Post
by blindpig » Mon Aug 14, 2023 11:07 am
(Continued from previous post. I am having doubts about the usefulness of Google Translator in this endeavor...)
Thus, a deeper understanding of being, which we directly consider in this unity, is that it is a being that passes into nothing . And a deeper understanding of nothing, which we directly consider in this unity, is that it is nothing passing into being . We now see being and nothing only as overflows in their unity.
The direction of the transition of nothing into being is called APPEARANCE, the direction of the transition of being into nothing is TRANSITION (from "to pass" means to disappear, to pass - "this is a transient phenomenon").
But is it now possible to call the unity of being and nothing, in fact, a unity? We have established that the fact that they are one and the same clearly dominates their difference. Their difference is imaginary, completely abstract, which at the same time is not a difference (EFN 150). Being and nothing have turned in our understanding into a kind of plus and minus in something monolithic.
At the same time, any unity is the unity of the different (the unity is formed only by two or more things). It follows from this that the “unity” of being and nothingness is not their connection, but BECOMING, the moments of which are the emergence and passing (the term “becoming” is taken here, at first glance, rather arbitrarily, in ordinary speech, becoming means the emergence and growth of something ). This is a deeper understanding of their “unity”, based, on the one hand, on the weakness and abstractness of their difference, on the other hand, on the unambiguousness and affirmativeness of their transition into each other.
Hegel sums up the thought path we have traversed remarkably:
“Becoming is the first concrete thought and therefore the first concept, while being and nothingness are, on the contrary, empty abstractions. If we are talking about the concept of being, then it can only consist in the fact that it is becoming, because, as being, it is empty nothingness, and, as empty nothingness, it is empty being. In being, therefore, we have nothingness, and in the latter, being. But this being, which remains in nothingness, is becoming. In this unity of becoming, we must not lose sight of difference, for without the latter we would again return to abstract being. Becoming is only the positedness of what being is according to its truth” (EFN 154).
All our further movement of thought will be an unfolding of becoming, as it were, into the depths of being and nothingness, the layers of which will be the filling with certainty, the growth of tension of the object received with ever greater concreteness.
Thus, we have before us becoming, defined as passing and arising. What can we see in it? First of all, the balance in which its moments are located, because being and nothing are equal (for they are one and the same ), which means that the passage and the emergence are equivalent moments of becoming. However, they are opposite in direction, absolutely exclude each other . We can take directly only one moment, either passing or arising, but not both.
Of course, we cannot consider becoming metaphysically as a whole, the parts of which are being and nothingness. Being and nothing are not components, they are only moments, they have already lost their logical independence.
There is only one way out - to take the formation directly as it is, but forcedly as something abstractly defective. We take becoming as something simple (that is, not one, because unity is the unity of something different, as already mentioned above). But at the same time, we know that becoming contains “anxiety” within itself, and we will have to keep these moments of it in memory for further unfolding.
Therefore, taking becoming itself directly, we get something calm and simple, something one-sided and very boring. Of course, we take becoming from the positive side, that is, as being, and nothing will turn out to be for us, as it were, from the back side, we keep it in mind. It turns out the result of formation - CASH BEING . "Being", because we took it as it is, in other words, as something positive, something that is. "Present", because it is present to us, but we remember that behind it lies its negation, which, therefore, is not present. Determinate being is what has become . Becoming posited in the form of one of its moments, in the form of being (EFN 156).
The dialectical procedure that we have done is called in philosophy " REMOVAL ", that is, negation with retention . Definite being with all its appearance shows that it has nothing to do with anything, it is being, moreover, strengthened by the fact that it is present. But this “presence” of it at the same time indicates that nothing in it is in a retained, hidden state, as if somewhere behind.
Removal is a characteristic of diamatic negation, however, when we talk about the removal of things filled with concrete content, then only the useful content of the negated is retained, and not all of it, as in the case of nothing.
Now it is clear why Hegel used such a seemingly strange word as "becoming", the meaning of which at the stage of its introduction did not explicitly express the unity of being and nothingness. Transition and emergence, as two opposite movements in one, must lead to something, come to some kind of result. Such a result of becoming is existence. But, again, we must remember that becoming does not go anywhere, nothing happens to it, we just look into it more carefully, in particular, we take it as being, which is immediately in front of us. Such a takeshows that becoming, therefore, can be considered as having become, and in this case it has the form of a one-sided, immediate "unity" of its moments—determined being. Nothing here is indicated, as it were, by the reverse side of the characteristic "cash". Similarly, when we say “daughter,” for example, we automatically assume parents. Or saying "wife", we assume a husband. If we say that existence is present, it means that this existence also has an underside, a denial hidden from us.
Hegel writes that since being disappears into nothing, and nothing disappears into being, therefore, both of them disappear, which destroys becoming and turns it into actual being. Hegel also writes that becoming is an unstable restlessness that settles down, turns into a result - calm simplicity (NL 98). This is nothing more than an attempt to explain the derivation of determinate being from becoming, which in essence is the taking of the internally mutually mediated by its equal moments of becoming directly as being, which hides its negation behind itself. All Hegelian “transitions”, “occurs”, “transforms”, “settles”, “falls away” are nothing more than explanations for our movement of thought into the depths of becoming. Therefore, “become” is not in itself, but as if it has become for us. We saw the formation in a new logical form.
Thus, we have before us the existence of being - one-sidedly taken "unity" of being and nothingness, or "simple unity of being and nothingness." If becoming is internally mediated (being is indirectly nothing, and vice versa), then we see existence as something immediate, simple. What can we see in it? It is obvious that we are faced with the task of “equalizing” the one-sidedness of existing being and seeing the formation with the equality of its moments at a new level of penetration into the depths. But first we must simply draw out nothing. We must first of all find the nothing hidden from our eyes. But it will not be that original nothing (like emptiness and empty thinking), it is nothing, as follows from its new role that has been revealed, it belongs to existing being.. It is no longer just nothing, but the nothingness of existence. This means that a more precise name will be required - NON-EXISTENCE . Non-existence is not just nothing, but the nothing of existence.
What is the best way to describe the relationship between the one side of becoming (existent being) that we have posited, as it were, and the non-being inherent in it? Here you just need to understand that insofar as non-being is hidden behind the existing being, removed in it, to the extent that it lies deeper. And what in general can reflect the depth of penetration from category to category? It can only reflect the growth of tension, the fullness of the object. At the same time, we must not forget that being and non-being are one, they are inseparable.
Thus, non-being accepted into being (present) in such a way that the concrete whole has the form of being, immediacy (present being), constitutes DEFINITENESS . Non-existence in the presence of existence, as it were, determines it, thereby the concreteness of existence as a whole is acquired . The positive, that is, the presence of being, tells us what it is, and the negative , that is, its determinateness, tells us what kind of being it is. We note for ourselves that this line of the relationship between positive and negative will be further developed.
[Let's return for a moment to the question of the opposition between the presence of existence and certainty. From the point of view of everyday thinking, this opposition seems incomprehensible and far-fetched. That is, something is and what it isis, is the opposite. I offer this simplified thought experiment as a metaphor. Imagine, for example, a piece of land. We see before our eyes a certain surface of the earth, it is (being). What can we say about what is one meter below it? Maybe there is an archaeological rock, maybe rubbish or a treasure is buried. Or maybe it's just land. We don't know this, we don't know what the certainty of this section is. Suppose we dug up the earth and found that it was ordinary soil. This is a certain certainty of the piece of land we have taken. In this approach, it still seems completely incomprehensible why the surface surface of the site (being) is opposed to the soil (certainty). But if we imagine, for example, that we mentally took this very certainty, let's say, we decided to describe the soil of our site in a letter. We now write about the soil, that it is such and such, dry or wet there, with or without worms. If you abstract this taken certainty in itself, do you feel that it is, as it were, indifferent to its being? When we mentally tear out certainty, we intuitively understand that it is, as it were, cold to its being. Yes, without existence, that is, the fact that it is a land plot, it belongs to him, it would not exist at all. But it exists, and when it exists, it, being the definition of this section, is in fact opposite to its being, negative for it. Of course, this example is very conditional and extremely metaphorical, because the present being is not a thing, not an integral object, not a plot of land and not the surface of the earth, but only our abstraction, reflecting universal being in some very distant approximation. But still, I guess
Thus, we have obtained certainty, that is, we have discovered the sought-after nothingness in the present existence. But we still have not got rid of the one-sidedness of taking becoming as a determinate being, since we do not see anything equal in rights, we have only noticed that non-being determines the determinate being. Hegel therefore writes that becoming (“the whole, the unity of being and nothingness”—NL 102) is not yet posited in itself.
Insofar as determinate being has at last become something concrete for us through determinateness, several relations of its moments have been revealed in it.
First of all, it should be noted that the determinateness, with the help of which we will consider these moments, is not something separate from the presence of existence. We remember that existence is only our one-sided abstract "taking" of monolithic becoming, therefore, the negation in it - its certainty - is only a moment, considering which, we must simply develop its understanding more deeply. So Hegel writes:
“In view of the immediacy in which being and nothingness are united in being, they do not go beyond each other ” (NL 103).
Thus, if being in itself tells us only that something is immediately there, then determinateness as the negation of the “availability” of being should give us much greater depth, namely, what kind of something it is—how it is internally mediated. At this depth, as on a foundation, all further definitions unfold, and they appear to us as negative. But at the same time, I will note once again that the existence and its certainty are inseparable, one. We are looking at the same thing . We find the positive and the negative in one object, and then the negative in the positive and the positive in the negative, peering more attentively.
Let's look at certainty. First of all, let us take it as it is, that is, in isolation, as, therefore, a kind of being. (For reference: if we take being in the same way, then we will not get anything interesting, because being is by its nature indefinite, which means we will find nothing and return to the sphere of already passed categories). Certainty, taken in isolation, as a real certainty, is QUALITY . This is a completely simple immediate being (positive), which we saw, mentally wresting the determinateness (negative) from the existing being. With this, in principle, no difficulties are observed, since having received existence, we already then realized that it had become concrete, and therefore qualitative. In this case, we simply developed this characteristic to a specific term.
However, here the perspicacious reader should note that since the quality we have considered is also being (after all, it is, it is not nothing as such), therefore, we are obliged to investigate the question of what kind of being it is . It may simply be a being, or it may be just as much a present being as its maternal being. It is clear that it cannot be simply being or pure being, since we are already in the sphere of being, enriched by negation, therefore, this is also present being . Hence the conclusion that the quality contains the moment of negation.
Therefore, the quality, taken from the side that it is being (being), is REALITY , and taken from the side that it is non-being, is NEGATION in general.
Reality is a view of existence as a quality . Negation is the view of existence as a defect. Reality therefore looks like something devoid of negativity and imperfections. Negation thus looks like some pure limitation. Generally speaking, quality is something completely simple, immediate (NL 103).
One can give an infinite number of examples of how the same thing is something important and positive, and at the same time limited and negative, but all these examples, due to their fullness, will to a greater extent express categories that we have not yet reached, but which will develop precisely out of the reality and negation already obtained by us. In a language, for example, a quality taken as a reality is available in the form of any non-negative characteristics - kind, intelligent, cheerful, and a quality taken as a negation - in the form of any characteristics from the opposite - kind, not stupid, cheerful. That is, in the first case, say, a smart person means that he does smart things and has smart thoughts (something affirmative and, as it were, devoid of flaws), and in the second case, a smart person means
Reality, therefore, means that we have an existing being, which acts as a positive quality. The negative aspect of this present being (the quality taken as nothing) is a simple negation, and it is, as it were, hidden in reality, but it exists. Therefore, the quality can be taken both as positive (as being) - reality and as negative (as nothing) - negation. Quality, taken negatively, is limitation.
Quality, as an essential certainty, in contrast to the negation contained in it, but different from it, is reality (EFN 157).
[From what has been said, it is clear that the diamatic categories “objective reality” and “quality” and the Hegelian categories “quality” (as an isolated determinateness) and “reality” (as a positively taken quality) do not coincide in their direct meaning. The materialistic categories, as it were, absorbed the Hegelian ones and embraced: the first - all being with negation, the second - all certainty as a quality. But more about this will be below, after the entire analysis of the "Science of Logic"].
It should be noted that we cannot yet use the category “quality” to put forward any set of specific qualities, because we still do not have in the full sense even that which could have these qualities. In addition, the quality itself cannot be taken in the plural. We are still in the sphere of determinate existence, the definiteness of which has only just begun to become clear to us. The quality we have achieved is still a very distant abstraction, here we cannot get ahead of ourselves.
In the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, Hegel explains that by quality in nature he understands, for example, chemical elements, and in "the realm of the spirit, quality is found only in the form of something subordinate" (EFN 157). Such a narrow understanding of quality is seen as a victim of the need for illustrations at a rather superficial categorical level of consideration. It is better to refrain from examples, since the diamatic category of quality covers not just quality as an isolated determinateness, but in general all qualitative certainty in its entirety, which we will fully analyze after completing the first section of the Science of Logic.
Thus, we have found determinateness as a quality in determinate being. The difference between reality and negation has been considered as a quality, taken as a determinate being. Since reality and negation (as a quality) are sublated in determinate being (after all, they belong to determinateness, that is, negative, sublated non-existence, or nothing), since, moreover, determinate being is inseparable from its determinateness, therefore, we have only refined our view of determinateness present existence.
Now we can say that before us is a very definite, qualitative existence, or SOMETHING . The root “what” expresses being, and the prefix “not” is its inherent negation, which gives depth to certainty. Similarly, the synonym for the word "something" - "something" - contains these two elements. The root “what” expresses being, and the postfix “that” is demonstrative, defining negation. The question "What?" suggests that there is something, and the answer "That!" points to the concrete that is, in other words, to its determinateness.
The something we have received is the first negation of negation (NL 108) in the sense that we first denied determinate being as non-being, having obtained determinateness, then we denied determinateness by the fact that it is also determinate being, having finally seen something as a determinate determinate being.
Something is not a concrete thing, but only a superficial view of something as an existing being. We have received something in a sphere where there is not yet sufficient tension, depth, where there is still nothing but the present being, enriched by its own negation. Something is only the beginning of an object. We have not yet even fully balanced the moments of formation, because we still look at the existence of an abstract, one-sided. Nothing (negation), having turned into non-being, then into certainty, then into quality as reality and as negation, is still not equivalent to being (positive), which unduly dominates it. Therefore, further we will continue to dig out negation, but already at the level of something.
Definite existence, something - that which is and that which is. In other words, it is (positive, being) and it is something (negative, nothing).
So, we have before us something in the sphere of existence as such. The latter means that we look at becoming (the "unity" of being and nothingness) one-sidedly, as being.
“In determinate being a) as such, one must first of all distinguish its determinateness b) as a quality. The latter, however, must be taken both in one and in the other definition of determinate being, as a reality and as a negation. But in these determinatenesses, determinate being is also reflected into itself, and posited as such, it is (c) something that exists" (NL 101).
So, firstly, something is being, and secondly, it is a determinate being, for it is taken as a whole, as becoming (the “unity” of being and nothing) or, in other words, as being enriched by its inherent non-being, in- thirdly, the internal moments of this unity are mutually mediated, they gave us certainty - a quality in the form of reality and simple negation.
We need to continue the logical search for the disclosure of the negative (nothing) in order to balance the becoming. As Hegel writes, before that we considered cash being as a definition of being, in which negativity (determinacy in the form of quality - reality and negation) was only negation in general, "the first negation", and now we have to define it further to "inside-itself- being something, to the negation of negation” (NL 111). This just means to find in something an equal, inherent, negative moment in something in order to balance the formation.
However, the study of nothingness as the reverse side of existing being has exhausted itself. We have found certainty - quality, but further development of our view of certainty (as we understand it) turns out to be impossible. There is nothing else to do, looking into something does not give us anything. But at the same time, we remember that the negative (nothing) must acquire an equivalent position, we will inevitably find two opposites equal to each other, similar to the original being and nothing, but on a new level. The only way to continue the movement of thought is to take something itself as nothing , as negative.
Something taken as nothing is another something or simply another (=other). The Other is something devoid of certainty. Seeing before us the original something and another something, we now find out what their difference consists in. [The word "DIFFERENCE" is too early to use, it, in my opinion, implies a difference in certainty, differences, and we don't have them yet. Comparing two somethings does not produce any definite difference between them.]
The first thing to note is that it doesn't matter what you take for something. If we took for "something" the original something, it means that something else is "other". If they took something else for "something", then the original something is "other". The same is true and vice versa, if the original something is taken as "another", it means that another something is taken for "something" (NL 111). The only logical way out is to take the other only as "other" . This means that if we mentally imagine that the other we have taken is retained precisely as another, does not become something for us, then it is equal to itself and not equal to itself .
To simplify understanding, you can imagine three things. We take something 1 and something 2. Something 1 is “other” something 2, and something 2 is “other” something 1. But we will make a trick, we will take something 3 as “other” in relation to something 1 and something 2. In this case something 3 is simultaneously “other” in relation to something 1, in relation to something 2 and at the same time is equal to something 1 as “other” something 2, and also equally with something 2 as “other” something 1. It turns out that something 3 equal to itself and not equal to itself. In fact, this relationship is also revealed with two somethings, the third something is given only for clarity.
Within the framework of our logical path, there is still no quantity, we consider only qualitative certainty, therefore, even the two somethings found are not two “things”, but only the “other” we saw in a certain existence. I would say that this is similar to when a child at some point begins to realize that he will not remain the same, tomorrow he will become a little different, and for example, after graduating from school - in many ways different, adults.
It is clear that Hegel reveals the form of the existence of matter - movement, change. He, without introducing the axiom of the motion of matter, considering only the first approximation of objects in the form of existence, from the mere fact that the basis of all objects is the opposition of two principles (being and nothingness, positive and negative), he deduces the category of change.
For clarity, I propose reasoning based on real things. Let's take something simple. Let's say there are a lot of stones. What conclusion can a person draw from this on the basis of ordinary or formal thinking? That all stones are different, but they are all stones. That's all. Or even worse, that each stone exists, as it were, as an individual, and their commonality is just a mental convention. Hegel, on the other hand, from this multitude of stones finds out that each stone is equal to itself and not equal to itself, that is, it is constantly changing. How does he discover it? Taking one stone for something (that is, abstracting from everything that is defined in a stone, except for the fact that it is a present being), another stone for another and further, as we did above, finds out what the “other” actually is, why the other stone is generally different , why are not all stones something absolutely uniform and monolithic? Since there is a difference between them, it means that each of them is the embodiment of this property of being [matter] to distinguish, that is, he is what he is, and he is not what he is. Moreover, this logic works with any objects, they do not have to be homogeneous. Since we see a house and a person, we observe their difference, it means that a person is equal to himself and not equal to himself, a house is equal to itself and not equal to itself. This is what dialectics teaches. This position requires that you carefully, slowly reflect on it. Since we see a house and a person, we observe their difference, it means that a person is equal to himself and not equal to himself, a house is equal to itself and not equal to itself. This is what dialectics teaches. This position requires that you carefully, slowly reflect on it. Since we see a house and a person, we observe their difference, it means that a person is equal to himself and not equal to himself, a house is equal to itself and not equal to itself. This is what dialectics teaches. This position requires that you carefully, slowly reflect on it.
Thus, the other, taken in isolation, is the other of itself (NL 112). Or, as some like to say, the other of the other is the other (that is, it is the same and different). So, considering something in isolation as other, we found that change is inherent in it. But not a change in the formal sense, that something ceases to be itself, becomes absolutely qualitatively different, but as a moment of this something, that is, it becomes different, remaining itself.
The reasoning about change refers to every something, to our original something and to the something that we introduced when we took something as nothing.
However, in order to draw a conclusion from what has been said, we need to pay attention to the fact that reasoning about something and another something (otherness), about revealing the moments of equality and inequality of something with itself, was made in relation to the existence and did not affect the certainty of something. When we took something as nothing, we reasoned about something only as about the presence of being. Consequently, we have received conclusions only about the existence of something.
The moment of inequality of existence with itself, the change of this existence is called BEING-FOR-ANOTHER . The moment of equality of existence with itself is called IN-ITSELF-BEING .
Hegel describes the inequality of existence with itself in this way:
“Determinant being as such is immediate, irrelevant; or, in other words, it is in the determination of being. But determinate being, as including non-being, is a determinate being that has undergone negation within itself, and then, in the closest way, another; but since it is at the same time also preserved in its subjection to negation, it is only being for the other” (NL 113).
Thus, determinate being, as we remember, is a one-sided positively taken "unity" of being and nothing, or "simple unity of being and nothing", it includes certainty as negation, the development of which (negation) gave us the concept of "other", therefore , determinate being in this case is only being-for-the-other. Definitive being exists, as it were, only in change, in the transition into something else .
Further, Hegel describes the moment of equality of existing being with itself in the following way:
Determinate being, which we have seen only as being for the other, “is preserved in its lack of presence of being and is being; but not being in general, but as a relationship with oneself in contrast to its relationship with another, as equality with oneself in contrast to its inequality. Such being is being-in-itself.
Why, when we found such a powerful negation as "other", did not our entire existing being become this other? Or, in other words, why is it possible to step into the same river twice? A change in existing being cannot lead to a qualitatively absolutely different existing being, at least because this changing existing being does not contain another existing being, and there cannot be other external sources of change, therefore, with its essence, it seems to resist being for another (change ). Consequently, determinate being is also being-in-itself .
It is important, by the way, that Hegel put change in the first place, and defined “selfhood” only from the opposite, as resistance to change. This again expresses the priority of the universal, because to remain oneself in the absolute process of change is only a moment of this very change. While vulgar philosophy and everyday consciousness do exactly the opposite, they consider the world as a set of things that, if they change, then only under the external influence of each other, do not have a reason for self-change within themselves.
Hegel:
"Something is in itself, in so far as it has gone out of being-for-other, has returned into itself."
The expression "in itself" means that we look at being as immutable, as if from its own point of view, from its own logical disposition. The word “being-in-itself”, generally speaking, expresses a certain “selfhood”, inner immediacy (as, for example, “thing-in-itself”) and does not correspond to the fact that being-in-itself is formed, starting from being-for -other. This name reveals induction, so Hegel later clarifies it.
It follows that being-for-others and being-in-itself, as we understand them, constitute two moments of the determinate being of something, thereby transforming it in our eyes into a changing something. The truth is so far only in the plane of existence. As we remember, the development of our view of the negative, after the establishment of a certain existence (something) as a one-sidedly posited becoming, led us to the idea of the “other” (something). This, in turn, made it possible to reveal the two opposite moments of existence indicated above. These moments themselves together are not the product of negativity, on the contrary, each of them expresses its side - positive (being) or negative (nothing). Hegel writes:
“Being and nothingness in their unity, which is existence, are no longer being and nothingness. They are such only outside their unity. In their restless unity, in becoming, they are arising and passing. — Being into something is being-in-itself. Being, relation to oneself, equality with oneself, is now no longer immediate, but is relation to oneself only as the non-being of other being (as a determinate being reflected into itself). And in exactly the same way, non-being, as a moment of something in this unity of being and non-being, is not the absence of determinate being in general, but another, and, more specifically, in distinguishing being from it, it is at the same time a correlation with its own lack of determinate being, being- for the other” (NL 114).
Now the same thing, but a little different. The “other” (something) is a kind of new form of negation for us, the otherness of our something. The quality of this otherness differs from the quality of something in that it constitutes, as it were, the breadth of the existence of something and is being-for-other. In turn, the being of the quality (determination) of the original something, in contrast to this relationship with another, is being in-itself (EFN 157-158).
Being-for-other and being-in-itself are obviously opposed and at first glance are immediate to each other. But if we take a closer look, we will discover their identity, which manifests itself precisely in the repulsion of the moment of equality with oneself (in-itself-being) from change (being-for-other) and is expressed approximately as follows: what is not in itself passes into that, what is in itself (NL 116). Being-in-itself is mediated by being-for-the-other. Being-in-itself is the exit from being-for-other "into itself". That is, conditionally, for example, we are what we are, because we are not others. And the same way: we become different, that is, those that we are not, but at the same time remaining ourselves.
It can be seen that considering being-for-other and being-in-itself, we fix in their connection a certain new understanding that being in-itself is not just a moment of equality with itself, but a moment of equality with itself, mediated by all that, what something is not, that is, as it were, everything else. And I remind you again that we do not yet have a quantity, therefore, by “other” we mean not other things, like other things, but other states of this something, its change. And something with us is not some concrete, not some thing, but something in general, an abstraction that embraces any thing.
So, a new understanding of the moment of equality, that which was "in itself", Hegel changes to "in it", IN-IT-BEING . This means that the moment of equality with oneself is not a “selfhood”, not a “thing-in-itself”, not a mystical inductive individual, but being in itself. That is, this is the same being, but not for another, but in itself . Being-for-other is in him. We, as it were, got out of the logical disposition of the immutable existence and saw a wider picture, now it is clear that the moment of immutability is relative, mediated by the thrust of the transition to something else. It generally exists only because we have fixed the “other”.
Now we must find out the significance of these moments for the certainty of something. Determinate being, to which they have been related in our consideration so far, is inextricably linked with its determinateness. We, as it were, fill these moments with certainty - equality and inequality something with ourselves.
By the way, in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, Hegel generally omits the derivation of the moments of equality and inequality with oneself for existing being, immediately writes about their significance for certainty (EFN 157 - 158).
First of all, let us clarify that being-for-other as the breadth of the existence of something belongs to this something itself;
Considered through the prism of the moments of equality and inequality with itself, certainty is no longer just an abstract certainty of something, but a real certainty , which we put “reflected into itself”, that is, already fully developed, as if reflected from these established moments of existence.
To business. In what form have we left certainty? The certainty of a changing something is first of all a reality, that is, a quality enriched by its own simple negation. Hegel also calls such determinateness being. Further, as we remember, we revealed the "other". What does this "other" mean for the existing reality, given the data obtained about the moments of equality and inequality with oneself? First of all, this means that the “other” is some kind of otherness of our quality, our reality. But at the same time, the “other” and our something are one and the same, they are inseparable. This means that this other being (“other”) is, as it were, the breadth of our something, and not something from outside. In turn, our quality, our reality, the existence of our quality as such, is only a product of correlation with this otherness.
Hegel calls this quality, the reality, determinateness in-itself . Next, you need to introduce a separate name for this quality, reality, “put it as this determinateness reflected into itself” in the words of Hegel (NL 118).
How could one call such a quality, reality, which, as it were, is a reflection from everything else, retains itself in contrast to the transition to something else? - Appointment of something or its DEFINITION .
“The quality which is “in itself” (das Ansich) in a simple something, which is essentially in unity with another moment of the latter, with being-in-it, can be called its definition, insofar as this word is distinguished in its exact meaning from determinateness in general. . Determination is affirmative determinateness as being-in-itself to which something in its determinate being, struggling with its intertwining with that other by which it could be determined, remains corresponding, holding itself in its equality with itself and manifesting this latter in its being-for. -other. Something fulfills its definition (destination) because further determinateness, growing in a diverse way on the basis of its relation to another, becomes corresponding to its in-itself-being, becomes its fullness. The definition implies that what something is in itself
Since this segment of the text is quite popularized, we will analyze in more detail all its components.
First, why quality and not reality? The fact is that an isolated certainty is taken, and it is called, first of all, quality. Is the definition real? Yes, of course, it is in general a whole definite existence, and therefore reality - we will come to this below.
Second, what does quality mean in itself? This means that Hegel begins the "setting of thought" with being-in-itself, with that kind of "self" quality, with its certain isolation and immediacy. After the word “quality”, he describes something like a logical arc – being-in-itself, being-in-itself, filling with certainty (“being essentially in unity”).
Thirdly, this chain can be deciphered, roughly speaking, as follows: a quality that is invariably what it is, but opposite to its other into something, making this something itself qualitative in accordance with its certainty, is a definition. Below Hegel gives an example of thinking - a person is thinking "in itself" in the sense that thinking is inherent only in a person. We look, as it were, from the “selfhood” of a person, that is, thinking, we take it in isolation, directly, therefore it is “in-itself”. However, thinking did not fall from heaven, but is a reverse reflection (negation) of the biological in man, opposite to it, therefore thinking is seen not only “in itself”, but already in itself. Therefore, thinking does not sit in a person somehow isolated, it is the person himself, thinking as a whole, thinking in him. That is, this "in-itself", as it were, repelled from the whole being-for-other in man and determined everything in general.
Two comments must be made on the concept of definition (appointment).
First. The Hegelian category of definition is not the same as the scientific meaning of the term "definition". Some are armed with the above quotation from the Science of Logic in an effort to define various phenomena. They say, for example, that since a definition is a quality, then you need to take “one quality” of the phenomenon and dance from it. In fact, the quality that constitutes the Hegelian concept of definition is not any particular quality, as in the example of thinking. This is the whole certainty of something, taken in the moment of equality with itself. Moreover, there are no “other qualities”. Below there will be an “other” determinateness—in the sense of the determinateness of something, taken in the moment of inequality with oneself, of being-for-another. The concept of "definition" is a concept from the sphere of being, a synonym for purpose, the purpose of something. It is generally paired, it cannot be taken by itself. AND,
[Scientifically, a definition is a verbal formulation of the current level of a concept. The true concept for each specific phenomenon or connection of phenomena is always one, and there can be several definitions, that is, formulations of the concept. The definition is always brief, only roughly formulates the current level of the concept, while its detailed presentation includes the entire movement of scientific thought. For example, the book “Capital. Marx's Critique of Political Economy is a detailed exposition of the scientific concept of "capitalism".
The true concept changes only in the sense that there is a transition from the truth of one order to the truth of the next, deeper order. There are, of course, true concepts, which, having exhausted their depth through cognition, have become absolute complete truths. This concerns the fundamental categories of being, the most general laws of society and history, as well as the whole mass of phenomena that disappeared in the course of the development of nature or society, but were nevertheless known.]
Second. So far, we have considered the moments of equality and inequality as a change in existing being or something. Therefore, they brought out a changing something. However, in the course of reasoning about the significance of these moments for certainty, it turned out that the moment of inequality with oneself (being-for-other) can express not only a change in certainty, but also that side of it, which, as it were, does not relate to the meaningthis something. Take the same example with a person. The spiritual (thinking) in a person is "in itself", then deeper - "in him", which is the opposite of his being-for-another - bodily. Here, the corporeality of man as something is the being-for-other of his determinateness, although it is impossible to represent the spirit and the body as unchanging and changing. Here, as equality and inequality with themselves, they express the main and the secondary, the important and the unimportant, the primary and the secondary. And this is generally understandable, equality with oneself should cover, first of all, what is important, and inequality with oneself - what is not important.
The definition (appointment) of something is an expression of positivity, an elucidation of certainty, posited only as being. Yes, we remember that the definition (appointment) was, as it were, repelled, formed from the opposite - from the negative definition of the "other", but this is hidden, not on the surface. On the surface, we have a definition (appointment) as a definite existence, that is, a whole something. As if the imbalance of positive and negative in becoming has intensified even more. We urgently need to increase the depth of the negative moment of certainty as being-for-other.
In this case, Hegel writes:
The filling of being-in-itself with determinateness is also different from that determinateness, which is only being-for-other and remains outside determination. For in the realm of [categories] of quality, differences retain, even in their sublation, a direct qualitative being in relation to each other. What something has in it is thus divided, and in this respect it is an external determinate being, something whose determinate being is also its determinate being, but does not belong to its being-in-itself. Determination is thus character” (NL 119).
The second sentence is translated somewhat clumsily. This means that the difference between being-in-itself and being-for-other, filled with certainty, is already a difference in quality, and not just in a more abstract, present being.
Thus, determinateness as being-in-itself (and, consequently, “in it”) is determination (purpose). With this, everything is clear, we are interested in certainty as being-for-other. In this case, firstly, it is also “in it”, and secondly, expressing the moment of inequality of something with itself, it means change and something unimportant or external. Hegel called this "external existence" - CHARACTER . This is the certainty that does not determine the essence of something, alien, but belonging to it . It is this certainty that is the source of change and something is subjected to external influence on it. She seems to be something else.
However, it is important to remember that there are no two certainties, we are looking at the same certainty, just now we understand its negative side much more deeply. For example, the division of thinking in a person and his corporeality is very arbitrary, because he thinks through biochemical processes, that is, through the body. It cannot be said that this is where the corporality of a person ends and that he is thinking begins, and vice versa.
So something is equal to itself and not equal to itself. The change into something takes place in its determinateness, namely, in its character. Character is that moment in something which becomes something else. Hegel calls character the impermanent surface of the otherness of something (NL 119). Something remains unchanged in its definition (purpose), that is, in a moment that remains itself. In this opposition of definition (appointment) and character lies their difference. Moreover, both the definition (appointment) and the character of something are one and the same determinateness of it—that is, in this they are identical.
One should take a closer look at the identity of definition (purpose) and character. Does it consist only in the fact that they are both one and the same determinateness? Not only. The fact is that the moment of being-in-itself (equality with oneself), the filling of which with certainty gave us the definition (purpose), was established, as we remember, as a repulsion from the moment of being-for-other (inequality with oneself ) , which Hegel called "in-it-being", therefore, at the level of certainty, that is, definition (purpose) and character, he must manifest himself in a similar way. At first glance, the definition (purpose) does not care about character, but if we take the definition (purpose) not just as being-in-itself, but as being-in-itself (as being-for-other is in ititself), it is obvious, firstly, that the definition (appointment) itself was once a character, secondly, that the character is able, as it were, to penetrate into the definition (appointment), changing it, thirdly, that the definition may be reduced to character.
The result was a monstrous philosophical garden (NL 120), which Hegel himself, for example, in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, generally misses, apparently in order not to completely confuse students. Lenin did not consider it necessary to comment on this fragment in his summary. If we look at the Hegelian proposition not from its logic, but from a diamatic point of view, then its essence becomes clear.
So, Hegel unfolds the system of categories from the axiom of abstract being, therefore, he deprives himself of the opportunity at the stage under discussion to operate with the categories of change, the movement of matter and the interdependence of its forms. He generally argues about being outside the category of matter. But at the same time, Hegel’s dialectical logic strives for the most reliable reflection of the logic of the real existence of matter, therefore he understood that in-itself-being and in-itself-being, filled with certainty, that is, definition (purpose), does not fall from the sky, is not "self", given out of nowhere, but is the result of repulsion from the other. Something is what it is, not because God created it that way, but because it is nothing else. Hegel cannot, within the framework of his logic, explain this in any other way, except by introducing this separate moment of the identity of "in-it-being", which entails a link between definition (purpose) and character, their transition into each other. This is such an inevitable mystical outgrowth that covers Hegel's prediction of the real diamatics of movement, change as a form of existence of matter. In the future, this mystification will develop in depth, expressing the universal connection of the elements of being.
So, definition (appointment) and character are opposite, being one and the same certainty. Moreover, this determinateness is inseparable from the present being, therefore, in their opposition, they form, as it were, two things. It turns out that the definition (appointment) and character are two somethings in one, the original something. It seems that we have finally brought determinateness in present being as an expression of negativity (nothing) to its fuller disclosure. Now a determinate existence (something) is posited as a changing something, the moments of which are two somethings—determination (purpose) and character. If earlier we fixed something and something else as some abstractions, only assuming that in the future their qualitative difference would be revealed, now the difference in definition (purpose) and character appeared before us asquality change . Here, perhaps, Hegel could be satisfied with the resulting beautiful philosophical symmetry, because he is often just accused of "schemes". So, by the way, do some contemporary epigones of Hegel, who interpret this fragment in the spirit of the equality of definition (purpose) and character as two moments of something. However, Hegel himself does not do this, but starts, on the basis of the relation of definition (appointment) to character, an argument about something as a whole, writes that something is something precisely as the removal of its other.
“The negation of one’s other is only the quality of the given something” (NL 121, note that in the seventh line on this page the typo is not “nothing”, but “something”).
Thus, the being-within-itself, that is, the whole content of something, is the “non-being of other being,” or, to put it more simply, the negation of the entire external universe. Something is unique not because it is unique in itself, but because it is different from everything else. This is a normal diamatic position, following from the axiom about the unity of the world and the defining role of the general in the individual, but presented in a mystical way. For example, idealists argue that an individual is such because he was uniquely created or, for example, is the product of a set of genes. Diamatic, without denying the biological role of heredity, argues that the individual is created by circumstances, that is, he is "the non-existence of his otherness."
Therefore, Hegel presciently writes that something preserves itself through the cessation of some other. Which brings us to a new understanding of the certainty of something as a qualitative BORDER .
“It is only in its limit and because of its limit that something is what it is. It is impossible, therefore, to consider the boundary as merely external to existing being; it, on the contrary, penetrates into all existence” (EFN 159).
Certainty in this case acts as the boundary of quality , not quantity. In the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, Hegel cites a piece of land as an example. Its quantitative boundary is the area and geometric shape, and its qualitative boundary is what kind of plot it is, say, arable land, onion, forest, pond, or a combination of the above. The qualitative boundary is the reality of the existence of something, its certainty .
The concept of the boundary of quality embraces both definition (purpose) and character; in general, it became possible in our consideration due to the opposition and identity of definition (purpose) and character. The role of the category of character, in fact, comes down to connecting the content of something with the external, with the other, so that the boundary is not only a limitation of this something for itself, but also a limitation of this something for another. In the future, this will make it possible to assert that any border, by its very essence, entails overcoming, overstepping, because it is partly related to something else. All this intricacies serves simple axioms about the movement (change) of matter and the material unity of the universe (the mutual connection of everything with everything).
As we remember, we were faced with the task of “equalizing” the one-sidedness of existing being and seeing the formation with the equality of its moments. We looked at nothing through the chain: 1) non-existence - 2) certainty (quality) - 3) identity and opposition of definition (purpose) and character, and, finally, 4) qualitative border. It is precisely the border that has gained equality with existing being.
Whatever we take, it is, therefore, it is being. At the same time, it is limited in its definiteness , which means that it is nothing in the sense that the boundary, on the one hand, shows that its definiteness is only the negation of the other, on the other hand, it leads to a transition into the other. The latter allows, among other things, to speak of something as changing.
If something is taken away from certainty, that is, its boundary, then one empty being will turn out. If you take away being from something, then you get one empty nothingness, that is, the same empty being, but taken as negativity.
The boundary is one of the deepest and most interesting categories of the realm of being.
The transition of character into definition (appointment), that is, the transition of something into another, that is, overcoming the boundary of something, becomes in Hegel a consequence of self-movement, which we discovered, even seeing nothing in being. Hegel very poetically writes that something, like the other, is the other (NL 121).
Let's repeat an important point. The certainty of something, taken as within-itself-being (the boundary, taken as if from the inner, limiting side), is the non-being of other being, that is, the denial of everything else. And this otherness, as we remember, is contained in the same certainty something in the form of character. One can, perhaps, say that the content of something is both its uniqueness (distinction from everything), and everything that affects it from the outside, from which its definition (purpose) is repelled and its character is formed. Something is always a negation in the sense that it is the cessation in it of every other (Hegel writes "some other", but I think it would be more accurate to say "any other" - perhaps these are translation errors).
Considering earlier being-for-other, filled with certainty, we found out that this is character, then we found out that certainty as a whole is the boundary of something, therefore, we deepen our understanding and now we have the right to call being-for-other already non-being- for- another . That is, character within the category of boundary appears as a qualitative negation of the other. The boundary in this sense is the non-existence-for-other.
And this is understandable, because the other is also some something, therefore, the boundary of our something is also a boundary in relation to another, is also its boundary. Therefore, the boundary is the non-existence of another something. But since the boundary of our something for another something is also a boundary separating them, it means that this boundary is also non-being for our something, as for the other in relation to the second something. Hence, the boundary is the non-existence of any something in general .
At first glance, this conclusion looks paradoxical, because it turns out that the certainty of something manifests itself as its own non-existence and as the non-existence of all something in general. But what is really paradoxical here, if, as we remember, determinateness as a whole is “non-being taken into being in such a way that the concrete whole has the form of being”? This we already know and we have learned by heart. And at this stage, we must understand that no matter what the certainty is, no matter what couples of something we take, if we are talking about a qualitative border, that is, about a sufficiently deep understanding of certainty, it still remains non-existence, and no matter what something is being said. The determinations of all somethings are identical, just as the non-existence of every something, if these definitions are already considered as a boundary. I will give an extensive extract from the NL (122) to consolidate what has been said:
“Something, therefore, is immediate determinate being in relation to itself, and has a boundary in the immediate way as a boundary in relation to another; it is the non-being of the other, and not of the something itself; the latter limits its other in it. But the other is itself something in general; therefore, the limit that something has in relation to another is also the limit of the other as something, the limit of this something, by which it does not admit the first something as its other, or, in other words, it is the non-being of this first something; thus, it is not only the non-existence of the other, but is the non-existence of both one and the other something, and, therefore, the non-existence of [every] something in general. But it is also essentially the non-being of the other; thus something is at the same time due to its boundary. Being limiting, something, however, is lowered to the point that it itself turns out to be limited, but its limit, as the cessation of the other in it, at the same time is itself only the being of this something; the latter is due to it what it is, has its quality in it. This relation is the external manifestation of the circumstance that the boundary is a simple or first negation, while the other is at the same time the negation of the negation, within-itself-being-given something. Something as immediate, present being is, therefore, a limit in relation to another something, but it has it in itself and is something through its mediation, which is also its non-being. It is that mediation through which something and the other are as much as they are not.
It should be noted that we consider qualitative certainty not in the fullness of real things, as is customary in everyday thinking, but only as a difference from another. That is, the certainty of something at a given level is not the certainty of a chair, table, or closet, but only an abstract idea that certainty, as non-being (nothing) of existing being, as a qualitative boundary, distinguishes between something and another something.
(Continued on following post.)
"There is great chaos under heaven; the situation is excellent."
