July 18, 19:29
Discussion on the problems of the slowdown of the Soviet economy in the 60s and 70s
Another video by Safronov about the USSR economy: "Reasons for the slowdown of the Soviet economy in the 60s and 70s". This video is much weaker than Safronov's other videos. In fact, he simply lists everything he could find on the topic. And then makes a rather helpless conclusion.
By the way, a funny thing: Safronov says that the growth rate began to fall in the late 1950s, but he provides a graph showing that the growth rate has been falling since the late 1960s. Probably a slip of the tongue.
Safronov says that stability is a serious obstacle to identifying problems. In fact, it's the other way around: everything is more visible on a plateau. Of course, the graph doesn't exactly show a plateau, but rather a gentle slope, but there is no fundamental difference. It's one thing to understand the reasons for certain peaks and troughs in the economy when the economy is in turmoil due to accelerated development, due to preparations for war, due to the war itself, due to the consequences of the war, etc. But it's a completely different matter when there is quiet, gradual development. Here, any problems in the economy, even very minor ones, are clearly visible. Fewer surges mean less to study. That's why stable periods are much easier to study. Simply because there is less material to study. Yes, and this point is clearly visible in the graph provided by Safronov. He himself names the years (the end of the 60s?), when it all began. Actually, the graph itself:
image_2024-07-10_014831320.png
It suggests itself that these years, the end of the 60s, should be carefully studied in order to find the problem of the slowdown in the growth rate of the Soviet economy. But instead of the obvious search for the reason for the economic slowdown, Safronov then lists and describes all the possible (!!) problems in the USSR economy. Making a simple manipulation, equating problems and reasons. Or maybe he is simply making such a mistake. There can be many problems, but the reason is always specific. That is, if a plant stopped, then it stopped for a specific reason, not every problem becomes a reason. In general, a plant can have many problems. Most often, there are many problems. This in itself does not mean anything. Because the reason is always some one problem. In any economy of any country, in any part of it, there are many problems. By the way, Khrushchev was removed in 1964, and the recession began according to schedule in 1968.
I think I understand why Safronov doesn’t like stability. He thinks that the entire period of stability should be studied to understand why the economy was slowing down. But what should be studied during a period of stability, he doesn’t really understand. Everything is stable! He thinks that during stability something is maturing, it’s not visible because of the stability, and then suddenly, it collapses the economy. That’s why you can’t find it at peaks and recessions, only during periods of stability. Ohhh. A PhD doesn’t understand that you need to study peaks and recessions to find the causes, not plateaus. This is such an absurd mistake… Even for an ordinary economist, it’s unforgivable. Perhaps the mistake is due to the fact that Safronov had little practice. At least he should have worked as an accountant. If only he had known that the economy immediately responds to intervention. More precisely, everything is immediately visible in the reporting documents. Not after five or ten years, but immediately!
In general, Safronov is once again selling the hackneyed tale of a multitude of problems, also known as the "perfect storm", as a reason for something. I repeat, a multitude of problems as a reason is always with those who do not want to look for the real reason, or cannot. Many modern empty talkers-economists love it very much. He named a multitude of problems, and then you can list everything that comes to mind. By the way, not only economists, historians also love it.
In principle, we could have finished here, because an error in setting the problem makes the entire study meaningless. Safronov made a mistake in setting the question itself, starting to look for the reasons for the slowdown of the Soviet economy in the 1960-1970s in the recession that had begun. The only thing he covered in his study was the problems of the Soviet economy, which, although they negatively affected the economy, could not in themselves be the reasons for the "stagnation". According to the most ordinary formal logic: you cannot find the reason for anything after the beginning of this very something. The reason is always found before! Before, not after!
Nevertheless, let's see what problems that matured during Brezhnev's rule are named in the video:
1. The calculation argument. But in essence, Safronov is talking about the complexity of the economy for a planned system, calling it a modification of the calculation argument. That is, the impossibility of preparing effective plans for a complex economy due to the impossibility of taking into account all categories of the economy. The complexity of the economy for planning is also an argument that Wasserman (awas1952) likes to cite. Nevertheless, the argument about the complexity of the economy seems inappropriate. Just now, both Stalin and Khrushchev coped well with the complexity of the economy, demonstrating confident economic growth. But under Brezhnev, they suddenly stopped coping. And so abruptly. If they had shown how much some complexity of the economy grew under Brezhnev, maybe the argument would have been more convincing. But this is precisely not the case. Because in reality, there was no such sharp increase in the complexity of the economy in 1968-69 either. Neither after the 70s did the complexity of the economy grow in leaps and bounds. Safronov also mentions the introduction and development of ASPR (automated system of planned calculations), i.e. the use of computers in state planning, which discredits the argument about the growth of the complexity of the economy. Since although the complexity of the economy grew, the planning methods also developed.
But the organization of production in the USSR, and not only in the USSR, refutes this modification of the calculation argument. No Gosplan needs to pick through the product range, since during the reporting period the enterprise receives applications from consumers of the enterprise's products, where all the necessary product range is indicated. The enterprise's employees only need to have time to summarize all the applications in the production plan for the next reporting period.
2. "Val" and the preservation of the commodity nature of production. Here Safronov formulated the name of the problem unsuccessfully. If the nature of production was previously commodity, then why did its preservation suddenly ensure a decline in the economy? Before, it ensured growth, and now it suddenly ensures a decline. What nonsense is obtained: nothing changes, but the economy suddenly begins to fall instead of growing. By the way, here Safronov is either lying or mistaken. Production in the USSR did not have a commodity nature. The commodity nature of production is, in fact, a capitalist economy! Here, in point 3, I discussed in detail why Trotskyists are confused about the concept of commodity nature.
Nevertheless, Safronov says here that the indicators in state planning increasingly poorly reflected the needs of the economy. That is, the fulfillment of the indicators planned by Gosplan did not give the planned economic effect. Thus, here Safronov speaks of a calculation argument. That the planned indicators do not reflect the needs of society, since they can be wound up. He confused himself for no reason.
The calculation argument is easy to beat. Under Stalin and Khrushchev, the planned indicators somehow reflected the needs of society. After all, the economy grew according to these planned indicators. Why did it suddenly stop under Brezhnev? Maybe it is not the planned indicators that are the issue, but something else? The conclusion suggests itself.
3. Deficit. Here it is necessary to clarify that we are not talking about a deficit of consumer goods, but about a deficit in production. Safronov explains its presence by the fact that the state gave loans to production. But here, as in describing the deficit of consumer goods, Safronov does not understand that if the state budget is balanced, then even if you douse yourself with loans, there will be no deficit. The government simply will not be able to give loans for a larger amount than it has in the budget. Yes, economic growth may slow down if the loans are not used properly, but there will be no deficit. A deficit appears with a budget surplus! When more money is printed than the state has goods. Safronov does not fully understand the nature of deficit. Or maybe he is confused.
Then his words about the psychological causes of deficit are very difficult to listen to. A candidate of economic sciences is looking for the causes of deficit in psychology. Allegedly, there was no one to limit the "wants" of departments. The "wants" of departments should be limited by the budget! You can't give out more money than is in the budget. Because in this case, more money is given out than is available. And money is a reflection of goods. That is, with a budget surplus, more resources are divided between departments than are available. Here, of course, there will be a shortage, aka deficit, of resources, because in reality there are fewer resources.
Then Safronov says that "deficit created deficit", i.e. deficit created even more deficit. In fact, deficit cannot create deficit. If we draw an analogy, it is like saying that foam creates foam.
By the way, the deficit in the economy also appeared in 1968-69. Earlier I wrote about the reasons for the deficit with evidence: here. In short, the deficit in the USSR appeared due to the adoption of surplus budgets. And from the production sphere, the deficit flowed into the consumer goods sphere, because these two spheres (some also call them contours) were not isolated. There were a number of opportunities to cash out the money allocated for production, thereby introducing them into the consumer goods sphere. More about this here, here and here.
4. Insufficient volumes of reconstruction. I don’t know why Safronov chooses such unfortunate names, especially since in the video he uses understandable, generally accepted expressions in economics. Here he means that the renewal of fixed assets was delayed. I would call it “Insufficient renewal of fixed assets.”
Someone Popov believes that it was due to the deficit. If there is a deficit of production capacity in the economy, then it will be difficult to stop any enterprise for modernization.
And someone named Khanin believes that due to underfunding of the renewal of fixed assets, although he does not provide facts, he explains the process through hidden inflation. But hidden inflation is a deficit!
Here we go! It turns out that both economists are talking about the same thing, and Popov clearly understood the topic better, and Safronov did not understand what Khanin was saying, which is why he put it in a separate point. But in essence, this should be attributed to the previous point, and not singled out as a separate one, because this is a manifestation of a deficit.
5. Shortage of labor. The influx of labor from the villages has been exhausted. Population growth has slowed down. And it was no longer possible to ensure economic growth in an extensive (by increasing the number of workers) way. Only intensive (by increasing labor productivity). For the intensive method, it is necessary to increase the mechanization of production. And what's the problem? During the Great Patriotic War, the mechanization of industry in the USSR was ahead even in Europe. For example, in the USSR, automatic welding was used in the production of tanks, while in Germany, only manual welding was used.
Safronov does not say what the problem is with mechanizing industry and agriculture, or rather, he reduces everything to a deficit. But he gives an interesting example. In 1973, a program was adopted to develop the mechanization of warehouses, loading and unloading, but after 7 years, not a single new lifting and transport equipment plant, with the help of which it was planned to mechanize, was put into operation. I am the only one here who is tormented by the question: "Who was shot for this?" Either no one, or Safronov is not interested in this. Personally, I see the problem here far from being a deficit. I will note that Khrushchev carried out even his idiotic economic plans, i.e. brought them to fruition. Not Stalin, of course, but he managed without executions. And Brezhnev could not even build lifting and transport equipment plants in 7 years.
It should also be noted that the graph above shows an indicator of the number of workers that stands out from the others in terms of dynamics: it shows a constant decline, while the others first show growth and only then a decline. This means that the number of workers did not affect the slowdown of the USSR economy in the 60s and 70s. Let me clarify that, in general, the shortage of labor has a negative impact on the economy, but the graph shows that this slowdown of the Soviet economy was not due to it. That is, it is a problem, but not a reason.
6. Insufficient sales market for innovation and the Cold War. Safronov is talking here about the problem of the small sales market of the Soviet economy. A small sales market means little money from the sale of goods, which means we can allocate little money for innovation. Although he said above, and even gave examples, that money was found for innovation. Yes, and in general he talks about the failure to build a common economic space with the Warsaw Pact countries. It would be more appropriate to call the problem that way.
The leadership of the USSR was unable to organize the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries into a single economic space with a division of labor. Justifying this failure with some kind of group egoism surprised me as an economist. The common economy is built on common interests. If someone does not want to interact with you economically, it means that you ignore their interests. In economics, everything is very simple and banal. Economics implies the egoism of each participant. Each participant in the common economic space follows their own private interests. Therefore, in order to build a common economic space, it is necessary to take into account the interests of each participant. Each one! Safronov as an economist cannot help but know this! What egoism? What does egoism have to do with it? Does Safronov really think that capitalists do not have egoism? But for some reason they were able to create a common economic space. Even today's capitalist Russia is creating a common economic space: BRICS, the customs union. Or is modern capitalist Russia not an egoistic state? But the USSR could not! Egoism allegedly prevented it! Instead of inventing egoism as the reason for the failure, it would be better to find the real reasons for the failure to build a common economic space. It would be fine if it was written by a journalist, but a candidate of economic sciences found the reason for the failure to build a common economic space in egoism! At least not in astrology.
7. Departmental egoism. It seems that this is one of Safronov's favorite "economic" terms. And by the way, he named a number of economists of the same opinion. Did I miss something? Is this some kind of new trend in economics? Various departments (military-industrial complex, agro-industrial complex, heavy industry, etc.), as well as regional authorities of individual republics in the USSR, promoted their interests to the detriment of the overall economy. Safronov says that this did not happen under Stalin, because the tyrant, they say, kept everyone in check. Forgetting that, according to his own words at the beginning of the video (!), this did not happen under Khrushchev either. That is, even Khrushchev somehow kept everyone in check. But in general, pulling the budget away from departments and regions is not such a problem, because it only creates distortions in the development of regions and departments. Those departments and regions that promote their interests better receive more resources for development. This is the norm for any state. Obviously, such "localism" cannot influence more or less global projects (for example, the construction of a hydroelectric power station), as well as the distribution of shares in general. Therefore, this is a struggle for the remains, for percentages of shares. For example, to allocate not 15% of the budget to the military-industrial complex, but 16%. That the budget is sawed into parts can be said about the distribution of the budget in any country. Yes, the budget is sawed into parts in all countries. Each department and agency gets its piece of the budget. This is normal! Why should this destroy the economy?
Of course, in capitalist countries only the state budget is distributed, and some part of the economy is not distributed, because it is in private hands. In the USSR, the entire economy is in the hands of the state. But what does this fundamentally change? The budget is distributed based on plans. Plans are made with scientific and technical justification. They are audited in many government agencies, including the State Planning Committee. So unified management of the entire economy is only a plus for the Soviet state. It is impossible to seriously upset the balance of the economy with such input data. Actually, there are no examples of anything in the USSR economy going to hell because of the fight for budget allocation. Neither our own nor other economists.
8. Technological heterogeneity of the Soviet economy. Despite the pompous title, this is simply a retelling of the previous point at a lower level. Safronov says that departmental egoism led to a deliberate overspending of resources even at the design stage. No facts are provided. It sounds fantastic. It sounds very much like a retelling of some industrial tale. Allegedly, departments that constantly received low-quality resources began to include in their projects an allowance for low-quality resources. I have not seen a single GOST for low-quality resources. I cannot imagine how it is possible to include in a project an allowance for the fact that there will be low-quality steel. Design is based on steel grades. There is no such grade as "low-quality". This is a criminal offense! If you include more steel than necessary, what does that mean? It means you want to steal the extra steel! Please, to prison. I repeat, there are no examples.
GOSTs even include an excess. That is, if according to GOST a grade of steel or concrete or brick can withstand a certain load, then in reality it can withstand more. The reserve is included at the GOST level. So that when engineers design exactly right, there will be no collapses later. Any use of more durable grades of materials must be justified, because this affects the price of the project towards an increase in cost. Of course, one can assume that some project with excess of material durability will pass. But this is not the rule, it is the exception. And you can’t build a trend on exceptions. And
if by low-quality resources we mean low grades of steel, then what does some kind of egoism have to do with it? Well, one department snatched up more high-grade steel for itself. So what? That’s not the problem! The problem is that a lot of low-grade steel is produced. We need to improve the quality of the steel produced. If a country produces a lot of low-grade steel, someone will still have to design using such steel. What difference does it make in principle, which department will have to design using such steel? The problem here is in setting up production of high-grade steel. A purely production problem. Not even an economic one.
The funniest thing is that Safronov does not understand this, he thinks that engineers actually designed using low-quality materials, laying them in excess so that they can withstand loads. That's what he says. He thinks that steel comes in according to documents of one grade, but in fact it is supposedly steel of a lower grade. That's why he talks about overspending of materials. Like, they take more of it, because the real properties do not correspond to the documented ones. That is why there is overspending of steel. He does not know about acceptance. Well, or forgot.
Safronov also gives many examples of minor errors of an economic nature. Which exist in any country. At the level of considering the entire economy of the USSR, this is equivalent to looking for fleas. It does not say anything. For example, instead of implementing more advanced engines, they spent resources on producing fuel for more imperfect engines with worse efficiency. Or failure to improve the level of technical culture due to the requirement for high resource injections at the initial stage. Here Safronov in some way contradicts what he said at the beginning of the video. I described this in the same article in paragraph 5, which talks about the mechanization of work in warehouses. Thus, according to Safronov himself, money was allocated to improve the level of technical culture. Another thing is that the project, at least in terms of deadlines, failed. I think he did not even see the contradiction. Because there is no analysis of the problems he listed. He is simply retelling what someone said somewhere.
And the answer to the question "Why were there not enough resources?" is easily found in the financial documents, which I wrote about earlier here and here. This is a discrepancy between funds and material resources. That is, money was allocated, but the resources themselves were not enough. Why? Because of the printing press. The budget plans were surplus.
9. Social problems. The deficit affected the motivation of workers. Women's active work interfered with childbearing. The shortage of labor leads to loyalty to the violation of labor discipline and the poaching of employees from each other, etc. In general, about nothing. What has already been digested once is brought out in a separate point, and told again. If Safronov, without putting it in a separate point, simply talked about the social aspect of various economic problems in the USSR, it would be okay. But as a separate problem, this is no good.
Safronov's conclusions, let's say, are strange: incorrect investment decisions led to a slowdown in the growth of the Soviet economy. Where are the wrong ones? Safronov himself gives a number of examples of investment decisions made by the Soviet government: mechanization of warehouse work, as well as loading and unloading, purchase of ready-made production lines. Are these wrong? Why are they wrong? Which ones are right? And how does it follow that it's all about erroneous investment decisions? From what's said in the video, this doesn't follow!
Well, okay, let's assume. Investments in the USSR in the 60s and 70s were distributed with errors. Because of this, the economy slowed down. But there is the example of Khrushchev! How were his investments? Corn, virgin lands, soybeans. How was the level of Khrushchev's investment errors? Higher or lower? No one else could bury investments in the "hole" as well as Khrushchev could. But under Khrushchev, the Soviet economy not only grew, the rate of economic growth increased. This is clearly visible from the graph at the beginning of the article! It turns out that Khrushchev's wrong investment decisions did not prevent the economy from moving forward, but suddenly they began to hinder Brezhnev. Why? That's how Khrushchev put a spanner in the works for Safronov's conclusions.
Safronov also says what he thinks should have been done to stop the slowdown in the USSR economy. Considering what Safronov has said up to this point, I would not listen to his advice.
https://smertnyy.livejournal.com/63105.html - zinc
https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9273701.html
On the Vatican's Goals in World War II
July 15, 14:26
On the Vatican's Goals in World
The Presidential Library collection has been expanded with an electronic image of a declassified intelligence message from London to Moscow, which reported on the Vatican's goals in the final stages of World War II.
Pope Pius XII saw the preservation of German military traditions as the only defense against Soviet Russia.
The original document is kept in the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. It is dated May 20, 1943. The resident reported that he had managed to obtain information from well-informed German sources about the Vatican's attitude to the global armed conflict that was taking place at that time. The
Vatican's intentions and goals were set out in detail in the coded telegram. It was reported, for example, that the Vatican was seeking to conclude peace through negotiations between the Allied countries and the "Axis powers."
The Vatican was doing everything it could to prevent the Anglo-American armies from invading Europe, so as not to turn Europe into a field of bloody battles. There was a "special attitude" toward the Soviet Union. "At any cost and under any circumstances, prevent the penetration of Russian influence into Europe and isolate the Soviet Union" - this was goal number three.
At the same time, the Vatican itself wanted to take on the role of the main mediator between the warring parties. However, this noble goal had another side. As the resident reported, the Vatican planned to use the difficult situation that had arisen to strengthen the power of the Catholic Church in the world.
"The Vatican believes that the powerful fascist movement has reduced the danger of socialist ideas," follows from the cipher telegram. "Schismatic activity and, as a result, the strong weakening of the influence of Protestantism have created a situation for the Vatican in which it claims to become the only moral force and the decisive factor in influencing the political forms of state structure."
It was also stated that the Vatican would do everything possible to keep the German military machine from complete collapse, helping not only Germany, but also its allies, and opposing any other political combinations that would have a democratic character or pro-Russian positions.
According to a declassified document, the main supporter of this idea was Pope Pius XII, who "saw the preservation of German military traditions as the only defense against Soviet Russia."
"The Vatican aims to create a European federation without including Russia and England," followed from the secret report. "Thus, to create a bloc of European states comprising 250 million Catholics in addition to 100 million Protestants and followers of the Greek Orthodox Church."
The basis of this new bloc, according to the plan, was to be the German General Staff, the Habsburg monarchy and the Vatican.In the area of world politics, this new Europe could exert its influence on Latin America through the Madrid "Hispanidad".
The resident also noted that the Vatican had developed active activities to "make peace", sending its messengers to different countries. For example, Archbishop Spelman went to New York, where under his leadership the first group was created, which, as the resident claimed, took over the Republican Party
https://rodina-history.ru/2024/07/13/va ... ossii.html - zinc
On the issue of the current "mediation efforts" of the Vatican. These "peacekeepers" have extensive experience working in the interests of European fascism.
https://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/9266918.html
Google Translator
