Modi has been careful not to antagonize Beijing. Notably, India did not participate in recent security drills in the Asia-Pacific along with the U.S. and other partners.

New Delhi has also maintained its strong support for the BRICS group that includes Russia, China, Brazil and other Global South nations advocating for a multipolar world not in hock to Western dominance.

This traditional policy of non-alignment by India is not what Washington wants. It seems that Modi did not heed the memo given during his splendid Washington visit. He rebuffed the American expectation of steering India towards U.S. geopolitical objectives of toeing a tougher line against China and Russia.

What seems to have intensified Washington’s exasperation with Modi is the worsening proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. After two and half years of conflict, President Vladimir Putin’s forces have gained a decisive upper hand over the NATO-backed Kiev regime. Hence, Biden and other NATO leaders have begun to desperately ramp up provocations against Moscow with recent permission for Ukraine to use Western long-range weapons to hit Russian territory.

When Modi visited Washington last June, the West was (unrealistically) confident that the Ukrainian counteroffensive underway at the time would prove to be a damaging blow to Russian forces. Western predictions of overcoming Russian lines have waned from the cruel reality that Russian weapons and superior troops numbers have decimated the Ukrainian side.

During Modi’s state trip last year, Washington’s focus was on getting India to act as a bulwark against China, not so much Russia. Modi has not delivered on either count, but the situation in Ukraine has cratered, from the NATO point of view.

Commenting on U.S. priorities last June, Richard Rossow of the Washington-based think-tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said: “If the invasion went worse for Ukraine, or was destabilizing the region, the Biden administration might have chosen to reduce the intensity of engagement with India. But the United States has found that nominal support to Ukraine, with allies and partners, has been sufficient to blunt the Russian offensive…” (How wrong was that assessment!)

Rossow continued his wrongheaded assessment: “Russia’s ineffective military campaign [in Ukraine] has also underscored the fact that China presents the only real state-led threat to global security, and the United States and India are steadily deepening their partnership bilaterally and through forums like the Quad to improve the likelihood of peace and tranquility in the region. So long as this strategic relationship continues to grow, it is unlikely that a U.S. administration will press India to take a hard line on Russia.”

Washington and its NATO allies have got their expectations about Russia losing the conflict in Ukraine all badly wrong. Russia is winning decisively as the Ukrainian regime stumbles towards collapse.

This is a double whammy for the Biden administration. China and Russia are stronger than ever, and India has given little in return for all the concessions it received from Washington.

From the American viewpoint, India’s Modi has not delivered in the way he was expected to by Washington despite the latter’s fawning and concessions. New Delhi has remained committed to the BRICS multipolar group, it has not antagonized China and it has not succumbed to U.S. pressure to condemn Russia. Far from condemning Moscow, India has increased its imports of Russian oil and gas.

Now with the U.S. and NATO’s reckless bet on Ukraine defeating Russia looking like a beaten docket, Washington’s disappointment with India is taking on an acrimonious tone.

In one year, Modi’s India has gone from a geopolitical darling to a target of U.S. recrimination over alleged human rights violations and democratic backsliding. It is not so much that political conditions in India have degraded any further. It is Washington’s geopolitical calculations that have been upended. Hence the chagrined and increasingly abrasive attitude towards New Delhi from its erstwhile American partner.

https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/ ... -shoulder/

[blindpig]

JUNE 28, 2024 BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
India-Iran makeover dovetails into Iran’s ties with Russia


Prime Minister Narendra Modi (R) and Iran’s president late Ibrahim Raisi at the BRICS Summit, Johannesburg, August 18, 2023

TEHRAN — There is enormous appreciation among Iranian intellectuals, diplomats and politicians regarding Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s stellar support for their country’s membership of the BRICS grouping. Modi played a key role to navigate Iran’s membership purposively at the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg last August.

The Russian President Vladimir Putin couldn’t be present at Johannesburg. But Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the summit in person, rubbishing the malicious rumours and canards to the contrary orchestrated by the western media. The Anglo-Saxon game plan was to somehow get Iran’s membership question deferred to an indefinite future.

The defining moment was a phone call from the Iranian President late Ibrahim Raisi to Modi in the week before the summit meeting. However, the ground for the last-minute flurry of diplomatic activity was prepared in the preceding weeks by the National Security Advisor Ajit Doval when he attended the meeting of BRICS national security advisors in Johannesburg in late July, just weeks prior to the summit to review security and economic cooperation.

Doval held separate “working meetings” with his Russian and Iranian counterparts — Nikolai Patrushev and Ali-Akbar Ahmadian respectively. The NSAs discussed Iran’s BRICS membership issue as a core vector of the Johannesburg summit.

Ahmadian and Doval’s talking points covered the whole spectrum of Iran-India relations and an ambitious agenda to deepen the ties across the board in fields ranging from transportation, energy and banking to counter-terrorism.

The two NSAs agreed that the Chabahar Port project, which is the anchor sheet of Modi’s hugely ambitious vision for India’s regional policies, stands to gain from Iran’s BRICS membership, even as the Moscow-led International North-South Transportation Corridor is steadily coming into operation.

Tehran visualises that in the downstream of Chabahar Port, Indian trade and industry can and should enter the hinterland in a big way via trade, investments and project exports. The Iranian side feels that Chabahar has the potential to elevate India’s partnership with Iran to an altogether higher strategic level.

Significantly, the makeover in India-Iran ties also dovetails into a paradigm shift under way in the two countries’ respective relations with Russia. Iran and Russia signed a memorandum this week in Tehran to turn Iran into “a regional gas hub.” Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller personally attended the signing ceremony, testifying to the highest importance the Kremlin attaches to the futuristic project.

The Russian intention is to enter the Iranian market in the northern Caspian region through Soviet era pipelines from the Caucasus and Central Asia and to participate in the development of the Iranian gas industry, the construction of gas pipelines, LNG projects and mining projects. Gazprom is interested in organising swap supplies to third countries and a number of LNG projects in the south of Iran are being considered, according to a report in Kommersant newspaper, for tapping the South Asian market.

Now, the big picture is not complete without factoring in that Moscow and Tehran are also in the cusp of a historic transformative breakthrough in their relationship with the Russia-Iran comprehensive cooperation treaty that has been under negotiation since 2022 ready for signature no sooner than the new government in Tehran settles down. Setting aside protocol, Putin had a telephone conversation on Wednesday with Iran’s Acting President Mohammad Mokhber — their second such conversation in the past fortnight. (here and here)

At any rate, Doval at his meeting with his Iranian counterpart at Johannesburg assured him that Iran’s accession to BRICS would expand the grouping’s economic and political capacities. Doval was quoted as saying that New Delhi would use “every means and opportunity at its disposal to facilitate Iran’s accession” to the BRICS grouping.

The Indian readout of the phone conversation between Modi and Raisi just four days before the Johannesburg summit highlighted that “The two leaders reiterated their commitment to further strengthen bilateral cooperation including to realise the full potential of Chabahar Port as a connectivity hub. The two leaders also discussed cooperation at multilateral forums including expansion of BRICS and looked forward to their meeting on the margins of forthcoming BRICS summit in South Africa.”

How far these positive impulses will be carried forward at Modi’s one-on-one discussions with Putin during his forthcoming two-day visit to Moscow on July 8 remains to be seen. Russia and Iran together own more than 60 percent of global gas reserves, and the expectation in Tehran is that the two countries’ energy deal in the making will facilitate the formation of “an energy balance in the region” — as Iran’s Oil Minister Javad Owji put it. Without doubt, Russia and Iran can be the most reliable suppliers of natural gas for the Indian market over the next several decades and strengthen India’s energy security through this century.

A holistic picture will be incomplete without casting an eye on the upcoming BRICS Summit as well. After all, Russia and Iran are under US sanctions. The crux of the matter is that the BRICS Summit in October in Kazan under Putin’s chairmanship will be focused on the creation of a new payment system for the member countries. Different variants are under consideration — the use of stablecoins (cryptocurrency tokens pegged to assets like gold), a platform to link the central banks’ digital currency systems, and the integration of national systems for financial messaging.

At a media briefing in Moscow on Thursday, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said BRICS countries are “actively and evenly pursuing initiatives” in all the 3 above-mentioned areas. Ryabkov said the political momentum is “crucial here,” and added, “Perhaps there won’t be any decisions (at the Kazan summit) that completely revolutionise everything, and that may not be necessary in such a sensitive area where gradual progress is often best. However, there will be tangible outcomes and I’m pleased that all member states, including those who recently joined on January 1 share our common understanding and vision of the steps needed to move forward.”

Modi had built a good rapport with Raisi who was due to visit India later this year. The importance of picking up the threads with Raisi’s successor cannot but be stressed. Perhaps, an early visit by Doval to Tehran is timely.

By the way, Afghan situation is also causing concern to Iran and Russia as there are growing signs of a consolidation of Islamic State-Khorasan in the northern regions of Afghanistan with the active support of the CIA. In response, Moscow intends to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations and strengthen cooperation in counter-terrorism with the authorities in Kabul.

https://www.indianpunchline.com/india-i ... th-russia/

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Interpreting Lavrov’s Latest Insight Into Indian Geopolitics

ANDREW KORYBKO
JUN 28, 2024



Lavrov was directly asked to share his opinion about the observation that “India is now leaning more towards the US”, which his interlocutor provocatively added is now even an opinion among some in Russia.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov shared some detailed insight into Indian geopolitics during Wednesday’s Primakov Readings, which is important to interpret considering the debate among some in the Alt-Media Community (AMC) over that country’s role in the global systemic transition. In the order of the points that he made on this subject, Russia’s top diplomat began by describing his predecessor Yevgeny Primakov’s Russia-India-China (RIC) troika as the ancestor of BRICS.

He then expressed confidence that India would do what’s needed to keep developing in the event that it’s ever sanctioned by the US like China presently is and unable to purchase that country’s technology. Lavrov then took a turn towards talking about India’s participation in the Quad by referencing that country’s insistence that its interests therein have nothing to do with military cooperation but nevertheless warning that the US still hopes to involve that group in such schemes against China.

Lavrov was directly asked later on to share his opinion about the observation that “India is now leaning more towards the US”, which his interlocutor provocatively added is now even an opinion among some in Russia. That was likely a reference to the pro-BRI policymaking faction that emerged over the past year, which believes that Russia should accelerate China’s superpower trajectory even at the expense of becoming its “junior partner” as revenge against the US for everything that happened since 2022.

They have a zero-sum view of International Relations since they’re convinced that a form of Sino-US bi-multipolarity is inevitable and accordingly suspect that India’s multi-alignment policy is just an excuse for disguising its tilt towards the US. Their “friendly rivals” are the balancing/pragmatic faction, who believe that it’s still possible to midwife complex multipolarity in partnership with India, which they consider to be a counterweight for preemptively averting potentially disproportionate dependence on China.

This background is crucial to keep in mind since it frames the insight that Lavrov shared in response. He started off by reminding everyone about how far back their strategic relations go and how strong they’ve become in the nearly eight decades since India’s independence. He then once again referenced RIC, but added that it hasn’t been able to meet in recent years due to India first requiring the resolution of its border dispute with China, which Lavrov said that “we (Russia) understand.”

The next thing that he said was that the US doesn’t want RIC to reassemble, thus hinting that those two should speedily resolve this impasse in order to not inadvertently advance America’s divide-and-rule interests. On that topic, Lavrov built upon his earlier warning about the US’ plans to explicitly state that “It is also clear that the United States is trying to drag India into the anti-China project. Everyone understands what we are talking about”, but then lauded India for defying US pressure to dump Russia.

Another important point that Lavrov made was to draw attention to how China and India are in relationships of complex interdependence with the Western model of globalization formed by the US, though he immediately clarified that they still understand the need for reforming this system. His remarks that were summarized in the preceding two paragraphs can be interpreted as candid acknowledgements of how serious the Sino-Indo dispute is and the impact it can have on multipolarity.

He pragmatically eschewed blaming either side, though his quip about how “we (Russia) understand” India’s position of not resuming RIC talks until the border dispute with China is resolved suggests a polite reaffirmation of Moscow’s consistent policy of always supporting Delhi’s claims over Beijing’s. This innuendo was then balanced out by warning about the US’ ulterior motives in some of its engagements with India, though without implying that India will ever be receptive to them.

Lavrov’s final comment about how his country’s fellow RIC partners are in relations of complex interdependence with the Western model of globalization was meant to convey that Russia understands the reason why India and China still engage in dialogue and trade with the US. The signal being sent is that his country’s supporters in the AMC shouldn’t recklessly speculate that either of those two have nefarious motives in maintaining those relations like some have done with respect to Indo-US ones.

India and China will keep putting their national interests first as their leaderships truly understand them to be when dealing with the US, and Russia’s trusted ties with each of them mean that its own leadership won’t question their intentions since it knows that they’re not directed against their country. Even so, Russia would prefer for those two to patch up their border dispute as soon as possible since it’s worried that the US will exploit it to divide-and-rule them, which could have serious implications for Eurasia.

That’s not to suggest that Russia fears the scenario of India ever becoming an American puppet, but just that it understands their independent convergence of interests vis-à-vis China, which is nowadays taking the form of them tacitly reopening the “Tibet Question” as explained here and here. This explains why it’s begun to promote a new Eurasian security system in order to ideally create the conditions for India and China to sustainably resolve their problems and correspondingly reduce the risk of another conflict.

Readers can learn more about these efforts here and here, which are beyond the scope of this analysis to detail, but are relevant when remembering that Prime Minister Modi is poised to visit Moscow next month so this might also end up on the agenda of his talks with President Putin. Altogether, the takeaway from Lavrov’s insight into Indian geopolitics is that Russia has a mature and nuanced understanding of its multi-alignment policy, and it trusts that India will always remain a reliable partner.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/interpre ... st-insight

[blindpig]

Why So Many Indians Rejected PM Modi: 2024 Election Was a ‘Revolt of the Farmers’
JULY 2, 2024



Economists Radhika Desai and Prabhat Patnaik analyze India’s 2024 general election and why Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s far-right Hindu-nationalist party BJP lost its majority. They discuss the state of the economy, rising unemployment and inequality, and Modi’s neoliberal model.



Transcript
Radhika Desai: Hello and welcome to the 29th Geopolitical Economy Hour, the show that examines the fast-changing political and geopolitical economy of our time. I’m Radhika Desai and working behind the scenes to bring you our show every fortnight are our host Ben Norton, our videographer Paul Graham, and our transcriber Zach Weisser.

The election results from India made the whole world sit up and take notice. Headlines used words like “stunning” and “shocked” to describe the result. No Indian election has elicited such worldwide attention. Modi and his BJP have thundered into the electoral arena with the slogan “Ab Ki Baar, Char So Paar”, which means “this time will go over 400”.

The National Democratic Alliance, the coalition that the BJP leads, was to win more than 400 seats in a Lok Sabha that has 545 seats. And the BJP itself was supposed to win 370 seats, which would have itself constituted the super majority of over two-thirds. The idea was to win a third term, and this would have bested or this would have equaled Nehru’s, the record of India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. And by achieving a super majority, it would have bested even his performance.

India’s mainstream media, which is in India called the “godi media”, which means the “lapdog media”, published opinion polls showing that the BJP would easily surpass even these hubristic goals.

However, some of us who knew, who had our ear to the electoral ground rather than our ear to the echo chamber in which the Modi cult seems to live, knew that the electorate could have delivered a very substantially different verdict. And on the last day of polling, a very well-known pollster and an activist, Yogendra Yadav, basically proposed that for Modi, anything below 300 seats would be a moral defeat. A tally below 272, which is the halfway mark in the Lok Sabha, would have been a political defeat. And anything below 250 seats would have been a personal defeat for Modi.

And by winning 240 seats, Modi suffered all three defeats. 240 seats were 63 fewer than its score of 303 seats in 2019, and below even its 2014 tally of 282.

To top it all, these reverses were suffered in an election that was fought on Modi’s persona alone. He was the sole face of the BJP on posters, in advertisements, in the media, as if only he was running for the party in all the seats, not the hundreds of BJP candidates.

Indian voters have cut Modi down to size. They have humbled him. They have stripped him of the aura of invincibility. And they have made him reliant on two allies who are known to be capricious, and also known to have opposed some of the most extreme elements of his agenda.

The principal reason for this humbling is the manner in which Modi has managed the economy in the last 10 years. We knew the economy would be decisive and devoted our last Geopolitical Economy Hour to it as well. And today, with the new government installed, with Modi trying to proceed as though nothing has happened, and a re-energized opposition doing everything possible to underline the reasons for this humbling, what we are going to do today is we are going to review how the economy determined the result, and then reflect on what the result means going forward for India, its economy, its politics, its foreign policy, and much else besides.

And with us to do this is a guest who could not be more qualified to do all of this with us. Professor Prabhat Patnaik is India’s leading critical and Marxist economist and commentator on all aspects of its politics as well. Welcome, Prabhat. It’s so wonderful to have you.

Prabhat Patnaik: Thank you, thank you.

Radhika Desai: So Prabhat, why don’t we start off by you just giving us a kind of synoptic view of how you assess the results overall and what it means for India in the near term future?

Prabhat Patnaik: Well, you are absolutely right that this time the elections were fought on economic questions that the BJP tried to project, Hindu supremacism as its main plank. And Modi’s election speeches were abysmal. They were really terrible. I mean, simply the low level at which he pitched these speeches, the anti-Muslim rhetoric was unbelievable.

But at the same time, the rebuff that Modi got is indicative of the economic questions which are currently agitating people.

The two main issues in terms of the economic questions are, of course, unemployment, which is now massive, particularly youth unemployment; and the rise in prices, particularly the rise in food prices.

Now, both of these, in a sense, are global phenomena. Their current state in India is reflective of a global crisis. I don’t think, you know, there’s a tendency in liberal circles to blame Modi for this. As a matter of fact, these are global phenomena. They have to do with the current state of neoliberal capitalism. And Modi is a very staunch votary of neoliberal capitalism.

So in that sense, really, it is a much more structural problem that is confronting the Indian economy, but a problem that particularly confronts the Indian economy because of the fact that Modi has no ideas other than simply pursuing neoliberalism as faithfully as he can.

But at the same time, I think one has to be clear that neoliberalism in India itself, or if you like the capitalist agenda in India itself, is fraught with a problem. You see, unlike in advanced countries, in India, you actually have almost half the population consisting of peasants and petty producers, by which I mean craftsmen, fishermen, you know, artisans, and so on.

Now, if you have half the population consisting of this, and any capitalist development is one that actually displaces this, actually brings hardships to this section of the population, then naturally they would revolt against it.

So, if you wish to combine capitalism with democracy in a state like India, in that case, you need something extra so that you can sell the capitalist development on some other criteria.

Now, Modi is useful for Indian big capital for this reason, because he brought in Hindu supremacism. You see, in India, you don’t have a Christian democratic party. You don’t have a Tory party. The only completely unambiguously pro-capitalist party is at the same time a Hindu supremacist party. Now, that is really indicative of the fact that promoting capitalism in a country like India is something that does not sell, I mean, within a democratic framework, unless it is the case that you actually camouflage it by something else like Hindu supremacism.

As a matter of fact, you know, in the past, there have been pro-capitalist parties like the Satantra party and so on, which really came across because, you know, they hardly got much votes. Now, that being the case, particularly the peasants and the petty producers have been very badly hit by neoliberal capitalism, particularly in the last 10 years, because of the Modi administration pursuing such a strategy unambiguously, unashamedly.

A couple of things he did. One was the demonetization of the currency. Again, it was a crazy idea. But on the other hand, demonetization of the currency is something which was not opposed to, on the contrary, is generally approved of by agencies like the World Bank and the IMF. So, demonetization of currency notes brought enormous hardships to particularly this segment of the population. They had to queue up for hours all through the nights in order to get their cash changed. Sometimes they just didn’t have enough cash to buy their inputs, they got indebted. And because they got indebted, they actually, you know, got into that cycle of debt, which made them more unviable. So, this segment.

Now, similarly, he introduced a goods and services tax. Now, the goods and services tax is again something which is part of the neoliberal agenda. But on the other hand, it is something that actually brings great hardships to the small producers. They don’t have these meticulous accountings and so on, because of which their costs go up. And they are not in a position to kind of meet deadlines in terms of filling in forms and so on. And as a result, they get squeezed by it.

Also, it means that a whole lot of sectors that earlier were not taxed at all, now had to be brought into the tax net. And these sectors were really sectors of artisan production and so on.

So, the Bodhi policy of blindly pursuing neoliberalism was hurting the peasantry and the petty producers very badly. In a sense, the unemployment crisis is particularly acute because theirs is the sector that generates maximum employment. And therefore, you find that, to me, the election results represent a revolt of the peasantry, a revolt of the peasants and petty producer class.

You look at the states where Modi has lost the maximum number of seats. One is Uttar Pradesh and the other is Maharashtra. In Maharashtra, everybody is agreed that actually the crash in onion prices was a very important factor behind Modi’s defeat or BJP’s defeat. And likewise, in Uttar Pradesh, there has been, you know, that Eastern Uttar Pradesh has suffered because the artisans of Eastern Uttar Pradesh have been very badly hurt by Modi’s economic policies, which are really neoliberal policies without an apology.

Now, likewise, Western Uttar Pradesh has been hurt because that is the area which was in the thick of the peasant agitation against these three infamous farm laws that tried to withdraw minimum support prices from a whole range of commodities where currently such prices are offered.

So, I would say that really the most significant aspect of it is that it’s a revolt of the peasantry and petty producers. And in that sense, Modi’s defeat also, in a sense, constitutes a defeat for the capitalist project in India.

I mean, obviously, it’s not as if the left has done well, the left has not. But the point is that, you know, it constitutes a setback for the capitalist project. In fact, you look at all the kind of, you know, the elite, the capitalists, you know, they are all great supporters of Modi, because they are the beneficiaries of neoliberal capitalism. But it’s the small producers, the peasants, the farmers, and so on, who really have put a spanner in the works. And so I think Modi’s defeat is really a setback for the capitalist project in India.

Radhika Desai: I think this is absolutely a critical point, the one that you’re making, because, if you think about it, the capitalist class are the ones that brought Modi to power. They essentially insisted back in 2012, 2013, that Modi should be the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, and he should do at the all India level what he had done in Gujarat, etc.

And you’re also absolutely right that Modi is pursuing a neoliberal policy, because contrary to what most people think, neoliberalism has never been about creating free markets or free competition; it has always been about giving more and more freedoms to the big capitalist classes, legislating entirely in their favor. And so, you know, what you’re saying is that, okay, the left has not done very well, but this election has shown the fundamental non-viability of capitalism. And Modi has really done that, because in a certain sense, we’ve had neoliberal government since the 1980s or 1990s, but this government has been so single-mindedly and relentlessly in favor of neoliberal legislating in favor of the capitalist class and doing them all sorts of favors.

Now that Modi is forced to rely on a coalition government, how much do you think this will matter? How much do you think that the coalition, his coalition partners will restrain him? And what do you think will be the capitalist class’s reaction? How will they react to this? How have they reacted to this election result? And what will now happen?

Prabhat Patnaik: You know, I do not see Modi doing, let us say, an Indira Gandhi in terms of pursuing policies which would bring some relief to the people. I don’t see him doing that, because I think he has no economic imagination. And he is really a corporate product.

I mean, you’re absolutely right that Modi’s rise to a dominant position in national politics was really, in a sense, a maneuver by the big capitalists. In fact, he was mooted as a prime ministerial candidate at a business summit that was held in Gujarat.

And what is more, he, if you like, constituted the bridge between big capital on the one hand and Hindu supremacism on the other.

Mind you, it was not an easy thing. In fact, even now, within the Hindutva fold, there are very many forces which were lying dormant, which are now speaking up, which really are not very much in favor of big capital. I mean, they represent, in a sense, rather similar to the tendencies in Nazi Germany that really took the Nazi rhetoric against big capital seriously.

But Modi is the person who really has brought about, he is the bridge between Hindutva on the one hand, the corporate-Hindutva alliance, which has been ruling India, the architect of that alliance is Modi.

Now, I don’t think the corporates themselves are going to do anything in order to bring about even some kind of a capitalism with a human face. On the contrary, whatever statements you come across, I mean, for instance, Arvind Panageria, who is a very senior economist of the government, says, “What’s wrong with inequality?” Because inequality, if you remember, was one of the issues which was being discussed by the opposition, throwing up the fact that in India, there has been an enormous increase in income and wealth inequality in the last few years.

Similarly, the other day, I saw that a person who belongs to the Prime Minister’s Advisory Council saying that, look, we have to rethink our positions, that inequality should be shunned.

So the point is, I do not see ideologically or in terms of Modi’s economic imagination the government pursuing an economic policy different from what they are doing now.

In fact, Modi himself, even though one of the measures, which actually accounts for a degree of support that he obtains from the poor, is giving five kilograms of food grains every month per head to about 800 million people. Now, that actually began during the pandemic. But that, instead of finishing at the time of the pandemic, was continued. Modi thought that he would actually, after the election, he is going to withdraw it.

But the point is that generally he has been criticizing any such transfers to the poor on the grounds that these are freebies that they take away from the money that could be given to the capitalists to incentivize them in order to undertake investments and so on.

So in a sense, his whole thinking is one that actually does not believe in providing relief to the people, certainly does not believe in sustaining or supporting or protecting the peasant agriculture or the petty production sector, as was the case in India for decades after independence.

The peasantry, as you know, was supported through a set of procurement prices, support prices, procurement operations and so on. Now that support is withdrawn for cash drops, Modi wanted to withdraw it from food crops. But on the other hand, he was not allowed to because of the agitation. So I don’t see any serious changes in the economic policies.

But then that raises the question, how is he going to manage to cope with this? I think, in fact, if anything, it might actually mean greater recourse to Hindu supremacism. Because, I’m not saying consciously, I’m not saying in terms of rhetoric, but if you have a communal riot somewhere, which is engineered locally, let us say, in that case, that would have a certain diversionary role.

So I see Modi pursuing with the old agenda that he was pursuing, by diverting people’s attention by all kinds of such kind of incidents and so on and so forth.

I mean, obviously, he would not explicitly say such a thing, because then he would lose the support of his allies, because the allies are on the whole secular people. And likewise, I think the attack on intellectuals is not going to be withdrawn or reduced in any way, as is clear, because Arundhati Roy has been targeted.

So I don’t see Modi actually withdrawing in any way. But he would, first of all, do it in a more quiet way. But secondly, he would actually continue with the whole Hindu supremacist agenda, because he can’t do anything about the capitalist agenda.

Radhika Desai: So do you think that there is any prospect that this government might fall? For example, if he pursues the policy that you are saying he is pursuing, then surely it is, I mean, can it be sustained? Will there not be, you know, the opposition is re-energized, as you rightly pointed out, his allies are secular. I mean, do you think there is any prospect of the government not finishing its term? And if so, what form do you think that might take?

Prabhat Patnaik: You know, there are two kinds of possibilities within this. One is the allies breaking away from the BJP. The other is rifts within the BJP. Now, I think the allies breaking away is likely to be less, perhaps, prominent than rifts within the BJP. Because, you know, within the BJP, Modi has been having a kind of power which no BJP leader earlier had ever enjoyed. Because, and already now you can see their criticisms by the RSS of the BJP, and so on. Because Modi also tried to lord over the RSS.

In other words, even while pursuing a Hindu supremacist agenda, he tried to do it on his own without necessarily consulting with the RSS or listening to them and so on. So I suspect if there is a threat to him, that threat is likely to come through an inner party revolt within the BJP, at least in the foreseeable future. Because, you see, even whether it’s Modi or Amit Shah and so on, who’s the Home Minister, they are not very senior people within the BJP. They were not senior people within the BJP. Amit Shah was handpicked by Modi, brought from Gujarat and made Home Minister of India.

So the point is that within the BJP, there would also be a certain amount of resentment against this Modi’s arrogance and so on. And I think there may be divisions. I don’t think these divisions would come out into the open in the form of splits and so on. But a quiet removal of Modi on the ground that he’s old, he’s past 75 and so on, is something which is not impossible.

Radhika Desai: So maybe, in a certain sense, let’s shift focus a little bit to the opposition. You know, this time, part of the reason why Modi suffered such a loss of majority and other forms of humiliation, I suppose, that he has suffered in terms of the electoral verdict is because of the way in which the INDIA coalition came together. The (Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance) INDIA coalition consisted of the Congress party, various regional parties, and of course, the left parties.

And so, and it seems as though, from my point of view, it seems as though the INDIA coalition did two or three things that were very, very good and important. Number one, Congress did not play the sort of big brother role and try to hog most of the seats. In fact, Congress contested the fewest seats ever in its history, allowing its allies to contest more seats.

Secondly, it seemed to have really taken on a fairly radical agenda, you know, putting issues of unemployment, inflation, caste census, all these things at the center of its agenda.

So can you sort of comment on these? I mean, how secure and permanent are these changes? Can we expect any, you know, what can we expect from the INDIA alliance going forward?



Prabhat Patnaik: You know, you’re absolutely right that the Congress really, or the INDIA coalition generally, has really placed a lot of emphasis on the economic agenda. And that being the case, the INDIA coalition, of course, now they’re not in power. But when they do come to power, the INDIA coalition would have to make up its mind again on this whole neoliberal capital agenda.

I mean, let’s be very clear that within the Congress, there is a very clear division between those who are committed to the neoliberal capitalist agenda, and those who would like at least to provide some relief to the people. They may not be people who are ideologically anti-neoliberal or something, they may not operate at the level of ideology, but they are people who would like, let us say, some wealth taxation to be imposed. And they would like some transfers to the people. They would like some support to the peasantry. They would like some law on minimum support prices. They would like that, you know, some protection as far as the petty production artisan sector is concerned and so on. So they are people who would like to, if you like, withdraw a little from the aggressive neoliberal agenda.

So I think within the Congress, there is a left and a right division. And let’s be very frank, I think the Gandhis within the Congress, they distinctly belong to the left. I mean, whatever, left or center, I don’t mean left. But they are people who are somewhat more sensitive to the mood of the ordinary citizen. And they would like, in Indira Gandhi fashion, to reach out some kind of transfers and benefits and so on to the people.

Now, I think this is a division. As you know, when the left withdrew support from the UPA (the United Progressive Alliance, which governed India from 2004 to 2014), the then prime minister actually said that he was relieved. That, you know, that he had been kept in check because of the support of the left. But now he can actually go ahead and do things as he liked.

And what is more, much of the crucial legislation, the most important being the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme, was introduced under UPA 1 through the pressure of the left. And that is something which really has played an extraordinary role in providing whatever little support and succor that the people get. And this was clear during the pandemic, because when thousands of people migrated back to their villages, they immediately enrolled themselves in the MGNREGS and got something by which to kind of, you know, get an income and live.

So the point is that, at the moment, fortunately, all these are under wraps. But of course, if the INDIA coalition, when it comes to power, not immediately, but over a period of time, would have to make up its mind where exactly it wishes to stand.

If it pursues neoliberal capitalism, in that case, it would simply be a precursor to Modi coming back, or precursor to some Modi-like figure coming back.

On the other hand, if it actually does a few things like imposing a wealth tax, having some kind of an agenda of providing relief to the people and so on, in that case, it would necessarily have to retreat somewhat from neoliberal regime, from the neoliberal policies. And in such a case, it would actually have a much longer duration.

Radhika Desai: So what would you say, I mean, realistically, a kind of a viable program that the Congress might pursue? You already mentioned that it should consist of some welfare measures, but what else might it have as a sort of, you know, not supremely ambitious, but a sort of minimum viable program that would take India forward in some way, particularly on the productive side of the economy? What can the Congress-led INDIA coalition do?

Prabhat Patnaik: You know, the main constraint, even on corporate investment now, is a shortage of demand. Therefore, it is extremely important to enlarge purchasing power in the economy in the hands of the people.

Now, the Modi government’s economic program, if anything, is to pursue neoliberal capitalism and whatever resources the government has to use those resources for infrastructure investment and infrastructure expenditures.

Now, infrastructure investment and expenditures have largely multiplied effects that leak out abroad, because a lot of these, you buy equipment from outside and so on, and therefore, its impact on the domestic level of demand is not very high. If the same amount of money could be spent, let us say, in handing over purchasing power to the people, in that case, it would create demands for commodities, and that demand for commodities would be not only for one or two crony capitalists, but would be for a large number of people who produce locally in the villages and so on in a dispersed manner. And that is, of course, much more employment generating.

So I would say that the multiplier effects of government expenditure that is in the form of welfare expenditures are likely to be much greater even in terms of employment generation than the kind of expenditures that Modi is doing at the moment, which is creating capital, which, if anything, is really state capital expenditures.

But in addition, if you enlarge government expenditures by raising wealth taxation and so on, wealth and inheritance taxation, in that case, you would be able to really bring about a substantial increase in employment.

I’ll give you one example. In every government department, there are huge numbers of jobs which are unfilled. You know, part of the reason you hear of these railway accidents taking place and so on is because people are just not employed to the extent that is required.

Likewise, I know that in terms of government teaching establishments, colleges and universities, innumerable vacancies exist.

Now, the point is, if these vacancies could be filled up, that would not only be a direct generation of employment, particularly education, educated employment, but particularly youth employment. But what is more, it will also have great multiplier effects.

So these are things that the government should actually be thinking in terms of doing. But I don’t think Modi is capable of doing it. But if INDIA comes to power, it should be doing it.

Radhika Desai: I always like to say that Modi has had throughout his 10 years what I call a one-point economic program, which is to essentially do whatever the corporate capitalist classes want.

And you emphasize that Modi has put a lot of emphasis in terms of government expenditure on infrastructure spending. And infrastructure spending is nothing but a big bonanza for big capitalists, because they, first of all, they get these big lucrative contracts, they can be cost overruns for which there is no accountability. As you say, they’re allowed to import whatever they want.

And of course, the effect of all this activity may be to create fantastic infrastructure for rich people, you know, with flyovers and bridges and roads and what have you. And very little really that comes out for ordinary people. So that’s absolutely right.

But so you, and I also agree with you that, of course, given that the demand constraint is there, you know, relieving that, putting more money in the pockets of ordinary people will have a very stimulative effect on the Indian economy.

But do you not feel that there are any other elements, for example, some measure of planning, some measure of, for example, Modi had his so-called Make in India program, which was supposed to make manufacturing 25% of the economy. In fact, manufacturing shrank as a proportion of GDP under Modi. So don’t you think some kind of a project of manufacturing and, of course, also agricultural revival will be necessary?

Prabhat Patnaik: All of that I agree. I mean, of course, that is over a medium term, that’s over a longer term. In India at the moment, it’s not as if we have a shortage of food grains, food prices are rising, not because of a shortage of food grains. It’s true that you know, I mean, at this very moment, there may be a shortage of wheat and so on. But that’s because the harvest has not come in. And it’s true that suppose you have a poor harvest, then you may meet it.

But it’s not as if in India there is, as it were in secular sense, we are a food grain constraint economy. Now, we are not a food grain constraint economy, not because of the fact that people are eating well, but precisely because of the fact that the limitations of the purchasing power.

So if you like, the proximate constraint on the people, I mean, on the economy is really from the demand side. Of course, the moment demand-side constraints are looked after, then they’re going to hit against supply bottlenecks, the inflation will rise. And that’s when you actually have to prepare for overcoming the supply bottlenecks. And that’s when you’d also have to have a larger amount of food grains output and so on.

The government itself has to resume its role of carrying out research and development, which it was doing in agriculture earlier. Now, virtually, the only agencies which are entrusted with this are the international agribusiness.

Now, the substitution of the state, of the Indian state by international agribusiness is something which is absurd because of the fact that it also, quite apart from anything else, hurts the farmers, because they have to pay much more.

So the point is, you’re absolutely right that all these have to be done. They have to be done sequentially. So what I was really talking about is what is the immediate thing that you can do?

Radhika Desai: Yeah, very important. And I think you put it really well. The whole issue of sequencing is, I think, very well put there.

I want to shift slightly again the focus. You know, one of the things that happened during the election campaign is that Rahul Gandhi particularly, but other leaders as well, took to waving copies of the constitution around, saying the constitution is in danger and so on.

So would you comment on that? I mean, what has happened in the 10 years of Modi? What can we expect in the future, you know, to the constitution?

And particularly the issue of federalism is very important, not only because, you know, India is such a big and diverse country and so on, but I would say it’s also because the opposition to Modi, you know, of course, there is the Congress, there are left parties, but the third big component of the opposition to Modi has come from the regional parties, what are called the regional parties, but they’re really parties that were originally devised to take control of state power, exercise power in various states. So if you can comment on all those aspects a little bit, please.

Prabhat Patnaik: Yes, I think there are certainly, I mean, there are at least two major areas in which the constitution is being violated.

One, as you say, quite rightly, is, of course, in the center-state relation, the whole question of federalism, where the violation to start with, took a bizarre form when a goods and services tax was introduced in lieu of the sales tax.

Now, the sales tax is something which was written into the constitution. Most state governments obtain at least 80% of their revenue from sales tax. It was the tax in the hands of the state government and they had freedom about where to tax, how much to tax, what kind of rates to impose and so on.

Now, the point is that the substitution of sales tax by a GST, basically, and a GST in which no individual state has the freedom to levy a tax that it likes, because the GST has to be agreed to by the GST council, the whole idea is to have a uniform tax across the country.

Now, that’s absurd. You look at the United States, from one shop to another, the price of a commodity differs. So, it’s a bogus idea that the national market would be better served if you had only one kind of common tax rate and so on. But again, it’s a demand of neoliberalism. The World Bank and so on insist upon it.

So, the point is that that, however, really crippled the state finances. And today, state after state is suffering from it, because of the fact that they just do not have the freedom to levy whatever taxes that they were doing before.

Now, of course, it is true that in India, structurally, the states never have had enough resources to look after their expenditure needs. But what is more, even the resources they had are now being denied to them. And what is more, they also do not have the freedom to raise resources. That is completely out.

The other area, in fact, I have been thinking, I mean, I don’t know, I’d like to talk to some lawyers and so on, whether individual states should not even consider opting out of this GST arrangement. You know, I think that is something which at least can be thought about, can be considered.

Radhika Desai: Well, and I think just on that point, I think that is a very important point to pursue because, of course, one of the things we will see in the coming years is that now that the INDIA Alliance has done as well as it has, we will see perhaps more state governments being elected, which will not be BJP governments, which will be of one or the other type of INDIA Alliance government, and they may very well want to pursue this option.

Prabhat Patnaik: Absolutely. You know, even when the GST was introduced, there was one suggestion made by many people that have an agreed base GST and leave it to the states to top it up by having different rates of taxes, you know. So you could move to such an arrangement, some such arrangement you’d have to move to in order to, I mean, quite apart from the Finance Commission and so on, you know, the division of resources within central states. Quite some such arrangement would have to be resorted to in order to give states some kind of leeway so that they can, if some states want to raise more taxes to kind of finance health care, fine, it should be allowed to do that.

Now, the other area where the constitution has been totally trampled upon is, in fact, in the realm of personal individual freedom, political freedom, and so on, journalistic freedom, etc.

Now, the amendment which Modi brought in to, I mean, to start with the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act was a terrible act to start with. The left had opposed it when it was introduced. But on the other hand, Modi’s amendment to it, which came during his tenure, where any individual, whether or not that individual is linked to any terrorist organization, can be declared a terrorist, is just shocking.

Because under the UAPA, you are really speaking not even allowed to get bail. So, literally, the government can pick up anybody, call him a terrorist, put him in jail without trial. Even charges don’t have to be kind of brought to the accused. Even if some charges are brought because there’s some time limit, in that case, those charges can be subsequently added to and so on and so forth. So, final charges are not even brought to the accused. And what is more, the accused is not even tried.

There are people who have been jailed for years and years without trial. And I think that is just shocking. That is just shocking. And that’s a complete violation of the constitutional rights of the individual. And I think something has to be done about that. Today, I find in the papers that someone has suggested that they free all political prisoners. Anyway, but I think such demands have to be raised.

Radhika Desai: Well, you know, the BJP is trying to make a great deal of the fact that this is, I mean, they have somehow brought the 50th anniversary of the emergency forward by a year and they’ve been talking about it. And I think the opposition has quite rightly said that, you know, you may use the ‘75 to ‘77 emergency as a stick with which to beat Congress, but you have had an undeclared emergency for the last 10 years. And I think they are absolutely right, because it’s like this. I mean, how would you compare the two, do you think?

Prabhat Patnaik: In fact, at the moment, what Modi has added is much worse than the emergency, because on the one hand, in terms of attack on personal freedoms and so on, it is like the emergency. But the emergency was not something which meant a class attack on workers and peasants. It is not something which actually violated secular foundation of the Indian constitution and so on. So this is much more a kind of fascistic attack on the constitution rather than simply an authoritarian attack. I mean, I’d like to distinguish between the two.

Radhika Desai: Yeah, I mean, that’s that’s quite interesting. And in fact, that was another question I really wanted to ask you. I mean, both you and I have used the term fascism to describe Modi’s government. So, you know, can you elaborate a little bit more on that? I mean, in what way do you consider this government a fascist government?

And also, how do you see this evolving? Because I know you’ve written somewhere that in the classical instances of fascism in the interwar period in Europe, of course, fascism ended in war. And so, well, will Modi lead us to a war? If not, how would you expect fascism to unfold from here on?

Prabhat Patnaik: You know, that is why, I mean, I don’t see Modi leading us to a war or anything. I’d like to draw a distinction between the interwar period fascism, which I’ve called classical fascism, and the current fascism, which is neofascism, because the current fascism is not confined to India. There are large numbers of countries all over the world, Argentina being the latest addition to it, where you actually have neofascist governments. I’ll come to exactly where the distinction between the two is in a moment.

But the point is that, you know, that in terms of all the features that classical fascism had, you actually find it in neofascism.

Firstly, very close relationship between a few monopoly groups on the one hand and between monopoly capital and the fascist elements in what (Michał) Kalecki had called classical fascism a partnership between big business and the fascist upstarts. Now, that’s exactly what you have here.

Corporate Hindutva alliance, within the corporate sector, within monopoly capital, a particularly small group of favored monopoly capitalists. You know, in Japan, you had the Shinko Zaibatsu, not just Zaibatsu. Similarly, as you know, Daniel Jarre has written about fascism and big business in his book. He talks about behind Hitler being a whole range of new monopoly houses, not the old ones with, I mean, the old ones supported him, but not the old ones in textiles and so on, but the new ones in producer goods, armaments and so on. So there is always a new group of fascism, a new group of monopoly houses that actually support the fascist particularly strongly.

Generally, the location of the other, which is, of course, a minority group, linguistic or religious and so on, against which a hatred is generated that we know is common to both. You, of course, have a suppression by an authoritarian state, but the suppression of the authoritarian state is supplemented by vigilantism by street thugs that you find in India. I mean, the ABVP is going around terrorizing everybody, terrorizing in university, terrorizing students and so on. So an acute personality cult, I mean, really an obnoxious personality cult.

So all these are really common between classical fascism and neo-fascism. What is different is the fact that the same reason for which liberal bourgeois governments cannot overcome the current neoliberal crisis, the same constraints also apply to fascist governments. That’s because of the fact that to overcome the crisis, if you need to have larger government expenditure, which is what Keynes had suggested, which is what the New Deal had introduced, though pretty soon it was withdrawn, then this additional government expenditure has to be taxed either by taxing the capitalists or it has not to be taxed at all. It is simply to be financed by a fiscal deficit.

But if you spend a hundred dollars and you raise the hundred dollars by taxing working people, then there’s hardly any net addition to demand because they use the bulk of the hundred dollars for their own consumption anyway. So you may have a reduction in their consumption and rise in government expenditure, but no net increase in demand.

But both these ways of financing government expenditures, namely either through a fiscal deficit or taxing the rich, are ways that finance capital does not like. And at the moment, since finance capital is international, globalized, while the state remains a nation-state, which was not the case in the 1930s, you have the incapacity of the nation-state to go against the wishes of finance capital.

You remember, even when Biden talked about a corporate minimum, a minimum corporate tax, they couldn’t agree. I mean, he wanted 25 percent, but ultimately they settled on 15 percent, which is lower than the prevailing corporate tax rates in most countries. So the idea of, you know, taxing the corporates or the rich generally, or fiscal deficit, most countries now have fiscal responsibility legislation, this idea is out. Therefore, the government can do very little, even the fascist government can do, neo-fascist government can do very little in terms of overcoming the crisis.

Now, that’s a big difference between classical fascism and now. Classical fascism overcame the Great Depression through military expenditure, and of course, military expenditure led on to the war. But now you have the continuation of the crisis. But of course, that would not lead us to war. On the contrary, that would basically mean that in this continuation of crisis, as I said, unless the anti-fascist element, the India bloc, for instance, actually pursues some economic agenda that withdraws somewhat from neoliberalism, Modi will make a comeback, or a Modi-like figure will make a comeback.

Radhika Desai: I mean, in a certain sense, Prabhat, what you’re saying is that unless, at least, I mean, supposing the India bloc were to defeat Modi in the next election, unless the India bloc at least begins to set India on a path that goes away from capitalism, we may have this sort of scenario once again. And I presume that that means ultimately that you have to be very clear that the big corporate capitalist class do not get to determine the agenda of the state. Rather, the state requires, the state regulates, and in a certain sense, regulates taxes and in various other ways, determines, assigns a role to big capital if it is allowed to continue to exist, which I think it probably would be for at least some time. So that’s really fascinating.

And maybe we should probably also wind down our conversation as we are coming close to an hour. But maybe my last question to you would be, you know, you mentioned that, you know, today, today, capital is global and so on. Speaking of sort of foreign capital and so on, can you say a little bit about the role of foreign capital in India under Modi, and then also about Modi’s foreign policy in relation to this, particularly given that, you know, we know that Western countries, in particular, the United States, have been very eager that India should play a role as a sort of Western allied counterweight to China, etc. And, and of course, we also know that Modi would dearly love to fulfill this, this wish of the West. So yeah, I mean, what have we seen in terms of foreign policy and foreign capital under Modi? And what do you expect going forward?

Prabhat Patnaik: No, I think Modi has certainly taken India closer to the West than it had ever been in the past. But I don’t think Modi has been able to shake off completely India’s links with the old non-aligned movement and so on.

On every issue, for instance, you look at, you look at Palestine, you know, India talks about, not only talks about two state solution, but India actually voted for Palestine becoming a member of the United Nations, which was vetoed by the US. Mind you, so did France vote for it. But on the other hand, the other Western, major Western countries abstained, but India actually voted for it.

Similarly, on Ukraine, I think the kind of close relations that India has traditionally had with earlier the Soviet Union, and now Russia, has meant that it has not been a part of the Western bloc or the Western alliance. So in that sense, Modi is playing a certain role.

But on the other hand, this also implies that India’s stock in the non-aligned movement has gone down greatly, that India is no longer as respected as a leader of the G77 and so on, as it earlier was. So it’s falling peculiarly between two stools. I mean, on the one hand, the G77 is something which is no longer looking at India with the same kind of respect as before. On the other hand, the G7 doesn’t really think of India very much as a part of their bloc, so that, you know, India is falling between the stools.

I think Modi left to himself would probably like to join the Western alliance. But obviously, I think the objective situations, compulsions, the economic compulsions and historical compulsions, including, of course, the defense arrangements we have had with the Soviet Union earlier and Russia now, all compel him to take a certain position, quite apart from the fact that India is benefiting greatly from the sanctions against Russia, because we import Russian kind of oil and gas and we export it to Europe. So in that sense, and India is doing very well, in fact, some of the favored monopoly houses have been really profiting greatly from this.

Radhika Desai: Yeah, no.

Prabhat Patnaik: So I do not see an immediate change as far as that is concerned.

Radhika Desai: Yeah, I mean, there’s been a lot more continuity, I suppose, in foreign policy, as you say, because of the constraints and also precisely the constraints that in a sense have been further intensified by Modi, given his the way in which he has essentially crashed the economy, really, if you think about it. So yeah. So Prabhat, that was really a fantastic conversation. Thank you so much. I think I’m sure that everybody will really appreciate the deep understanding that you’ve brought into this conversation. And we hope that you’ll come back and discuss some other issues with us as well sometime in the future. Thanks very much.

Prabhat Patnaik: Certainly, Radhika. It’s a pleasure talking to you. Thank you very much. Thanks. Goodbye. Yeah.

Radhika Desai: Bye-bye.

(Geopolitical Economy) by Radhika Desai

https://orinocotribune.com/why-so-many- ... e-farmers/

[blindpig]

Modi’s Trip To Moscow Was Much More Important Than Most Observers Realize

ANDREW KORYBKO
JUL 10, 2024



The most spectacular achievement from Modi’s trip to Russia wasn’t whatever they formally agreed to, but him and Putin informally agreeing to redouble their joint efforts to accelerate tri-multipolarity processes.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi just completed his first trip to Russia in half a decade and put an end to the several-year-long hiatus in annual meetings between their leaders. The outcome was nine agreements on a wide range of subjects along with a detailed joint statement for guiding their special and privileged strategic partnership to 2030. There were no landmark deals, but nor should any have been expected, since the meeting was only planned recently for the reasons that’ll now be explained.

“Modi’s Trip To Moscow Was Meant To Assess The Reliability Of Russia’s Geopolitical Balancing Act” after his hosts sent eight signals since the start of the year hinting at an impending pro-Chinese pivot, which the reader can learn more about by reviewing the preceding hyperlinked analysis. The indisputable personal rapport between him and Putin during their two days together put an end to concerns about Russia preparing to privilege China over India and thus breathed new life into tri-multipolar processes.

This concept refers to the paradigm of dividing the world into three internally diverse groups: the US-led West’s Golden Billion; the Sino-Russo Entente; and the informally Indian-led Global South. These three groups became more prominent after the global systemic transition was unprecedentedly accelerated by Russia’s special operation, though they predate that development. Prior to then, however, International Relations could best be described as being in a state of Sino-US bi-multipolarity.

What’s meant by this is that everything was trending towards an unofficial division of the world between China and the US where everyone was pressured to some extent to take one or the other’s side. A return to the pure bipolarity that marked most of the Old Cold War till the Sino-US rapprochement was always unlikely because there were already some strategically autonomous emerging players. Likewise, despite the US, China, and India being the informal leaders of their groups, none have full control over them.

Therefore, this present tripolar system can best be described as tri-multipolar, with the key axis being the Russo-Indo Strategic Partnership since it prevents the American and Chinese superpowers from coming together to revive bi-multipolarity in the event of a New Détente between them. Russia’s perceptible shift towards China since the start of the year, which was detailed in an earlier analysis, caused serious concern in India because it suggested that Moscow was abandoning their shared grand strategic goal.

Before those eight signals were sent, India assumed that Russia would continue cooperating with it to accelerate tri-multipolar processes with a view towards midwifing complex multipolarity, which required neither Russia nor India pivoting towards China or the US respectively. What changed over the past year was the emergence of a pro-BRI policymaking faction in Moscow whose members concluded that Sino-US bi-multipolarity is inevitable so it’s best for Russia to turbocharge China’s superpower trajectory.

The ruling establishment’s balancing/pragmatic faction had a tough time fending off their “friendly rivals”, the latter of whom compellingly argued that their envisaged policies would represent the sweetest revenge against the US after all that their adversary did to Russia since 2022. This explains the signals that Russia sent since the start of the year hinting at an impending pro-Chinese pivot, which finally prompted India to dispatch Modi to Russia to investigate what’s really going on and why.

He considered this to be such a priority for his country’s objective national interests that he broke with tradition by traveling to Russia as the first trip of his third term instead of to a nearby country like usual. The timing also coincided with the annual NATO Summit, thus showing that India is strategically autonomous of the West and impervious to its pressure to curtail ties with Russia. The official US criticism that followed only served to reinforce the aforementioned points.

Russia is always happy to host Modi, even more so than usual due to the timing that was described above as well as the fact that it was his first visit to the country in half a decade, which is why such pomp and circumstance were prepared for him. His three-hour-long informal meeting with Putin at the latter’s dacha was presumably when those two friends candidly discussed the most sensitive aspects of their countries’ strategic partnership and clarified the confusion caused by Russia’s recent pro-Chinese signals.

They clearly worked everything out as proven by their exuberant mood during those informal talks and the official ones the day after. Putin even awarded Modi Russia’s highest civilian honor, the Order of St. Andrew the Apostle, thus showing his country’s pro-BRI faction that he doesn’t approve of their plans to pivot to China. Instead, Russia will continue to pragmatically balance between China and India, thus reaffirming its tri-multipolar grand strategy and putting an end to bi-multipolar speculation.

To be sure, the pro-BRI faction isn’t going away and will continue to make their case that Russia’s best interests are served by acknowledging the supposedly inevitable reversion to Sino-US bi-multipolarity and accordingly turbocharging China’s superpower trajectory, but few in Moscow will listen to them. The most spectacular achievement from Modi’s trip to Russia wasn’t whatever they formally agreed to, but him and Putin informally agreeing to redouble their joint efforts to accelerate tri-multipolarity processes.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/modis-tr ... -much-more

(Silly awards cost nothing but appease the credulous. Material relations come first with the pragmatic, which Putin has become much more so after the reality of the West's unremitting hostile intent finally dispelled his delusion of Russia joining 'the Club'.)

India Has A Role To Play In The Emerging Non-Western Peace Process On Ukraine

ANDREW KORYBKO
JUL 10, 2024



India would do well by preparing another Voice of Global South Summit for later this month, which could counteract the perception that China dominates the emerging non-Western peace process and result in India playing a key role within it.

The predictable failure of the Swiss talks on Ukraine to resolve that country’s conflict presented China with an opportunity to lead an emerging Brazilian-fronted process based on their six-point consensus from late May for assembling a more workable framework ahead of November’s G20 Summit in Rio. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban just endorsed those points, and his shuttle diplomacy over the past week raises hopes that more countries will jump on board. Here are some background briefings:

* 4 June: “Non-Western Peace Processes For Ukraine”

* 20 June: “Switzerland Said That The Next Talks On Ukraine Will Be Much More Different Than The Last”

* 6 July: “Orban’s Mediation Mission In Moscow Could Set The Stage For Peace Talks By November’s G20”

* 7 July: “Orban Shared Some Detailed Insight Into His Mediation Efforts”

* 8 July: “Russia Is Unlikely To Heed China’s Latest Call For A Prompt Ceasefire”

It was within this context that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said during his visit to Moscow that his country is “ready to make any contribution” to ending the conflict. While it might seem like China and Brazil have already squeezed India out of this process, that’s actually not the case at all when remembering that India is the Voice of the Global South after hosting two such events during its G20 Chairmanship. It can therefore easily organize at least another online one about Ukraine if it wants to.

That would be in Delhi’s interests to do so since having as many fellow developing countries on the same page as possible ahead of any potentially Chinese-organized but Brazilian-fronted talks (whether before and/or during the G20) would ensure that India has a leading say in them. Although Sino-Indo ties remain tense over their unresolved border dispute, China’s Brazilian frontman is unlikely to snub India by not inviting it to any talks that it hosts since they’re both BRICS members, after all.

Accordingly, India would do well by preparing another Voice of Global South Summit for later this month (ideally in person but it could also be partially or only online depending on the attendees’ schedules), which could counteract the perception that China dominates the emerging non-Western peace process. By gathering as many Global South countries together in advance of whatever Brazil might soon host with China’s support, India can show the world that its opinion on this subject seriously matters.

Through these means, it’s possible that Ukraine and the West might agree to rely on India for mediating between Kiev and Moscow after Zelensky just said that this role can’t fall on Orban. In his words, “Only serious, strong alliances can act as go-betweens. Are there many such countries in the world? A few. I think the US is one. I think China, and the EU. Not just one country, but the entire European Union.” He didn’t mention it, but India is one such strong country, though he’s currently very upset at it.

Modi’s visit to Moscow incensed Zelensky, but at the end of the day, India is arguably the most agreeable country to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. The US can’t play that role, it doesn’t want to China to, and the EU is furious at Orban’s shuttle diplomacy, so India naturally emerges as the so-called “compromise candidate” who Russia, the US, the EU, and Ukraine could prospectively all agree upon. Zelensky himself even said last month that a mediator can help end the conflict so it’s not far-fetched.

For there to be any realistic chance of that happening, India must urgently organize another Voice of Global South event focused exclusively on this conflict in order to beat the Sino-Brazilian duopoly to the chase by getting everyone on the same page before those two organize their own such event about this. In that scenario, India would show the world that its opinion on this subject seriously matters, which could lead to Ukraine and the West agreeing to rely on it for mediating talks with Russia.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/india-ha ... e-emerging

('Anything but China', hey Andy? And why should it matter what the US wants? And why should Russia retreat from it's necessary goals?)

[blindpig]

JULY 12, 2024 BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
India-Russia ties take a quantum leap in the fog of Ukraine war


President Vladimir Putin (R) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi (L) took a walk in the woods at the presidential estate in Novo-Ogaryovo, Moscow Region, July 8, 2024

The lodestar of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 8-9, it must be the disclosure by the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in the Kremlin Maxim Oreshkin that the two leaders discussed the topic of cash payments with the use of cards of national payment systems as an important element of trade support infrastructure and interaction in general.

Oreshkin added that the two countries are also putting in place an arrangement on interaction between their central banks on the issue of accepting national payment card.

At one stroke, Modi electrified the forthcoming BRICS Summit in Kazan in October. Modi also informed Putin that he will be attending the summit meeting. It is no secret that the BRICS member states are seeking to improve the international monetary and financial system and are prioritising the creation of a platform that will enable them to conduct transactions in national currencies in mutual trade.

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had announced after a meeting of the economic bloc’s foreign ministers in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, last month that “Our agenda is extensive. It includes issues that will directly affect the future world order based on fair grounds.” Indeed, more and more countries are having doubts about SWIFT, after many Russian banks were cut off from the Belgium-based financial messaging system following the start of the Ukraine conflict in 2022.

From the American perspective, the terrible beauty about Modi’s Russia trip is that behind his anti-war rhetoric, PM created an ambience of high moral standing for Delhi that he promptly exploited to bring about a paradigm shift in the India-Russia relations.

Make no mistake, SWIFT translates as US hegemony; it is about isolating Russia from the international financial system; and here we see India teaming up with Russia to create a payment system using local currencies. Notionally, this is not an anti-American move, because the bulk of trade continues to be in the US currency. Cynics may say India is running with the hounds and hunting the hares. But who cares? Americans must be going nuts. Oil, fertiliser, nuclear power plants, ABM system, joint development and production of weaponry — and now, an ecosystem that ignores SWIFT.

Coincidence or not, Modi arrived in Moscow on the same day that NATO’s 75th anniversary summit meeting began in Washington with an agenda loaded against Russia while Modi chose to spend that evening closeted with the Russian leader at his country residence in the Moscow suburbs for a private meal, a walk in the woods and several hours of intense conversation to choreograph a quantum leap in the Russian-Indian relations. And all this while the NATO summit made a renewed pledge to defeat Russia in the Ukraine war.

A Russian pundit at the Academy of Sciences and concurrently a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian foreign ministry, Andrey Volodin summed up Modi’s visit as signifying a “breakthrough” in Russian-Indian relations characterised by a “new climate of trust, which existed in relations between the Soviet Union and India during the times of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.”

Volodin listed the increase in the bilateral trade turnover and the transition of the economic relations to national currencies as the second important outcome of the visit. He flagged that cooperation in the military-industrial sphere “received a certain boost” as indeed the development of the International North-South Corridor, which “opens up unprecedented opportunities.”

Indeed, disregarding the US state department spokesman’s repeated expressions of concern this week over the consolidation of the Indian-Russian relations, the Putin-Modi joint statement defiantly asserted that the Intergovernmental Commission on Military and Military Technical Cooperation will hold its session in Moscow in the second half of this year. The joint statement added,

“Responding to India’s quest for self-sufficiency, the partnership is reorienting presently to joint research and development, co-development and joint production of advanced defence technology and systems. The Sides confirmed commitment to maintain the momentum of joint military cooperation activities and expand military delegation exchanges.”

From a geopolitical perspective, Volodin highlighted two points: first, “India has declared itself as a developing world power that does not succumb to external pressures,” and, second, “an impetus has been given (this trend will continue in the future) to the development of the security system in Eurasia. Some countries hoped that India would avoid this dialogue, but it did not avoid this dialogue.”

This is the crux of the matter. At the grand ceremony in St Andrew’s Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace where Putin presented the Order of St Andrew the Apostle to Modi on Tuesday, the prime minister made a highly revealing statement. Modi said:

“Our relationship is extremely important not only for our two countries, but is also of great significance for the entire world. In the current global context, India and Russia, as well as their partnership, have taken on a new importance. We are both convinced that further efforts are needed to ensure global stability and peace. In the future, we will continue to work together to achieve these goals.”

The big picture is that India has taken a leap of faith. It is one thing not to give in to US bullying but it is another thing altogether that Delhi is co-relating the Indian experience with that of Russia — and even China. Interestingly, Modi left Moscow Tuesday and headed for Austria whose neutrality is anchored in Joseph Stalin’s statesmanship.

Today, India-Russia relations “are blossoming and getting stronger as time goes by” and their cooperation “represents a guarantee for the future of our people” — to borrow Modi’s words. Make no mistake, this thought process goes way beyond strategic autonomy. No country on earth can dictate the trajectory of the India-Russia relationship.

To be sure, the walk in the woods by Putin and Modi in the presidential estate at Novo-Ogaryovo was much more than a photo-op. Putin had done his ‘homework’ alright.

Actually, we got a preview of it in Lavrov’s hugely significant remarks at the 10th Primakov Readings international forum in Moscow on June 26 pinned on the ‘media leak’ that Modi was due to travel to Russia in a fortnight’s time. That was one of the most important speeches by Lavrov in recent times.

Lavrov disclosed that Russia has plans to convene meetings with India and China again in the RIC format. Lavrov underscored that Russia, India and China will only benefit from the revival of RIC format.

“It is also obvious that the United States is trying to drag India into its anti-China project… Both China and India are much more deeply involved in the Western system of globalisation in terms of the volume of financial, investment, and trade agreements and many other things. But the fact is that just like us [Russia], China and India are fully aware of the discriminatory nature of what the West is doing,” Lavrov said.

It is a seductive thought that a long journey into the Asian Century may be beginning. If the RIC format revives on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, the journey will accelerate. China probably senses it.

Global Times featured two commentaries on successive days commending Modi’s foreign policies. (here and here) The second commentary cites Chinese expert opinion that “The deepening of relations between Russia and India is an important step toward global strategic balance.” (here)

While Modi was still in Moscow, China’s special representative on border talks with India, Foreign Minister Wang Yi messaged National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to express his willingness to collaborate with Delhi to “properly handle” border-related issues amid the ongoing dispute in eastern Ladakh.

https://www.indianpunchline.com/india-r ... raine-war/

******

New Agenda of Russia-India Relations
Posted on July 11, 2024 by Yves Smith

Yves here. This post provides a useful background on recent Russia-India dealings, how the Ukraine war disrupted them, and how they are getting on a new footing. As a finance person, perhaps I am putting too much weight on it, but India’s plans to accept the Russian Mir card looks to be an important step forward (not mentioned in this post but highlighted by Alexander Mercouris yesterday). He focused on that as India defying the prospect of US financial sanctions, which the US threatened to use against Turkiye after some of its banks started accepting them. The latest news I can find is that Turkiye’s banks indeed dropped them and are now working with Russia on a new payment mechanism.

The Mir card could be important to Russia-Turkiye dealings in that Russia is annoyed that India is running a large trade deficit with Russia. Not only is the rupee not convertible outside India (which could be solved through exemptions or other means) but even if it were, what does Russia do with all this currency? It’s not as if the rupee is a great store of value or that India has a lot of investible financial assets. More Russian tourists going to India would help reduce this imbalance.

Finally, this development helps put paid to the common Western denigration of Russia, that it’s just a junior partner of China. China presumably was not wildly enthusiastic about the recent Russia economic and military pact with North Korea but could see it as beneficial in the larger frame of causing problems for US allies in the Pacific. In this case, China might not be stoked about Russia bolstering a regional competitor, but again likely sees Russia helping pull India away from the US as a significant plus.


By Alexey Kupriyanov, PhD in History, Senior research fellow, The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, RIAC Expert. Originally published at Russia Council; cross posted from InfoBrics

The last time Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Russia to meet President Vladimir Putin was almost five years ago, in September 2019. The following year, the pandemic broke out, and the Russian leader did not pay a return visit until December 2021. A few months later, the Ukraine crisis began, and since then the annual bilateral summits have been unofficially put on pause. Now, finally, Modi is coming to Russia again—and this meeting is likely to be quite different from all previous ones, because over the past two years, India–Russia relations have undergone a transformation that would have been hard to imagine even five years ago.

Still a Polycentric World

In the previous decade and a half, Russian and Indian political and expert circles have shaped consistent narratives describing the present and future of bilateral relations. While Russian experts nostalgically recalled the good times of Soviet–Indian friendship and deplored the stagnation of trade, Indian experts looked at the situation more pragmatically. Russia in their worldview was an important balancer, helping to escape an excessive bias of Indian policy toward the most promising non-regional partner—the United States. In addition, a further weakening of Moscow, which could push it toward an alliance with Beijing, was seen as a major risk. In the latter case, resource-rich Russia might turn into a multiplier of Chinese power, which was in direct conflict with India’s foreign policy interests. As a result, developing political dialogue with Russia and forming a new polycentric world in which Moscow, as one of the world centers, would be a reliable partner for New Delhi, fully met India’s strategic goals.

The start of the special military operation came as a shock to Indian policymakers. By then, the Indian leadership had by and large outlined and begun implementing a plan for a major restructuring of the national economy that would ensure sustained growth of over 5% per year and India’s gradual emergence as the world’s third largest economy by GDP, which in turn would help reduce social tensions. This required a relatively stable foreign policy situation and continued U.S.–China decoupling, which would stimulate the outflow of Western capital from China and the development of alternative production chains that would bypass the PRC and threatened border zones. India was expected to take advantage of these dynamics and be able to attract Western capital that would bring along modern technology, facilitating a surge in Indian economy. In this scenario, the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Israel and European nations would be assigned the role of capital and technology suppliers, the wealthy Gulf states—the role of investors, whereas China would be looked upon as a convenient adversary and Russia as a balancer.

This whole scheme came apart after the start of the operation in Ukraine. Overnight, Russia ceased to be a balancer, relations between India’s Western partners and Russia deteriorated, Moscow began to drift economically toward Beijing, while India’s relations with China remained as tense as before. In this situation, India was faced with a choice: to dismantle the entire support system of its strategic autonomy, which has been decades in the making, to give in to Western pressure and join the anti-Russia camp, or to stick to the previous course, hoping that the Ukraine crisis would end in the foreseeable future and the situation would more or less improve. The Indian leadership chose the second option, showing remarkable political flexibility: the author of these lines has often attended events featuring Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, where he skillfully parried all the attacks of Western politicians, experts and journalists, demonstrating that the West itself is slow to sever profitable trade ties with Russia while urging the countries of the Global South to do so. This tactic was successful: by the time Western business finally pulled out of the Russian market, the political pressure on India significantly subsided.

This choice was easier for India than for European nations: for Indian politicians, the Ukraine crisis is a relatively insignificant conflict somewhere on the western tip of Eurasia, much less important than the Afghan conflict, for example. Furthermore, Kiev had been actively developing cooperation with Islamabad over the previous years, supplying Pakistan with weapons. Of course, many people in India sympathize with Ukraine in this conflict, especially among the middle-class, who receive information about world events from the Western media, but the Ukraine crisis does not have a serious impact on India’s domestic political agenda. There were only two notable incidents: the evacuation of Indian students from Ukraine at the very beginning of the conflict and the recent scandal involving the enrollment of Indians as contract soldiers in the Russian army and the subsequent posting of plaintive videos where they plead for evacuation from the trenches. In the end, the ruling party and Modi personally turned the first episode to their advantage by organizing an exemplary operation of repatriating the students; the second instance is still being covered in the Indian media but has slipped out of the spotlight since the elections. Now that the elections are over, it’s time to discuss the backlog of challenges in bilateral relations.

Economy: Onward and Upward

Prior to the special military operation, Russia – India trade was effectively stagnating: passing the $12 billion mark took strenuous effort, this growth being due in no small part to dollar inflation. Traditionally, Russian–Indian economic cooperation was based on three pillars—military-technological cooperation, nuclear energy and space; exports of Indian foodstuffs and light industry products to Russia were slowly increasing, and Indian medicines were steadily carving out a niche in the Russian market. Yet given the course taken by both Russian and Indian leadership to localize manufacturing, business increasingly favored investing and developing production capacity locally. The economies of both countries benefited, but trade stagnated.

After the start of the operation, economic ties with the West began to fray, and the Russian economy urgently refocused on new markets, including India. Trade was growing at a spectacular rate, jumping from $12 billion to $65 billion in two years, with crude oil accounting for the lion’s share of this growth. Initially, Western countries tried to cut off this flow, but Russian big business demonstrated a phenomenal ability to dodge sanctions: they used shell or fly-by-night companies in third countries and shadow fleets, along with other tricks. Indian big business provided much help in establishing bypass routes. In the end, this strategy bore fruit: Western political and economic elites, having realized that their economies may crumble without Russian energy, generally accepted the new reality.

Although large holdings have emerged as the driving force behind the rise in trade, small and medium-sized businesses are becoming increasingly more important in boosting trade. These smaller firms have had a particularly hard time: they have entered an unfamiliar market with a distinctive corporate culture, established rules and specific legislation. But gradually, albeit slower than desirable, India is entering a role that Russia needs it to play: a supplier of technology and ready-made hi-tech products, either Western or its own, built within the framework of Western architecture. In tactical terms, this will provide Russian manufacturers with a much-needed substitute for Western hi-tech imports; in strategic terms, it will allow the Russian economy to avoid technological dependence on China.

Thus, trade between India and Russia continues to grow, but more importantly, Indian exports to Russia are growing in absolute numbers. Now the next stage is looming ahead: the building of production chains with the participation of Russian and Indian companies. This is necessary both for Russian enterprises, which will thereby be able to remove at least part of their production from under the sanctions, and for Indian companies, given that hopes for a stable decoupling between the U.S. and China seem to have been dashed, while the amount of Western investment in the Indian economy, which rose sharply a few years ago on the back of aggressive rhetoric by U.S. leaders, is dwindling.

Blessed Are the Peacemakers

On the one hand, India is benefiting from the conflict in Ukraine: never before has so much oil been injected into the Indian economy at such a low price. Moreover, Russian entrepreneurs, seeking to evade Western sanctions, are beginning to explore the Indian market, lugging knowledge, money and technology with them. The downsides, however, outweigh the upsides: entering the Russian market now is risky, transactions are difficult, and the need for constant political maneuvering is not going anywhere.

Furthermore, Indians do not understand where the conflict is even heading. All the wars and operations that India has conducted since declaring independence were fairly short and did not involve mobilization of the population and economy. The last major war, the Third Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, ended in a quick and decisive Indian victory, showcasing the high quality of Soviet equipment and the advantages of the Soviet art of strategy. Pakistan then suffered a crushing defeat and lost its eastern territories, where the independent state of Bangladesh was founded. The most recent conflict, in Kargil in 1999, was also largely successful for India. In less than three months, Indian infantry, air force and artillery, operating under difficult conditions, routed the invading militants and Pakistani military that supported them, recapturing all the heights they had occupied.

Many people in India expected the Russian army to repeat what the Indians did in 1971, and when it became clear that there would be no blitzkrieg and Russian troops withdrew from Kiev, Kharkov Region and the right bank of the Dnieper River, the pendulum swung the other way. Indian experts expected the Ukrainian side to demonstrate a blitzkrieg during the much-touted offensive in 2023. But its result was close to nil. The shape that the conflict has taken now—with bloody battles over a forester’s hut, partial mobilizations, a shortage of munitions, total transparency of the enemy’s rear, and an obvious unwillingness to militarize the national economy and the entire life—is incomprehensible and unfamiliar to India.

However, after Moscow made it clear that it does not aim to occupy and annex Ukraine, whereas Kiev, despite its rants about getting back to the 1991 borders, will clearly not be able to do so, a window of opportunity is opening for India. It has a real chance to play the role of an arbiter and a moral superpower by acting as one of the mediators and reconcilers. In this sense, Deputy Foreign Minister Pawan Kapoor’s trip to Geneva and Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow may well turn out to be links in the same chain. The very fact of the Indian prime minister’s visit to the Russian capital is quite telling: before that, both sides tacitly preferred not to poke the Western bear, focusing on practical results rather than fine gestures. But now Modi’s trip will be perceived much warmer in the Western capitals. The Ukraine conflict has been dragging on, Kiev is clearly not going to win on the battlefield, and not only Russia but also the West are suffering from sanctions. There is more talk about a ceasefire and freezing the situation along the demarcation line—and Modi has a chance to score political points for himself by acting as a messenger of peace. Especially when the burgeoning ties between Russia and China are of equal concern to India as to the West, although for different reasons.

https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2024/07 ... tions.html

*****



Kerala, India’s Communist-led state, provides a model for digital literacy
By Peoples Dispatch (Posted Jul 11, 2024)

Originally published: Peoples Dispatch on July 9, 2024 (more by Peoples Dispatch) |

Communist-led Kerala’s digital education initiative (EdTech) is a model for all middle income and developed countries even in the global north, says a recent study conducted by United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF).

The “Little Kites” program initiated by the public funded Kerala Infrastructure and Technology in Education (KITE) “equip[s] students with digital skills, fostering a new generation capable of navigating and and shaping the technological landscape of the future” claims a study titled “Empowering Adolescents with Future Ready Skills: The Inspiring Story of Little Kites.”

The “Little Kites” program was introduced by the Left and Democratic Front (LDF) government led by chief minister Pinayari Vijayan for the first time in 2018 as part of the Public Education Rejuvenation Mission. It is now the largest ICT network for students in India.

The Unicef study was released in the presence of chief minister Vijayan and general education minister of Kerala V Sivankutty on July 6 in Trivandrum.

Kerala’s digital education model is setting a global standard! A recent UNICEF (@UNICEFIndia) study highlights the Little KITEs programme, India’s largest ICT student network, implemented by Kerala Infrastructure and Technology for Education (KITE) across 2,174 high schools. It… pic.twitter.com/38Xm7mODP8

— Pinarayi Vijayan (@pinarayivijayan) July 7, 2024

The program was launched by the Left government, keeping in mind the critical role of digital inclusion in education. It is for students of public or government aided schools from grades 8, 9 and 10. There are over 2,174 schools benefiting from the program, which is almost 50% of all such schools in the state.

Over 180,000 students are currently enrolled in the program in Kerala. Nearly 1.2 million students have already benefited from the program since its inception. It has also emphasized on increased participation of girls in order to address gender gaps in science and technology related fields.

Little Kites program aims to increase digital literacy and promote innovative thinking among children. The curriculum focuses on providing skills related to AI, robotics, mobile app development, 3D animation, multimedia, language computing, electronics, IoT and others along with developing critical thinking, problem solving, creativity and communication.

Most importantly, it focuses on developing a sense of sharing and community and collaboration among the children, the study says.

The initiative “also promotes the responsible use of technology and encourages active participation in EdTech infrastructure maintenance, thus creating an enriching learning experience with a view to the future,” the study highlights.

Surviving against all odds
The project survived Kerala’s dire financial crisis, deliberately engineered through the choking of funds by the right-wing central government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as well as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Aligning it with UNICEF’s Life Skills Framework, the government used the COVID-19 outbreak in 2019 as an opportunity to provide education. Without the program, millions of students, mostly among poorer sections of the society, would have been left without access to learning as physical schools were shut without the innovative use of the program to provide digital access.

The program and initiatives, taken during the COVID-19 outbreak, make Kerala the state with the highest access to digital learning among teachers and students in comparison to all other states in India, the study says.

Unlike the other states in India, where publicly-funded education is facing fund cuts and encouragement towards privatization, the only left-ruled state of India has seen tremendous transformation and growth in public schooling in the last few years.

The government has invested in the programs involving thousands of teachers who were trained in digital equipment such as robots and other AI tools and large scale digitization of public schools.

The UNICEF study points out that the program has encouraged a large number of parents to take their children back to public schools in the state, reducing financial stress on their children’s education.

Study notes that “little kites is completely designed and run in-house by KITE without any dependence on for-profit corporations.”

Using free and open source software (FOSS) instead of prosperity software, the KITE program saved millions of dollars of public funds.

Its resilience, design and success won the program the best innovation project award in 2022 from the state government. In September of 2022, Finland’s education department collaborated with the Kerala government to implement the Little KITE program in Finnish schools.

https://mronline.org/2024/07/11/kerala- ... -literacy/

[blindpig]

July 30, 2024 by M. K. BHADRAKUMAR
Winds of change in India-China relations


India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (L) met Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Vientiane, Laos, July 25, 2024

There is an expectation that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would prioritise a historic turnaround in India’s relations with China as a legacy of his 15 years in power. Things are indeed moving in such a direction.

A senior Indian official told the national news agency PTI about the need to take a “nuanced approach” towards foreign direct investments (FDI) from China, and that the government is open to considering FDI proposals from Beijing in sectors involving high-end technologies like electric vehicles and batteries as well as modern capital equipment of different types.

This is of a piece with a palpable shift in Indian policy through the past six-month period. The interplay of three key factors accounts for this shift. First, the stabilisation of the border situation, thanks to the new mechanism for managing border tensions — ‘buffer zones’ to separate the two armies where both sides would withdraw troops and cease all patrols — is having positive fallouts.

Such zones have already been established at five out of the seven flashpoints. The government has not bragged about this remarkable achievement, but its synergy in closer commercial ties matters to both countries who are facing the headwinds of escalating trade barriers worldwide. There has been a steady relaxation of Indian restrictions on visas for Chinese professionals in some select industries.

Second, this pragmatic shift also underscores India’s urgent need for Chinese technology, investment and expertise to meet its immediate industrial needs. Last week, Chief Economic Adviser Anantha Nageswaran had stated in the annual economic survey that Delhi should focus on FDI rom China to boost India’s exports to the US and other Western countries, and help keep India’s growing trade deficit with Beijing in check.

Nageswaran’s remark came after Reserve Bank of India data showed that net FDI inflow into India dropped by 62.17 percent year-on-year to $10.58 billion in 2023-24, a 17-year-low. Simply put, India’s ability to attract foreign investment has come under challenge amid a combination of adverse circumstances — global economic uncertainty, trade protectionism and geopolitical risks, etc. Chinese investment can bring funds to India, introduce advanced technology and management experience, and promote the upgrade of Indian industries and the optimisation of its economic structure.

A third unspoken factor is that the geopolitical environment has radically changed. Certainly, Russia has gained the upper hand in the war in Ukraine. This is a crushing blow to the credibility of the US and NATO and is happening at a time when the Asia-Pacific is looming large as another potential flashpoint. The regional states — except Japan, perhaps, which is rapidly militarising — do not wish to see another destructive NATO-led proxy war in their region.

Washington’s weaponisation of sanctions in the wake of the Ukraine war has also not gone down well in Southeast Asia. After all, if the Collective West could freeze Russia’s reserves (approximately, $400 billion) and spend the interest out of it flouting international financial law, what prevents such brigandage vis-a-vis smaller countries of the region?

To be sure, the growing attraction of BRICS in the southeast Asian region carries a big message. Thailand and Malaysia are the latest regional states to express interest in joining the bloc. This will naturally further enhance their relationship with China.

Meanwhile, India’s relations with the US are also somewhat under the weather lately following the latter’s renewed involvement with Khalistani separatists based in North America. The US allegations of India hatching assassination plots, hinting at the ‘smoking gun’ leading to the top echelons of the political leadership in Delhi have created a perception that the US has ulterior motives to create pressure points on the country’s leadership. Clearly, the US is incapable of understanding the resilience and centrality of India’s strategic autonomy.

In such an environment, the Quad has lost its gravitas. Quad is out of step with the needs of the regional countries in Asia-Pacific, where the strategic choice of the vast majority of countries is for economic development. China’s comfort level is rising that India is not ganging up with the US’ containment strategy against it.

Beijing would view with satisfaction the comments by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar following the Quad FMs meeting in Tokyo on Monday slamming the door shut firmly on any third-party role for Quad in the fraught India-China ties. He said, “We have a problem, or, I would say, an issue between India and China… I think it is for two of us to talk it over and to find a way.”

“Obviously, other countries in the world would have an interest in the matter, because we are two big countries and the state of our relationship has an impact on the rest of the world. But we are not looking to other countries to sort out what is really an issue between us,” Jaishankar added.

India shares the misgivings of the ASEAN states about the US-driven expansion of NATO as a global organisation with focus on the Asia-Pacific. India’s reaction has been one of further strengthening its strategic independence. Interestingly, Modi’s visit to Russia coincided with the NATO Summit in Washington. (See my blog titled India-Russia ties take a quantum leap in the fog of Ukraine war)

A recent survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a think tank funded by the Singaporean government, showed that in Malaysia, nearly three-quarters of the survey’s respondents said ASEAN should favour China over the US if the bloc were forced to align with one of the two rival superpowers.

India is very much attuned to these trends in the ASEAN region. The centrality of ASEAN is the cornerstone of India’s Act East policy, whereas, the US pays only lip-service to it and has worked behind the scene to weaken the group’s cohesion and unity.

Succinctly put, the phobia whipped up by American think tanks, media and US officials over the Sino-Russian entente has lost traction. India, on the contrary, has strengthened its ties with Russia and is moving towards the stabilisation of its relations with China, making them predictable.

Given the above scenario, the period between now and October when the BRICS is scheduled to hold its summit meeting under the chairmanship of Russia is going to be a formative phase. The latest meeting of the foreign ministers of India and China in Vientiane last week appears to have gone off well.

The Chinese readout highlighted Jaishankar’s statement that “Maintaining stable and predictable development of the bilateral relations is entirely in the interests of the two sides, and holds special significance to upholding regional peace and promoting multi-polarity. India and China have broad converging interests and face the shadow brought by the situation in the border areas. But the Indian side is ready to take a historic, strategic and open perspective to find solutions to the differences and get the bilateral relations back to a positive and constructive track.” (Emphasis added.)

The clincher is going to be how far the agreement at the FM-level meeting in Vientiane to resolve the residual border issues gets translated into action. India’s ‘nuanced approach’ to attracting FDI from China is a step in the right direction. A meeting between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan on 22-24 October is entirely conceivable.

In a longer-term perspective, though, there is no alternative to discarding the self-serving Indian narratives on relations with China built on phobias, seething rivalries and even outright falsehoods, which have percolated deep into the mindset of the Indian elites through decades of indoctrination so as to create a new forward-looking, positive pivot for an enduring friendship between the two nations. The task isn’t easy as interest groups have proliferated and US lobbyists are actively interfering. The onus rests ultimately on the Indian leadership to show the courage of conviction.

https://www.indianpunchline.com/winds-o ... relations/